DORA LEIGH EASTERWOOD, wife and personal representative of the Estate of HORACE MELTON, deceased, Plaintiff, v. HUSQVARNA PROFESSIONAL PRODUCTS, INC., Defendant Case No. 2:19-CV-1065-WKW-WC United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division Filed July 27, 2020 Counsel Dana Gibson Taunton, Jon Cole Portis, Robert Graham Esdale, Jr., Beasley Allen Crown Methvin Portis & Miles PC, William Davis Azar, William D. Azar, PC, Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff. Dennis Ray Bailey, John Evans Bailey, Rushton Stakely Johnston & Garrett PC, Montgomery, AL, Jeffrey Carl Warren, Pro Hac Vice, Bowman and Brooke LLP, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendant. Capel Jr., Wallace, United States Magistrate Judge ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR ENTRY OF PROTECTIVE ORDER *1 Before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 14) and Defendant's Cross-Motion for Entry of Protective Order (Doc. 18). Upon consideration of the motions, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion (Doc. 14) is DENIED and that Defendant's motion (Doc. 18) is GRANTED, as set forth below. I. INTRODUCTION Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(1)(G), a protective order can be sought when a party has good cause to prevent public disclosure of “a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information....” The Eleventh Circuit “ ‘has superimposed a balancing of interests approach to Rule 26(c).” Naramore v. Daimler Trucks N. Am., LLC, No. 1:18-CV-156 (LAG), 2019 WL 6037716, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 3, 2019) (quoting In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 820 F.2d 352, 356 (11th Cir. 1987)). “This approach balances a party's ‘interest in obtaining [the information] against the [opposing party's] interest in keeping that information confidential.’ ” Id. (quoting Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985)). In this case, Plaintiff does not dispute that good cause exists for a protective order to prevent the disclosure of Defendant's proprietary information and trade secrets. Doc. 14 at 2. Instead, the parties' dispute concerns the scope of the protective order. II. DISCUSSION A. Sharing Provision Plaintiff has proposed a protective order that contains the following sharing provision permitting her attorneys to share Defendant's confidential information with other plaintiffs' attorneys: Counsel for Plaintiff may share Confidential Discovery Material with attorneys and expert witnesses involved in other litigation pending against the producing party and which involve allegations of a lack of a Roll Over Protection System (ROPS) or allegations of defects related to handling and stability of a Zero-Turn Mower (ZTM). Doc. 14 at 8. Defendant objects to this language, arguing, among other things, that Plaintiff has failed to establish good cause for sharing Defendant's confidential documents outside the instant litigation and that the proposed sharing provision is too broad, as it is not limited in time or duration or to cases involving the same make, model, or model platform as the mower made the basis of the instant litigation. Doc. 18 at 10–11. Under the Eleventh Circuit's balancing approach, to determine whether there is good cause for a protective order to prevent sharing, the Defendant's interest in preventing disclosure of confidential information must outweigh Plaintiff's interest in disclosure. Naramore, 2019 WL 6037716, at *2 (citing In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 820 F.2d at 356). Again, the parties do not dispute that Defendant has an interest in protecting its confidential information, but Plaintiff asserts that she should be permitted to share Defendant's confidential information because it prevents discovery abuse by defendants, “make[s] the entire process more transparent, trustworthy, and verifiable,” and “makes the judicial system more efficient.” Doc. 21 at 7, 11. *2 In Lohr v. Zehner, a decision issued by this Court, the plaintiff sought a provision in the protective order allowing him to share the defendant's confidential documents with “other attorneys representing parties, and the experts and consultants retained by them, in ‘substantially similar litigation’ against [defendant], meaning any pending litigation against [defendant] wherein it is alleged that [defendant] negligently or wantonly hired, supervised, trained and/or retained a tractor-trailer driver who is alleged to have negligently or wantonly caused a collision as a result of his negligence and wantonness.” No. 2:12CV533-MHT-SRW, 2014 WL 12742197, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 6, 2014). The plaintiff asserted that sharing was necessary because it would reduce discovery costs to plaintiffs, eliminate the need for each plaintiff to start discovery from scratch, allow plaintiffs' lawyers to exchange ideas with colleagues around the country, and promote judicial efficiency. Id. at *2. The plaintiff also maintained that the information would remain secure because “[a]ll attorneys receiving confidential information must agree to abide by the protective order in this case and submit to the jurisdiction of the court,” and the documents “would not be turned over to Defendant's competitors or used by Defendant's competitors....” Id. Defendant, however, argued that the provision “would greatly increase the risk of the improper dissemination of [its] proprietary and confidential information and would expose [it] to competitive harm,” as well as “mak[ing] the enforcement of [the] Protective Order essentially impossible.” As a result, the Defendant requested that the Court prohibit sharing with other plaintiffs' attorneys. After considering the parties' positions, the