VYSE GELATIN COMPANY n/k/a VyGC Inc., Plaintiff, v. JEFFREY HICKS and JT NATURALS, USA, LLC, Defendants Case No. 17-cv-02937 United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division Filed: February 11, 2020 Counsel Mark Elliott Furlane, Berger, Newmark & Fenchel P.C., Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff. Ankur V. Shah, Shah Legal Representation, Chicago, IL, for Defendants. Pacold, Martha M., Judge ORDER *1 Before the court are the request for attorney's fees [76] and second motion for sanctions [79] by plaintiff VYSE Gelatin Company n/k/a VyGC, Inc. (“VyGC”) against defendants Jeffrey Hicks and JT Naturals, USA, LLC. For the reasons set forth below: VyGC's request for attorney's fees [76] is granted in part and denied in part. Defendants are directed to pay plaintiff, within 28 days of this order (by March 10, 2020), $5,940 for plaintiff's attorney's fees incurred in connection with its first motion for sanctions. VyGC's second motion for sanctions [79] is granted in part and denied in part. As a sanction for defendants' failure to comply with the June 3, 2019 Order and the earlier October 18, 2018 order, under Rule 37(b)(2), the court: (1) orders defendants to provide to VyGC, within 28 days of this order (March 10, 2020),[1] the discovery set forth below in this order (see Rule 37(b)(2)(A)), and (2) awards VyGC its reasonable attorney's fees related to the second motion for sanctions (see Rule 37(b)(2)(C)). VyGC is directed to submit a fee request, supported by reasonable documentation, by February 28, 2020; any objections by defendants are due by March 13, 2020. The fee award must be paid within 28 days of the court's order disposing of the fee request. The court extends the briefing schedule on defendants' motion to amend answer and for other relief (Dkt. 114) as follows: plaintiff's response to Dkt. 114 is due April 7, 2020; defendants' reply in support of Dkt. 114 is due April 28, 2020.[2] The next status hearing is set for March 18, 2020 at 10:00 a.m. STATEMENT This case involves VyGC's efforts to collect approximately $75,880 from defendants (Hicks and a company controlled by Hicks). VyGC alleges that from December 2015 through February 2016, defendants ordered products, goods, and services from VyGC, and that VyGC delivered them and invoiced defendants for $80,880. (Dkt. 53 at 1-2 (Dow, J.).)[3] VyGC alleges that defendants have not contested the underlying invoices, that defendant Hicks tendered a check for $59,280 that was returned twice for insufficient funds, that Hicks agreed to a payment plan, executed a personal guarantee, and agreed to pay costs and attorney's fees incurred by plaintiff in collecting the debts, and that defendants have paid only $5,000 of the $80,880 owed. (Id.) *2 On August 22, 2016, VyGC (then known as VYSE Gelatin Company) filed this lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Cook County. (Id. at 2.) On April 19, 2017, defendants removed the case to federal court. (Dkt. 1.) The parties filed various motions, including defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (Dkt. 31) and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 41). The prior judge denied both of those motions on August 20, 2018. (Dkt. 53.) On August 28, 2018, VyGC served defendants with written discovery (interrogatories and document production requests). (Dkt. 71 at 1 (Dow, J.).) Defendants' responses and objections were due September 27, 2018. (Id.) Defendants failed to respond or object to the discovery. (Id.) On October 12, 2018, VyGC filed a motion to compel. (Dkt. 57.) On October 18, 2018, the prior judge granted VyGC's motion to compel discovery and set a November 1, 2018 deadline for defendants to respond to the outstanding discovery responses. (Dkt. 60 (Dow, J.).) The October 18, 2018 order emphasized that the November 1, 2018 deadline was a “FINAL deadline.” (Id.) On November 5, 2018, VyGC moved for sanctions (the first motion for sanctions), pointing to deficiencies in defendants' discovery responses and first document production. (Dkt. 62.) On June 3, 2019, the prior judge, acting under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2), granted VyGC's first motion for sanctions for defendants' failure to comply with the October 18, 2018 order setting the final discovery deadline. (See Dkt. 71 (June 2019 Order) (Dow, J.).) The June 2019 Order concluded that defendants' discovery responses were untimely and that defendants had therefore waived any objections (id. at 3); struck defendants' affirmative defenses as a sanction for defendants' failure to comply with their discovery obligations (specifically, the October 18, 2018 order) (id.); directed defendants, within 14 days, to respond fully to the discovery and to produce a privilege log as required by Rule 