SOUTHERN-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. SANBORN BUILDERS, INC., SCOTT MESSENGER and TABATHA MESSENGER, Individually and as Husband And Wife, Defendants Case No. 3:18cv145-TKW-HTC United States District Court, N.D. Florida Filed July 23, 2020 Counsel Elizabeth Anne Parsons, Megan Marie Hall, Wilson Harrell Farrington Etc., Pensacola, FL, for Plaintiff. Cameron Townes Gore, Bruce Douglas Partington, Clark Partington, Pensacola, FL, for Defendant Sanborn Builders Inc. Joseph A. Passeretti, Beggs & Lane RLLP, Pensacola, FL, for Defendants Tabatha Messenger, Scott Messenger. Cannon, Hope T., United States Magistrate Judge ORDER *1 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Southern-Owners Insurance Company's (“Southern-Owners”) Amended Motion for Protective Order,[1] seeking to preclude Defendant Sanborn Buildings, Inc. (“Sanborn”) from taking the deposition of Southern-Owner's Rule 30(b)(6) corporative representative on certain topics.[2] ECF Doc. 61. Defendant Sanborn responded in opposition. ECF Doc. 62. At the request of both parties, the Court held oral argument on the motion on July 10, 2020. After the hearing, both parties submitted supplement memoranda. ECF Docs. 67, 68. Upon consideration, and for the grounds set forth below, the amended motion is GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part. I. BACKGROUND In November 2015, Scott and Tabatha Messenger (the “Messengers”) hired Sanborn to build a home in Santa Rosa County, Florida. ECF Doc. 1-1, p. 7-23. Dissatisfied with the result, in September 2017 the Messengers filed suit in state court against Sanborn, alleging: (1) breach of contract; (2) violation of Fla. Stat. § 553.84; (3) negligence; and (4) breach of implied warranty. ECF Doc. 1-1, p. 1-6; Messengers v. Sanborn Builders, Inc., Circuit Court in and for Santa Rosa County, FL, Case No. 2017-CA-000722 (the “Underlying Action”). Specifically, the Messengers alleged that there were defects in the home's roofing, plumbing, and electrical systems. ECF Doc. 1 at 4. Southern-Owners issued a commercial general liability policy (the “Policy”) to Sanborn for the policy period from June 15, 2016 through June 15, 2017 and June 15, 2017 through June 15, 2018. ECF Doc. 1-2. Southern-Owners filed this action in November 2018, seeking a declaration that it does not have a duty to defend or indemnify Sanborn or the Messengers under the Policy for the Underlying Action. ECF Doc. 1. Among other arguments, Southern-Owners contends coverage for property damage to the Messengers' home caused by Sanborn's negligence or that of its subcontractors was limited by the “your work” exclusion.[3] Under Southern-Owner's interpretation of the Policy terms, coverage is only available for damage to “other products,” that is, products put in place by someone other than Sanborn or its subcontractors. *2 Sanborn filed an answer asserting several affirmative defenses. In the First, Second, Fifth, and Sixth affirmative defenses, Sanborn argues that the Policy, as interpreted by Southern-Owners, renders the language in the “your work” exclusion ambiguous and coverage for “products-completed operation hazard” (“PCOH”)[4], for which it paid a separate premium, illusory[5]. ECF Doc. 9. On March 11, 2019, Southern-Owners moved for summary judgment. ECF Doc. 28 at 17-27. After filing their oppositions, Sanborn moved for the Court to defer ruling on the motion because the Messengers had sought leave to amend their complaint in the Underlying Action, which amendment could alter the coverage analysis. ECF Doc. 41. On April 30, 2019, the Court granted that motion and stayed all proceedings. ECF Doc. 42. Subsequently, on June 9, 2019, the Court lifted the stay after the state court granted the Messengers' motion to amend. ECF Doc. 44. Additionally, the Court gave Southern-Owners twenty-one (21) days to re-file its motion for summary judgment. Id. Instead of refiling its motion for summary judgment, however, Southern-Owners sought to have the Court stay this action to allow for additional discovery in the Messengers' underlying action, specifically to determine whether they were alleging damage to other property i.e., their personal property, caused by Sanborn's negligence. ECF Doc. 47. On July 23, 2019, the Court granted that motion and stayed the instant action, including tolling the dispositive motion deadline. ECF Doc. 49. On August 23, 2019, the Court modified the stay, at the request of the parties, to allow the parties to engage in limited discovery pertaining to the following matters: (1) Tabatha Messenger's Affidavit; (2) Sanborn's defenses; and (3) issues raised in the amended complaint in the Underlying Action. ECF Docs. 50, 51. This limited stay relief resulted in a request by Sanborn for the deposition of a Southern-Owners' corporate representative. That