TINNYE DANETTE HAYNES and KATHY SUE PORTER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Plaintiffs, v. JAN J. OTHO, d/b/a KIND KEEPERS, Defendant Case No. MO-16-CV-00096-DC United States District Court, W.D. Texas, Midland-Odessa Division Filed November 17, 2017 Counsel James E. Hunnicutt, Mary L. Scott, Jennifer Jackson Spencer, Spencer Scott PLLC, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiffs. Jan J. Otho, Midland, TX, Pro Se. Counts, David, United States Magistrate Judge AMENDED ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE AND FOR FINAL DEFAULT JUDGMENT *1 BEFORE THE COURT is Plaintiffs Tinnye Danette Haynes, Kathy Sue Porter, and Sharon Dickens' Motion to Strike Defendant's Answer and for Final Default Judgment. (Doc. 51). This case is before the undersigned U.S. Magistrate Judge by consent of the parties in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. (Doc. 15). After due consideration, Plaintiffs' Motion is GRANTED. (Doc. 51). I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background Plaintiffs allege Defendant Jan J. Otho is an individual doing business as Kind Keepers. (Doc. 1 ¶ 1). Defendant exercised operational control of Kind Keepers including controlling finances, managing employees, and controlling the schedules of Plaintiffs. (Id. ¶ 2). As the sole proprietor of Kind Keepers, Defendant exercised decision making authority concerning the classification and pay rates of Kind Keeper's employees. (Id. ¶ 3). Plaintiffs worked for Kind Keepers during the three-year period preceding the filing of the Complaint. (Id. ¶¶ 4–5). Plaintiffs were home care workers for Kind Keepers and provided household services. (Id. ¶ 6). During the relevant period, Plaintiffs worked on average over forty hours per week. (Id. ¶ 17). Plaintiffs allege Defendant failed to withhold federal income, Social Security and Medicare taxes from Plaintiffs' paychecks. (Id. ¶ 19). Further, Plaintiffs claim Defendant told them that they were not entitled to be paid time and one-half for their overtime work because they were “independent contractors.” (Id. ¶¶ 37–38). Plaintiffs dispute their classification as independent contractors. (Id. ¶¶ 20–35). Overall, Plaintiffs claim Defendant's acts resulted in a willful and intentional violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). (Id. ¶¶ 39 and 58–62). Defendant denies having a duty to withhold amounts from Plaintiffs' paychecks for taxes. (Doc. 12 ¶¶ 2, 8, and 19). Defendant further denies the allegation that Plaintiffs are nonexempt under the FLSA and contends Plaintiffs are not entitled to overtime pay. (Id. ¶¶ 5–6). Finally, Defendant asserts the affirmative defenses of statute of limitations, estoppel, laches, waiver, and asserts again that Plaintiffs were independent contractors. (Id. ¶ 50). B. Procedural History Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on April 15, 2016. (Doc. 1). On October 11, 2016, Defendant's attorney withdrew. (See Oral Order Granting Oral Mot. to Withdraw). Defendant chose to proceed pro se, and the Court advised Defendant through a Pro Se Litigant Advisory of her duties in the case. (Doc. 25). From the beginning, issues arose. First, Defendant displayed an unwillingness to participate in discovery. Defendant failed to send initial disclosures to Plaintiffs as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 or to respond to Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories as required by Rule 33. (Doc. 26). These failures forced the Court to order Defendant to make initial disclosures, respond to Plaintiffs' interrogatories, and pay Plaintiffs' attorney fees and expenses. (Id.). Despite the Court's Order, Plaintiffs allege Defendant has yet to respond to any discovery request or pay their attorney fees. (Doc. 60 at 2). *2 Second, through the life of the case, Defendant chose not to communicate with the Court or Plaintiffs on multiple occasions. Plaintiffs reported in their Motion to Compel that Defendant was unresponsive. (Doc. 32 at 3–4). Additionally, despite the Court ordering Defendant to appear, Defendant failed to appear at a hearing held on March 1, 2017. (Docs. 37 and 38). Defendant's unresponsiveness led the Court to believe Defendant had changed addresses. (Doc. 42). As a result, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause to determine Defendant's location. (Id.). Defendant responded that she had not changed addresses, leaving the Court to conclude she was simply unresponsive to the Court's orders and the discovery process. (Doc. 43). Defendant's only explanation for her unresponsiveness is that it is too costly for her to mail opposing counsel paperwork. (Id.).[1] Third, Defendant has not followed proper procedure. The Court is sympathetic to the fact that Defendant is neither an attorney nor represented by an attorney. However, the Court has advised Defendant on numerous occasions that despite proceeding pro se, she must, at a minimum, participate in the case and follow the rules. (See Docs. 25 and 62 at 22:14–22:30). The following examples reveal that Defendant has not attempted to do so. In the first example, it appears Defendant possesses relevant evidence but chooses not to participate in discovery. (Id.).