In re Application Pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1782 of Japan Display Inc., Petitioner, v. Tianma America, Inc., Respondent Case No. 2:21-mc-00374-CAS-MAAx United States District Court, C.D. California Filed October 01, 2021 Counsel Abigail Lubow, Vinson and Elkins LLP, San Francisco, CA, Eric Joseph Klein, Pro Hac Vice, Jeffrey R. Swigart, Pro Hac Vice, Vinson and Elkins LLP, Dallas, TX, Bruce L. Ishimatsu, Ishimatsu Law Group PC, Marina Del Rey, CA, for Petitioner. Erik Raymond Puknys, Finnegan Henderson Farabow Garrett and Dunner LLP, Palo Alto, CA, for Respondent. Snyder, Christina A., United States District Judge ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PETITIONER'S MOTION TO COMPEL TIANMA AMERICA, INC. TO COMPLY WITH SUBPOENA (ECF NO. 20-1) ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY TIANMA AMERICA, INC. SHOULD NOT BE HELD IN CONTEMPT (ECF NO. 19) I. INTRODUCTION *1 Before the Court is Petitioner Japan Display Inc.'s Motion to Compel Tianma America Inc. to Comply with Subpoena (“Motion”). (Mot., ECF No. 20-1.) The Motion was filed jointly by Petitioner Japan Display, Inc. (“Petitioner”) and Respondent Tianma America, Inc. (“Respondent”), in the form of a Joint Stipulation as required by Central District of California Local Civil Rule (“Local Rule”) 37-2. C.D. Cal. L.R. 37-2. Through the Motion, Petitioner seeks, and Respondent opposes, an order compelling Respondent to comply with a subpoena issued by Petitioner to Respondent pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 45 and produce the documents requested therein. (Mot. 6.[1]) In support of the Motion, Petitioner filed the Declaration of Huifang Dong (“Dong Declaration”) (Dong Decl., ECF No. 20-2), and the Declaration of Eric J. Klein (“Klein Declaration”) (Klein Decl., ECF No. 20-3), along with its accompanying Exhibits A through E (Pet.'s Ex. A (ECF No. 20-4); Pet.'s Ex. B (ECF No. 20-5); Pet.'s Ex. C (ECF No. 20-6); Pet.'s Ex. D (ECF No. 20-7); Pet.'s Ex. E (ECF No. 20-8)). In support of its opposition to the Motion, Respondent filed the Declaration of Tao Jiang (“Jiang Declaration”) (Jiang Decl., ECF No. 20-9), and the Declaration of Yingchun Chen (“Chen Declaration”) (Chen Decl., ECF No. 20-10). Respondent also filed its Submission of Certified Translation of Chinese Case Cited by Japan Display Inc. (“Case Translation”). (Case Trans., ECF No. 26.) Also before the Court is Petitioner's Motion for an Order to Show Cause Why Tianma America, Inc. Should Not be Held in Contempt (“Contempt Motion”). (Contempt Mot., ECF No. 19.) Through the Contempt Motion, Petitioner asks this Court to require Respondent to show cause why a contempt citation should not be issued against it for failure to produce documents in response to Petitioner's subpoena. (Id. at 2.) In support of the Contempt Motion, Petitioner filed the Declaration of Eric J. Klein (“Klein Contempt Declaration”) (Klein Contempt Decl., ECF No. 19-1), along with its accompanying Contempt Exhibits A through D (Pet.'s Contempt Ex. A (ECF No. 19-2); Pet.'s Contempt Ex. B (ECF No. 19-3); Pet.'s Contempt Ex. C (ECF No. 19-4); and Pet.'s Contempt Ex. D (ECF No. 19-5)). Respondent filed its Response to Japan Display, Inc.'s Motion for an Order to Show Cause (“Opposition to Contempt Motion”). (Opp'n Contempt Mot., ECF No. 24.) Petitioner filed its Reply in Support of Motion for an Order to Show Cause Why Tianma America, Inc. Should Not be Held in Contempt (“Reply on Contempt Motion”) (Reply Contempt Mot., ECF No. 25), along with its accompanying Contempt Reply Exhibits A through C (Pet.'s Contempt Reply Ex. A (ECF No. 25-1); Pet.'s Contempt Reply Ex. B (ECF No. 25-2); Pet.'s Contempt Reply Ex. C (ECF No. 25-3)). The parties appeared before the Court for hearing on both the Motion and the Contempt Motion on September 29, 2021. Having read and considered the papers submitted by the parties as well as their oral argument, the Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and the Contempt Motion is DENIED as moot. II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND *2 The Court summarizes the allegations and claims in Petitioner's Ex Parte Application for an Order Authorizing Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 Supporting Memorandum (“Section 1782 Application”) (Section 1782 Appl., ECF No. 1-2), the Motion and its related submissions, and the Contempt Motion and its related submissions. In so doing, the Court neither opines on the veracity or merit of Petitioner's allegations and claims, nor makes any findings of fact. A. The Companies and Technology At Issue Petitioner is a Japanese corporation involved in the manufacture of thin film transistor (“TFT”) liquid crystal display (“LCD”) panels. (Section 1782 Appl. 5.) Among its technical innovations is a TFT LCD fabrication process utilizing low temperature polycrystalline silicon (“LTPS”) that allows the TFT LCD panels to “achieve a higher resolution while minimizing power consumption.” (Id.) These advantages make LTPS TFT LCD panels “ideal for consumer and industrial electronic devices, including smartphones, tablets, cameras, game consoles, automotive electronics, and medical equipment.” (Id.) Tianma Microelectronics Co. Ltd. (“Tianma”) competes with Petitioner in the marketplace of TFT LCD panels, including those that utilize the LTPS technology. (Id.) Tianma chiefly serves customers in Mainland China, Taiwan, Europe, America, Japan, and South Korea. (Id. at 5–6.) According to its website, Respondent claims to be a “ ‘leading provider of small to medium display solutions to America, utilizing cutting edge technologies from [Tianma]’ and ‘offers a comprehensive range of Liquid Crystal Display (LCD) products and associated technologies[, including] ... a-Si and LTPS-TFT LCD ... products.’ ” (Id. at 6–7 (citations omitted).) B. The Underlying Litigation Petitioner claims that Tianma's products use Petitioner's patented technology without Petitioner's permission. (Id. at 6.) Petitioner avers that, through its investigation, it has been able to identify “several cellular phone devices that include Tianma's infringing TFT LCD panels.” (Id.) On this basis, on September 30, 2020 and December 2, 2020, Petitioner filed four patent infringement cases in the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (“Chinese Proceedings”). (Id.; see also Mot. 3–4; Jiang Decl. ¶ 3.) In the Chinese Proceedings, Petitioner names Tianma, among others, as defendant and accuses several Tianma products of infringing four Chinese patents that Petitioner purports to own—specifically, Chinese Patents ZL200710301194.9, ZL200610095788.4, ZL200810082224.6, and ZL200710146566.5—all of which relate to Petitioner's TFT LCD technology (collectively, “Asserted Patents”). (Section 1782 Appl. 6; see also Mot. 3–4; Jiang Decl. ¶¶ 3, 4.) Each of the four cases in the Chinese Proceedings allege that the infringing products “that have been manufactured, used, offered to sell, and sold by [Tianma] include but are not limited to liquid crystal display devices of Model Nos. TL066FVMH02-00, TL065FVMM01-00 and TL065FVXF21-00.” (Mot. 3–4 (emphasis added).) C. The Discovery Dispute On March 18, 2021, Petitioner asked this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (“Section 1782”), to authorize it to obtain discovery from Respondent, a nonparty to the Chinese Proceedings, for use in the Chinese Proceedings. (Id. at 3; see generally Section 1782 Appl.) In its Section 1782 Application, Petitioner explains that it needs discovery from Respondent because its investigation into Tianma's infringement “is limited by the fact that most displays are ultimately integrated into end-user devices for which the display manufacturer is not publicly known,” and, given Respondent's relationship to Tianma, Respondent likely has information relevant to the Chinese Proceedings. (Section 1782 Appl. 6–7.) In support of this assertion, Petitioner points to Respondent's statements on its website that it “has responsibility for all sales, marketing and engineering support of the Tianma Group display solutions in the Americas.” (Id. (citation omitted).) In addition, Petitioner concludes that, because Respondent describes “the types of products in Tiamna factories, including in factories located in China,” as well as Tianma's production line of certain TFT-LCD display products, Respondent must be knowledgeable about Tianma's manufacturing processes, as well as sales, technical, and marketing information related to the products accused in the Chinese Proceedings. (Id.) *3 On April 5, 2021, the Court granted Petitioner's Section 1782 Application (“Section 1782 Order”). (Section 1782 Order, ECF No. 12.) In its Section 1782 Order, the Court authorized Petitioner to obtain discovery from Respondent and to serve upon Respondent the subpoena attached to the Section 1782 Application (“Subpoena”). (Id. at 9.) The Subpoena issued on April 7, 2021. (Subpoena, ECF No. 13.) It commands Respondent to appear for deposition and to produce certain documents. (See generally id.) Relevant to this Motion are the document requests contained in the Subpoena. Specifically, the Subpoena seeks documents about the products in the Chinese Proceedings, defined in the Subpoena as follows: “ ‘Accused Products’: means all TFT LCD products, including all LCD panels, modules, or display solutions, made or sold by [Tianma] or any of its subsidiaries and affiliates” during the period April 1, 2012 to the date of the Subpoena. (Id. at 5–6.) The Subpoena seeks the identification of each Accused Product known to Respondent or sold by Respondent and Tianma and, as to each, information about its sales, marketing, and technical specifications. (Mot. 4; see generally Subpoena.) Petitioner served the Subpoena on Respondent on April 7, 2021. (Mot. 5.) The Subpoena commands production of documents “on or before 5:00 p.m. PT, April 16, 2021.” (Subpoena 1.) On April 30, 2021, Respondent served its Objections and Responses to Petitioner's Document and Deposition Subpoena (“Response”). (Response, Pet.'s Ex. A.) In its Response, Respondent asserts a variety of general objections