BATASKI BAILEY, Plaintiff, v. EQUIFAX CREDIT INFORMATION SERVICES, INC.; EXPERIAN SOLUTIONS, INC.; and TRANSUNION LLC, Defendants CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:18-cv-01725-AT-JKL United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division Signed June 25, 2020 Counsel Bataski Bailey, Atlanta, GA, Pro Se. Alex Michael Barfield, Stanton Law, LLC, Atlanta, GA, Michael Adam Merar, Quilling, Selander, Lownds, Winslett & Moser, P.C., Plano, TX, for Defendant TransUnion LLC. Totenberg, Amy, United States District Judge ORDER *1 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Bataski Bailey's Appeal of the Magistrate Judge's Decision. [Doc. 108.] The case deals with claims brought under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq., and is therefore before Magistrate Judge John K. Larkins “to hear and determine any pretrial matters pending before the Court[.]” (See N.D. Ga. Standing Order No. 18-01 at 1.) On April 24, 2020, Magistrate Judge Larkins issued an Order addressing three discovery-related motions filed by the parties: 1. Defendant Trans Union LLC's Emergency Motion to Quash and for Protective Order Regarding Plaintiff's Notice of Deposition (Doc. 72); 2. Defendant Trans Union's Motion to Compel Discovery Responses (Doc. 86); and 3. Plaintiff Bataski Bailey's Motion for Order Compelling Defendant[ ] Trans Union LLC For a Substantive Response to Requests for Production of Documents. (Doc. 87.) Magistrate Judge Larkins granted both of Defendant Trans Union, LLC's (“Trans Union”) motions (Docs. 72 and 86), and denied Plaintiff's motion (Doc. 87). (See Larkins Order, Doc. 95.) On May 20, 2020, Plaintiff filed an Appeal of the Magistrate Judge Decision as to denial of his Motion to Compel. [Doc. 108.] For the following reasons, Plaintiff's Appeal is DENIED, and the Court affirms the Magistrate Judge's decision in all respects. I. STANDARD OF REVIEW Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a), the District Judge must consider timely objections made to the Magistrate Judge's decision on a non-dispositive matter and set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). Clear error is a “highly deferential standard of review,” and a finding is clearly erroneous “when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Holton v. City of Thomasville School District, 425 F.3d 1325, 1350 (11th Cir. 2005). II. DISCUSSION Plaintiff's Appeal does not allege that any aspect of the Magistrate Judge's Order was incorrect as to the factual or procedural history of this case as discussed in that Order. The Court therefore adopts and incorporates by reference the extensive factual and procedural background provided in the Magistrate Judge's Order. (See Larkins Order, Doc. 95 at 2–26.) As an initial matter, Plaintiff's Appeal is untimely. Plaintiff had 14 days to file any objections to the Magistrate Judge's Order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). The Magistrate Judge issued his order on April 24, 2020, but Plaintiff did not file his Appeal until May 20, 2020, 26 days later. Despite this untimeliness, the Court exercises its discretion to examine the merits of Plaintiff's Appeal to allow the parties to move forward with this case. Plaintiff's Appeal asks this Court to reverse the Magistrate Judge's Order only as it relates to the Magistrate Judge's decision to deny Plaintiff's Motion to Compel production of documents responsive to his Requests for Production of Documents #1 and #3. (See, generally, Appeal, Doc. 108.) Plaintiff's Requests for Production and Defendant's Responses are as follows: *2 REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1: All documents identified in response to Plaintiff's First Interrogatories to Defendant[ ]. RESPONSE: Trans Union refers Plaintiff to Trans Union's documents produced and labeled TU 1 – TU 40. Trans Union has withheld from production its confidential policies and procedures as those documents contain confidential and proprietary information of Trans Union. Trans Union will produce these relevant documents upon entry of an appropriate protective order. Trans Union has limited its search to consumer relations documents related to the alleged account and inquiries identified in Plaintiff's Complaint, as well as during the relevant time period and subject matter as alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint and relevant to Trans Union's defenses. Trans Union objects to this Request on the grounds that “[a]ll documents” is overly broad and fails to identify the documents sought with sufficient particularity. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(l)(A). Further, the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C), (c)(l). Trans Union further objects to this Request because it is not limited to information relevant to this case and is not proportional to the needs of the case. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). Plaintiff appears to be asking for all information in Trans Union's possession regardless of the irrelevant, cumulative or duplicative nature of such information. Trans Union further objects to providing information that constitutes confidential, proprietary, and trade secret information of Trans Union. FED. R. CIV. P[.] 26(c). Furthermore, Trans Union objects to this Request on the grounds that “[a]ll documents” without any limitation on time or subject matter, would include documents and information protected by the attorney-client and work product privileges. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b); FED. R. EVID. 502. [...] REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3: All documents whatsoever related to plaintiff's credit file (to include any documents requested and received as a result of any subpoenas and/or other requests). RESPONSE: Trans Union refers Plaintiff to Trans Union's documents produced and labeled TU 1 – TU 40. Trans Union has limited its search to consumer relations documents related to the alleged account and inquiries identified in Plaintiffs Complaint, as well as during the relevant time period and subject matter as alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint and relevant to Trans Union's defenses. Trans Union objects to providing a broader response on the grounds that “[a]ll documents” is overly broad and fails to identify the documents sought with sufficient particularity. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(l)(A). Trans Union further objects to this Request because it is not limited to information relevant to this case and is not proportional to the needs of the case. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). Plaintiff appears to be asking for all information in Trans Union's possession regardless of the cumulative or irrelevant nature of such information. Trans Union also objects to providing information that constitutes confidential, proprietary, and trade secret information of Trans Union or confidential information of other consumers. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). Trans Union objects to this Request on the grounds that, as worded, it encompasses information protected by the work product privilege. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b). *3 (Doc. 87-1 at 9–11.) With respect to Request No. 1, the Magistrate Judge found that although Trans Union responded that it withheld any confidential policies or procedures from production, “Mr. Bailey has not pointed to any documents identified in Trans Union's interrogatory responses that have not been produced.” (Larkins Order, Doc. 95 at 44–45.) The Magistrate Judge further noted that, notwithstanding the caveat in Trans Union's Response, it appeared that Trans Union has produced the information asked for in Request No. 1. (Id.) The Magistrate Judge also noted that Defendant asserted as early as December 2019 that it would produce the confidential policies and procedures referenced in its Response only upon entry of a protective order. (See Larkins Order, Doc. 95 at 45–46 (“This sort of objection – which is common in federal litigation – is reasonable, especially given that Mr. Bailey wishes to conduct discovery about Trans Union [sic] internal processes and procedures.”).) With respect to Request No. 3, the Magistrate Judge again declined to compel Defendant to produce any additional documents, noting that, “Trans Union's objections to this request are well-taken, as the request is patently overbroad and seeks information that has no bearing on the claims or defenses in this case.” (Larkins Order, Doc. 95 at 45.) In his Appeal, Plaintiff highlights the part of Trans Union's Response to Request 1 which indicates it withheld some confidential documents, saying that he “believes the information withheld by the defendant[ ] is essential to the plaintiff[’s] ability to prove elements of his allegations as these documents are the sole means of proving the [defendants] do not have ‘reasonable procedures to ensure maximum accuracy’ as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681e.” (Appeal, Doc. 108 at 3–5.) Plaintiff does not specify here which documents in particular he believes are mistakenly withheld, instead asserting that he has a legal right to the referenced confidential policies and procedures, whatever those may be. (Appeal, Doc. 108 at 2 (“Discovery requests are considered relevant if there is any possibility that the information sought may lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”).) However, Plaintiff did attach to his Motion to Compel copies of an email correspondence apparently between Plaintiff and counsel for Defendants that occurred between February 19, 2020 and February 24, 2020, in which counsel for Defendant allegedly says, “Trans Union remains ready, willing, and able to produce certain relevant, confidential policies and procedures upon the entry of an appropriate protective order.” (Email, Doc. 87-1 at 15.) So even though Plaintiff has not identified for the Court the specific documents in question, it is clear that Defendant is aware of – and in possession of – the documents that would be responsive to Plaintiff's Request 1. In declining to compel production of these materials, The Magistrate Judge notes that it is Plaintiff who has stood in the way of production here, as it is Plaintiff who has refused to agree to a protective order, even though Plaintiff has agreed to similar protective orders in other litigation. (Larkins Order, Doc. 95 at 47.) To resolve this, the Magistrate Judge ordered Trans Union to file a motion for a protective order, and allowed Plaintiff 14 days to respond in opposition if he so desired. The Court notes that Defendant filed its Motion for a Protective Order on May 8, 2020 (Doc. 98), and Plaintiff did not file any opposition to the motion. Accordingly, upon the Magistrate Judge's entry of an Order granting the unopposed motion for a protective order, Plaintiff will receive production of the confidential policies and procedures in Defendant's possession. It is therefore clear that the documents Plaintiff seeks – which include confidential information to the Defendant – are well within Plaintiff's control to obtain, and an order compelling Defendant to produce these documents is unnecessary. There is no cause shown here to compel the production of these materials which Defendant has already agreed to produce upon the entry of the protective order which is unopposed by Plaintiff. *4 Although Plaintiff asks this Court to overturn the Magistrate Judge's decision regarding Request No. 3, he did not make any argument whatsoever to support that portion of his appeal, other than his general assertion of a right to any materials which may potentially turn out to have some possible bearing on the case. (See Appeal, Doc. 108 at 3.) Notwithstanding Plaintiff's failure to levy any specific objection to the Magistrate Judge's Order with respect to Request No. 3, the Court reviewed that portion of the Order as well, and found that the Magistrate Judge's finding is neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law. No part of the Order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). As such, Plaintiff's Appeal is denied. III. CONCLUSION As set forth in more detail above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Appeal of the Magistrate Judge's Decision [Doc. 108], and affirms the Magistrate Judge's Order [Doc. 95] in full. This matter is REFERRED back to Magistrate Judge Larkins. IT IS SO ORDERED this 25th day of June, 2020.