request, in turn, resulted in the instant amended motion for protective order. II. SANBORN'S DEPOSITION NOTICE Sanborn's deposition notice contains nineteen (19) contested topics. Topics 1-3 ask for “all facts supporting” the allegations in the complaint and Southern-Owners' position that there is no coverage for Sanborn's claim. Topic 4 relates to Southern-Owners' investigation of the claim and whether there is coverage for defense or indemnity. Topics 5 and 6 ask for the “legal basis” supporting Southern-Owners' position that there is no coverage. Southern-Owners objects to Topics 1-6, which it claims essentially seeks information from Southern-Owners' claim files, on the grounds of relevance, breadth, and privilege. *3 Topics 7-16 seek information related to premium rates charged for PCOH coverage, including how they were calculated or changed over time, particularly after the subcontractor exception was eliminated from the “your work” exclusion; the code for each class of insurance on the declaration page of the Policy; whether Southern-Owners offers a subcontractor exception; submissions from Southern-Owners to the Florida Department of Insurance; and the number of claims paid by Southern-Owners under PCOH coverage in the last 5 years. Southern-Owners objects to these topics, which it argues relate to its underwriting file, on the grounds of relevance. Topics 17-19 relate to communications between Southern-Owners and Sanborn, Southern-Owners and the Messengers, and Southern-Owners and various third parties, including its expert(s). Southern-Owners objects to these topics on the grounds of breadth and privilege. III. TOPICS 7-16 Because the parties devote most of their arguments to Topics 7-16, the undersigned will begin with those topics. The threshold inquiry in any discovery dispute is relevance. Under Rule of Evidence 401, relevant evidence is evidence having “any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence and the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. Additionally, Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure defines the scope of discovery as including “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case….” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (2019). Courts must construe Rule 26(b)(1) liberally to allow for the fullest discovery appropriate. See Farnsworth v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1546-47 (11th Cir. 1985). According to Southern-Owners, these topics seek information not relevant to the issues in this case because (1) Judge Kahn previously denied Sanborn's motion to compel responses to interrogatories and requests for production in this case, which sought the same information, on the ground of relevance (ECF Doc. 24); (2) Judge Hinkle previously determined in Auto-Owners, Inc. v. Moore, Civil Action No. 5:15-cv-225-RH-GRJ, a case also involving Sanborn's counsel, identical arguments, and identical policy language, that PCOH coverage was not illusory and the policy language was not ambiguous; and (3) Judge Hinkle denied the insured's motion to compel in Southern-Owners, Ins. Co. v. The Dozier Corp., Civil Action No. 5:17-cv-227-RH-GRJ, a case also involving Sanborn's counsel and seeking the same information based on the same arguments made here. Sanborn counters that (1) Judge Kahn never determined the policy was not ambiguous and, indeed, no such determination has yet been made in this case – keeping alive its affirmative defenses; (2) Judge Hinkle's decisions in the Moore and Dozier cases are not binding authority; and (3) it has presented to this Court arguments which were not previously made. A. Judge Kahn's Prior Order The parties do not dispute that Sanborn previously moved for the Court to compel Southern-Owners to respond to interrogatories and requests for production seeking the same information as contained in Topics 7-16. As stated above, Judge Kahn denied that motion for lack of relevance. ECF Doc. 24. In reaching that decision, Judge Kahn relied on Judge Hinkle's summary judgment order in Moore and further stated that Sanborn had not explained how the Policy was ambiguous or coverage illusory and that Sanborn had conceded that there was at least some PCOH coverage. ECF Doc. 24 at 5-7. To the extent that Southern-Owners is seeking to apply Judge Kahn's prior order as the “law of the case,” Southern-Owners would be incorrect. “Under the law of the case doctrine, ‘an issue decided at one stage of a case is binding at later stages of the same case.’ ” United States v. Escobar–Urrego, 110 F.3d 1556, 1560 (11th Cir. 1997). “Notably, however, ‘a court's previous rulings may be reconsidered as long as the case remains within the jurisdiction of the district court.’ ” Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 578 F.3d 1283, 1288–89 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Vintilla v. United States, 931 F.2d 1444, 1447 (11th Cir. 1991)). “Consequently, ‘law of the case applies only where there has been a final judgment.’ ” Id. (quoting Gregg v. United States Indus., Inc., 715 F.2d 1522, 1530 (11th Cir. 1983)). *4 Sanborn, therefore, was free to renew its request for this discovery. Additionally, the undersigned notes that Sanborn raises arguments in its opposition here that were not raised over a year ago when Sanborn filed its motion to compel. Thus, the undersigned does not find Judge Kahn's prior order to be dispositive on the issue of relevance. See Milinazzo v. State Farm Ins. Co., 247 F.R.D. 691, 701 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (leaving open the availability for plaintiff to try to argue again that underwriting documents are necessary to resolve ambiguity); Sharpe Invest. Land Trust No. C v. Pacific Ins. Co., Ltd., 2009 WL 10667812, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 6, 2009) (unreported) (“[s]hould Plaintiff's argument for the relevancy of the underwriting files strengthen as discovery unfolds, Plaintiffs may raise this issue again”). B. Moore and Dozier The undersigned also disagrees with Southern-Owners' reliance on Judge Hinkle's prior orders in Moore and Dozier. While those orders are certainly persuasive and could ultimately carry the day, they are also not binding on this Court. See Fishman & Tobin, Inc. v. Tropical Shipping & Constr. Co., Ltd., 240 F.3d 956, 965 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Unlike circuit court panels where one panel will not overrule another, ... district courts are not held to the same standard.... While the decisions of their fellow judges are persuasive, they are not binding authority.... As a result, the district court cannot be said to be bound by a decision of one of its brother or sister judges”) (internal citations omitted). Similarly, Sanborn is not barred by collateral estoppel from seeking discovery on Topics 7-16. As Southern-Owners recognizes, one of the elements of collateral estoppel is the existence of identical parties. See, e.g., Pleming v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 142 F.3d 1354, 1359-62 (11th Cir. 1998). There is, however, no identity of the parties in either Moore or Dozier with the case at bar. The fact that Bruce Partington represented the insured in those cases does not create an identity of the parties or privity of the parties. See In re Warmus, 276 B.R. 688, 695 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (“[a]ppearance as an attorney litigating an issue while representing defendants is not the same as an opportunity to litigate on behalf of oneself”); Palma v. Safe Hurricane Shutters, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1346 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (citing Freeman v. Lester Coggins Trucking, Inc., 771 F.2d 860, 864 (5th Cir. 1985) (“a mere showing of parallel interests or even the use of the same attorney in two suits was insufficient for ‘virtual representation' of a non-party in a prior suit for purposes of collateral estoppel”)). Moreover, Moore was decided on a motion for summary judgment. Thus, for the undersigned to preclude Sanborn from engaging in discovery on its affirmative defenses based on Moore, the undersigned would necessarily be deciding at this stage that those defenses are wholly without merit – an issue not properly before the undersigned and which should not be resolved on a discovery motion. See Leksi, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 129 F.R.D. 99, 105 (D.N.J. 1989) (“The issue of the ambiguity of the policies is for the trial court to decide. Since that issue is not before this court, I find that the information sought by Leksi concerning the drafting history of the policy language, the insurers participation in insurance organizations and their adoption of particular policy language is relevant as it may lead to admissible evidence concerning the insurers' intent and their interpretation of the policies”) (internal citations omitted). C. Relevance In its supplemental memorandum, Southern-Owners argues that the information sought in Topics 7-16, which encompass its underwriting files, are not relevant in a first party action unless the “court determines that the contract terms are ambiguous.” ECF Doc. 67 at 5. According to Southern-Owners, mere allegations of ambiguity are not enough. Id. The undersigned disagrees. First, the cases relied upon by Southern-Owners do not support its position. For example, the court in Fletcher v. Great Am. Inc. Co., 2010 WL 11507484 (M.D. Fla. Jun. 17, 2010) found the insurer's underwriting file to be relevant under Rule 26 because “[i]f the Court determines” the term occurrence or exclusions to be ambiguous, then Plaintiff