that purportedly apply to all requests and a specific objection to Request No. 1. In sum, Respondent objects that the Subpoena is overbroad because it seeks information for products beyond the three identified in the complaints of the Chinese Proceedings. (Id. at 3–4.) Based upon these objections, Respondent limits its responses to those products and contends that, because “it has not sold or otherwise distributed, or provided service or support for” those products, it has no responsive documents within its possession, custody or control responsive to any of the requests of the Subpoena. (Id. at 5–8.) Petitioner contends that Respondent's unilateral narrowing of the definition of “Accused Products” to the three products Petitioner identified in the Chinese Proceedings is improper. (Mot. 5, 8–9.) Thus, the gist of the dispute between the parties is the scope of the Subpoena. While the parties seem to agree that the scope of the Subpoena is determined by the scope of the Chinese Proceedings, they disagree on the scope of the Chinese Proceedings. (See generally Mot.) Petitioner argues that the Chinese Proceedings are not limited to the three identified products (id. at 11–17), while Respondent argues that they are (id. at 18–20). Petitioner explains that the plain language of the complaints in the Chinese Proceedings—that the infringing products “include but are not limited to” the three identified products—necessarily encompasses products beyond the three identified. (Id. at 5, 14.) Petitioner offers the declaration of its counsel in the Chinese Proceedings as an expert on Chinese patent law. She testifies that the Chinese Proceedings will expand beyond the three accused products. (See generally Dong Decl.) On this basis, Petitioner seeks an order compelling Respondent to produce documents relating to the “almost 1,000 products” implicated by the Subpoena. (Mot. 8–9.) Respondent counters that, despite Petitioner's “including but not limited to” language, Petitioner will not be able to accuse products in the Chinese Proceedings beyond the three it has named therein. (Id. at 19–20.) Respondent offers two declarations of experts on Chinese patent law in support of its position. Both dispute Petitioner's argument and contend instead that the Chinese Proceedings will be limited to the three accused products. (See generally Jiang Decl.; Chen Decl.) In addition, Respondent contends that compliance with the Subpoena “imposes [an] undue burden” in that it “ensnares almost 1,000 products.” (Pet.'s Ex. C.) D. The Parties' Attempts to Resolve the Dispute *4 The parties attempted to resolve the dispute without motion practice. Upon receipt of Respondent's Response to the Subpoena, Petitioner began the meet-and-confer process required by Local Rule 37-1 and Magistrate Judge Maria A. Audero's informal discovery dispute resolution procedure. See C.D. Cal. L.R. 37-1; Honorable Maria A. Audero, https://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/honorable-maria-audero (last visited Sept. 27, 2021). (Mot. 5–6.) In addition, the parties participated in an informal discovery conference (“IDC”) with Judge Audero on June 3, 2021. (Id.) During, and subsequent to, the IDC, the parties exchanged compromise offers. (See id. at 6.) In that the exchange of compromise offers did not result in a resolution of the dispute, this Motion followed. III. ANALYSIS A. Legal Standard A litigant granted relief under Section 1782 may obtain discovery as if the matter had been brought in domestic court. In re Bayerische Motoren Werke AG, No. 19-mc-80272-VKD, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67184, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2020) (citing Heraeus Kulzer, GmbH v. Biomet, Inc., 633 F.3d 591, 594, 597 (7th Cir. 2011)). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States [D]istrict [C]ourts.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Discovery under those Rules is governed by Rules 26 through 37 and 45. See Fed. Rs. Civ. P. 26–37, 45. Rule 34 governs requests for production of documents. See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 34. Rule 34(c) states that “[a]s provided in Rule 45, a nonparty may be compelled to produce documents and tangible things or to permit an inspection.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(c). Rule 45 governs discovery of nonparties by subpoena. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45. Pursuant to Rule 45(c), and subject to conditions not relevant here, a subpoena may command “the production of documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(2)(A). Under Rule 45, a nonparty served with a subpoena duces tecum may make written objections “before the earlier of the time specified for compliance or 14 days after the subpoena is served.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B). If an objection is made, the serving party may, at any time and on notice to the subpoenaed nonparty, “move the court for the district where compliance is required for an order compelling production or inspection.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B)(i). The Advisory Committee Notes to the 1970 Amendment to Rule 45 provide that the “scope of discovery through a subpoena is the same as that applicable to Rule 34 and other discovery rules.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 advisory committee's note to 1970 amendment. Under Rule 34, the proper scope of discovery is as specified in Rule 26(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a); see also Exxon Shipping Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 34 F.3d 774, 779–80 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying both Rule 26 and Rule 45 standards to rule on a motion to quash subpoena). Rule 26(b)(1) governs the scope of discovery and provides that parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that evidence is relevant if: “(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. As a general matter, Rule 26(b) is to be “liberally interpreted to permit wide-ranging discovery of information,” even if that information is not ultimately admitted at trial. Comcast of L.A., Inc. v. Top End Int'l, Inc., No. CV 03-2213-JFW(RCx), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18640, at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 2, 2003). District courts have broad discretion in resolving whether the information sought is relevant for discovery purposes. Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2006). *5 “The party who resists discovery has the burden to show discovery should not be allowed, and has the burden of clarifying, explaining, and supporting its objections.” Keith H. v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.R.D. 652, 655–56 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (citation omitted); see also Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975) (“Under the liberal discovery principles of the Federal Rules defendants were required to carry a heavy burden of showing why discovery was denied.”) B. Respondent Is Relieved of Its Waiver of Objections. Petitioner contends that Respondent has waived its objections because it served the objections fourteen days later than permitted by Rule 45(d)(2)(B). (Mot. 9–11.) Respondent concedes that it served its objections two weeks late. (Id. at 21.) However, it contends that its two-week delay was not unreasonable given that the dispute “implicates foreign proceedings and requires coordination with counsel from two countries,” and, in any event, caused no prejudice to Petitioner. (Id. at 21–22.) While the Court agrees with Petitioner that Respondent's objections were untimely and thus waived, it finds that unusual circumstances and good cause exist to relieve Respondent of its waiver. “A nonparty's failure to timely make objections to a Rule 45 subpoena duces tecum generally requires the court to find that any objections have been waived.” Moon v. SCP Pool Corp., 232 F.R.D. 633, 636 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (citations omitted); see also Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1992) (“It is well established that a failure to object to discovery requests within the time required constitutes a waiver of any objection.”). However, where a court finds unusual circumstances and good cause, “the failure to act timely will not bar consideration of objections [to a Rule 45 subpoena].” Moon, 232 F.R.D. at 636 (collecting cases) (alteration in original) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Unusual circumstances have been found where: “(1) the subpoena is overbroad on its face and exceeds the bounds of fair discovery; (2) the subpoenaed witness is a non-party acting in good faith; and (3) counsel for the witness and the subpoenaing party were in contact concerning the witness' compliance prior to the time the witness challenged the legal basis for the subpoena.” McCoy v. Southwest Airlines Co., 211 F.R.D. 381, 385 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Here, the Court finds that the three conditions necessary for a finding of unusual circumstances are present. As to the first condition—that the Subpoena is overbroad on its face and exceeds the bounds of fair discovery—for the reasons explained below, the Court finds that the Subpoena is disproportional to the needs of the Chinese Proceedings and, thus, exceeds the bounds of fair discovery. As to the second condition—that Respondent acted in good faith—Petitioner makes no argument to the contrary. At best, Petitioner notes that, on April 19, 2021, Respondent stated it would produce documents by the end of April and that Petitioner “had no reason to object”—presumably to this extension—“because Respondent indicated that it would be producing documents.” (Mot. 10 (citing Pet.'s Ex. D at 2).) However, the Court finds that Petitioner's reading of Respondent's statement is too narrow. Respondent stated: “Regarding our response to the subpoena, [Respondent] expects to produce documents by the end of the month ....” (Pet's Ex. D. at 2 (emphasis added).) Given Respondent's reference to its “response,” it is a bridge too far to say Respondent did not intend to respond to the subpoena but instead intended only to produce documents. Indeed, Rule 45 contemplates a response to a subpoena duces tecum solely for the purpose of objecting to the subpoena. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B) (“A person commanded to produce documents ... may serve ... a written objection to inspecting, copying, testing, or sampling any or all of the materials ....”). *6 Moreover, Petitioner makes no argument that it has been prejudiced. At best, Petitioner notes that “[i]f Respondent had timely served its objections, [Petitioner] could have begun the process to compel production two weeks earlier.” (Mot. 10.) But, this assertion is contradicted by Petitioner' actions. In fact, Petitioner waited ten days (until May 10, 2021) to engage Respondent in meet-and-confer efforts to resolve the dispute, another ten days (until May 20, 2021) for the second required meet-and-confer conference, and, upon the Court's June 3, 2021 order allowing Petitioner to file its discovery motion, Petitioner did not file the Motion until more than two months later, on August 9, 2021. (Pet.'s Ex. C; ECF No. 18.) Respondent, on the other hand, explains that the two-week delay was necessitated by the fact that the discovery sought “implicates foreign proceedings and requires coordination with counsel from two countries to understand the nature and scope of the subpoena vis-à-vis the underlying Chinese proceedings.” (Mot. 21.) Thus, the Court finds that Respondent has acted in good faith. As to the third condition—that Respondent and Petitioner were in contact concerning Respondent's compliance prior to the time Respondent challenged the legal basis for the Subpoena—the evidence reveals that this condition is satisfied. Petitioner inquired of Respondent's counsel on April 6, 2021 whether he represented Respondent, to which Respondent's counsel responded in the affirmative on April 13, 2021. (Pet.'s Ex. D at 4–6.) The parties continued corresponding through April 19, 2021 regarding the commands of the Subpoena and the terms of a stipulated protective order. (Id. at 2–5.) On April 19, 2021, the parties exchanged the email through which Respondent refers to its “response to the [S]ubpoena” and asserts that “Respondent expects to produce documents by the end of the month.” (Id. at 2.) No evidence is offered regarding communications between Respondent's April 19, 2021 email and its April 30, 2021 response. (See generally Mot.) Nevertheless, the Court finds that the parties were in contact about the Subpoena prior to Respondent's assertion of objections thereto. Accordingly, the Court concludes that unusual circumstances and good cause exist here to allow Respondent's substantive objections to stand and the dispute be resolved on the merits. C. The Court OVERRULES Respondent's Relevance Objection. Respondent asserts a specific objection in response to the Subpoena's Request No. 1[2], as follows: In addition to the General Objections, [Respondent] objects to this request as overbroad to the extent it requests information regarding any product beyond those Petitioner identified in its Chinese complaints, information possessed by any entity other than [Respondent], or information relating to “end-user product[s]” of independent third parties of which [Respondent] has no control. (“Relevance Objection”). (Pet.'s Ex. A at 5.) Respondent contends that “[a]ny products besides [the three identified in the Chinese Proceedings] are irrelevant to the Beijing cases, so they fall outside the proper scope of the Section 1782 subpoena.” (Mot. 18.) Petitioner advances three arguments against Respondent's Relevance Objection. First, Petitioner argues that this Court, in granting the Section 1782 Application, already decided that the Subpoena seeks information that is relevant to the Chinese Proceedings. (Id. at 11–12.) Second, it argues that the information requested satisfies the relevance requirement of Rule 26. (Id. at 12–15.) Third, it argues that, while the Court should not engage in the interpretation of Chinese law to determine relevance, should it be so inclined, it would conclude that the requested information is relevant even under Chinese law. (Id. at 15–17.) *7 The Court disposes of the first and third arguments first, and then turns to the question of relevance under Rule 26. For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that the information sought by the Subpoena is relevant to the Chinese Proceedings under Rule 26(b)(1). 1. The Court's Statement in the Section 1782 Order—That the Subpoena Seeks Relevant Information—Does Not Preclude a Different Conclusion Here. Petitioner argues that, in granting its Section 1782 Application, and allowing it to serve the Subpoena on Respondent, the Court already has concluded that the Subpoena seeks “relevant” information. (Mot. 11–12 (citing In re Schlich, 893 F.3d 40, 52 (1st Cir. 2018) (“[T]he statutory requirement prescribing that information be ‘for use’ in a foreign proceeding incorporates a relevance requirement.”).) It points to this Court's Section 1782 Order which states that “the ‘Proposed Subpoena seeks evidence that is relevant to Petitioner's patent infringement claims and damages.” (Mot. 12 (citing Section 1782 Order 8).) Respondent does not argue to the contrary. (See generally Mot.) Although a failure to oppose an argument could constitute consent to the granting of the requested matter (see C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-12; Resnick v. Hyundai Motor Am., Inc., No. CV-16-00593-BRO (PJWg), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67525, at *67 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2017)), the Court nevertheless resolves Petitioner's argument on its merits. “The Section 1782 screen—the judicial inquiry that the statute requires—is designed for preventing abuses of the right to conduct discovery in a federal district court for use in a foreign court.” Heraeus Kulzer, GmbH, 633 F.3d at 597. When, upon that judicial inquiry, the court determines that such abuses are unlikely, “the ordinary tools of discovery management, including Rule 26, come into play; and with objections based on the fact that discovery is being sought for use in a foreign court cleared away, [S]ection 1782 drops out.” Id. (citation omitted). Section 1782 petitions regularly are reviewed on an ex parte basis. See, e.g., In re Republic of Ecuador, No. C-10-80225 MISC CRB (EMC), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102158, at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2010) (noting that “[s]uch ex parte applications are typically justified by the fact that the parties will be given adequate notice of any discovery taken pursuant to the request and will then have the opportunity to move to quash the discovery or to participate in it.” (citations and quotation marks omitted)). Orders granting Section 1782 applications provide that discovery is “authorized” and thus “the opposing party may still raise objections and exercise its due process rights by challenging the discovery after it is issued ....” In re Varian Med. Sys. Int'l AG, No. 16-mc-80048-MEJ, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38911, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2016). Here, in ruling on Petitioner's Section 1782 Application, the Court contemplated that, because Petitioner's application was made on an ex parte basis, objections could follow service of the Subpoena and would be resolved at that time. It stated: An ex parte application is an acceptable method for seeking Section 1782 discovery. See In re Letters Rogatory from Tokyo Dist., 539 F.2d 1216, 1219 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that the subpoenaed parties may raise objections and exercise their due process rights by bringing motions to quash the subpoenas). *8 (Section 1782 Order 3.) Indeed, the Court acknowledged that Respondent could challenge the Subpoena. (Id. at 7 n. 3 (“If Respondent challenges the Subpoena, it is free to present any such contrary evidence.”).) Moreover, the Court expressly directed Petitioner to “in good faith accommodate any reasonable requests by Respondent to limit the scope of the Subpoena.” (Id. at 9.) Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner's first argument is unavailing and that the Section 1782 Order does not preclude a relevance inquiry here. 2. The Court Declines to Interpret Chinese Discovery Rules to Resolve This Dispute. Petitioner argues that the Court should not engage in an interpretation of Chinese law in order to resolve this motion to compel. (Mot. 15–17.) Respondent counters that, because Petitioner convinced this Court to issue the Subpoena based upon its counsel's interpretation of Chinese law, it should not be allowed to now escape the “battle of the experts” it created. (Id. at 18.) The Court agrees with Petitioner that it need not delve into the contours of Chinese discovery rules to resolve this dispute. Section 1782 provides as follows: The order may prescribe the practice and procedure, which may be in whole or part the practice and procedure of the foreign country or the international tribunal, for taking the testimony or statement or producing the document or other thing. To the extent that the order does not prescribe otherwise, the testimony or statement shall be taken, and the document or other thing produced, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a). Here, the Court's Section 1782 Order—which authorizes the discovery to proceed—expressly directs Respondent “to comply with the [S]ubpoena in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of this Court.” (Section 1782 Order 9.) The Court need look no further to conclude that resolution of this discovery dispute must be guided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, not Chinese discovery rules. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has made clear that federal courts should not, when responding to requests for judicial assistance, “feel obliged to involve themselves in technical questions of foreign law relating to ... the admissibility before such tribunals of the testimony or materials sought.” In re Request for Jud. Assistance from Seoul Dist. Crim. Ct., 555 F.2d 720, 723 (9th Cir. 1977). Nor would an interpretation of Chinese discovery rules be helpful here. As the Court's research reveals,[3] Chinese procedural rules do not contemplate U.S.-styled discovery. The Court has reviewed an English translation of the Civil Procedures Law of the People's Republic of China found on the website of the China Justice Observer.[4] See Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (2017), Chapter VI: Evidence, China Laws Portal—CJO, https://www.chinajusticeobserver.com/law/x/civil-procedure-law-of-china-20170627 (last visited Sept. 28, 2021). Rather than provide for pre-trial discovery procedures similar to those under the Rules here, the Chinese procedural rules require that each party obtain its own evidence and enlist the court's assistance in discovery only when the party has been unable to collective the evidence on its own, at which point the Chinese court conducts discovery directly. (See id.) Specifically, Article 64 states: A party shall be responsible for providing evidence in support of his or her allegations. Where a party ... [is] unable to collect evidence on [its] own for reasons beyond [its] control, or where the people's court deems that the evidence is necessary for the trial of the case, the people's court shall investigate and collect evidence. *9 The people's court shall thoroughly and objectively investigate and verify evidence in accordance with legal procedures. (“Article 64”). Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (2017), Chapter VI: Evidence, Article 64, China Laws Portal—CJO, https://www.chinajusticeobserver.com/law/x/civil-procedure-law-of-china-20170627 (last visited Sept. 28, 2021). Accordingly, the Court will not engage in an interpretation of Chinese discovery rules, and specifically a determination of whether the discovery sought here would be available under Chinese law. Instead, the Court turns to the discovery rules under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to resolve the question of whether the matter and information sought by the Subpoena is discoverable thereunder. 3. The Information Requested by the Subpoena Satisfies the Relevance Requirement of Rule 26. The Subpoena requests documents that identify each of the Accused Products, during the period April 1, 2012 through the date of the Subpoena, known to Respondent or that Respondent or Tianma has sold, distributed, or serviced (Request No. 1). (Subpoena 5–6, 8.) As to each such product, the Subpoena seeks manufacturing information (Request No. 2); production volume and sales information (Request No. 3); the naming convention (Request No. 4); technical specifications or descriptions (Request No. 5); and marketing information (Request No. 6). (Id. at 8–10.) Petitioner contends that the discovery sought by the Subpoena “bears on [its] patent infringement claims.” (Mot. 13.) It explains that the Asserted Patents in the Chinese Proceedings relate to a TFT LCD device, and “[e]ach of Tianma's TFT LCD products are liquid crystal display devices that have common features,” including those described in its four patents. (Id.) It argues that the requested discovery “is necessary to confirm that Tianma's TFT LCD products meet the limitations of the patent claims.” (Id. at 13–14.) Respondent counters that, because the Chinese Proceedings will be limited to the three products accused therein, discovery about any other product is not relevant and thus exceeds the proper scope of discovery. (Id. at 18–20.) For the reasons stated below, the Court agrees with Petitioner that the discovery sought by the Subpoena is relevant to the Chinese Proceedings under Rule 26(b)(1). *10 To establish that the information Petitioner seeks is relevant to its claims under Rule 26(b)(1), Petitioner offers the Dong Declaration for the proposition that its legal claims will be permitted to extend to products beyond the three identified in the Chinese Proceedings. (Id. at 17; see also Dong Decl.) Ms. Dong establishes her expertise in Chinese patent law by declaring that she has been in the practice law for over twenty years and represents Petitioner in the Chinese Proceedings. (Dong Decl. ¶¶ 2, 3.) She notes that “[t]here is precedent for an intellectual property court finding a series of products infringing the plaintiff's patent where only some of the products from that series were specifically identified in the complaint.” (Id. at ¶ 4.) She points to patent infringement case No. (2017) Yue 73 Min Chu 4323 (May 26, 2020) heard by the Guangzhou Intellectual Property Court, an intermediate intellectual property court in China, and explains as follows: [T]he plaintiff only specified three models in the complaint. But during a hearing, the plaintiff further specified that the infringing products at issue in the case were a series of intelligent wireless cloud AP products. That is, the plaintiff argued that the infringing products were not limited to the models specified in the complaint. The court agreed and finally found that the infringing products included the entire series of products manufactured, sold, or promised to sell by the defendant that used the same technology after examining the relevant evidence and the statement of the defendant. In other words, the court found that the infringing products were not limited to the three models specified in the complaint. Further, when the court assessed damages, the court considered the fact that there are numerous models of infringing products. (Id.) She notes that, because “China is a single jurisdiction, ... the laws and rules applied by the Beijing Intellectual Property Court should be the same as those applied by the Guangzhou Intellectual Property Court.” (Id. at ¶ 5.) She concludes that, in her opinion, “the Beijing Intellectual Property Court would be receptive to evidence about Tianma's TFT LCD products that use the same technology as those products specifically identified in the complaints.” (Id. at ¶ 6.) Respondent counters with the declarations of Messrs. Chen and Jiang, both asserting that the Chinese Proceedings will be limited to the three products identified in the complaints and, thus, discovery into any other products is not relevant to Petitioner's claims. (Id. at 19; see also Chen Decl.; Jiang Decl.) Mr. Chen establishes his expertise in Chinese patent law by declaring that he practiced intellectual property law in China for 38 years, that he currently is retired from the China National Intellectual Property Administration, and that, prior to his retirement, he served as the Director of the Litigation Division at the Patent Reexamination Board of the China National Intellectual Property Administration. (Chen Decl. ¶ 1.) He avers that, “[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, [Petitioner] ... would not be allowed to accuse other products, beyond those identified in the complaints, of infringing patent rights involved in [those] cases.” (Id. at ¶ 8.) He states he is “confident” that the Chinese Proceedings “will be limited to the TL066FVMH02-00, TL065FVMM01-00, and TL065FVXF21-00 products that [Petitioner] identified in the complaints, despite the use of the catch-all phrase of ‘but are not limited to’ in the complaints.” (Id. at ¶ 10.) He opines that “[d]iscovery conducted on products other than these three identified products is irrelevant to the Chinese cases, because the Chinese cases are limited only to these three products identified in [Petitioner's] Chinese Complaints.” (Id.) Mr. Jiang establishes his expertise in Chinese patent law by declaring that he has been practicing intellectual property law in China for nineteen years and represents Tianma in the Chinese Proceedings. (Jiang Decl. ¶¶ 1, 3.) He notes that, “under Chinese law, the catch-all phrase of ‘but are not limited to’ is insufficient to put any products other than the ones identified into issue.” (Id. at ¶ 7.) He opines that “[a]ny other products would be irrelevant to the claims in the Chinese cases, and the Beijing Intellectual Property Court would not accept, in the existing cases, evidence relating to other products that might infringe [Petitioner's] patent rights.” (Id.) He explains that, under Chinese law, Petitioner bears the burden of presenting evidence to support infringement allegations. (Id. at ¶ 19.) He notes that, in the Chinese Proceedings: “no other products have been the subject of any briefing, nor has the court in any of these cases indicated that other products are of any relevance to the cases.” (Jiang Decl. ¶ 11.) He notes that he disagrees with Ms. Dong's conclusions from the Guangzhou case. (Id. at ¶ 22.) He contends that the Guangzhou case is distinguishable from the circumstances in the Chinese Proceedings because the Guangzhou court's ruling that additional products were within the scope of the case was premised on the “unique situation,” not present here, that “the Defendant admitted and confirmed that Defendant's products in the same series as the products specifically identified and accused in the complaint use[d] the same technology to which the asserted patent was directed.” (Id. at ¶¶ 22, 23 (emphasis added).) He notes that here, in contrast, Tianma “never admitted any of its series of products use the same technology as the three products [Petitioner] identified in its complaints and in fact believes the opposite is true.” (Id. at ¶ 24.) *11 As a threshold matter, the three declarations are admissible pursuant to Rule 44.1. As the Ninth Circuit has noted, “Rule 44.1 allows courts to consider a wide array of materials in order to ascertain foreign law.” Universe Sales Co. v. Silver Castle, Ltd., 182 F.3d 1036, 1038 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2444 (2d ed. 1995) (courts may “consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, without regard to whether the material considered would be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.”)). In addition to a court's own research to determine foreign law, “expert testimony