HOLLY WIER, Plaintiff, v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC., Defendant No. 19 CV 7000 United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division Filed: March 09, 2021 Counsel Michael J. Merrick, Merrick Law Firm LLC, Chicago, IL, Karen J. Doran, Karen J. Doran, Attorney at Law, LLC, Wheaton, IL, for Plaintiff. Sean C. Herring, Dana Elfvin, Sabreena Torez El-Amin, Jackson Lewis P.C., Chicago, IL, for Defendant. McShain, Heather K., United States Magistrate Judge ORDER *1 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Holly Wier's motion to compel discovery. [51].[1] For the reasons that follow, Wier's motion is granted in part and denied in part. Background Holly Wier has sued her former employer, United Airlines, Inc. (“United”), claiming failure to accommodate, discrimination, and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Illinois Human Rights Act, as well as interference, discrimination, and retaliation under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). [1]. Wier began working for United in December 1994. [Id.] 2, ¶ 6.[2] She worked in the company's Network Operations – Pilot Training Scheduling department. [51-2] 2.[3] According to Wier's Complaint, she applied for and received intermittent leave under the FMLA to care for her mother, who had a stroke in November 2015. [1] 3, ¶¶ 11–12. Wier only used “approximately one day of leave” before her mother's death in March 2016. [Id.] 3, ¶ 12. About six months later, in September 2016, Wier requested intermittent FMLA leave from August 2016 through August 2017 in order to attend therapy appointments and take care of her health condition (anxiety and depression). [Id.] 3, ¶¶ 13–14. Wier claims that United “repeatedly” requested medical documentation beyond that required by the FMLA, but ultimately approved her request in October 2016. [Id.] 3, ¶¶ 15–16. In July 2017, Wier sought an additional six months of intermittent FMLA leave, which United approved for the period of August 15, 2017 through February 15, 2018. [Id.] 3, ¶¶ 17–18. Wier alleges that, in August 2017, a representative of United contacted her therapist and asked the therapist to confirm that she had completed Wier's FMLA paperwork certifying her need for leave. [Id.] 4, ¶ 19. Wier further alleges that the United representative asked her therapist for medical information about Wier, including the therapist's thoughts about Wier's prognosis. [Id.] 4, ¶ 20. Wier alleges that her therapist advised the representative that, although Wier's treatment was going well with some improvement made, Wier would be unable to function without being able to use intermittent FMLA leave when necessary. [Id.] 4, ¶ 21. Wier claims that she received a letter from United in October 2017, which advised that additional information was needed for her FMLA certification, as her therapist's license had been cancelled or not renewed—of which Wier was “completely unaware.” [Id.] 4, ¶¶ 22–23. Wier's primary care physician sent a new FMLA certification to United on October 16, 2017. [Id.] 4, ¶ 26. *2 Wier alleges that, the next day, United managers called her into a meeting and “interrogated and berated her about her use of FMLA leave over the past two years.” [Id.] 4, ¶ 27. According to Wier, “Defendant purported to be concerned about Ms. Wier's ‘dependability’ and her ‘misuse of FMLA time.’ ” [Id.] 4, ¶ 28. Wier claims that, on October 26, 2017, she received a letter from United stating that her employment was terminated because it was “unlikely she was unaware that her therapist's license had lapsed” and she had “admittedly committed fraud” by completing the FMLA paperwork herself to have her claim approved. [Id.] 5, ¶ 30. In particular, the letter stated that Wier had violated United's “Working Together Guidelines,” pursuant to which employees are expected to be truthful in all communications and refrain from any activity in violation of local, state, or federal laws. [Id.] 5, ¶ 31. Wier claims that United's stated reason for terminating her employment is pretextual and seeks discovery aimed at exploring the veracity of United's purported reason. [Id.] 6, ¶ 41; [51] 3. Wier served her First Set of Interrogatories and First Requests for Production on April 23, 2020. [51] 1. United served its responses on August 18, 2020. [51-1, 51-3].[4] A week later, Wier's counsel sent a letter to defense counsel regarding, among other things, Wier's requests for information and documents as to other United employees “whom it terminated for alleged fraud.” [51] 3. Counsel met and conferred and exchanged correspondence relating to the requested discovery in September, October, and November 2020. [Id.]. United provided additional information on October 19 and served supplemental answers to two interrogatories on November 9, 2020. [51] 3; [51-2]. Wier filed the instant motion to compel on December 18, 2020. [51]. After United filed its response brief, the Court directed Wier to file a short reply, which she filed on January 22, 2021. [70]. Legal Standard “In ruling on a motion to compel, the discovery standard set forth in Rule 26(b) applies.” Mendez v. City of Chicago, No. 18-cv-6313, 2020 WL 4736399, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 14, 2020). Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party “may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The factors that bear upon proportionality are “the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Id. “Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Id. “The party requesting discovery bears the initial burden of establishing its relevancy.” Eternity Mart, Inc. v. Nature's Sources, LLC, No. 19-cv-02436, 2019 WL 6052366, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 2019). “If discovery appears relevant, the burden is on the party objecting to a discovery request to establish the request is improper.” Doe v. Loyola Univ. Chi., No. 18 CV 7335, 2020 WL 406771, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2020). “Magistrate judges have ‘extremely broad discretion in controlling discovery’ when matters are referred to them for discovery supervision.” Eternity Mart, 2019 WL 6052366, at *2 (quoting Jones v. City of Elkhart, 737 F.3d 1107, 1115 (7th Cir. 2013)). Discussion Wier claims that United “should be compelled to provide evidence concerning other employees whom it fired for alleged fraud.” [51] 3. In support, Wier points to the position statement United submitted to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) in May 2018 in response to Wier's charge of discrimination. Specifically, Wier highlights United's statement that it “consistently administers its policy of terminating employees who commit fraud.” [51-4] 2. Wier claims that her discovery requests were designed to “explore and test the veracity of that defense contention.” [51] 3. Wier seeks further responses to Request for Production (“RFP”) No. 16 and Interrogatory No. 11. *3 Interrogatory 11: With respect to Defendant's statement at page 4 of its U.S. E.E.O.C. Position Statement—“United consistently administers its policy of terminating employees who commit fraud”—identify the policy and all individuals Defendant questioned or accused of committing fraud, and specify those who were investigated and terminated or otherwise disciplined for that reason from 2010 to present. RFP 16: With respect to Defendant's statement at page 4 of its U.S. E.E.O.C. Position Statement—“United consistently administers its policy of terminating employees who commit fraud”—produce the policy and all documents regarding the individuals Defendant questioned, accused, investigated and/or terminated or otherwise disciplined for committing fraud from 2010 to present. [51-1] 9; [51-3] 7. United answered both requests by objecting that they were “overly broad, vague and ambiguous, and not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” [51-1] 9; [51-3] 8. United also referred Wier to its “Working Together Guidelines and Code of Ethics and Business Conduct.” [Id.]. United provided a supplemental answer to Interrogatory No. 11, in which it (1) identified two employees from Wier's department, Network Operations – Pilot Training Scheduling, whose employment was also terminated for engaging in “apparent fraud” and (2) directed Wier to seventeen pages within its document production. [51-2] 2. United limited this response to include employees terminated for fraud within the period of January 1, 2013 to October 31, 2017—when Wier's employment was terminated—as Wier agreed to limit her requests to that timeframe. [51] 5. Wier contests United's limitation of its response to those individuals in Wier's department as well as the sufficiency of its production relating to those individuals. Wier claims that a department-wide limitation is “unsupportable” because United's statement to the EEOC was “not limited in any way.” [Id.]. Additionally, Wier claims that United has refused to produce any documentation underlying the allegations of fraud against the two employees identified within her department. [Id.]. In particular, Wier alleges that United only provided a single-page document for the second employee, which fails to identify the allegedly fraudulent conduct. [Id.] (citing [51-5]). Wier states that she is entitled to “all investigative documents and internal communications relating to the termination of Employees #1 and #2 so that she can compare their conduct to her own and compare Defendant's investigations.” [Id.] 5–6. Moreover, Wier alleges that United “violated its own progressive discipline policy when it fired her, and so [she] has a right to know whether in fact United consistently fires employees alleged to have committed fraud.” [Id.] 6. Wier argues that a company's failure to follow its corrective action or progressive discipline policies constitutes evidence of pretext. [Id.]