26(b)(5) (id.); awarded VyGC reasonable attorney's fees related to the first motion for sanctions and directed the submission of a fee request and any objections (id.); and warned defendants that “[i]f Defendants again fail to comply with a Court order, including this order, the Court will entertain a renewed motion for entry of default judgment” (id.). After the June 2019 Order, the parties briefed the request for attorney's fees. (Dkts. 76, 78.) On June 28, 2019, VyGC filed a second motion for sanctions, challenging the adequacy of defendants' supplemental discovery responses (provided in response to the June 2019 Order) and seeking default judgment. (Dkt. 79.) That motion was fully briefed. (Dkts. 85 (response), 86 (reply).) The case was then reassigned to this judge. (Dkt. 88.) The court addresses in turn (1) VyGC's request for attorney's fees and (2) VyGC's second motion for sanctions. Request for Attorney's Fees The June 2019 Order awarded VyGC “reasonable attorneys' fees related to its motion for sanctions” (i.e., the November 5, 2018 first motion for sanctions (Dkt. 62), granted in the June 2019 order). (Dkt. 71 at 3 (Dow, J.).) It also set deadlines for VyGC to submit a fee request and for defendants to submit any objections, and directed that “[t]he fee award must be paid within 28 days of the Court's order disposing of the fee request.” (Id.) VyGC submitted its fee request (Dkt. 76) and defendants submitted objections (Dkt. 78). Before the court are the fee request and the objections. *3 Attorney's fee awards are typically calculated using the lodestar method—multiplying the reasonable hourly rate by the hours reasonably expended. Johnson v. GDF, Inc., 668 F.3d 927, 929 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Golden v. City of Chicago, No. 13-cv-01477, 2015 WL 12839131, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2015) (applying lodestar method to request for attorney's fees incurred in pursuing motion to compel). Hours are not reasonably expended if they are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary. Stark v. PPM Am., Inc., 354 F.3d 666, 674 (7th Cir. 2004). The best evidence of whether attorney's fees are reasonable is whether a party has paid them. Cintas Corp. v. Perry, 517 F.3d 459, 469–70 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Balcor Real Estate Holdings, Inc. v. Walentas-Phoenix Corp., 73 F.3d 150, 153 (7th Cir. 1996). Here, VyGC requested $5,967.50 in attorney's fees, which it calculated by multiplying its attorney's rate of $275 per hour by the 21.7 hours spent on the motion for sanctions and request for attorney's fees. (Dkt. 76 at 2 ¶¶ 2-3.) VyGC paid its attorney $5,472.50 (19.9 x $275) for the 19.9 hours worked on the motion for sanctions but, at the time its request was filed, had not paid the additional $495 (1.8 x $275) for the 1.8 hours worked on the request for attorney's fees. (Id.) In support of the request, VyGC submitted its attorney's bill and time keeping entries. (Id. at 4-7 (Exs. 1-2).) In response, defendants list a series of complaints regarding VyGC's company name, VyGC's legal status, and a 2016 asset sale by VYSE Gelatin Company (now known as VyGC); argue that the court should not award attorney's fees because the sanctions were unwarranted; and request that if fees are awarded, they be reduced to $30 because the motion for sanctions should have taken 0.3 hours (or eighteen minutes) at a rate of $100 per hour. (Dkt. 78 at 4-6.) Some of defendants' complaints regarding the 2016 asset sale were addressed in the prior judge's August 20, 2018 Memorandum Opinion and Order, which, among other things, denied defendants' motion to dismiss based on the asset sale. (Dkt. 53 at 8-10.) Defendants now raise a new argument, that VyGC Inc. lacks good standing, according to the Illinois Secretary of State website (Dkt. 78 at 2, 3, 5, 7); but they provide no legal authority explaining why this affects the reasonableness of the fee request, and a search of the Illinois Secretary of State website reveals that VyGC Inc. is currently listed as “active.”[4] Defendants' objections regarding the basis for the sanctions were addressed in the prior judge's June 2019 Order. (Dkt. 71.) Defendants do not provide a basis to revisit the prior judge's orders. The court declines to do so.[5] *4 All that remains is whether the amount of fees that VyGC requests is reasonable. The court has reviewed VyGC's request and supporting documentation, which include counsel's June 10, 2019 bill, the supplemental time entries dated June 14, 2019, and counsel's biography. (Dkt. 76.) Based on these materials, the court finds that counsel's hourly rate of $275 is reasonable and that counsel reasonably spent 21.6 hours litigating the motion for sanctions and request for attorney's fees. Plaintiff's calculation is based on 21.7 hours, but plaintiff included the June 3, 2019 entry for 0.1 hours twice. (Compare Dkt. 76 at 5 (Ex. 1) with id. at 6 (Ex. 2).) Thus, the court reduces the time to 21.6 hours. 