[2] By doing so, Defendant prevents Plaintiffs from obtaining relevant information. Next, the Court advised Defendant to respond to Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Answer and for Final Default Judgment at the Final Pretrial Conference on August 17, 2017. (Doc. 62 at 21:00–21:50). Defendant attempted to respond by dropping off a letter with Court Security Officers at the front door of the U.S. Courthouse. The Court told Defendant this was not a proper submission and instructed her to file the response with the U.S. District Clerk's Office. Defendant did not file a response. Additionally, the Court cautioned Defendant at the Final Pretrial Conference that she should file a Witness and Exhibit List. (Id. at 20:35–20:50). However, Defendant has yet to file any pretrial documents. Finally, Plaintiff Tinnye Haynes attempted to settle with Defendant. (Doc. 58). The Court ordered Defendant to deposit settlement funds into the Court's Registry as a condition precedent to the settlement agreement by August 24, 2017. (Id.). As of the date of this Order, Defendant has not deposited the funds. Despite the examples listed above, the Court is mindful that Defendant filed an Answer, attended mediation, and appeared at the Final Pretrial Conference. (Docs. 12, 45, 61, and 62). Due to these attempts to engage in the case, the Court afforded Defendant an opportunity to avoid default by ordering Defendant to participate on September 13, 2017. (Doc. 63). The Order required Defendant to comply with initial disclosure requirements, respond to Plaintiffs' discovery requests, file a witness and exhibit list, and respond to the Motion at issue by September 29, 2017. (Id. at 5). The Court hoped Defendant would comply with the Order so that the case could proceed with discovery and to a trial on the merits. Unfortunately, Defendant did not seize the numerous opportunities afforded her by the Court. Plaintiffs informed the Court that Defendant made no effort to provide initial disclosures or respond to Plaintiffs' discovery requests. (Doc. 64). Additionally, the Court has not received a Witness and Exhibit List or a response to the Motion at issue from Defendant. As a result of Defendant's refusal to engage, the Court is left with a case where discovery does not progress, orders are not followed, and attorney fees are not paid. Accordingly, proceeding to trial is futile and Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Answer and for Final Default Judgment is ripe for review. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW *3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 enables a court to strike a party's pleading and render a default judgment against the party if the party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A). The Rule also requires the Court to order the disobedient party, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C). Striking a pleading is a drastic remedy, is viewed with disfavor by the federal courts, and is a request infrequently granted. 5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1380 (3d ed. 2017). However, a default judgment may be entered against a pro se litigant when the litigant willfully refuses to comply with discovery orders. See Bivins v. Miss. Press Register, Inc., 72 F. App'x 166, 167 (5th Cir. 2003). Additionally, where a defendant demonstrates flagrant bad faith and callous disregard of its responsibilities, striking the defendant's pleadings and entering a default judgment is warranted. Cruz v. Morris, CV H-14-3377, 2016 WL 7048054, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 12, 2016) (citing McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Apffel, P.C. v. Quarles, 894 F.2d 1482, 1486 (5th Cir. 1990)). As a guideline, a court may strike a party's pleading and enter a default judgment under Rule 37 when two criteria are met. First, the penalized party's discovery violation must be willful. United States v. $49,000 Currency, 330 F.3d 371, 376 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Smith v. Smith, 145 F.3d 335, 344 (5th Cir. 1998); Batson v. Neal Spelce Assocs., Inc., 765 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir. 1985)). Second, the drastic measure is only employed where a lesser sanction would not substantially achieve the desired deterrent effect. Id.; see also United States v. Real Prop. Known As 200 Acres of Land Near FM 2686 Rio Grande City, Tex., 773 F.3d 654, 660 (5th Cir. 2014). III. DISCUSSION Defendant failed to obey the Court's orders to provide or permit discovery. (Docs. 26, 33, 39, and 63). As shown below, Defendant's failure is willful and no sanctions less than striking Defendant's pleading and entering a default judgment will achieve the desired deterrent effect. After declaring default and entering a default judgment against