accompanied by extracts from foreign legal materials has been and will likely continue to be the basic mode of proving foreign law.” Id. Still, as a general matter, it is well-established that courts must disregard legal conclusions and opinions offered by experts. “Experts may interpret and analyze factual evidence but may not testify about the law.” S.E.C. v. Cap. Consultants, LLC, 397 F.3d 733, 749 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Crow Tribe of Indians v. Racicot, 87 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 1996)); see also United States v. Scholl, 166 F.3d 964, 973 (9th Cir. 1999) (comparing the roles of judges and experts and noting that “[e]xperts ‘interpret and analyze factual evidence. They do not testify about the law because the judge's special legal knowledge is presumed to be sufficient ....”) (quoting U.S. v. Brodie, 858 F.2d 492, 496–97 (9th Cir. 1988) ))). Nevertheless, while foreign law experts may not opine as to the ultimate application of the foreign law to the facts of the case, under Rule 44.1,a court may consider testimony from foreign law experts “to aid in a court's understanding of foreign law.” Edumoz v. Republic of Mozam., 968 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1052 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (quoting Krish v. Balasubramaniam, No. 1:06-cv-01030 OWW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76194, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2006)). Here, the Court must disregard the legal conclusions offered by Respondent's experts regarding the relevance question before this court. Mr. Chen opines that discovery beyond the products named in the four complaints would be irrelevant to the Chinese Proceedings. (Chen Decl. ¶ 10.) Mr. Jiang opines that the catch-all phrase “but are not limited to” is insufficient to make relevant in the Chinese Proceedings any discovery regarding products not identified in the four complaints, that the scope of “ ‘documents requested in the subpoena’ far exceed[s] what is ‘relevant to the Chinese proceedings’ or ‘JDI's patent infringement claims,’ ” and that documents are relevant to the Chinese proceedings only to the extent they relate to the three accused products. (Jiang Decl. ¶¶ 11, 14, 16–18.) The Court disregards these statements because the application of Chinese law to the relevance question here is a function that this Court is competent to perform without the aid of an expert. In contrast, the Court accepts the explanations of Chinese law submitted by the three experts and, based thereon, concludes that Petitioner might be able to accuse products beyond those already identified in the Chinese Proceedings. Ms. Dong, Petitioner's expert, clearly avers that, based upon the precedential Guangzhou case, the Chinese court “would be receptive to evidence about Tianma's TFT LCD products that use the same technology as those products specifically identified in the complaints.” (Dong Decl. ¶¶ 4–6.) Mr. Jiang, Respondent's expert, disputes Ms. Dong's conclusion by distinguishing the Guangzhou case from the Chinese Proceedings on the basis that the circumstances present in the former—an admission by the defendant-infringer that the products used the same technology—are not present here. (Jiang Decl. ¶¶ 22–24 (“[Tianma] never admitted any of its series of products use the same technology as the three products [Petitioner] identified in its complaints and in fact believes the opposite is true.”).) At the hearing, Petitioner noted its disagreement with Respondent's interpretation of the Guangzhou ruling and argued instead that the court's decision was premised on the fact that the case, from its inception, alleged that the patents at issue were infringed upon by a series of products, not just the three products accused in the pleadings. Either way, Mr. Jiang's conclusion ignores that the purpose of discovery is to learn the facts that ultimately will support the claims and defenses of the case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b). As the Court in O2 Micro Int'l v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., 467 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2006), aptly explains: *12 The Federal Rules replaced a system in which the issues had to be conclusively defined at the outset of litigation through the pleadings, with a system that relied on discovery and pretrial hearings to gradually identify the precise issues in dispute as more information became available .... Id. at 1366. Indeed, the very reason Petitioner needs the discovery sought by the Subpoena is to determine whether there exist products, beyond those already identified, that use the same technology, and thereby refute Respondent's assertions to the contrary—all of which goes to the heart of the Chinese Proceedings. Moreover, consistent with Ms. Dong's testimony, a reasonable corollary of Mr. Chen's testimony is that there are circumstances under which Petitioner might be permitted to expand the list of accused products beyond those identified in the complaints. (Chen Decl. ¶¶ 8, 10 (“Absent exceptional circumstances, [Petitioner], after filing the complaints, would not be allowed to accuse other products, beyond those identified in the complaints, of infringing patent rights involved in the above cases.” (emphasis added)).) What Petitioner's burden might be to establish the “exceptional circumstances” required to accuse new products is not pertinent to the relevance inquiry before this Court. And even if it were, Respondent offers no insights into this burden or the likelihood that Petitioner would not be able to satisfy it. (See generally Mot.; Chen Decl.) For purposes of this relevance inquiry, the Court need only concern itself with the fact that, if Petitioner is able to establish the requisite exceptional circumstances, new products could be added to the list of accused products. The Court's independent research of Chinese patent law reveals nothing to the contrary. Specifically, the Court has reviewed an English translation of the Patent Law of the People's Republic of China[5] found on the website of the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”).[6] See Patent Law of the People's Republic of China (as amended up to the Decision of December 27, 2008, of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Amending the Patent Law of the People's Republic of China), WIPO Lex, https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/legislation/details/5484 (last visited Sept. 28, 2021) (“Chinese Patent Law”). Seven of the eight chapters of the Chinese Patent Law cover the prosecution of a patent, while only one chapter—Chapter VII—addresses the protection of patent rights. But Chapter VII, entitled “Protection of Patent Rights,” offers no insight into the procedural litigation rules of patent cases. Id. at 11–14. The only section somewhat relevant here—Article 59—states the unremarkable propositions that: For a patent right of an invention or a utility model, the scope of protection shall be confined to what is claimed, and the written description and the pictures attached may be used to explain what is claimed. For the design patent right, the scope of protection shall be confined to the design of the product as shown in the drawings or pictures, and the brief description may be used to explain the said design as shown in the drawings or pictures. Id. at 11.[7] *13 Based upon the representations of the parties' experts, and the Court's own research, the Court reasonably can, and does, conclude that the discovery Petitioner seeks here is relevant under Rule 26(b)(1) to its claims in the Chinese Proceedings. This conclusion is in accord with rulings in this district that have permitted discovery into products beyond those identified in a complaint or infringement contentions. For example, in Kaneka Corp. v. Zhejiang Medical Co., No. CV 11-2389 SJO (SS), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195852, at *50–51 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2016), the court allowed discovery into “comparable patents or products.” Similarly, in Sony Corp. v. Westinghouse Digital Electronics, LLC, No. CV 08-3934 RGK(FMOx), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135840, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2009) (citations omitted), the court explained that relevant discovery in a patent infringement case includes, among other things, “any products reasonably similar to the accused product,” and concluded that the plaintiff was “entitled to seek the identity of all products that are reasonably similar to any accused product, not just those products plaintiff has already identified.” Likewise, in O.S. Security LLC v. Schlage Lock Co., No. SA CV 14-00319-AG (DFMx), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186875, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 5, 2015), the court was persuaded by the ruling in Epicrealm, Licensing, LLC v. Autoflex Leasing, Inc., No. 05-0163, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68784, at *10 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2007), that there exists no bright line rule that discovery can only be obtained if related to an accused product, and that “the scope of discovery may include products and services ... ‘reasonably similar’ to those accused in the [infringement contentions].” Other district courts, including in other California districts, concur with this approach. See, e.g., L.G. Philips LCD Co. v. Tatung Co., No. Misc. F-07-0009 EFB, Misc. S-07-0018 FCD EFB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24890, at *5–6 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2007) (allowing plaintiff to seek information about “all potentially infringing products, not just those that have so far been identified”); DR Sys., Inc. v. Fujifilm Med. Sys. USA, Inc., No. 06cv417 JLS (NLS), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29485, at *12–14 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2008) (allowing discovery of “products that are reasonably similar to the accused products” (quotation marks omitted)); Fresenius Medical Care, 224 F.R.D. 644, 652–53 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (allowing discovery of licensing information for products comparable to those under the patents-in-suit); Barnes & Noble, Inc. v. LSI Corp., No. C 11-02709 EMC (LB), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61627, at *18–19 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2012) (allowing discovery into comparable products); Honeywell Int'l Inc. v. Acer America Corp., 655 F. Supp. 2d 650, 656 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (allowing discovery into products that are “reasonably similar” to those accused in the preliminary infringement chart); AGA Med. Corp. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., No. 10-3734 (JNE/JSM), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157787, at *23–24 (D. Minn. Oct. 19, 2011) (allowing discovery into non-infringing products as relevant to damages); L.G. Elecs., Inc. v. Q-lity Comput. Inc., 211 F.R.D. 360, 368 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (declining to limit discovery to products specifically identified in initial patent infringement disclosures and noting that “plaintiffs are entitled to require information about other products that may infringe”). *14 Although not argued by Respondent, the Court acknowledges the other line of authority that limits discovery to products specifically accused. See, e.g., Mediatek, Inc. v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., No. 11-5341YGR (JSC), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19568, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2013) (disallowing discovery into non-accused products under local patent rules); Caritas Techs., Inc. v. Comcast Corp., No. 2:05CV339, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94879, at *14 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2006) (holding that the plaintiff only had the right to discover information regarding the alleged infringing service, not information on whether it should assert a claim of infringement regarding other services). The Court distinguishes those authorities from the case at bar on the basis that those cases rely upon special patent rules that require the plaintiff to serve infringement contentions specifically identifying the infringing products, while neither the Chinese Proceedings nor the Central District of California have such a discovery requirement. Nevertheless, even some of those authorities permit a plaintiff to seek discovery as to products not specifically identified “if the plaintiff does not know of the allegedly infringing product when it serves its infringement contentions and could not have discovered the product absent discovery.” Infineon Techs. AG v. Volterra Semiconductor Corp., No. C 11-6239 MMC (DMR), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175730, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2012); see also Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. C 08-986 SI, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53942, at *13–14 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2009) (finding that failure to specifically accuse products is not dispositive where defendant had notice that plaintiff accused “what is purportedly the same process in a different product.”) Indeed, the Federal Circuit has expressed disapproval of any rule that would purport to require early identification of infringement contentions without the ability to later amend them. O2 Micro Int'l, 467 F.3d at 1365. It explained: If a local patent rule required the final identification of infringement and validity contentions at the outset of the case, shortly before the pleadings were filed and well before the end of discovery, it might well conflict with the spirit, if not the letter, of notice pleading and broad discovery regime created by the Federal Rules. Id. On the basis of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the information requested by the Subpoena satisfies the relevance requirement of Rule 26(b)(1) as to products not yet accused by Petitioner in the Chinese Proceedings. D. Although Relevant, the Information Requested by the Subpoena Is Not Proportional to the Needs of the Case and Imposes an Undue Burden on Nonparty Respondent. Finding relevance does not end the inquiry here. Instead, the Court now must turn to the question of whether the discovery requested by the Subpoena is proportional to the needs of the case, also under Rule 26(b)(1), and avoids imposing an undue burden on Respondent under Rule 45(d)(1). Although relevance is broadly defined, “it is not without ultimate and necessary boundaries.” Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674, 679–80 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In addition to relevance, Rule 26(b)(1) requires that the discovery be proportional to the needs of the case. Fed. R. Civ. 26(b)(1). Proportionality is determined by a consideration of the following six factors: “[(1)] the importance of the issues at stake in the action, [(2)] the amount in controversy, [(3)] the parties' relative access to relevant information, [(4)] the parties' resources, [(5)] the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and [(6)] whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Id. “Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Id. The parties, together with the court, “have a collective responsibility to consider the proportionality of all discovery and consider it in resolving discovery disputes.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment. Further, the court “must limit the frequency or extent of discovery” pursuant to Rule 26(b)(2)(C) if: (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or (iii) the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1). *15 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). In addition to the discovery standards under Rule 26 incorporated by Rule 45, Rule 45(d)(1) itself provides that “[a] party or attorney responsible for issuing and serving a subpoena must take reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject to the subpoena.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1). “While discovery is a valuable right and should not be unnecessarily restricted,” discovery is more limited when it comes to protecting nonparties “from harassment, inconvenience, or disclosure of confidential documents.” Dart Industries Co. v. Westwood Chemical Co., Inc., 649 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1980) (citations omitted). “Thus, a court determining the propriety of a subpoena balances the relevance of the discovery sought, the requesting party's need, and the potential hardship to the party subject to the subpoena.” Gonzales, 234 F.R.D. at 680 (citation omitted). With respect to proportionality, Respondent primarily argues that the information sought by the Subpoena, “which encompasses more than a thousand different products,” is not proportional to the needs of the Chinese Proceedings. (Mot. 6.) The Court shares Respondent's concerns. As an initial matter, the Court notes that Respondent's proportionality argument is conclusory at best. (Mot. 6, 8, 18.) Nevertheless, pursuant to its independent obligation under Rule 45(d)(1) to enforce Petitioner's duty to avoid imposing an undue burden on a nonparty Respondent, the Court is compelled to engage in a thorough proportionality examination. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1). For the reasons explained below, the Court concludes that the proportionality factors weigh against compelling the extent of discovery sought by the Subpoena as written. There is no question that the first and fifth proportionality factors weigh in favor of compelling the discovery sought by the Subpoena. The issue at stake in the Chinese Proceedings involves the vindication of Petitioner's rights to the four Asserted Patents which, depending upon the Chinese court's ruling regarding Petitioner's ability to accuse new products, could involve “more than a thousand different products.” (Mot. 8.) And, to the extent new products are accused, the discovery sought about those products would be important to the resolution of the Chinese Proceedings. Having no information regarding the second and fourth proportionality factors—the amount in controversy and the parties' resources, respectively—the Court considers these factors neutral in the analysis. It is the third and sixth proportionality factors that raise the greatest concerns against allowing the discovery sought by the Subpoena. The third factor—the parties' relative access to the information sought—weighs against compelling the discovery. Petitioner notes that Respondent has access to the information sought by the Subpoena, and Respondent does not dispute this. (See generally Mot.) And, as Petitioner explained in its Section 1782 Application, it is unable to obtain the information it seeks here through the Chinese Proceedings for two reasons: first, because Respondent, as a nonparty to the Chinese Proceedings, is not within that court's jurisdictional reach; and second, because discovery in China is significantly more “restrictive” and “limited” than the discovery procedure used in the United States. (Section 1782 Appl. 10–11, 14–15.) *16 The Court is not unmindful that the Chinese procedural rules—specifically Article 64—place the burden on the plaintiff to provide evidence in support of its claims and that only where a party is unable to collect the evidence it needs does the Chinese court provide assistance. See supra Section III.C.2. However, the Court has no evidence before it that Petitioner has made any effort to avail itself of the assistance of the Chinese court, pursuant to Article 64, to obtain the discovery it seeks directly from Tianma, the party it has sued. Moreover, the Court has become aware, through its own research, that the latest revision to the Chinese Patent Law—which became effective on June 1, 2021, three months after the filing of the matter before this Court but two months before the filing of the Motion—recognizes the difficulty in