could use documents from the underwriting file and procedures to resolve those ambiguities. Id. at *4. Thus, the Fletcher court did not decide that an ambiguity existed before requiring production of the underwriting files. *5 Similarly, while the court in Koster v. Landmark Am. Ins. Co., 2016 WL 3014605 (M.D. Fla. May 20, 2016) stated that “a mere dispute over the applicability of policy terms ‘does not, in and of itself, make the term(s) ambiguous,’ ” id. at *2, that statement is far different from Southern-Owners' position that “mere allegations of ambiguity are insufficient to warrant discovery.” ECF Doc. 67 at 5. Indeed, there was no defense or allegation in Koster that any term of the policy was ambiguous. Instead, the plaintiffs in Koster argued that the requested documents were relevant to “help clarify” two policy exclusions that defendant was relying on for its affirmative defenses. See id.; but see, Dade Cty. Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins., 2011 WL 13100237, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2011) (requiring production of underwriting file based on plaintiff's contention that the requested information could shed light on the meaning Defendant assigned to certain undefined terms). Southern-Owners does not cite, nor was the undersigned able to identify, any cases which hold that a court must decide that policy terms are ambiguous before permitting discovery on the issue. It appears the opposite is true. An allegation of ambiguity is sufficient to make the underwriting files discoverable. See, e.g., The Atriums of Palm Beach Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 2009 WL 1066747, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Jun. 17, 2009) (recognizing that an insurer can be compelled to produce its underwriting file if the insured makes a “prima facie showing that the material provisions of the policy are ambiguous”); Milinazzo, 247 F.R.D. at 701 (denying motion to compel production of underwriting files because plaintiff had not alleged an ambiguity in the contract language). In Nestle Foods Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 135 F.R.D. 101 (D.N.J. 1990), the court compelled the production of drafting history for the policy and stated, “[t]here has been no ruling, nor will this Court now determine, if the policies in question are ambiguous. Consequently the admissibility of extrinsic evidence … remain open issues…. These questions are premature and remain to be decided by the trial court. Nonetheless, defendants would preclude plaintiff from exploring materials relating to these issues. But in order for plaintiff to determine whether there is a claim for ambiguity, plaintiff must be allowed to explore the creation of the language and whether the intent of the drafter(s) is inconsistent with its application.” Id. at 105. Moreover, while Sanborn may ultimately fail on these defenses, they are nonetheless colorable arguments. There are no reported decisions from the Florida Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit which have squarely addressed these defenses.[6] Additionally, other jurisdictions have decided the issue both ways. In Owners Ins. Co. v. Jim Carr Homebuilder, LLC, 157 So. 3d 148 (Ala. 2014), for example, the Alabama Supreme Court agreed with the insured that PCOH coverage “nullifies and renders inapplicable the ‘your work’ exclusion.” Id. at 157; see also, Amerisure Ins. Co. v. Auchter Co., 2017 WL 3584896, at *25 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2017) (finding EIFS exclusion, as interpreted by the insurer, “would make coverage for ‘property damage’ merely illusory, despite the fact that coverage is expressly provided for by the Policies”). However, in Supreme Servs. and Specialty Co., Inc. v. Sonny Greer, Inc., 959 So. 2d 634 (La. 2007), the Louisiana Supreme Court reached a holding similar to that of Judge Hinkle's in Moore, namely, that the language was neither ambiguous nor the coverage illusory because there remains coverage for damage to “other property” – that is, property that was not put in place by the insured or its subcontractors. Id. at 645 (holding that there was no ambiguity between PCOH coverage and the “your work” exclusion). *6 The district judge in this case may very well agree with Judge Hinkle and the Louisiana Supreme Court or he may agree with the Alabama Supreme Court. Regardless, there is no dispute that these defenses remain pending in this action. See Champion Int'l Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 129 F.R.D. 63, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (compelling production of drafting history and stating “[a]lthough Champion may be unable to prove that defendants made representations which conflict with the plain meaning of the policy's coverage, the Court must allow