Defendant, the Court assesses damages for Plaintiffs as the prevailing party. A. Defendant's Failures to Obey the Court's Orders to Provide or Permit Discovery Are Willful. Defendant failed to obey the Court's orders to provide or permit discovery. (Docs. 26, 33, 39, and 63). When a court orders a party to respond to pending discovery requests, but the party does not respond or responds untimely, the party commits a willful violation of the court's order. Cruz, 2016 WL 7048054, at *1; see also $49,000 Currency, 330 F.3d at 376. Additionally, when a court orders a party to produce documents, but the party repeatedly fails to produce the documents, the party also commits a willful violation. See Batson, 765 F.2d at 513–14; see also Real Prop. Known As 200 Acres, 773 F.3d at 660–61. In the instant case, Defendant did not send Rule 26 initial disclosures or respond to Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories. (Doc. 26 and 33). The Court ordered Defendant to send initial disclosures and respond to Plaintiffs' interrogatories. (Docs. 26, 33, and 63). Defendant did not comply with the Court's orders. (Docs. 51 at 5 and 64 at 2). The Court ordered Defendant to appear and show cause for her failure to comply. (Doc. 38). Defendant did not appear at the hearing. (Doc. 39). *4 Previously, Defendant attended mediation, appeared at the Final Pretrial Conference, and filed a letter with the Court. (Docs. 43, 55 at 1, and 62). Defendant's actions indicate to the Court that she knows when an appearance is required and how to file documents with the Clerk. Therefore, the Court concludes that Defendant willfully failed to comply with the Court's orders, appear, and respond to Plaintiffs' discovery requests. B. Lesser Sanctions Will Not Achieve the Desired Deterrent Effect. Rule 37 provides seven sanctions that a court may impose on a party for disobeying a discovery order: (i) directing that the matters embraced in the order or other designated facts be taken as established for purposes of the action, as the prevailing party claims; (ii) prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses, or from introducing designated matters in evidence; (iii) striking pleadings in whole or in part; (iv) staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed; (v) dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part; (vi) rendering a default judgment against the disobedient party; or (vii) treating as contempt of court the failure to obey any order except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 (b)(2)(A). The Rule aims to punish disobedient parties and deter future parties who might be tempted to ignore discovery orders in the absence of the Rule. Nat'l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976). Only sanctions (iii) striking the pleadings in whole and (vi) rendering a default judgment against the disobedient party will achieve the desired deterrent effect in the instant case. Here, sanctions (i), (ii), and (v) are not relevant. Sanctions (i) and (ii) contemplate continuing the litigation. However, as Defendant has not even provided initial disclosures to Plaintiffs, it is difficult to see how this case could proceed. Further, sanction (v) is directed at disobedient plaintiffs and is therefore also not applicable here. Sanctions (iv) and (vii) will not benefit the case. As Defendant is nonresponsive, staying the case until the discovery order is obeyed pursuant to sanction (iv) will only further stagnate the discovery process. Additionally, because Defendant previously failed to obey orders to pay attorney fees and settlement funds into the Court's Registry, holding Defendant in contempt of court under sanction (vii) will likely have no deterrent effect. (Docs. 26 and 60). Plaintiffs filed this case in April 2016. (Doc. 1). Due to Defendant's actions, the case has barely progressed in over a year and a half. The most appropriate Rule 37 sanctions for Defendant's failure to comply with discovery orders are (iii) striking Defendant's pleadings and (vi) entering a default judgment against Defendant. As shown above, lesser sanctions are not appropriate because they are irrelevant or will not have the desired deterrent effect. Based on the preceding discussion, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendant's Answer and for Final Default Judgment. (Doc. 51). The Court ORDERS Defendant's Answer struck and the entry of default and default judgment against Defendant. C. Damages Plaintiffs request unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, attorney fees, costs, as well as pre and post-judgment interest as damages. (Doc. 51 at 10–11). A default judgment conclusively establishes the defendant's liability but does not establish the amount of damages. Mancia v. JJ Chan Food, Inc., 3:12-CV-2467-L, 2015 WL 5179017, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 4, 2015) (citing TWA v. Hughes, 449 F.2d 51, 70 (2d Cir. 1971)). A court may enter a default judgment against a party and determine damages