John L. Miller v. D. A. White, et al Case No. CV 14-7543-GW-KK United States District Court, C.D. California Filed December 03, 2020 Counsel John L. Miller, Lancaster, CA, pro se. Kelli Marie Hammond, CAAG - Office of the Attorney General California Department of Justice, Sacramento, CA, for D. A. White et al. Kato, Kenly Kiya, United States Magistrate Judge Proceedings: (In Chambers) Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order [Dkt. 183] *1 On November 2, 2020, Plaintiff John L. Miller (“Plaintiff”) constructively filed[1] a Motion for Protective Order seeking to prevent Defendants from deposing him on the grounds (a) the Court erred in granting Defendants' Third Motion to Modify the Scheduling Order; (b) the Notice of Deposition “illegitimately” contains a request for production of documents at deposition; and (c) Plaintiff “shouldn't be subjected to the annoyance of an illegitimate deposition[.]” ECF Docket No. (“Dkt.”) 183. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order is DENIED. I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND On September 6, 2018, Plaintiff, an inmate at California State Prison – Los Angeles County (“CSP-LAC”) in Lancaster, California, constructively filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleging various claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) against defendants D.A. White, D. Foreman, D. Barker, J. Middleton, R. Henderson, and Paulette Finander each in their individual capacity. Dkt. 22. Plaintiff alleges violations of his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights generally arising out of his transfer on or about July 24, 2012, from Pleasant Valley State Prison (“PVSP”) to CSP-LAC. Id. at 6–10, 13. On September 17, 2020, Defendants filed a Third Motion to Modify the Scheduling Order and Extend Time for Completing Discovery and Filing Dispositive Motions. Dkt. 163. Defendants argued good cause exists to extend the discovery and dispositive motion cut-offs because, due to the limitations caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, (a) Defendants' counsel has been working remotely, (b) it is more difficult to communicate with Defendants and collect documents to support Defendants' motion for summary judgment, and (c) the modified programming at CSP-LAC has prevented Defendants' counsel from meeting with her clients or taking Plaintiff's deposition. Id. On September 18, 2020, the Court found good cause for the requested extension and granted Defendants' Third Motion to Modify the Scheduling Order continuing the discovery cut-off to November 30, 2020 and the dispositive motion deadline to December 29, 2020. Dkt. 164. In addition, in light of the modified programming and limited movement at CSP-LAC resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, the Court granted Defendants' request to take Plaintiff's deposition via videoconference. Id. On October 5, 2020, the District Judge issued an Order affirming the September 18, 2020 Order granting Defendants' Third Motion to Modify the Scheduling Order. Dkt. 176. On October 16, 2020, Defendants served Plaintiff with a Notice of Deposition to occur by video conference on November 23, 2020. Dkt. 183 at 25–26; Dkt. 184, Ex. A. On November 2, 2020, Plaintiff constructively filed the instant Motion for Protective Order. Dkt. 183. On November 19, 2020, Defendants filed an Opposition. Dkt. 184. The matter thus stands submitted. II. DISCUSSION A. APPLICABLE LAW *2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30 governs depositions by oral examination. See FED. R. CIV. P. 30. Rule 30(a)(1) provides that, subject to certain limitations, “[a] party may, by oral questions, depose any person, including a party, without leave of court ....” FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(1). “A party may unilaterally choose the place for deposing an opposing party, subject to the granting of a protective order by the Court pursuant to Rule 26(c)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P., designating a different place.” Cadent Ltd. v. 3M Unitek Corp., 232 F.R.D. 625, 628 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, a party's failure to appear at that party's deposition “is not excused on the ground that the discovery sought was objectionable, unless the party failing to act has a pending motion for a protective order under Rule 26(c).” FED. R. CIV. P. 37(d)(2); Paige v. Consumer Programs, Inc., 248 F.R.D. 272, 275 (C.D. Cal. 2008). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) provides in relevant part: A party ... may move for a protective order ... in the court for the district where the deposition will be taken. The motion must include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with other affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action. The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense[.] FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). A motion for protective order “must be supported by ‘good cause’ and a strong showing is required before a party will be denied entirely the right to take a deposition.” Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975). B. ANALYSIS Here, Defendants served a proper Notice of Deposition to occur before the discovery cut off, and the Court finds no good cause to prevent Defendants from taking Plaintiff's deposition. Dkt. 183 at 25–26; Dkt. 184, Ex. A. First, Plaintiff's disagreement with the Court's scheduling orders extending the discovery cut off is not a reason to preclude Plaintiff's deposition. Plaintiff merely repeats the arguments he presented in his request for reconsideration of the Court's September 18, 2020 scheduling order, which has now been affirmed by the District Judge. Second, Plaintiff's argument that Defendants should not be permitted to request production of documents at his deposition is meritless. In fact, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically permit “[t]he notice to a party deponent may be accompanied by a request under Rule 34 to produce documents and tangible things at the deposition.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(2). Finally, Plaintiff's argument that his deposition would cause “annoyance” is not a reason to prevent Defendants from taking his deposition. “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test.” Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, Plaintiff's conclusory allegations simply do not override Defendants' right to take his deposition. Blankenship, 519 F.2d at 429. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to make a strong showing of good cause to prevent Defendants from deposing him. IV. CONCLUSION Based upon the foregoing reasons, IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Protective Order is DENIED. The discovery cut off is hereby extended to January 4, 2020 for the limited purpose of taking Plaintiff's deposition and the substantive motion cut off is continued to February 4, 2020. Footnotes [1] Under the “mailbox rule,” when a pro se prisoner gives prison authorities a pleading to mail to court, the Court deems the pleading constructively filed on the date it is signed. Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 770 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).