. Finally, Wier explains that her “request is standard ‘comparator evidence,’ which can be a primary source of evidence in discrimination cases.” [Id.] 6 (citation omitted). United responds that Wier's requests are neither relevant nor proportional to the needs of this case. As to relevance, United argues that “the lack of limitations as to the same decision-makers, types of fraud, or geographic scope relative to Plaintiff” renders Wier's requests irrelevant and overbroad. [64] 2–3. United states that, in order to prevail on her claims, Wier must “identify a similarly situated employee, who is not a member of her protected class, who engaged in the same behavior and was treated more favorably.” [Id.] 3–4. United states that Wier has not alleged that she is “similarly situated to employees outside the department in which she worked—let alone those in entirely different positions and states.” [Id.] 1. Nor has Wier specified “any discovery parameters bearing on membership in her alleged protected class (i.e., disability status, accommodation/FMLA leave status) or the type of conduct engaged in (i.e., FMLA fraud or fraud related to other types of leave).” [Id.] 4. United concludes that Wier has failed to provide “any explanation of how all of United's more than 90,000 employees across the country—regardless of job description and duties, supervisors, geographic locations, and qualifications—are directly comparable to her.” [Id.]. United asserts that it has met its discovery obligations by identifying relevant individuals responsive to Wier's requests: “those who are potentially similarly situated” to Wier. [Id.] 3–5. *4 United also argues that Wier's request for a “blanket disclosure” of all employees that have been terminated for fraud and all related documentation is not proportional to the needs of this case. [Id.] 5. United argues that Wier's “desire to ‘compare investigations’ and ‘explore’ the circumstances that led United to conclude that other terminated individuals engaged in fraud is insufficient [and] would undoubtedly result in irrelevant disputes and mini trials on issues that have nothing to do with Plaintiff's claims or United's defenses.” [Id.] 6. Rather, United claims that Wier's requests amount to a “classic fishing expedition,” as she has “given no reason to believe that anything relevant is likely to be found in the personnel records she seeks.” [Id.] (citation omitted). United argues that, even if the requested discovery was relevant, the burden of production would “significantly outweigh any minimal benefit” for two reasons. [Id.] 7. First, United claims that the requests “infringe on the privacy interests” of non-parties, as personnel records and especially those related to allegations of fraudulent conduct and termination are “sensitive and confidential.” [Id.]. Second, United argues that “the process of searching for and producing the requested information for over 90,000 employees nationwide for a 5-year period will be time consuming and cumbersome, and the costs are likely to be significant.” [Id.]. As an initial matter, the Court finds that Wier has obfuscated the scope and purpose of the discovery she seeks in her motion. With regard to what she seeks, Wier repeatedly stated in her motion that she sought discovery regarding individuals whose employment was terminated for fraud: “Defendant should be compelled to provide evidence concerning other employees whom it fired for alleged fraud” [51] 3; “Plaintiff is entitled to evidence concerning all other employees whom Defendant alleges it fired for fraud, since Defendant relies on its allegation, and represented to a federal agency, that where fraud is concerned, it consistently terminates employees” [Id.] 5; and “Plaintiff Holly Wier prays that this Court grant her Motion to Compel and order Defendant to identify all individuals it fired for fraud from January 1, 2013 through October 31, 2017 and produce all documents relating to those investigations and terminations.” [Id.] 6. In her reply, however, Wier claims that United “has adulterated the scope of Plaintiff's requests,” as Wier's requests “are not limited solely to employees whom United fired for fraud; they also seek evidence of others whom United did not terminate.” [70] 3. While it is true that Interrogatory No. 11 and RFP No. 16 are not limited to individuals whose employment was terminated for fraud, Wier's motion only contemplates terminated employees. Wier's reply brief clarified that she also seeks information and documents about individuals whose employment was not terminated, echoing the verbiage of her discovery requests, which seek “all individuals [United] questioned or accused of committing fraud, specify[ing] those who were investigated and terminated or otherwise disciplined for that reason, and produc[ing] all documents regarding the individuals Defendant questioned, accused, investigated, and/or terminated or otherwise disciplined for committing fraud from January 1, 2013 through October 31, 2017.” [Id.] 5. As to why Wier seeks the requested discovery, the Court also finds Wier's explanations at cross-purposes. For example, Wier stated in her motion to compel that she is “entitled to all investigative documents and internal communications relating to the termination of Employees #1 and #2 so that she can compare their conduct to her own and compare Defendant's investigations.” [51] 5–6. Wier also stated that her “request is standard ‘comparator evidence,’ which can be a primary source of evidence in discrimination cases.” [Id.] 6. In her reply, however, Wier