Court held that, “although plaintiff's goal to help future plaintiffs in future litigation may be laudable,” the future interests of unidentified non-parties and unnamed attorneys in unspecified collateral actions was speculative, and plaintiff did not establish that further dissemination of the defendant's confidential information was relevant and necessary to his particular action. Id. (citing Shire Dev., LLC v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 2013 WL 6858319, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 2013); Menendez ex rel. Menendez v. Wal-Mart Stores East LP, 2012 WL 90140, at *2–3 (N.D. Ind. Jan 11, 2012) (holding that, while sharing promotes speedy and inexpensive litigation and conservation of judicial resources, there was no evidence that collateral lawsuits actually existed, so any gain in judicial efficiency was purely hypothetical) (citations omitted); and Bertetto v. Eon Labs, Inc., 2008 WL 2522571, at *2–3 (D.N.M. May 29, 2008) (declining to grant discovery of defendants' privileged materials to as-yet unnamed plaintiffs without any court supervision)). See also Ginn v. Stryker Corp., No. 1:09-CV-01939-HGD, 2010 WL 11561215, at *1 (N.D. Ala. May 14, 2010) (“The court finds that the inclusion of a ‘sharing’ provision in the protective order is not necessary nor warranted for the purposes of this litigation, and that is the only important consideration. Attorneys in other litigation can do their own work with respect to discovery.”) Similarly, in this case, Plaintiff has made no showing that sharing Defendant's confidential information with other plaintiffs' attorneys is necessary and relevant to this case. This issue was addressed more recently in Naramore, supra, where the plaintiff's attorneys wanted to share information with “counsel representing any party alleged to have been injured in an accident involving [a] truck cab designed, manufactured or distributed by Defendant and involving an allegation of crashworthiness or defective cab structure.” Naramore, 2019 WL 6037716, at *1. In rejecting the provision, the court stated: Sharing discovery with collateral litigants is not per se unreasonable. See, e.g., Wilson v. Am. Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1571 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding that a defendant's interest in sealing the record to prevent the disclosure of discovery in other proceedings was not justified). The Court, however, must make a preliminary finding that the discovery at issue in this case is relevant to the collateral litigation contemplated by the sharing provision. See Porter v. Tyco Healthcare Grp. LP, 2008 WL 11320000, at *2 (N.D. Ga. June 11, 2008). Plaintiff's proposed sharing provision, as currently written, goes far beyond disclosure to other parties involved in similar litigation. Thus, there simply is “no way to determine whether the discovery in this matter is ... relevant to any” other party with whom Plaintiff seeks to share discovery. See id. (rejecting a sharing provision where the plaintiff sought to share information with “lawyers handling similar claims.”). *3 Naramore, 2019 WL 6037716, at *2. See also Gunson v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A., 300 F.R.D. 581, 584 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (“Plaintiff has made no showing that documents relevant to the instant proceeding are relevant to the out-of-district proceedings.”) (citing Long v. TRW Vehicle Safety Sys., No. CV-09-2209-PHX, 2010 WL 1740831, at *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 2010) (“[A] collateral litigant ... should not be granted automatic access to a defendant's confidential documents [without demonstrating] the relevance of the protected discovery to the collateral proceedings and its general discoverability therein.”)). In the instant case, Plaintiff's proposed sharing provision has no limitations on the make and model of the product involved, the specific alleged defect, or the production period. Further, in addition to the broad category of potential recipients this lack of limitations would create, Plaintiff has made no showing regarding the necessity or relevancy to other pending or future lawsuits. As a result, it is not possible for this Court to determine whether the confidential discovery produced in this matter is relevant to other pending or future litigation. With respect to Plaintiff's argument concerning efficiency in litigation, as mentioned above, any judicial efficiency achieved through sharing documents with unknown parties is purely hypothetical at this point. Furthermore, sharing confidential documents with unknown parties in unknown lawsuits may actually hinder judicial efficiency rather than promote it. See Lohr, 2014 WL 12742197, at *3. Because a collateral court would lack jurisdiction to enforce the protective order in this case, the parties would necessarily have to seek enforcement or modification from this Court. Id. (citing United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1427 (10th Cir. 1990) (“As long as a protective order remains in effect, the court that entered the order retains the power to modify it, even if the underlying suit has been dismissed.”) and Marshall v. Planz, 347 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1201 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (Court has the power to modify, and even vacate, its own protective orders, even after final judgment as long as the protective orders are outstanding and thus enforceable.)). Seeking enforcement from this Court would undoubtedly delay the collateral action, and it would “effectively require this Court to retain jurisdiction in perpetuity over the enforcement of the order....” Id. Neither of these