21.6 hours times the reasonable hourly rate of $275 results in a fee award of $5,940.00. As contemplated by the June 2019 Order, defendants are ordered to pay plaintiff, within 28 days of this order, $5,940.00 for plaintiff's attorney's fees incurred in connection with the November 5, 2018 motion for sanctions. Second Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(A), district courts “may issue further just orders,” including imposing appropriate sanctions, against a party that fails to obey a discovery order.[6] District courts have wide latitude in fashioning appropriate sanctions. e360 Insight, Inc. v. Spamhaus Project, 658 F.3d 637, 642 (7th Cir. 2011). Sanctions shall be “just” and “proportionate to the circumstances surrounding a party's failure to comply with discovery” obligations. Melendez v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 79 F.3d 661, 672 (7th Cir. 1996). The June 2019 Order directed defendants to respond fully to plaintiff's August 28, 2018 interrogatories and document requests within 14 days. (Dkt. 71 at 3.) That order explained that defendants' previous responses were deficient because: • In defendants' discovery responses on November 1, 2018 (the final deadline set by the October 18, 2018 order), defendants objected to every interrogatory and every request to produce, but defendants “ha[d] not identified any basis for finding that Defendants had good cause for failing to respond to the Discovery in a timely manner,” and therefore defendants waived any objections to the discovery; • Defendants did not produce a privilege log as required by Rule 26(b)(5); • Defendants did not provide substantive responses to the interrogatories, other than by making general references to documents, and even then, did not provide citations to specific pages or documents; • Defendants' document production was deficient. “For example, Defendants did not produce any purchase orders, invoices, bill of ladings, checks, checking account records, or other similar documents requested. The few pages of emails produced by Defendants postdate the requested business dealings and communications between the parties.” (Id. at 1-2.) After the June 2019 Order, the court granted defendants a brief unopposed extension of time to complete discovery. (Dkt. 77.) On June 24, 2019, defendants produced additional documents and a privilege log. (Dkt. 79 at 3 ¶ 5; Dkts. 79-2, 79-3, 79-5.) Defendants did not provide any supplemental responses to interrogatories. On June 28, 2019, VyGC filed a second motion for sanctions (Dkt. 79). In the second motion for sanctions, VyGC requests a default judgment against defendants for failure to comply with the June 2019 Order. (Dkt. 79 at 1.) VyGC contends that defendants' supplemental production does not adequately correct the deficiencies identified in the June 2019 Order. (Id. at 4-10.) Defendants filed a response opposing sanctions on various grounds. (See Dkt. 85 at 9-15.) VyGC filed a reply. (Dkt. 86.) The second motion for sanctions is before the court. The first question is whether defendants' supplemental production complied with the June 2019 Order. *5 As noted above, on June 24, 2019, defendants produced additional documents and a privilege log. (Dkt. 79 at 3 ¶ 5; Dkts. 79-2, 79-3, 79-5.) Defendants' supplemental production consists of 184 pages—105 pages of which were taken from VyGC's previous document production to defendants—and a two-entry privilege log. (See Dkt. 79 at 3-4 ¶¶ 5-7; Dkts. 79-3, 79-5.) The June 2019 Order ruled that defendants had waived the objections to discovery, including the objections to the interrogatories; yet defendants did not supplement their responses to the interrogatories. VyGC's current motion for sanctions contends that defendants' supplemental discovery responses remain deficient: • VyGC states, as noted above, that 105 of the 184 pages in defendants' supplemental production were taken from VyGC's previous document production to defendants. (Dkt. 79 at 3 ¶ 6.) • As to the remaining 78 pages, VyGC contends: “The documents again postdate the NSF [nonsufficient funds] checks and contemporaneous business transactions predating the NSF checks. Again, the supplemental production does not contain the requested purchase orders, bills of lading, contracts, agreements, banking and checking account records, or other requested contemporaneous documents.” (Dkt. 79 at 6 ¶ 10.) • VyGC provides a summary of the 78 pages in defendants' supplemental production, other than the 105 pages that VyGC had previously produced to defendants. (Id. at 7-8 ¶ 12.) VyGC contends: “Defendants seemingly pad their supplemental production with recent documents and documents postdating this litigation, including those copied from the state and federal court filings. The supplemental production again fails to produce the requested contemporaneous original business records predating the NSF checks the Defendants issued in February and March 2016, and in fact only one page is from before 2017, and that was a page produced to Defendants by Plaintiff in this federal suit.” (Id.) • VyGC further contends: “Only JTPROD0272-JTPROD0273, a two page document ... appears to be a new relevant document. This summary is a road map for identifying many of the requested original purchase orders, bills of lading, banking records, and other contemporaneous documents requested in the Discovery but which Defendants did not produce.... [T]he underlying source documents and detail reflected” in this document “were not produced.” (Id. at 9 ¶ 13 (footnote omitted).) • VyGC also contends that defendants have not supplemented their answers to the interrogatories. (Id. at 4-6 ¶¶ 8-9.) Defendants argue that their failure to respond was not in bad faith because they have produced “all discoverable nonprivileged emails between the parties and third parties,” and other documents either have been produced or “should not be discoverable ... absent a judgment.” (Dkt. 85 at 13-14.) Defendants contend that they have made a good faith effort to respond and ask that the court require VyGC to clarify the outstanding discovery requests and allow supplemental production and responses. (Id. at 14.) Having reviewed the 78 pages of the supplemental production attached to VyGC's second motion for sanctions (Dkt. 79-5) and the other exhibits to the motion (particularly Dkts. 79-2 (transmittal email) and 79-3 (privilege log)), the court concludes that defendants have not fully responded to the discovery, as required by the June 2019 Order, for essentially the reasons VyGC explains in the second motion for sanctions. The primary issue is that the document production is not sufficient. First, VyGC states (Dkt. 79 at 3 ¶ 6), and defendants do not contest, that the majority of defendants' supplemental production (105 of 184 pages) is a reproduction to VyGC of documents VyGC had previously produced to defendants (the Asset Purchase Agreement (APA) and schedules from the 2016 asset sale). Defendants argue that the APA was responsive to VyGC's discovery requests seeking documents relevant to defendants' defenses. (Dkt. 85 at 13.) However, defendants knew that VyGC already had the APA, since defendants received it from VyGC, so the document does not go very far toward demonstrating meaningful production efforts by defendants. *6 Second, defendants still have not produced the specific business and financial documents that VyGC requested, and the prior judge ordered in the June 2019 Order. (Compare Dkt. 71 at 2 (“Defendants' actual production of documents was deficient .... For example, Defendants did not produce any purchase orders, invoices, bill of ladings, checks, checking account records, or other similar documents requested. The few pages of emails produced by Defendants postdate the requested business dealings and communications between the parties.”); with Dkt. 79 at 3-4 ¶¶ 6-7, 6-9 ¶¶ 10-13; Dkt. 79-5 (78 pages of defendants' supplemental production).) As VyGC notes, defendants did produce a two-page document that refers to other underlying source documents, such as checks, bills, and purchase orders (Dkt. 79-5 at 45-46, JTPROD0272-JTPROD0273). Defendants, however, did not produce the underlying source documents, as required by the June 2019 Order. Nor have defendants provided supplemental interrogatory responses without the waived objections, as required by the June 2019 Order. As to the privilege log, the log contains two entries, both of which postdate the period of time covered by VyGC's document requests. Defendants' supplemental discovery responses did not comply with the June 2019 Order. Absent a sufficient argument otherwise, the record would support additional sanctions, potentially including default judgment, as the June 2019 Order warned. The court turns to defendants' arguments. Defendants oppose sanctions on the grounds that (i) VyGC's discovery requests are improper; (ii) VyGC failed to confer with defendants before moving for sanctions and refused to clarify, specify, or discuss what documents plaintiffs needed; (iii) defendants provided timely discovery twice; (iv) any failure by defendants was not willful or done with bad faith; (v) default judgment is a drastic remedy; and (vi) VyGC failed to produce discovery to defendants in a timely fashion. (See Dkt. 85 at 9-15.) First, defendants argue that VyGC's discovery requests are improper. This argument