without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing “where the amount claimed is a liquidated sum or one capable of mathematical calculation.” Id. (citing Leedo Cabinetry v. James Sales & Distrib., Inc., 157 F.3d 410, 414 (5th Cir. 1998)). A sum capable of mathematical calculation is one that can be “computed with certainty by reference to the pleadings and supporting documents alone.” Id. (citing James v. Frame, 6 F.3d 307, 311 (5th Cir. 1993)). Here, an evidentiary hearing is not required because the Court can determine damages through a mathematical calculation. i. Unpaid Overtime and Liquidated Damages *5 When a court strikes an employer's answer and enters a default judgment under Rule 37 in an FLSA case, the employee is entitled to damages in the amount of the employee's unpaid overtime wages and liquidated damages. Cruz, 2016 WL 7048054, at *1 n.1 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)). Viewing the employee's declaration setting forth the basis for awarding unpaid overtime wages and liquidated damages enables a court to determine damages. Id.; see also Mancia, 2015 WL 5179017, at *1–3 (citing Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687–88 (1946)). Plaintiff Tinnye Danette Haynes' Declaration and Plaintiffs' Motion establish her damages at $14,649.50 in unpaid overtime wages and $14,649.50 in liquidated damages. (Doc. 51 at 2–3 and 14–15). Plaintiff Kathy Sue Porter's Declaration and Plaintiffs' Motion establish her damages at $5,064.00 in unpaid overtime wages and $5,064.00 in liquidated damages. (Id. at 3–4, 10, and 17–18). Plaintiff Sharon Dickens' Declaration and Plaintiffs' Motion establish her damages at $6,018.00 in unpaid overtime wages and $6,018.00 in liquidated damages. (Id. at 4, 10, 20–21, 48–59). ii. Rule 37 Attorney Fees When a court grants a Rule 37 sanction, it must order the disobedient party, the attorney advising that party, or both, to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 (b)(2)(C). Plaintiffs do not request attorney fees for their Motion to Strike Defendant's Answer and Final Default Judgment. (Doc. 51 at 62). The Court appreciates this gesture and declines to award Plaintiffs attorney fees because other circumstances make an award of fees unjust.[3] iii. FLSA Attorney Fees Plaintiffs request $29,545.50 in attorney fees and $1,263.29 in costs. (Doc. 51 at 10).[4] The FLSA entitles a prevailing plaintiff to reasonable attorney fees and costs. Black v. SettlePou, P.C., 732 F.3d 492, 502 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit follows the lodestar method for determining the reasonableness of attorney fees. Heidtman v. Cty. of El Paso, 171 F.3d 1038, 1043 (5th Cir. 1999). To determine appropriate attorney fees, the court multiplies the reasonable hourly fee by the number of hours reasonably expended on the case to arrive at a lodestar figure. Saizan v. Delta Concrete Prods. Co., Inc., 448 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 2006). The court must determine the compensable hours listed in the time records. Shipes v. Trinity Indus., 987 F.2d 311, 319 (5th Cir. 1993). Time charged for work that is “excessive, duplicative, or inadequately documented” should be excluded. Watkins v. Fordice, 7 F.3d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 1993). The party seeking a fee award must show the reasonableness of the hours billed. Saizan, 448 F.3d at 799. That party must also demonstrate the exercise of billing judgment. Id. “Billing judgment requires documentation of the hours charged and the hours written off as unproductive, excessive, or redundant.” Id. The court reduces an award by a percentage intended to substitute for the exercise of billing judgment if evidence of billing judgment is not submitted. Id. The court also must select “an appropriate hourly rate based on prevailing community standards for attorneys of similar experience in similar cases.” Shipes, 987 F.2d at 319. The party seeking fees must establish the market rate and should present the court with evidence showing the reasonableness of the proposed rate. Riley v. City of Jackson, Miss., 99 F.3d 757, 760 (5th Cir. 1996). The appropriate hourly rate is typically established through affidavits of other attorneys practicing in the community. Tollett v. City of Kemah, 285 F.3d 357, 368–69 (5th Cir. 2002). Also, the trial court may use its expertise to assess the value of an attorney's services. Davis v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs of Mobile Cty., 526 F.2d 865, 868 (5th Cir. 1976). *6 After determining the number of compensable hours and the appropriate hourly rate, the court multiplies one by the other to produce the “lodestar” amount. Shipes, 987 F.2d at 319. After calculating the lodestar, the court considers whether to adjust the figure upward or downward by looking to the twelve factors articulated in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–18 (5th Cir. 1974).