Champion to try”). As the court explained in Ins. Co. of North Am. v. UNR Indus., Inc., 1994 WL 683423 (S.D. NY Dec. 6, 1994), when it compelled production of the policy's drafting history, “[w]hether these potential ambiguities will ultimately be deemed sufficient to justify introduction at trial of interpretative materials will be decided after discovery has concluded. For present purposes, UNR has sufficiently justified its demand for any drafting materials and any interpretative portions of claims manuals, other guidelines or communications with reinsurers with regard to these issues.” Id. at *1. Thus, Southern-Owners has not met its burden of showing “that the requested discovery has no possible bearing on the claims and defenses in this case.” Milinazzo, 247 F.R.D. at 695. Sanborn is, therefore, entitled to some discovery on these defenses. Specifically, the undersigned denies the motion for protective order as to topics 7-10, and 13.[7] Southern-Owners' motion, however, is granted as to topics 11, 12, 14, 15 and 16. The undersigned fails to find a sufficient nexus between these topics and Sanborn's position that the policy language is ambiguous or offers illusory coverage as to warrant an intrusion into these areas of inquiry. IV. TOPICS 1-6 AND 7-19 As stated above, Southern-Owners objects to Topics 1-6 on the grounds that they are overly broad and potentially invasive of the attorney-client and work product privileges. Additionally, Southern-Owners also argues that these topics implicate information that is within its claims files, which, under Florida law, is not relevant. As an initial matter, general objections based on vagueness, breadth, or burdensomeness are typically insufficient without more specific explanation. See Milinazzo, 247 F.R.D. at 695 (citing Josephs v. Harris Corp., 677. F.2d 985, 992 (3d Cir. 1982)). Also, while state law controls substantive issues in a diversity action, the admissibility of evidence is governed by federal law. Peat, Inc. v. Vanguard Research, Incorp., 378 F.3d 1154, 1159 (11th Cir. 2004). Thus, while Southern-Owners correctly notes that the insurer's claim file is generally not discoverable under Florida law, this Court finds that federal law is applicable. See, e.g., St. Joe, 2006 WL 3391208, at *3 (“Florida state court cases regarding discoverability of claims files are not binding on federal courts”). And, under federal law, there is no blanket protection for claims files. See Atrium on the Ocean II Condo. Assoc., Inc. v. QBE Ins. Corp., 2007 WL 2972937, at *2 (Oct. 9, 2007). Issues of attorney-client privilege, which are substantive in nature, are controlled by Florida law. Bradt v. Smith, 634 F.2d 796, 800 (5th Cir. 1981) (applying Florida state privilege law in diversity cases).[8] Under Florida law, the attorney-client privilege protects communications between a lawyer and a client and, barring an exception or waiver, is not subject to disclosure. See Fla. Stat. § 90.502. The burden of establishing the privilege is on the party asserting it. See Southern-Owners Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., v. Deason, 632 So. 2d 1377 (Fla. 1994). *7 Similarly, although work product privileges, being procedural in nature, are governed by federal law, the burden of establishing the work product privilege is also on the party asserting it. See United States v. Schaltenbrand, 930 F.2d 1554, 1562 (11th Cir. 1991); Bradt, 634 F. 2d at 800. The work product doctrine only protects documents “generated based on the anticipated probability that litigation will follow at the time the documents were drafted.'” Bartram, LLC v. Landmark Am. Ins. Co., 2011 WL 284448, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 24, 2011). The undersigned finds that topics 1-4 seek relevant information but agrees that, as drafted, they implicate the attorney-client and work product privileges because they, arguably, encompass matters post-dating the denial of the claim. Therefore, Southern-Owners' motion will be granted as to those topics only to the extent that Sanborn asks the witness information post-dating the denial of the claim or when litigation was reasonably anticipated. Additionally, the undersigned agrees with Southern-Owners that topics 5 and 6 clearly invade the attorney-client and work product privileges as they seek to have a lay fact witness answer questions about the “legal basis” for Southern-Owners' position. This is true regardless of the fact that topic 5 states that “privileged work product” is to be excluded. By asking for the legal basis for denying the claim, Sanborn is necessarily invading those privileges. Thus, Southern-Owners' motion will be granted as to those two (2) topics. With regard to topics 17-19, Southern-Owners does not explain in its motion how those topics are broad other than that they are “very broadly worded and can be construed as an attempt to seek information protected by” a privilege. ECF Doc. 61 at 9. At the hearing, Southern-Owners' counsel explained that topics 17-19 were not limited in time. Sanborn's counsel, however, indicated a willingness to discuss ways to narrow the requests and, thus, the Court asks that the parties engage in such discussions and, if they cannot resolve the issues among themselves, then Southern-Owners can come back to the Court with more specific objections. V. REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION Finally, Southern-Owners objects to the document request contained in the Notice, which seeks “any and all documents, memorandum, photographs, reports, or data consulted or reviewed in preparing for this deposition.” ECF Doc. 61-2 at 5. The undersigned agrees that this request is overly broad. Thus, the motion will be granted as to this request. Accordingly, it is ORDERED: 1. Southern-Owners' Motion for Protective Order (ECF Doc. 60) is DENIED as MOOT. 2. Southern-Owners' Amended Motion for Protective Order (ECF Doc. 61) is GRANTED as to Topics 5-6, 11, 12, 14, 15 and 16 and also as to the request for production of documents. 3. Southern-Owners' Amended Motion is DENIED as to Topics 1-4, except that questions on these topics are limited to matters before the claim was denied, Topics 7-10, 13, and 17-19. DONE AND ORDERED this 23rd day of July, 2020. Footnotes [1] Southern-Owners filed its original motion on May 28, 2020 and amended it on June 11, 2020 to include the revised deposition notice. ECF Docs. 60, 61. The filing of the amended motion moots the original motion. [2] Southern-Owners tendered a corporate representative on June 25, 2020, to testify on three agreed upon topics relating to the notice of claim. ECF Doc. 65 (Notice of Filing Deposition Transcript). [3] The exclusions at issue are: Exclusion 2.j. titled “Damage to Property,” which excludes from coverage “Property damage” to “(7) That particular part of any property that must be restored, repaired or replaced because ‘your work’ was incorrectly performed on it.” ECF Doc. 1-2 at 2.j.(7). The exclusion in subparagraph 7, however, does not apply “to ‘property damage’ included in the products-completed operations hazard.' ” Id. Exclusion 2.1. titled “Damage To Your Work,” which excludes from coverage “ ‘property damage’ to ‘your work’ arising out of it or any part of it and included in the ‘products-completed operations hazard.’ ” Id. at 2.l. [4] The Policy references PCOH coverage in “Section III – Limits of Insurance,” and states that “[t]he Products-Completed Operations Aggregate Limit is the most we will pay under Coverage A for damages because of ‘bodily injury’ and ‘property damage’ included in the products-completed operations hazard.’ ” Section III 3. Pursuant to the declaration page, the PCOH coverage has an Aggregate of $300,000 limit. ECF Doc. 1-2 at 49. The Policy defines “Products-completed operations hazard” as including, in pertinent part, “ ‘property damage’ occurring away from premises you own or rent and arising out of ‘your product’ or ‘your work.’ ” Id. at Section V 17.a.; Endorsement. [5] “When limitations or exclusions completely contradict the insuring provisions, insurance coverage becomes illusory.” See Amerisure Ins. Co. v. Auchter Co., 2017 WL 3584896, at *25 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2017) (citing Purrelli v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 698 So. 2d 618, 620 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)). [6] The Eleventh Circuit, however, in an unpublished opinion, held that the Your Work exclusion barred coverage of costs to repair damage to the insured's fitness center, but did not bar coverage for damage to “other property.” The court, however, did not address, and it does not appear the insured argued, that the application of that exclusion resulted in illusory PCOH coverage or that the language was ambiguous. See J.B.D. Constr. Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 571 F. App'x 918, 925 (11th Cir. 2014). Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the parties do not dispute the application of the Your Work exclusion or its enforceability. See id. [7] The undersigned recognizes that among its objections, Southern-Owners also argues that these topics include confidential and proprietary information. Sanborn states in the notice, however, that Sanborn and its counsel will agree to a protective order. Should Southern-Owners' concerns not be ameliorated through the use of a carefully crafted protective order, then it may seek the Court's assistance to impose additional language or protections. [8] Decisions in the Fifth Circuit prior to close of business on September 30, 1981 are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).