was available to defendants during the briefing on plaintiff's first motion for sanctions, the motion that the prior judge granted in the June 2019 Order. The June 2019 Order concluded that defendants waived their objections to the discovery requests when they did not provide a timely response or identify any basis for finding good cause for the delay. (See Dkt. 71 at 1-2 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4) (“[a]ny untimely objection to an interrogatory is waived, unless the court excuses the failure for good cause”) and citing Woods v. Cook Cty., Illinois, No. 13-cv-02607, 2014 WL 7261277, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 19, 2014)).) To accept now the argument that the discovery requests were improper, the court would have to reconsider the June 2019 Order on the basis of an argument that defendants could have made during the briefing that led to the June 2019 Order. That would not be appropriate. USA v. Black, No. 05-cr-00727, 2007 WL 9752034, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2007) (“reconsideration motions are not properly employed to present new arguments that previously were available”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). VyGC's discovery requests were broad, but defendants should have raised that objection in a timely fashion and attempted to confer in good faith with VyGC to narrow the scope. Second, defendants argue that VyGC should have attempted to confer with defendants before moving for sanctions. A motion to compel discovery “must include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer” with the other party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1). VyGC's current motion is not a motion to compel, but a motion under Rule 37(b)(2)(A) for sanctions for failure to comply with discovery orders (the October 2018 and June 2019 orders). Rule 37(b)(2) does not contain a certification requirement, as Rule 37(a)(1) does. (See also Dkt. 71 at 2 (“Rule 37(b)(2), which does not have a certification requirement, governs Defendants' failure to comply with the Court's October 18, 2018 order.”).) It has been many months since VyGC served defendants with interrogatories and document production requests. VyGC served written discovery on August 28, 2018. (See Dkt 71 at 1.) If defendants sought to resolve either sanctions motion, defendants could have reached out to VyGC to confer about narrowing the scope of the requests, prioritizing the requested documents, and attempting to make good faith productions in response. *7 Third, defendants argue that their discovery responses were timely. With respect to the initial discovery responses, the prior judge addressed this argument in the June 2019 Order. Defendants have not established a basis for reconsideration. As the June 2019 Order explained, defendants' discovery responses were due on September 27, 2018. (Dkt. 71 at 1.) Defendants did not object or respond to discovery at all by this deadline. (Id.) Instead, after receiving no discovery responses from defendants, VyGC filed a motion to compel (Dkt. 57), and the prior judge set November 1, 2018, as defendants' final discovery deadline (Dkt. 60). Defendants provided VyGC with their responses for the first time on November 1, 2018; the sufficiency of those responses was the subject of VyGC's first motion for sanctions. (See Dkt. 71.) After reviewing defendants' belated responses and the parties' briefs on the first motion for sanctions, the prior judge determined that defendants' objections were waived as untimely, determined that defendants' responses were insufficient, directed defendants to respond fully to the discovery and to provide a privilege log within 14 days (by June 17, 2019), and awarded sanctions (striking defendants' affirmative defenses) and attorney's fees related to the sanctions motion. (Id. at 3.) After receiving an unopposed one-week extension, defendants provided a supplemental document production and privilege log, but did not supplement their interrogatory responses. (Dkt. 79 at 3-4 ¶¶ 5-8; Dkt. 79-2.) The supplemental production following the June 2019 Order does not establish that defendants' discovery responses before the June 2019 Order were timely; the June 2019 Order found otherwise, and defendants have shown no basis for reconsideration. As to the timeliness of the discovery responses after the June 2019 Order, the supplemental production was not timely under the original September 27, 2018 deadline. While the supplemental production was provided within the time set by the June 2019 Order (and briefly extended), the production remains deficient, as described above. Also, defendants have not provided any supplemental interrogatory responses. Fourth, defendants argue that their failure to comply with the June 2019 Order