claims that United “misrepresents Plaintiff's discovery requests as simply an attempt to compare United's treatment of her to other employees, but that is not her purpose.” [70] 2. She reiterates this point several times: “Defendant argues that Plaintiff is seeking information for purposes of comparator analysis, but that misrepresents Plaintiff's requests”; “Again, Plaintiff's purpose is not to seek comparator data through these requests, but rather evidence concerning United's defense;” and “Again, comparator evidence of this sort is not what Plaintiff's discovery requests seek.” [Id.] 3–5. With respect to Wier's statement that her “request is standard ‘comparator evidence,’ ” Wier explains that she “merely noted in passing in the final sentence of her memoranda that the information sought will necessarily include so-called comparator evidence commonly used in discrimination cases.” [Id.] 3. In sum, Wier claims that United has attempted to “reimagine” and “re-frame” her arguments and “adulterate” the scope of her requests, [70] 2–3, but it is Wier's own language that has muddied the landscape. *5 At base, Wier asserts two theories to support the discoverability of information and documents concerning other United employees investigated for fraud—whether or not disciplined, up to and including termination. First is the comparator evidence theory. Wier seeks to demonstrate that United's proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her employment (i.e., fraud) is pretextual through comparison to other employees. Indeed, while not the primary aim of her discovery requests, Wier recognizes that the discovery she seeks—comparator evidence—“can be a primary source of evidence in discrimination cases” and “is a legitimate way for a plaintiff to establish pretext through circumstantial evidence.” [51] 6; [70] 4. Second is the general untrustworthiness theory. Wier seeks to “test the veracity” of United's statement to the EEOC that it “consistently administers its policy of terminating employees who commit fraud.” [51] 3, 5. Wier suggests that, if the evidence reveals that United did not have a policy of “terminating employees who commit fraud,” or did not “consistently administer” that policy, a jury “is entitled to question United's credibility (it lied to the EEOC) and question the veracity of its proffered legitimate reason (pretext).” [70] 3. The Court addresses each of these theories in turn. A. Comparator Evidence As noted above, Wier's briefing presents a conflicted front regarding her desire to use the requested discovery for comparator evidence. This Court ordered Wier to address United's argument that her discovery requests are overbroad because they contain no limitations relating to the employees to whom Wier seeks to compare herself. [66]. In response, Wier “point[s] out that the discovery of ‘comparator evidence’ is a legitimate way for a plaintiff to establish pretext through circumstantial evidence.” [70] 4. “[A]n employment discrimination plaintiff may demonstrate pretext by providing evidence that a similarly situated employee outside her protected class received more favorable treatment.” Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 841 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Morrow v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 152 F.3d 559, 561 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Whether couched in terms of establishing a prima facie case or in terms of demonstrating pretext, the inquiry remains the same: The plaintiffs in this case have the burden of showing that similarly-situated female employees—that is, female employees who had been the subject of comparable complaints of sexual harassment—were treated more favorably than the plaintiffs.”). Although Wier acknowledges that pretext can be established through comparison to similarly situated employees, she ostensibly refuses to accept a conception of “similarly situated” that does not include all employees nationwide who were questioned about, accused of, investigated for and/or terminated or otherwise disciplined for committing fraud from January 1, 2013 to October 31, 2017. Wier states only that United seeks to limit its discovery responses to “a tiny group of employees who are essentially clones of Plaintiff” and notes that the case law calls for “comparators, not clones.” [70] 4 (citing Coleman, 667 F.3d at 846). Wier is correct that “similarly situated” does not mean “identical in every conceivable way.” Coleman, 667 F.3d at 846; see also Gates v. Caterpillar, Inc., 513 F.3d 680, 690 (7th Cir. 2008) (“We recognize that to satisfy her burden [plaintiff] need not show that other employees are explicitly identical to herself—indeed, that would be a nearly insurmountable burden and this Court repeatedly has cautioned against a hyper-technical approach to this prong.”). But Seventh Circuit case law, including that to which Wier cites, makes clear that Wier's concept of “similarly situated” pushes the pendulum too far in the other direction. “There must be ‘enough common factors ... to allow for a meaningful comparison in order to divine whether intentional discrimination was at play.’ ” Coleman, 667 F.3d at 847 (quoting Barricks v. Eli Lilly & Co., 481 F.3d 556, 560 (7th Cir. 2007)). Typically, a plaintiff must at least show that the comparators (1) “dealt with the same supervisor”; (2) “were subject to the same standards”; and (3) “had engaged in similar conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances as would distinguish their conduct or the employer's treatment of them.” Gates, 513 F.3d at 690 (quoting Snipes v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 291 F.3d 460, 463 (7th Cir. 2002)). *6 Courts have drawn attention to the importance of common decision-makers in this analysis—a factor Wier does not acknowledge. “When the same supervisor treats an otherwise equivalent employee better, one can often reasonably infer that an unlawful animus was at play. The inference of discrimination is weaker when there are different decision-makers, since they ‘may rely on different factors when deciding whether, and how severely, to discipline an employee.’ ” Coleman, 667 F.3d at 847 (quoting Ellis v. UPS, 523 F.3d 823, 826 (7th Cir. 2008)); Timms v. Frank, 953 F.2d 281, 287 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining that “it is difficult to say that the difference was more likely than not the result of intentional discrimination when two different decision-makers are involved”). Thus, the Seventh Circuit “generally requires a plaintiff to demonstrate at a minimum that a comparator was treated more favorably by the same decision-maker who fired the plaintiff.” Coleman, 667 F.3d at 848; see also Paulcheck v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., No. 09 C 4226, 2010 WL 1727856, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 2010) (“Decisions made by other decision-makers than those responsible for decisions affecting the plaintiff are not proper objects of discovery in cases involving harassment or claims of unequal treatment.”). While United notes that Wier's discovery requests lack any limitation as to department or decision-maker(s), its response brief does not address the relevant decision-maker in this case. Nor does Wier. Based on the Court's review of United's initial interrogatory answers, “Rick McNabb made the decision to terminate Plaintiff's employment on or around October 24, 2017.” [51-1] 7. While the briefs do not address whether Wier's department contained more than one manager or supervisor, this is of no moment, as United has already expanded its discovery responses to include department-wide comparators. In its supplemental answer to Interrogatory No. 11, United identified and produced termination materials relating to other employees in the Network Operations – Pilot Training Scheduling department, who were terminated for engaging in apparent fraud between January 1, 2013 and October 31, 2017. [51-2] 2. Wier has made no argument nor pointed the Court to evidence suggesting that other decision-makers were involved and thus a broader comparator pool is warranted, other than to say “clones” are not required. Paulcheck, 2010 WL 1727856, at *1–3 (finding irrelevant material relating to “perhaps 250 of the defendant's other employees” in age discrimination case and explaining, “Without any evidentiary support that decision-making was indeed centralized—an argument the motion does not even make, let alone prove, and which, in any event, the defendant has denied—the plaintiff's request amounts to nothing more than a ‘fishing expedition’ ....”) (citation omitted). Woods v. Von Maur, Inc., No. 09 C 7800, 2010 WL 3420187 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2010) is instructive as to the bounds of this type of discovery based on decision-maker involvement. In Woods, the plaintiff, a sales associate at the defendant's Glenview store, claimed she was discriminated against because of her race and fired in retaliation for complaining about it. Id. at *1. The defendant claimed it terminated her for violations of its price adjustment policy for employees, which the plaintiff denied, adding that white employees who violated those policies were not fired. Id. The plaintiff moved to compel information and documents regarding “other employees who violated defendant's employee price adjustment policies,” explaining that “the information sought [was] relevant as to how defendant treated other employees who violated the same policy plaintiff [was] accused of violating.” Id. at *3. While the plaintiff limited her requests to those employees who had violated a price adjustment policy and were supervised by the regional director of stores (one of the decision-makers in her termination), the plaintiff argued that she was entitled to information regarding all employees who had violated the policies in the director's region, comprising four additional stores. Id. *7 The district court granted the motion to compel on this issue,[5] explaining, “If an employer makes an employment decision locally, a court may properly limit discovery to the plaintiff's local work unit.” Id. at *3. If, however, a plaintiff can establish that “the employment decision was made by someone outside