outcomes promotes judicial efficiency. With respect to protecting the confidentiality of Defendant's documents, as mentioned above, Plaintiff argues that Defendant's confidential information would remain secure despite information sharing because her proposed protective order does not permit sharing with Defendant's competitors and requires anyone who receives the documents to submit to the jurisdiction of this Court. However, courts have “recognize[d] that the more widely confidential documents are disseminated, it becomes both more likely that those documents will be released, and more difficult for the Court to enforce the terms of its protective order.” Id. (quoting Williams v. Taser Intern., Inc., 2006 WL 1835437 (N.D. Ga. Jun. 30, 2006) and citing Culinary Foods, Inc. v. Raychem Corp., 151 F.R.D. 297, 306–07 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (stating that, “if [plaintiff] were allowed to disseminate the confidential information, this would unduly raise the risk that [defendant's] competitors will obtain access to this confidential information”)). See also Brown v. Vivint Solar, Inc., No. 8:18-CV-2838-T-24JSS, 2020 WL 3250191, at *3–4 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 28, 2020) (recognizing that, while sharing information is “an appropriate goal under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which are intended ‘to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive, determination of every action,’ ” that right is limited when dealing with confidential information and finding that plaintiffs failed to establish that the confidential information at issue was relevant to collateral litigation) (citing Culinary Foods, 151 F.R.D. at 306–07); Naramore, 2019 WL 6037716, at *2 (noting difficulty of keeping documents from being released and enforcing protective order when documents are disseminated more widely and holding that defendant's interest in maintaining confidential information outweighed plaintiff's interest in disclosing information); Doriand v. Centocor Inc., No. 1:09-CV-00078-MP-AK, 2010 WL 325742, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2010) (“[T]he Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff has not shown a need for the sharing of the discovery and that the possible administrative efficiency produced by the sharing is outweighed by the risk of inappropriate release of information provided by Defendants that is sensitive, confidential and proprietary in nature.”); and Porter v. Tyco Healthcare Grp. LP, No. 1:08-CV-1203-CC, 2008 WL 11320000, at *2 (N.D. Ga. June 11, 2008) (holding that plaintiff failed to demonstrate sharing provision would serve asserted goals by vaguely referencing “lawyers handling similar claims” and “plaintiffs with similar claims,” thereby preventing the court from making a relevancy determination, and recognizing that sharing provision would unduly heighten risk that defendant's competitors would gain access to confidential information, so that risk of release and difficulties of enforcement outweighed plaintiff's interest in sharing documents with attorneys in cases that had not even been identified). Thus, although the undersigned recognizes that sharing discovery information is an appropriate goal under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in certain situations, that goal must be balanced against a party's important need to protect trade secrets or otherwise confidential information. *4 For the above reasons, the undersigned concludes that Defendant has established good cause for the entry of a protective order but that Plaintiff has not shown the sufficient need or relevancy for sharing Defendant's confidential discovery. Further, any benefits of sharing with other unknown plaintiffs' attorneys in speculative litigation, which are hypothetical at this point and may actually hinder rather than promote judicial efficiency, are outweighed by the risk of releasing Defendant's confidential information and the difficulty of enforcement. B. Document Authentication Defendant also objects to the following provision proposed by Plaintiff regarding document authentication: All protected documents are true and accurate copies of documents located in Husqvarna's possession or records. However, the parties specifically retain their rights to object to admissibility on any other grounds, such as relevance, hearsay, and materiality. Doc. 14 at 11. In response to the Defendant's objection to this provision, Plaintiff argues that it is “non-sensical that a Defendant would not agree to authenticate documents it authored.” However, the above provision is not limited to documents Defendant authored; it includes all documents in Defendant's possession. The term “protected documents” is not defined in Plaintiff's proposed protective order, and there is no language in the proposed order otherwise limiting this category of documents to those authored by Defendant. The term “confidential discovery material” is defined in Plaintiff's proposed order, but it is not limited to documents authored by Defendant. Therefore, Plaintiff's argument on this point is unavailing. Although it is clear that Plaintiff anticipates that this category of documents will be authored by the Defendant, the above provision does not make that specification. The Court has no way of divining all documents that will be produced by Defendant as “protected” or “confidential” in this litigation, and it declines to authenticate all of those documents by virtue of production alone. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 14) is DENIED. It is further ORDERED that Defendant's Cross-Motion for Entry of Protective Order (Doc. 18) is GRANTED. A protective order will be entered separately. DONE this 27th day of July, 2020.