was not willful or done in bad faith. The June 2019 Order concluded that defendants acted with willfulness, bad faith, and fault. The June 2019 Order explained: “Given that Defendants waited until the last minute to request an extension of time to comply with the Court's order from the Plaintiff (notably, not from the Court), and that Defendants responses were inadequate, the Court concludes that Defendants acted willfully, in bad faith, with fault.” (Dkt. 71 at 3.) However, the June 2019 Order imposed the less extreme sanction of striking defendants' affirmative defenses and gave defendants another chance to comply with their discovery obligations. As discussed above, after the June 2019 Order, defendants did supplement their responses, but the responses did not rectify the deficiencies identified in the June 2019 Order. As discussed below, the current record supports additional sanctions. However, as explained below, out of an abundance of caution, the court will issue a less extreme sanction, giving the defendants one final chance to comply with their discovery obligations. Fifth, defendants contend that default judgment is a drastic remedy. The court acknowledges this and, as discussed below, is giving defendants one final chance to comply with the June 2019 Order and their discovery obligations. Sixth, defendants argue that VyGC failed to produce discovery to defendants in a timely fashion. The June 2019 Order addressed this argument. (Dkt. 71 at 2 (“If Defendants believed that sanctions were warranted against Plaintiff for failure to comply with a Court order, Defendants could have moved for sanctions or moved to compel compliance. In any event, even if Plaintiff failed to comply with its discovery obligations, that does not excuse Defendants from complying with the Court's orders.”).) Defendants have shown no basis for reconsideration. *8 “Default judgment is strong medicine for discovery abuse.” Domanus v. Lewicki, 742 F.3d 290, 301 (7th Cir. 2014). “It is appropriate only where there is a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct, where other less drastic sanctions have proven unavailing, or where a party displays willfulness, bad faith, or fault.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). District courts do not view particular discovery violations in isolation. Instead, they consider the “entire procedural history of the case.” See Long v. Steepro, 213 F.3d 983, 986 (7th Cir. 2000). “[W]e weigh not only the straw that finally broke the camel's back, but all the straws that the recalcitrant party piled on over the course of the lawsuit.” See e360 Insight, 658 F.3d 637, 643 (7th Cir. 2011). Defendants did not comply with the October 2018 or June 2019 orders by the prior judge. In particular, defendants have not produced the documents required by the June 2019 Order, explained their efforts to produce those documents, or explained why production is not possible. Defendants have not provided a convincing argument against sanctions. The current record supports additional sanctions under Rule 37(b)(2)(A) for noncompliance with the October 2018 and June 2019 orders by the prior judge. The court also notes that this case has been pending in state court since 2016 and in federal court since 2017, despite a relatively low amount at issue and defendants' admission that they owe money to VyGC. On August 20, 2018, almost a year and a half ago, the prior judge observed: [A]s the Court has noted at previous status hearings, given the relatively small amount in controversy and the fact that Defendants have previously admitted that they owe money to Plaintiff, it is unclear why Defendants continue to vigorously litigate this case, resulting in more attorneys' fees for both parties. This is especially curious in light of the fee-shifting provision in the guaranty signed by Defendant Hicks. The Court therefore understands Plaintiff's frustration with being forced to expend time and resources litigating this case. Still, Plaintiff must comply with the rules in seeking a final disposition of this litigation. (Dkt. 53 at 14.) The discovery issues in this case do not appear to be complicated. Yet VyGC has already been forced to file two sanctions motions regarding discovery. The court also notes that defendants did not comply with the November 15, 2019 order, which directed a straightforward report to confirm subject matter jurisdiction, until the court issued a subsequent order requiring compliance. (Dkt. 101 (Dec. 6, 2019 order requiring supplemental report by defendants); see also Dkt. 93 (ordering the parties to file a joint jurisdictional statement); Dkt. 97 (demonstrating defendants' failure to respond to plaintiff's inquiries for the joint statement).) In light of all these circumstances, the court reminds