of her work unit, then she is entitled to broader discovery.” Id. (citation omitted). Based on the information presented by the parties, the court found that the plaintiff's store manager made the decision to terminate the plaintiff and the regional director “exercised her right of approval.” Id. at *4. Wier has provided no such evidence here. The Court also considers the type of conduct when analyzing the comparator pool. The Seventh Circuit has held that “acts of comparable seriousness need not be violations of identical company disciplinary rules.” Hiatt v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 26 F.3d 761, 770 (7th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). Rather, “[p]laintiffs are free to compare similar conduct, focusing more on the nature of the misconduct rather than on specific company rules.” Id.; see also Garduno v. Quaker Oats Co., 863 F. Supp. 676, 679–80 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (echoing Hiatt). Here, while United points out that Wier has failed to apply any limitation regarding Wier's alleged behavior (i.e., fraud), its production to date includes fraud beyond that related to FMLA leave. United stated that, of the other two employees in Wier's department who were terminated for fraud, the first “engaged in inappropriate activities while purportedly on sick leave” and the second falsified an employment application. [64] 5. United has thus contemplated and produced documents based on similar—rather than identical—conduct. Even as to the other two terminated employees from Wier's department, Wier raises issues regarding the completeness of United's production thus far. First, Wier claims that United produced only a one-page document regarding one of the other employees in Wier's department who was terminated for fraud, and that page “does not even mention the conduct alleged to have been fraudulent.” [51] 5. Wier attached this page as an exhibit to her motion. [51-5]. The Court's review of this document confirms that it identifies the fraudulent conduct: “Resignation Reason: Released—Violation of Rules”; “Remarks: Employee falsified employment application.” [Id.]. Second, Wier claims that United has “refused to provide Plaintiff with documents underlying the allegations of fraud against the two disclosed employees.” [51] 5. United responds, “Although there is no indication that either of these employment terminations are relevant to Plaintiff's claims or that further records are likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, Plaintiff continues inappropriately to seek underlying investigation records and all internal communications regarding the terminations.” [64] 5. Wier also takes issue with the limitation to these two terminated employees, though pinning down her specific request is difficult. Wier's Interrogatory No. 9 requests that United identify “all individuals Defendant questioned or accused of committing fraud.” [51-1] 9. And Wier's RFP No. 16 requests that United provide “all documents regarding the individuals Defendant questioned, accused, investigated and/or terminated or otherwise disciplined for committing fraud.” [51-3] 7. Indeed, based on the wording of these requests, Wier purports to seek records for individuals who were merely “questioned” about or “accused” of fraud, which of course may or may not have resulted in an investigation (or even been known to a decision-maker, given the generic nature of “questioning” or “accusing” someone). *8 The Court will not order United to search for and produce records regarding individuals who United ultimately did not determine to have committed fraud. United will, however, need to supplement its department-wide production to include individuals, if any, who it determined had committed fraud, yet ultimately were not terminated for that reason, as such materials are relevant to Wier's claims of pretext and United's defenses. Additionally, the Court agrees with Wier as to the parties' dispute regarding production of the underlying fraud investigation documents and emails. The Court finds these documents are relevant to the claims and defenses and do not implicate the proportionality concerns contemplated by a company-wide production. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The Court orders United to produce any non-privileged emails and investigation documents on all such employees, including any documents not yet produced for the two other terminated employees in Wier's department. While United maintains that Wier has not sufficiently shown that the two terminations within Wier's department, or further documents regarding the investigations underlying those terminations, are relevant to her claims, the Court disagrees. [64] 5. Indeed, even documents regarding employees who were terminated for fraud may yield relevant information (e.g., multiple infractions or prior warnings before termination). Such evidence may bear on Wier's claims or United's defenses. [51] 6.