[5] However, the court may not adjust the lodestar figure based on a Johnson factor already taken into account during the initial calculation. Saizan, 448 F.3d at 800; Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 553 (2010). “The most critical factor in determining an attorney's fee award is the degree of success achieved.” Saizan, 448 F.3d at 799 (quoting Singer v. City of Waco, Tex., 324 F.3d 813, 829 (5th Cir. 2003)). The fee award need not be precisely proportionate to the result obtained. Id. at 803–04. In a lawsuit initiated under the FLSA, “an attorney's failure to obtain every dollar sought on behalf of his client does not automatically mean that the modified lodestar amount should be reduced.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Furthermore, the court considers all of these factors while keeping in mind that it is common for FLSA attorney fees awards to significantly exceed the amount the plaintiff recovers in unpaid wages. See Howe v. Hoffman–Curtis Partners Ltd., LLP, 215 F. App'x 341, 342 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (finding it is not uncommon that attorney fee requests can exceed the amount of judgment in the case by many multiples). a. Reasonable Hourly Rate First, the Court must determine counsel's reasonable hourly rate by examining prevailing rates for attorneys of similar skill and experience in the relevant market. McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 649 F.3d 374, 381 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984)). This rate is usually established through affidavits of other attorneys practicing in the relevant community. Tollett, 285 F.3d at 368. The relevant community refers to “the judicial district in which the litigation occurred,” which is the Western District of Texas in this case. See Ramirez v. Lewis Energy Grp., L.P., 197 F. Supp. 3d 952, 956 (S.D. Tex. 2016). However, “the district court is itself an expert in assessing these matters.” Davis, 526 F.2d at 868 (citing Weeks v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 467 F.2d 95, 98 (5th Cir. 1972). Plaintiffs seek an hourly rate of $325 for Attorney Mary Scott, $135 for Senior Paralegal Patricia Haynes, and $275 for Attorney James Hunnicutt. (Doc. 51 at 61–62). The Court previously found the hourly rates of Mary Scott and Patricia Haynes reasonable. (Doc. 40 at 7–8). Attorney James Hunnicutt received a Juris Doctor degree from Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law in 2007 and has been a member of the State Bar of Texas since 2007. (Doc. 51 at 62 and 64). Mr. Hunnicutt is admitted to practice in the Northern, Southern, and Eastern Districts of Texas. (Id.). He has experience handling FLSA cases in federal courts, and similar cases involving employment discrimination as well as the Family and Medical Leave Act. (Id.). According to the 2015 State Bar of Texas hourly rate survey, the median hourly rate for attorneys with 7 to 15 years of experience in West Texas is $200 to $238.[6] Although above average, based on the above evidence; the prevailing market rate in this legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation; the Court's knowledge of rates in the relevant market; and the result obtained in this case; the Court finds James Hunnicutt's hourly rate of $275.00 reasonable. b. Number of Hours Reasonably Expended on the Litigation *7 The next step in the lodestar analysis is to determine the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation. As part of the reasonableness inquiry, the fee applicant must demonstrate the exercise of billing judgment. Saizan, 448 F.3d at 799. Billing judgment refers to the exclusion of hours that are excessive, redundant, or unproductive. Id. The remedy for lack of billing judgment is a reduction in hours “by a percentage intended to substitute for the exercise of billing judgment.” Id. The time records indicate that Mary Scott, Patricia Haynes, and James Hunnicutt logged 125.10 hours in this case. (Doc. 51 at 61–76). The attorney fees requested by Plaintiffs do not include time spent: (1) by counsel Jennifer Spencer in the case; (2) researching and preparing the Motion at issue; (3) creating the ADR Report, Mediation Statement, and preparing for mediation; (4) generating pretrial submissions; and (5) in internal conferences between counsel and paralegals. (Id. at 62–63). This unbilled work exceeds ten hours. (Id. at 63). Reviewing the time records and attachments, the Court finds Plaintiffs reasonably expended 125.10 hours on the litigation. Further, Plaintiffs' unbilled time shows the exercise of billing judgment. c. Johnson Adjustments and Calculation Plaintiffs request no enhancement under Johnson. (Id. at 62). Moreover, the Court finds no additional increases or reductions necessary based on the Johnson factors as the Court either considered the factors in the preceding sections or the factors do not apply in this case. The Court calculates the lodestar as 125.10 hours of legal services by Mary Scott, Patricia Haynes, and James Hunnicutt multiplied by their respective rates. (See Doc. 51 at 65–76). Accordingly, the Court