defendants that they need to comply with their discovery obligations promptly. The court reiterates the prior judge's warning from the June 2019 Order that “[i]f Defendants again fail to comply with a Court order, including this order, the Court will entertain a renewed motion for entry of default judgment.” (Dkt. 71 at 3.) However, because default judgment is strong medicine, because sanctions under Rule 37(b)(2)(A) are discretionary, and because, given the reassignment, the court does not have personal experience with the prior discovery, out of an abundance of caution, the court is giving the defendants one final chance to comply with their discovery obligations. As a sanction for defendants' failure to comply with the June 2019 Order and the earlier October 2018 order, the court (1) orders defendants to provide to VyGC, within 28 days of this order (March 10, 2020), the discovery set forth below (see Rule 37(b)(1)(A)), and (2) awards VyGC its reasonable attorney's fees related to the second motion for sanctions (see Rule 37(b)(2)(C)). The court now addresses each of these two requirements. 1. Required discovery: *9 To ensure that it is completely clear what information defendants should produce, the court held a status hearing on January 29, 2020, regarding the sanctions motion and defendants' deficient discovery responses. At that hearing, the court asked VyGC to identify priority documents for production by defendants and directed VyGC to submit a proposed order regarding the specific documents (for example, bank account records and other underlying documents) that were discussed on the record. (Dkt. 111.) VyGC promptly complied. (Dkt. 112.) The court has reviewed VyGC's proposed order and edited the document requests for clarity, so that there is no misunderstanding by defendants as to what information they should produce. The documents listed in the proposed order submitted by VyGC, and in this order below, do not include the full scope of discovery that VyGC originally requested. Instead, they consist of a prioritized subset of the discovery that VyGC originally requested. This order does not preclude VyGC from renewing later its other discovery requests. Pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A), the court orders defendants to provide VyGC, by March 10, 2020, with complete responses to the discovery requests set forth below. 1. Produce to plaintiff VYSE Gelatin Company n/k/a VyGC, Inc. the following documents or electronically stored information: a. All bank records from November 1, 2015 to August 31, 2016, for any account that was used by defendant Jeffrey Hicks, defendant JT Naturals USA, LLC, or JT Naturals, LLC to pay plaintiff VYSE Gelatin Company n/k/a VyGC, Inc. On JTPROD0272-273, for certain transactions, the type of transaction is listed as “Bill Pmt-Check” and either an accompanying check number or “wire” indication is listed; this request (Request No. 1(a), for bank records from November 1, 2015 to August 31, 2016) includes all accounts from which those “Bill Pmt-Check” payments were sent, and all bank records relating to those transactions. b. Copies of all information from the JT Naturals, LLC Vendor QuickReport system (like that produced as JTPROD0272-273) for all vendors from November 1, 2015 to August 31, 2016, that evidence, show, or indicate that the checks or wire payments issued were declined, returned, void, dishonored, or where any similar indication was given by the bank or financial institution that payment was not made due to insufficient funds or a similar reason (“NSF checks”). c. Any other documents from November 1, 2015 to August 31, 2016, that relate or refer to NSF checks issued by or on behalf of defendant Jeffrey Hicks, defendant JT Naturals USA, LLC, or JT Naturals, LLC. d. All information related to the invoices attached to or referenced in the First Amended Complaint (##62320, 62339, 62344, 62400,62496). This includes the invoices, the purchase orders (including purchase orders 15-310 and 16-012), and any other invoices or purchase orders referenced on JTPROD0272-273. Besides the invoices and purchase orders themselves, this request includes documents referring or relating to the invoices and purchase orders, meaning bills of lading, FedEx or Conway shipping and delivery information, certificates of analysis, and all communications relating or referring to the invoices or purchase orders. 