[6] The Court finds, however, that documents and information regarding employees outside of Wier's department are not relevant to the claims and defenses in this case. “In order for information regarding the way other employees were treated to be relevant, they must be similarly situated. If they are not, any comparison is meaningless—it is between apples and apples rather than one between apples and oranges.” Paulcheck, 2010 WL 1727856, at *2 (internal quotations and citation omitted). The comparison Wier proposes fails to meet this standard. B. General Untrustworthiness Perhaps recognizing that every employee in a 90,000-employee enterprise will not be similarly situated to her, Wier seeks an end-run around the “similarly-situated” requirement in order to achieve the same goal: gather as many documents as she can to hopefully establish that United's proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for firing her is pretextual. Wier insists that she “is entitled to test the veracity” of United's statement to the EEOC that it “consistently administers its policy of terminating employees who commit fraud.” [51] 3, 5. In other words, if the evidence shows that United (1) does not have such a policy; or (2) fails to “consistently” implement it, a jury would be entitled to question United's credibility and, in turn, the truthfulness of its purported reason for firing her. [70] 3. Wier's purported tactic is simple: identify as many cases as possible where United did not terminate someone who it determined had committed some type of fraud. Each instance would serve to poke holes in the dam in the hopes that enough instances would reduce it to rubble and show that either the policy or its enforcement is a sham. United's alleged willingness to lie about this makes it more likely that it lied about why Wier was terminated, she ostensibly claims. This is precisely the type of fishing expedition that could be applied to a panoply of scenarios in every case in every court. Wier cites case law addressing false statements to the EEOC as bearing on the issue of an employer's credibility. [51] 5. These cases, however, involved misrepresentations by employers as to specific instances, for which targeted discovery was appropriate (e.g., dispute over date decision-maker acquired knowledge of terminated employee's protected activity). This is not the scenario Wier envisions in this case. Wier argues that because United did not limit its statement to the EEOC, she need not limit her requests. [70] 4–5. “But discovery, like all matters of procedure, has ultimate and necessary boundaries.” Paulchek, 2010 WL 1727856, at *4 (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947)). For many of the same reasons addressed above, discovery limitations must exist, else parties could attempt to claim they are entitled to vast troves of documents to show—by the presence or absence of something, among thousands or perhaps millions of instances—some relevance. *9 Wier claims that she is “chasing down the truth of United's articulated defense that it fires all employees whom it believes committed fraud, and that it just applied that neutral policy to Plaintiff.” [70] 3. This chase is too far. Wier's motion to compel discovery on this basis is thus denied. In accordance with the above, the Court grants the motion to compel as to department-wide information and documents and denies it otherwise. The production will be limited to: individuals determined to have committed fraud, whether or not disciplined (including termination), within the Network Operations – Pilot Training Scheduling department from January 1, 2013 through October 31, 2017. This includes any underlying investigation documents and non-privileged internal correspondence relating to those investigations. United shall make this production to Wier within 14 days of this order. Conclusion Wier's motion to compel [51] is granted in part and denied in part as provided above. Footnotes [1] Bracketed numbers refer to entries on the district court docket. Referenced page numbers are taken from the CM/ECF header placed at the top of filings. [2] According to United's Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Plaintiff's Complaint, “Wier was employed by United in Chicago, Illinois between December 5, 1994 and October 21, 2008, and again between November 9, 2011 and October 27, 2017.” [15] 3. [3] Based on the record before the Court, it is unclear whether Wier was employed within this department for the entirety of her employment with United. Nonetheless, United's discovery responses indicate that Wier worked within this department for the period relevant to the instant discovery dispute, which is January 1, 2013 to October 31, 2017. [Id.]; see infra. [4] Wier's motion states that United answered her discovery requests on August 19, 2020, [51] 1, but the responses are dated August 18, 2020. [51-1, 51-3]. [5] The district court ordered the defendant to provide “information and documents regarding employees in [the regional director]'s region who were disciplined or discharged for violating defendant's employee purchase policies, including the price adjustment policy.” Id. at *4. [6] In making its production, United need not include personnel documents unrelated to the relevant fraud allegations or investigations.