collecting infringement evidence and has shifted the burden of producing damages evidence to the infringer. Specifically, in an article entitled Understanding the Fourth Amendment of Chinese Patent Law, the law firm Field Fisher provides the English-language version of Article 71, paragraph 4, which was added to the law in the 2021 version: [I]n order to determine the amount of damages, people's court may order the infringer to provide account books and other materials relating to infringement if the right holder has tried its best to provide evidence and the infringement related account books and materials are mainly controlled by the infringer. If the infringer refuses to provide or provides false account books and materials, people's court may determine the amount of damages in reference to the claims of the right holder and the evidence provided. (“Article 71”). Defeng Song, Understanding the Fourth Amendment of Chinese Patent Law, Field Fisher Insight (July 20, 2021) https://www.fieldfisher.com/en/locations/china/insights/understanding-the-fourth-amendment-of-chines.... Thus, while Article 71 appears to be limited to damages information, it does give Petitioner new access to at least some of the information it seeks through the Subpoena. Based upon its review of the requests in the Subpoena, the Court concludes that, pursuant to Article 71, Petitioner now should have ready access, with the Chinese court's assistance, to the damages information sought in Request No. 3—production volume and sales information. (See Subpoena 8.) However, as with Article 64, there is no evidence before the Court that Petitioner has availed itself of the new discovery mechanism afforded by Article 71. At the hearing, Petitioner explained that it likely would not be able to obtain the discovery it seeks through the Subpoena directly from Tianma in the Chinese Proceedings, through either Articles 64 or 71. This is because, according to Petitioner, Tianma has taken the position in both the Chinese Proceedings as well as in the Texas Cases, that Tianma and Respondent are wholly separate entities; that Tianma does not track the sales and distribution of its products by Respondent once Respondent receives them from Tianma; and that, as such, even though Respondent sells and distributes Tianma's products, Tianma does not have—and therefore would not be able to produce through the Chinese Proceedings—the information sought by the Subpoena. Respondent does not dispute this. Still, the Court is not convinced that Petitioner has made even minimal efforts to obtain the discovery through the Chinese Proceedings. Rather, it appears to the Court that Petitioner has bypassed the opportunities it has to obtain the discovery directly from Tianma in China and instead has elected to burden a nonparty in the United States. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the third proportionality factor weighs against compelling the discovery sought by the Subpoena. *17 Finally, the sixth proportionality factor—whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit—when viewed together with Petitioner's obligation under Rule 45(d)(1) to avoid imposing an undue burden on Respondent, weighs heavily against compelling the discovery sought by the Subpoena. As an initial matter, the Court notes that, while the information sought is relevant to the Chinese Proceedings, it is so only to the extent the Chinese court permits Petitioner to accuse additional products. And the answer to that question is, at this point, speculative at best. As noted above in Section III.C.3, to accuse new products, Petitioner must convince the Chinese court that exceptional circumstances exist, and this Court has no information regarding the nature of the burden Petitioner must overcome and whether facts exist to satisfy that burden. This speculative benefit must be weighed against the burden that compliance with the Subpoena would impose on Respondent. Other than stating that full compliance with the Subpoena would require it to identify, and provide information about, “more than a thousand different products” (Mot. 8), Respondent is silent on the specifics of the burden this will impose (see generally Mot.). Petitioner, on the other hand, notes that it has offered a compromise to narrow the scope of the Subpoena “which would effectively cut [Respondent's] production burden in half,” and that, in any event, any burden on Respondent is “mitigated by the fact that [Respondent] has already been collecting such information” pursuant to an order in another litigation. (Mot. 18 & n.5.) Respondent counters that the Subpoena remains overbroad even under what is Petitioner's second compromise offer. (Id. at 20–21.) The Court is troubled by the burden that the Subpoena imposes on Respondent, even if its scope were reduced from one thousand to five hundred products. Although Respondent does not quantify this burden, it is easy to conclude that requiring a nonparty to identify and produce manufacturing, production, sales, marketing, and naming nomenclature information regarding even the offered limitation of five hundred products for a period of almost ten years, all for the sake of an uncertain possibility that the information might become usable or admissible in the Chinese Proceedings, exceeds the bounds of fair discovery. Not only is such a request disproportionate to the needs of the case under Rule 26(b)(1), but it also imposes an undue burden when asked of a nonparty under Rule 45. The Court is not persuaded by Petitioner's argument that Respondent's burden is mitigated by the fact that it already is gathering this information pursuant to an order in other litigation, presently pending in the Eastern District of Texas. (Mot. 15 n. 4, 18 n. 5.) The Court takes judicial notice of the Texas Cases,[8] and finds that the court there indeed ordered Respondent to produce matter similar to that sought here (“Texas Discovery Order”). Japan Display, Inc. v. Tianma Microelectronics Co. Ltd., No. 2:20-cv-00283-JRG, ECF No. 76 (E.D. Tex. June 21, 2021). The Court also notes that, in its Opposition to Contempt Motion, Respondent concedes that it has “produced significant technical and sales-related discovery in the Texas [C]ases” in response to the Texas Discovery Order. (Opp. Contempt Mot. 3.) But rather than serve as mitigation of Respondent's burden, as Petitioner contends, this begs the question of why, having already obtained an order in the Texas Cases that compels the production of the information it now seeks, Petitioner insists on imposing this burden on Respondent a second time. Respondent explains: Petitioner agreed to a protective order in the Texas Cases that forbids the use of this information for any other purpose. (Id.) Thus, precluded from using the information obtained through the Texas Cases in the Chinese Proceedings, Petitioner seeks the same information here, where the protective order in effect expressly permits use of the information in the Chinese Proceedings. (ECF No. 15 ¶ 8.1.) This not only appears to be an end-run around the protective order in the Texas Cases, but the Court agrees with Respondent that a less burdensome solution to Petitioner's dilemma would be reformation of that protective order such that it allows the information Respondent already has produced to be used in the Chinese Proceedings and obviates the need for Respondent to produce the information a second time. (Opp. to Contempt Mot. 3–4.) The Court recognizes that, if Respondent opposes reformation of the protective order in the Texas Cases—as its papers indicate (Opp. Contempt Mot. 4 n. 1) and as it confirmed at the hearing—the burden claimed by Respondent could be rejected as one of its own making. See, e.g., Morgan Hill Concerned Parents Ass'n v. Cal. Dep't of Educ., No. 2:11-cv-3471 KJM AC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14983, at *18 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2017) (rejecting burdensomeness argument as a problem of the responding party's own making). Still, that remains to be seen and, in any event, this would not negate this Court's finding that the discovery is not proportional to the needs of the Chinese Proceedings. *18 For these reasons, the Court concludes that it will not compel Respondent's compliance with the Subpoena as written. E. A Compromise Is In Order. Although, for the reasons stated above, the Court will not compel the discovery sought by the Subpoena as written, it is persuaded that a reasonable compromise is in order. Indeed, the Court is required to modify a subpoena upon motion where, as here, the subpoena “subjects a person to undue burden.