2. Respond to the following interrogatories under oath (as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33(b)): a. For each document request above, identify any missing documents or information, and explain where they were maintained on April 14, 2016 (the date plaintiff sent its demand letter to defendants (Dkt. 28-6)). b. Explain why each piece of information described in part (a) above was not produced to plaintiff VYSE Gelatin Company n/k/a VyGC, Inc. in this case. 2. Reasonable attorney's fees related to the second motion for sanctions: *10 Under Rule 37(b)(2)(C),[7] the court awards VyGC its reasonable attorney's fees related to the second motion for sanctions. VyGC is directed to submit a fee request, supported by reasonable documentation, by February 28, 2020; any objections by defendants are due by March 13, 2020. The fee award must be paid within 28 days of the court's order disposing of the fee request. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above: VyGC's request for attorney's fees [76] is granted in part and denied in part. Defendants are directed to pay plaintiff, by March 10, 2020, $5,940 for plaintiff's attorney's fees incurred in connection with its first motion for sanctions. VyGC's second motion for sanctions [79] is granted in part and denied in part. As a sanction for defendants' failure to comply with the June 3, 2019 Order and the earlier October 18, 2018 order, under Rule 37(b)(2)(A), the court: (1) orders defendants to provide to VyGC, by March 10, 2020, the discovery set forth above in this order (see Rule 37(b)(2)(A)), and (2) awards VyGC its reasonable attorney's fees related to the second motion for sanctions (see Rule 37(b)(2)(C)). VyGC is directed to submit a fee request, supported by reasonable documentation, by February 28, 2020; any objections by defendants are due by March 13, 2020. The fee award must be paid within 28 days of the court's order disposing of the fee request. The court extends the briefing schedule on defendants' motion to amend answer and for other relief (Dkt. 114) as follows: plaintiff's response to Dkt. 114 is due April 7, 2020; defendants' reply in support of Dkt. 114 is due April 28, 2020. The next status hearing is set for March 18, 2020 at 10:00 a.m. ENTERED: Footnotes [1] At the last status hearing and motion hearing on January 29, 2020, the court set a deadline of February 28, 2020 for defendants to produce the discovery required by this order. (Dkt. 111.) The court is now extending that deadline to 28 days from the date of this order, i.e., March 10, 2020, to give defendants a full opportunity to review this order and make every effort to comply. [2] At the January 29, 2020 hearing, the court set a briefing schedule on defendants' motion to amend answer and for other relief (Dkt. 114). The briefing schedule was set based on defendants' discovery production deadline, which the court is now extending to March 10, 2020 (see n.1), so the court extends the briefing schedule as well. [3] The court assumes familiarity with prior orders in this case. (E.g., Dkts. 53, 71, 101.) Docket entries are cited as “Dkt. [docket number]” followed by the page and / or paragraph number. Page number citations refer to the ECF page number. [4] See Office of the Illinois Secretary of State, “Corporation/LLC Search/Certificate of Good Standing,” “Corporation File Detail Report” webpage, available at: https://www.ilsos.gov/corporatellc/CorporateLlcController (visited February 10, 2020). [5] While defendants have not filed a motion to reconsider (nor would any such motion be timely), to the extent they are attempting to reargue the first motion for sanctions or their motion to dismiss, their arguments do not meet the threshold for reconsideration. See Oto v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000) (motions to reconsider must present newly discovered evidence or establish a manifest error of law or fact); Boyd v. Wexler, No. 00-cv-02555, 2001 WL 219623, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 2001) (motions to reconsider “do not permit parties to ‘rehash’ old arguments or submit novel legal theories”) (internal citations omitted). Nor have defendants met the threshold for reconsideration of the predecessor judge's order after reassignment of the case. Best v. Shell Oil Co., 107 F.3d 544, 546 (7th Cir. 1997) (After a case is reassigned, “[a]lthough the second judge may alter previous rulings if he is convinced they are incorrect, he is not free to do so ... merely because he has a different view of the law or facts from the first judge. Instead, the presumption is that earlier rulings will stand, even though it can be overcome for compelling reasons (such as new controlling law or clear error).”) (internal citations omitted). [6] Rule 37(b)(2)(A) provides: “If a party ... fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an order under Rule 26(f), 35, or 37(a), the court where the action is pending may issue further just orders. They may include the following:....” [7] Rule 37(b)(2)(C) provides: “Instead of or in addition to the orders above, the court must order the disobedient party, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.”