JED HORWITT, Esq., as Receiver for Sentinel Growth Fund Management, LLC, Radar Alternative Fund LP, and Radar Alternative Master Fund SPC, Plaintiff, v. ALAN L. SARROFF, A.L. SARROFF MANAGEMENT, LLC, and A.L. SARROFF FUND, LLC, Defendants No. 3:17-cv-1902 (VAB) United States District Court, D. Connecticut Filed October 21, 2019 Bolden, Victor A., United States District Judge RULING ON DISCOVERY DISPUTE *1 On October 16, 2019, the Court held a telephonic discovery conference with Jed Horwitt, Esq. (“Plaintiff” or “the Receiver”), and Alan L. Sarroff, A.L. Sarroff Management, LLC (“Sarroff Mgmt.”), and A.L. Sarroff Fund, LLC (“Sarroff Fund”) (collectively, “Defendants”), to address more discovery disputes between the parties. These discovery disputes involve the following issues: (1) whether the Receiver may further depose Alan L. Sarroff and Larry Smith under Rule 30(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) whether Defendants must further respond to specific interrogatories and requests for admission; and (3) whether Plaintiffs must provide further discovery relating to e-mail communications between Mr. Mark Varacchi and Mr. Jason Rhodes. For the reasons explained below, the Rule 30(b)(6) depositions of Mr. Sarroff and Mr. Smith may go forward, Defendants must further respond to the outstanding interrogatories and requests for admission, and no further discovery relating to the Varacchi and Rhodes e-mail communications is necessary. In addition, given the multitude of discovery disputes, and the parties’ failure to move this case forward expeditiously without assistance from the Court, the Court will suspend its normal Chambers practices and permit the filing of motions to compel or motions for protective orders, without first having a discovery conference with the Court. See Arrowhead Capital Fin., Ltd. V. Seven Arts Entm't, Inc., 739 Fed.Appx. 701, 703 (2d Cir. 2018) (finding it was not an abuse of discretion for a district court to sanction a party for failure to comply with discovery obligations that prevented effective litigation of a claim). Consistent with suspending this practice, and having to resolve any such motions, the Court will award fees and costs, to the extent warranted under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, any motions to compel or motions for a protective order will be on an expedited schedule – with deadlines not likely to be extended – with any responses to any motion to compel or a motion for a protective order to be filed in seven (7) days and any reply to any response to a motion to compel or a motion for a protective order to be filed three (3) days after any such response. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Familiarity with the facts and prior proceedings is assumed, consistent with the Court's previous discovery order on August 30, and the Court's May 10, 2019 ruling denying Defendants’ motion to transfer venue or dismiss this case. See Order, ECF No. 156 (Aug. 30, 2019); Order, ECF No. 102 (May 10, 2019). On September 27, 2019, the parties jointly moved for a telephonic discovery conference. Joint Motion, ECF No. 161 (Sept. 27, 2019). The parties sought the Court's aid in resolving the parties’ disputes regarding answers to written interrogatories and the taking of depositions under Rule 30(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 2. Plaintiff also seeks to compel production of documents related to certain interrogatories and requests for admission, to which Defendants timely objected. Id. Defendants seek to compel Plaintiff to produce all email communications between Mr. Varacchi and Mr. Rhodes that are in Plaintiff's possession. Id. *2 On October 4, 2019, Plaintiff submitted a position statement regarding the 30(b)(6) depositions and to compel the miscellaneous discovery requests. Pl.’s Position Statement, ECF No. 169 (Oct. 4, 2019). On that same day, Defendants filed a response. Defs.’ Response, ECF No. 170 (Oct. 4, 2019). II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Under Rule 26(b)(1), “parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” 6 James Wm. Moore et el., Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 26.41 (3d ed. 2019); Fed R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)(a party “may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged material that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”) But “district courts have the inherent authority to manage their dockets and courtrooms with a view toward the efficient and expedient resolution of cases.” Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1892 (2016). Indeed, “[a] trial court enjoys wide discretion in its handling of pre-trial discovery ....” Cruden v. Bank of N.Y., 957 F.2d 961, 972 (2d Cir. 1992); see In Re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 517 F.3d 76, 103 (2d Cir. 2008) (the district court has “wide latitude to determine the scope of discovery”); Gen. Houses v. Marloch Mfg. Corp., 239 F.2d 510, 514 (2d Cir. 1956) (“The order of examination is at the discretion of the trial judge ....”). III. DISCUSSION A. The 30(b)(6) Depositions “Rule 30(b)(6) depositions...‘bind[ ] the corporation.’ ” Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency for Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n v. Royal Bank of Scotland Grp. PLC, 2015 WL 13634404 at *1 (D. Conn. 2015) (quoting Dongguck University v. Yale University, 270 F.R.D. 70, 74 (D. Conn. 2010)). The purpose thus behind individual depositions and depositions under 30(b)(6) is different and a party has “an interest in getting the corporation's testimony on an issue, rather than the testimony of an individual.” Id. (quoting Dongguck University, 270 F.R.D. at 74). The Receiver seeks the depositions of Mr. Sarroff and Mr. Smith, even though both have testified already in their individual capacities. The Receiver argues that denying 30(b)(6) Depositions “unfairly limi[s] Plaintiff's ability to inquire into issues that concern the Sarroff Entities.” Pl.’s Position Statement at 2-3. The Receiver also argues that Defendants’ unilateral decision to cancel the 30(b)(6) Depositions acts as a waiver to object to the 30(b)(6) Notices. Id. at 1. In contrast, Defendants argue that 30(b)(6) Depositions of Mr. Smith and Mr. Saroff “would be duplicative and wasteful” because they have already been deposed and answered questions “about virtually every topic” of the potential 30(b)(6) Depositions. Defs.’ Response at 4-5. The Court disagrees. Here, the Receiver seeks discovery on topics, such as “(i) the process undertaken by the Sarroff Entities, and (ii) the documentation they provided/received when they opened and maintained other investment accounts or vehicles as compared to their investments in Sentinel,” Pl.’s Position Statement at 5, “the negotiations of, and similarities and differences between the Sarroff Entities’ investments with Sentinel, on the one hand, and their [agreement] with an entity known as the Cedar Holdings (‘Cedar’), on the other,” id., and “Sarroff's understanding of their right to basic transparency and information (e.g., account statements) in the context of their investment relationships.” Id. at 6. *3 Because the Receiver has “an interest in getting the corporation's testimony on an issue, rather than the testimony of an individual,” these 30(b)(6) depositions, which have different purposes from the depositions taken of these individuals in their individual capacities, should be permitted. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency for Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 2015 WL 13634404 at *1. B. Production Requests and Interrogatory Requests “Parties may obtain discovery regarding any non-privileged matter that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation.” Cole v. Towers Perrin Forster & Crosby, 256 F.R.D. 79, 80 (D. Conn. 2009) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)). Courts construe relevance broadly “to include ‘any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.’ ” Id. (citing Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)). The Receiver argues that neither the documents nor the responses or admissions sought are unduly burdensome, and that both seek relevant information. Pl.’s Position Statement at 5-8. Defendants object to the production requests on the grounds that they are “overly broad, unduly burdensome, irrelevant and disproportionate to the needs of the case.” Defs.’ Response at 8. Defendants find the requests to compel responses to the interrogatory requests has no relationship to the facts, claims or defenses relevant to the case. Defs.’ Response at 9. The contested responses may go to Mr. Smith's credibility, but Defendants argue that “this does not render information that is admittedly irrelevant discoverable.” Id. The Court disagrees. The requests for production seek information relevant to Sarroff Fund's subscription agreements, offering memoranda, and documents; negotiations and drafts of the Cedar IMA; documents related to the 30(b)(6) topics 5-6 and 11; and Sarroff Fund's tax returns and the K-1s issued to its members. Pl.’s Position Statement at 5-6. The requests for admission seek further clarity including the identification of a person in an e-mail and clarify whether Smith Deposition Exhibits 48 and 53-55 are the only purported loan documents and wire transfer communications that Mr. Varacchi provided to Defendants. Id. at 7-8. The requested information thus is relevant. Moreover, it is not unduly burdensome to require the Defendants to provide it. As a result, the Court will require Defendants to provide the Receiver with this further requested discovery. C. E-mail Request Defendants request that the Court compel production of all e-mail communication between Mark Varacchi and his alleged co-conspirator, Jason Rhodes. Defs.’ Response at 1. Key word searches produced incomplete search results. Id. Defendants wish to conduct a manual review of every communication between the two individuals during the relevant time period. Id. at 2. The Receiver argues that Defendant's request for e-mail productions has been satisfied. In the Receiver's view, all keyword searches proposed by the Defendants has been undertaken and “all documents in its possession of which it is actually aware to the extent that he believes the documents are relevant” to the action have been produced. Pl.’s Position Statement at 8. The potentially responsive documents obtained from the Rhodes criminal complaint contain no search terms Defendants asked the Receiver to run. Id. at 8. Moreover, the Receiver had no knowledge of these e-mails before Defendants requested their review. Id. The Receiver also argues that, while that they have located and produced the e-mails referred to in the complaint, the “emails do not appear to relate to any disputed issue in the case.” Id. at 9. Finally, the Receiver argues that the cost of producing hard copies, or reviewing documents before producing them, is unduly burdensome and costly. Id. at 10. *4 The Court agrees. “Even when the requested information sought is relevant, ‘the court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery’ where it is ‘unreasonably cumulative or duplicative’ or when ‘the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.’ ” Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 293 F.R.D. 557, 561-62 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i),(iii)). The Receiver already has run searches on e-mails involving communications relating to Mr. Varacchi and Mr. Rhodes's communications, Pl.’s Position Statement at 8, on key words requested by Defendants and produced all documents in its possession. Id. While Defendants have argued that not having every communication “significantly prejudice[s]” them, see Defs.’ Response at 3, Defendants have failed to show that any alleged communications not already produced are “proportional to the needs of this case,” given the expected costs projected by the Receiver. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b); Silva v. Dick's Sporting Goods, Inc. 2015 WL 1275840, at *2 (D. Conn. Mar 19, 2015) (declining to compel production of information sought that was not germane to the issues of the case and so were irrelevant).[1] Accordingly, no further discovery on the e-mail communications between Mr. Varacchi and Mr. Rhodes will be permitted. IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons explained below, the 30(b)(6) depositions of Mr. Sarroff and Mr. Smith may go forward, Defendants must further respond to the outstanding interrogatories and requests for admission, and no further discovery relating to the Varacchi and Rhodes e-mail communications is necessary. In addition, given the multitude of discovery disputes, and the parties’ failure to move this case forward expeditiously without assistance from the Court, the Court will suspend its normal Chambers practices and permit the filing of motions to compel or motions for protective orders, without first having a discovery conference with the Court. See Arrowhead Capital Fin., 739 Fed.Appx. at 703 (finding that a district court's decision to sanction a party for failure to comply with discovery obligations which prevented effectively litigation of a claim was not an abuse of discretion). Consistent with suspending this practice, and having to resolve any such motions, the Court will award fees and costs, to the extent warranted under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, any motions to compel or motions for a protective order will be on an expedited schedule – deadlines not likely to be extended – with any responses to any motion to compel or a motion for a protective order to be filed in seven (7) days and any reply to any response to a motion to compel or a motion for a protective order to be filed in three (3) days after any such response. SO ORDERED at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 21st day of October, 2019. Footnotes [1] The Receiver estimates that the likely cost of this extensive production may exceed ten thousand dollars. See Pl.’s Position Statement at 10.