awards Plaintiffs' $26,592.00 in attorney fees. Additionally, the Court again ORDERS Defendant to pay Plaintiffs' attorney fees of $2,953.50 — awarded in the Court's previous order. (Doc. 40). d. Costs Plaintiffs request $1,263.29 in litigation costs. (Doc. 51 at 11). Plaintiffs itemize their costs in an attachment to the Motion at issue. (Id. at 76). The Court finds Plaintiffs' costs reasonable when compared to costs in similar FLSA cases. Therefore, Plaintiffs' are entitled to recover $1,263.29 in litigation costs. iv. Pre and Post-Judgment Interest Prejudgment interest is not recoverable under the Plaintiffs' cause of action. The Fifth Circuit distinguishes between FLSA claims brought under 29 U.S.C. § 216, concerning actions to recover unpaid compensation and liquidated damages, and FLSA claims brought under § 217, concerning injunctions. See Knowlton v. Greenwood Indep. Sch. Dist., 957 F.2d 1172, 1183 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Cox v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 919 F.2d 354, 357 (5th Cir. 1990)). While prejudgment interest is available for claims brought under § 217, it is not available for claims brought under § 216. Saldana v. Zubha Foods, LLC, SA:13-CV-00033-DAE, 2013 WL 3305542, at *8 (W.D. Tex. June 28, 2013) (noting the reason for this distinction is not apparent); see also Henderson v. Fenwick Protective Inc., 3:14-CV-505-M-BN, 2015 WL 9582755, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 23, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, 3:14-CV-505-M, 2015 WL 9582147 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 28, 2015). Here, Plaintiffs seek to recover unpaid compensation and liquidated damages, and therefore the Court may not award prejudgment interest. (Doc. 51 at 10–11). However, an award of post-judgment interest is mandatory under 28 U.S.C. § 1961. Saldana, 2013 WL 3305542, at *8 (citing Meaux Surface Protection, Inc., v. Fogleman, 607 F.3d 161, 172 (5th Cir. 2010); Reeves v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 705 F.2d 750, 751 (5th Cir. 1983)). Consequently, the Court ORDERS that post-judgment interest is payable on all the above amounts allowable by law, at the applicable federal rate permitted by 28 U.S.C. § 1961, from the date of this judgment until paid. IV. CONCLUSION *8 Based on the preceding discussion, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendant's Answer and for Final Default Judgment. (Doc. 51). Pursuant to Rule 37, the Court ORDERS Defendant's Answer struck and enters a default and default judgment against Defendant. The Court assesses damages as follows: 1. $14,649.50 in unpaid overtime wages and $14,649.50 in liquidated damages to Plaintiff Tinnye Danette Haynes; 2. $5,064.00 in unpaid overtime wages and $5,064.00 in liquidated damages to Plaintiff Kathy Sue Porter; 3. $6,018.00 in unpaid overtime wages and $6,018.00 in liquidated damages to Plaintiff Sharon Dickens; 4. $26,592.00 in attorney fees; 5. $1,263.29 in costs; 6. $2,953.50 in unpaid attorney fees that the Court previously ordered Defendant to pay Plaintiffs (Doc. 40); 7. Post-judgment interest payable on all the above amounts allowable by law, at the applicable federal rate permitted by 28 U.S.C. § 1961, from the date of this judgment until paid; It is so ORDERED. SIGNED this 17th day of November, 2017. Footnotes [1] This justification does not explain the failure to appear. Further, when asked at the Final Pretrial Conference whether Defendant uses email to communicate with opposing counsel, Defendant indicated that she did not prefer email. (Doc 62 at 15:10–16:45). [2] Defendant states, “I have plenty of discriminating evidence about these women[,] but honestly I just want to get this [case] resolved and not go through everything that I know about them.” (Doc. 43). [3] The Court noted previously that confusion in the prosecution of this case prolonged litigation. (Doc. 63 at 3). It would be unjust to award attorney fees in a case that could have been concluded earlier. [4] $2,953.50 of the attorney fees requested were already awarded by the Court but remain unpaid. (Doc. 40). [5] The twelve Johnson factors are: (1) the time and labor required for the litigation; (2) the novelty and complication of the issues; (3) the skill required to properly litigate the issues; (4) whether the attorney had to refuse other work to litigate the case; (5) the attorney's customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) whether the client or case circumstances imposed any time constraints; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) whether the case was “undesirable;” (11) the type of attorney-client relationship and whether that relationship was long-standing; and (12) awards made in similar cases. Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717–19. [6] STATE BAR OF TEXAS, 2015 HOURLY FACT SHEET (2015), https://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Demographic_and_Economic_Trends&Template=/CM/Co... entDisplay.cfm&ContentID=34182