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A)(iv). Here, the Court construes Respondent's assertion that it remains willing to accept Petitioner's compromise offer to narrow the scope of the Subpoena (Mot. 20–21) as seeking such a modification. And, in fact, compromise offers have been exchanged. However, the Motion is unclear regarding the timing and nature of the compromise offers. According to Petitioner's brief, it offered to limit its discovery requests to “those TFT LCD products made by Tianma or any of its Chinese subsidiaries” and Respondent “has not agreed to this proposal.” (Mot. 18; see also Pet.'s Ex. E at 2.) According to Respondent's brief, that was Petitioner's second offer. (See Mot. 20.) Petitioner's first offer, notes Respondent, was to limit the scope of the Subpoena to “Tianma's other TL products.” (Id. at 20–21) Respondent explains that Tianma “sells thousands of LDC Products with ‘TL’ or ‘TM’ in the product name ... [and that] TL products are those made with low temperature poly silicon technology.” (Id. at 7 n.3.) Respondent avers that it was agreeable to the offer because “the TL products at least share some similarities with the three products in the Beijing litigation.” (Id. at 20–21.) As such, Respondent's counsel sought clarification from Petitioner regarding the terms of the compromise offer: I wanted to ask one point of clarification before we take your proposal to [Respondent]. Can you please confirm that if [Respondent] provides its response to the subpoena regarding all TL products that it sells, then [Petitioner] will not seek a further response on other products pursuant to the subpoena thereafter? (Pet.'s Ex. E at 2.) In response, Petitioner's counsel wrote: We've received authorization from our client to limit the requested discovery to those products made by [Tianma] or any of its Chinese subsidiaries. [Petitioner] will not seek a further response on other Tianma products made by [Respondent]. Based on your representations at the informal discovery conference, we understand that [Petitioner's] compromise effectively cuts [Respondent's] burden in half. (Id.) Respondent did not accept this compromise and instead avers that it remains willing to accept Petitioner's first proposal to produce “information in its possession, custody, or control on all TL products.” (Mot. 21.) Petitioner's brief is silent as to the first offer. (See generally Mot.) However, at the hearing, Petitioner confirmed this sequence of events and noted that its first offer ultimately was taken off the table because the resulting production would be minimal and would provide little assistance in its discovery efforts for the Chinese Proceedings. *19 While the parties remained at an impasse on these compromise offers, Petitioner made yet a third compromise offer during the hearing: Petitioner would accept from Respondent, in full satisfaction of the Subpoena, the same documents Respondent produced in compliance with the subpoena issued in the Texas Cases. Petitioner reasoned that this would eliminate almost the entirety of Respondent's burden in searching for and producing documents, leaving only the burden of re-producing in the instant matter the approximately five hundred documents Respondent already has produced in the Texas Cases. Respondent does not dispute that its production in the Texas Cases involved approximately five hundred documents. Respondent also does not dispute that Petitioner's third offer reduces its burden almost entirely, leaving only the minimal burden of re-printing and re-bates-numbering the documents.[9] With this, the Court's concerns regarding proportionality and undue burden are alleviated, if not eliminated altogether. Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that, while it will not compel Respondent to comply with the Subpoena as written, it will compel Respondent to produce, in full satisfaction of the Subpoena, the documents Respondent produced in compliance with the subpoena issued in the Texas Cases. F. The Contempt Motion is Moot. In the alternative to its Motion, Petitioner's Contempt Motion seeks an order to show cause why Respondent should not be found in contempt for its failure to produce documents responsive to the Subpoena. (Contempt Mot. 2.) In light of the ruling on the Motion, the Court concludes that the Contempt Motion is moot and, as such, must be denied. IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, the Court ORDERS as follows: 1. Petitioner's Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Respondent shall produce, in full satisfaction of the Subpoena, the documents it produced in the Texas Cases. Such production shall be made no later than two weeks after the date of this Order. 2. Petitioner's Contempt Motion is DENIED as moot. Presented by: MARIA A. AUDERO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Footnotes [1] Pinpoint citations of page numbers in the Order refer to the page numbers appearing in the ECF-generated headers of cited documents. [2] Although the Relevance Objection is asserted only as to Request No. 1, because Request No. 1 seeks the identity of products for which additional information is then sought through Requests Nos. 2 through 6, the Relevance Objection inescapably also applies to Requests Nos. 2 through 6. [3] Rule 44.1—which governs the process for determining foreign law—“permits courts to consider ‘any relevant material, including testimony without regard to its admissibility under Rule 43;’ authorizes the court to ‘engage in its own research;’ eschews any requirement that the court formally take judicial notice of foreign law; and obviates the need for the court to provide ‘formal notice to the parties of its intention to engage in its own research on an issue of foreign law which has been raised by them, or of its intention to raise and determine independently an issue not raised by them.’ ” De Fontbrune v. Wofsy, 838 F.3d 992, 997 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1 advisory committee's note). [4] The China Justice Observer is sponsored by the Academy of Comprehensive Rule of Law at China University of Political Science and Law. See About China Justice Observer (CJO), https://www.chinajusticeobserver.com/p/about (last visited Sept. 28, 2021). Among other things, it provides English translations of Chinese laws. Id. [5] The current Chinese Patent Law came into force in 1985 and has been revised four times, respectively, in 1992, 2000, 2008, and most recently on October 17, 2020, coming into effect on June 1, 2021. See Atom Tong Xi Jun, What Do You Need to Know about China's New Patent Law 2021?, Newsletter June 2021, Plasseraud (June 8, 2021), https://www.plass.com/en/articles/what-do-you-need-know-about-chinas-new-patent-law-2021. [6] WIPO, a global forum for intellectual property (IP) services, policy, information and cooperation, is “a self-funding agency of the United Nations, with 193 member states”—of which the United States of America is one. See Inside WIPO: What is WIPO?, https://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2021); Member States, https://www.wipo.int/members/en/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2021). Among other things, WIPO collects the intellectual property laws of its member states, including the People's Republic of China. See China, WIPO Lex, https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/legislation/members/profile/CN (last visited Sept. 28, 2021). WIPO is recognized in the jurisprudence of the United States courts as a resource for intellectual property-related information. See, e.g., Aquavit Pharms. v. U-Biomed, No. 19-CV-3351 (VEC) (RWL), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134016, at *3 n. 1 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2021) (citing list of international trademark classifications published by WIPO); Digital Ally, Inc. v. Taser Int'l, Inc., No. 16-cv-2032-CM-TJJ, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34274, at *10–13 (D. Kan. Mar. 2, 2018) (considering prior art search through WIPO database, among others, to satisfy the diligence requirement); Purac Am. Inc. v. Birko Corp., No. 14-cv-01669-RBJ, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45955, at *9 (D. Colo. Apr. 8, 2015) (accepting WIPO definition for the term “intellectual property”). [7] This excerpt is drawn from the 2008 version of the Chinese Patent Law in effect through May 31, 2021. An English translation of the revised version which took effect on June 1, 2021 is not available at the time of the writing of this Order. See Decision of October 17, 2020, of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Amending the Patent Law of the People's Republic of China, https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/legislation/details/21040 (last visited Sept.28, 2021) (offering the only available text in Chinese). However, the Court's research regarding the 2021 version, through articles written by law firms involved in Chinese patent litigation, reveals that the revisions made do not involve the specific inquiry of whether Petitioner might be able to accuse products beyond those accused in the four complaints. See, e.g., Atom Tong Xi Jun, What Do You Need to Know about China's New Patent Law 2021?, Newsletter June 2021, Plasseraud (June 8, 2021), https://www.plass.com/en/articles/what-do-you-need-know-about-chinas-new-patent-law-2021 (noting revisions to improve patent prosecution, strengthen patent protection, improve legitimate rights and interests of the patentee (including improved evidentiary rules regarding damages), and improve the efficiency of patent exploitation); see also Fan Li, Amendment to China Patent Law Offer PTA, PTE and Patent Linkage, Foley & Lardner LLP Blog (June 28, 2021), https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2021/06/amendment-to-china-patent-law-offer-pta-pte (noting revisions related to patent term adjustments and extensions, and patent linkages); Ryan T. Davies et al., An Overview of the Latest Amendment to the Chinese Patent Law, Finnegan Blog (Mar. 5, 2021), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/articles/an-overview-of-the-latest-amendment-to-the-chinese-pat..., (noting significant revisions to increase protections for pharmaceutical and design patents, and increasing infringement damages); Defeng Song, Understanding the Fourth Amendment of Chinese Patent Law, Field Fisher Insight (July 27, 2021), https://www.fieldfisher.com/en/locations/china/insights/understanding-the-fourth-amendment-of-chines... (noting revisions related to patent prosecution, patent exploitation and commercialization, and patent protection, including the calculation of damages and evidence therefor). [8] See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2) (“The court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it ... can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”); Harris v. County of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 2012) (court may take judicial notice of “documents on file in federal or state courts”). [9] Respondent argued at the hearing that even with this significantly reduced burden, it cannot accept this compromise offer because the discovery remains a “fishing expedition” that will allow Petitioner to obtain information about products not accused in the Chinese Proceedings. But, as Respondent conceded at the hearing, this is nothing more than a restatement of its argument that the documents are not relevant in the Chinese Proceedings. The Court rejects this argument because that ship sailed with the Court's earlier finding of relevance.