Paulette Fauceglia v. University of Southern California, et al Case No. CV 19-04738 FMO (JEMx) United States District Court, C.D. California Filed September 07, 2021 Counsel Christine A. Yeroushalmi, SAG-AFTRA, Los Angeles, CA, Nancy L. Abrolat, Abrolat Law P.C., Manhattan Beach, CA, for Paulette Fauceglia. Elyse Anne MacNamara, Erika Amadi Iler, Keith W. Carlson, Carlson and Jayakumar LLP, David Richard Sugden, Call and Jensen PC, Newport Beach, CA, Ryan Patrick Kennedy, Goldberg Segalla LLP, Irvine, CA, George W. Abele, Paul W. Cane, Jr., Paul Hastings LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for University of Southern California, et al. McDermott, John E., United States Magistrate Judge Proceedings: (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER RE PLAINTIFF FAUCEGLIA'S MOTION TO QUASH OR MODIFY DEFENDANT'S SUBPOENAS TO PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYER (Dkt. 156 ) *1 Before the Court is Plaintiff Paulette Fauceglia's Motion To Quash Or Modify Defendant's Subpoenas To Plaintiff's Employer (“Motion”) filed on August 20, 2021. (Dkt. 156.) Plaintiff and Defendant University of Southern California filed a Joint Stipulation on that same day. (Dkt. 157.) Neither party filed a supplemental memorandum. The Court DENIES the Motion and ORDERS that the documents in issue be produced to Defendant within 10 days of this Order. The pending dispute concerns five categories of documents that Defendant has subpoenaed from Plaintiff's current employer Aurora Diagnostics Austin Pathology Services (collectively “Aurora”). (JS 3.) Aurora does not appear to have objected to the subpoenas. A Rule 45 subpoena authorizes discovery from non-parties equivalent to discovery from parties under Rule 34. See Adv. Comm. Note to 1991 Amendment; Meeks v. Parsons, 2009 WL 30003718*2-*3 (E.D. Cal.). A court, however, must quash or modify a subpoena that “requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception of waiver applies” or if the subpoena “subjects a person to undue burden.” Rule 45(d)(3)(A)(iii) and (iv). The burden of persuasion on a motion to quash is on the moving party. Green v. Baca, 226 F.R.D. 624, 653-54 (C.D. Cal. 2005). In dispute are categories 7, 16, 17, 18 and 20. Plaintiff asserts relevance and overbreadth objections to all of these categories. Plaintiff, however, lacks standing to quash a third party subpoena on grounds it is overbroad, unduly burdensome or seeks irrelevant information. See Jiae Lee v. Dong Youn Lee, 2020 WL 7890868*5 (C.D. Cal.) (no standing to quash subpoenas on grounds requests are “irrelevant, vague, overbroad, duplicative, unduly burdensome, etc.”); Eclat Pharms, LLC v. W. Ward Pharm. Corp., 2014 WL 12607663*1 (C.D. Cal.) (no standing to quash, except for privilege, on grounds that third party subpoena is overbroad and seeks irrelevant information); Dale Evans Parkway 2012, LLC v. National Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 2016 WL 7486606*3 (C.D. Cal.) (“A party lacks standing to quash a subpoena on grounds that it is overbroad or unduly burdensome on a third party”). The Court rejects these objections. Plaintiff also asserts that she has a constitutional right of privacy under both state and federal law. (JS 10.) As this is a federal civil rights claim (Dkt. 24), federal law governs the application of privilege. Galarza v. United States, 179 F.R.D. 291, 293 (S.D. Cal.). The Court rejects Plaintiff's argument that the subpoenas should be quashed because her employment and personnel records are private and confidential. Privacy interests are not absolute and generally yield to discovery needs when mitigated by protective order. Edwards v. County of Los Angeles, 2009 WL 4707996*3-*4 (C.D. Cal.); Stallworth v. Brolini, 288 F.R.D. 439, 444 (N.D. 2012). Federal courts balance the right of privacy against the relevance and necessity of the information sought. Id. The Court issued a Protective Order in this case on June 3, 2020. (Dkt. 69.) *2 The Court finds that Defendant's need for the information requested outweighs Plaintiff's privacy interests which will be mitigated by the protective order, as follows: Category 7: Medical Leaves of Absence. Plaintiff alleges that she has suffered ongoing emotional distress and asserts a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff therefore has put her mental state at issue, diminishing her privacy interest in the requested documents. See Thomason v. Skywest Airlines, Inc., 2012 WL 4052034*5 (E.D. Cal.) (“By claiming emotional distress, embarrassment, humiliation and the like ... plaintiff has put her psychological state at issue and defendant is entitled to discovery in this area”). Records relating to leaves of absence would allow Defendant to determine if Plaintiff's emotional state was affected by something other than Defendant's allegedly wrongful actions. See EEOC v. California Psychiatric Transitions, 258 F.R.D. 391, 400 (E.D. Cal. 2009). Plaintiff seeks to limit the scope of the request to medical leaves due to emotional distress but any medical leave could contribute to her distress and would be something other than Defendant's allegedly wrongful conduct. Categories 16 and 20 (Other Legal Actions and Complaints by Plaintiff. As above, records in these categories are relevant to whether other intervening factors are causing or contributing to Plaintiff's distress. Production of records relating to litigation are generally discoverable. United States Equal Empl. Opportunity Comm'n v. Atlanta Bread Co. Int's, Inc., 2007 WL 9700537*3 (S.D. Fla.). Categories 17 and 18 (Performance and Disciplinary Proceedings). Plaintiff's subsequent performance and disciplinary history are relevant to Defendant's defense that she was terminated for performance reasons, to her claimed ongoing emotional distress and to her future employability and compensation.