UNITED HEALTHCARE SEVICES, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. NEXT HEALTH, LLC, et al., Defendants NO. 3:17-CV-00243-E-BT United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division Filed September 15, 2021 Counsel Adam Joseph Sinton, Benjamin Daniel Van Horn, Sinton Scott Minock & Kerew, Denver, CO, Andrew G. Jubinsky, Leda Pauline Juengerman, Timothy A. Daniels, Figari & Davenport LLP, Dallas, TX, Claire Catherine Murray, Stephen W. Mooney, Weinberg Wheeler Hudgins Gunn & Dial LLC, Joseph James Minock, SSMK Legal LLC, Nicole Marie Bigman, Scott Preston Kerew, Sinton Scott Minock & Kerew, Atlanta, GA, D. Lee Roberts, Jr., Weinberg Wheeler Hudgins Gunn & Dial LLC, Las Vegas, NV, for Plaintiffs United Healthcare Services Inc., UnitedHealthcare Insurance Company. Alexandra Hunt, Sorrels Hagood, Connor Nash, Nash Law PLLC, Daniel L. Wyde, Wyde & Associates, James S. Bell, James S. Bell PC, Ralph Ritch Roberts, III, Law Offices of R. Ritch Roberts, Dallas, TX, for Defendant Next Health LLC. Alexandra Hunt, Sorrels Hagood, Connor Nash, Nash Law PLLC, Daniel L. Wyde, Wyde & Associates, James S. Bell, James S. Bell PC, Dallas, TX, for Defendants United Toxicology LLC, Medicus Laboratories LLC, US Toxicology LLC, American Laboratories Group LLC. Mark S. Kennedy, Joanna H. Martin, Lurese A. Terrell, Kennedy Attorneys & Counselors at Law, Dallas, TX, for Defendant Kirk Zajac. Alexandra Hunt, Sorrels Hagood, James S. Bell, James S. Bell PC, Dallas, TX, for Defendants Apex Pharma LLC, Executive Healthcare LLC, Total Pharma LLC, True Labs LLC, Dallasite Inc. Brian Daniel Poe, Brian D. Poe Attorney PLLC, Fort Worth, TX, for Defendant Andrew Hillman. Michael J. Lang, David F. Wishnew, Mark T. Jones, Crawford Wishnew & Lang PLLC, Dallas, TX, for Defendant Pioneer Laboratories LLC. Erik Bugen, Beaumont, TX, Pro Se. Brown, Ada, United States District Judge ORDER *1 Before the Court are the (1) Application for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses (Doc. 535) filed by Plaintiffs United Healthcare Services, Inc. and United Healthcare Services Insurance Company (collectively, United), and (2) Motion to Allocate Attorney's Fees against James S. Bell, PC and Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for the Entity Defendants[1] (Doc. 546) filed by James S. Bell, PC. Having carefully reviewed the application and motion, the parties' briefing, the record, and applicable law, the Court finds the application should be granted in part and denied in part and the motion should be granted. Background On November 18, 2020, the Court held a hearing on United's Motion for Sanctions Based on Entity Defendants' Repeated Violations of Discovery Orders (Doc. 323) and Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief in Support of its 11/13/2019 Motion for Sanctions Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A) (Doc. 506). The Court granted in part and denied in part the motion (Docs. 528 & 530, p. 111). The Court denied United's request that Entity Defendants' answer be struck but found appropriate an award of reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2) in light of Entity Defendants' continued violations of the Court's discovery orders (Docs. 528 & 530, p. 111). Specifically, the Court found United was entitled to its reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses related to (1) filing the motion for sanctions and supplement thereto, (2) preparing for and attending the hearings related to ongoing violations of production pursuant to the Court's Amended Protocol for Discovery of Electronically Stored Information (Doc. 271); (3) preparation for the June 3, 2020[2] hearing on production of the Great Plains database (Doc. 444) and United's subsequent time and effort to obtain production of that database; and (4) preparing for the November 18, 2020 hearing. At the Court's direction, United filed its Application for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses, requesting an award of $383,080.33 (Doc. 535). In response, Entity Defendants filed an Opposition to United's Application for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses (Doc. 538), asserting the award sought is excessive, inflated, and unreasonable and requires reduction. James S. Bell, PC thereafter filed the motion requesting that any attorneys' fees and expenses assessed be allocated to it and that it be allowed to withdraw as counsel for Entity Defendants. Applicable Law A district court may impose sanctions, including case dispositive sanctions, against a party that fails to obey discovery orders. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A). “Instead of or in addition to [such] orders, the court must order the disobedient party, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C). A court “has broad discretion in fashioning its sanction[.]” Law Funder, L.L.C. v. Munoz, 924 F.3d 753, 758 (5th Cir. 2019); Smith & Fuller, P.A. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 685 F.3d 486, 488 (5th Cir. 2012). Rule 37(b)(2) sanctions “must be both just and specifically related to the claim at issue in the discovery order.” Vicknair v. La. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr., 555 F. App'x 325, 332 (5th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). The sanction imposed should be the least severe sanction adequate to achieve the proper functions of Rule 37(b)(2) under the circumstances. See Smith, 685 F.3d at 488-90. *2 The Court uses the lodestar method to calculate the attorney's fees award. See Smith, 685 F.3d at 490; Tollet v. City of Kemah, 285 F.3d 357, 367 (5th Cir. 2002). The lodestar method is equal to the number of hours reasonably spent on the matter by an attorney multiplied by an appropriate hourly rate, which is the market rate in the community for such work. Smith, 685 F.3d at 490. The party seeking attorney's fees bears the burden of establishing “the reasonableness of the hours billed and, therefore, [is] charged with proving that they exercised billing judgment[,]” which “requires documentation of the hours charged and of the hours written off as unproductive, excessive, or redundant.” Saizan v. Delta Concrete, 448 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 2006) (footnotes omitted). The court should exclude any time that is “excessive, duplicative, or inadequately documented.” Watkins v. Fordice, 7 F.3d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 1993). The hours remaining are those reasonably expended. See id. There is a strong presumption the lodestar is reasonable. See Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 552 (2010). After calculating the lodestar, the court may adjust it based on twelve factors: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the legal issues; (3) the skill required to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney as a result of taking the case; (5) the attorney's customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or other circumstances; (8) the monetary amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) whether the case is undesirable; (11) the nature and duration of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. La. Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 329 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974)); see Hoffman v. L&N Arts, No. 3:10-cv-953-D, 2015 WL 3999171, at *28 (N.D. Tex. July 1, 2015). Because the lodestar is presumed to be reasonable, it should be modified only in exceptional cases. See Watkins, 7 F.3d at 457. Analysis 1. Sanctions United seeks a total of $383,080.33 in attorneys' fees and expenses. In support, it offers the Declaration of Scott Kerew (Doc. 534-1), which establishes that several attorneys at Weinberg, Wheeler, Hudgins, Gunn & Dial, LLC (WWHGD) and, subsequently, Sinton Scott Minock & Kerew (SSMK) worked to obtain and review discovery it was entitled to in this case. United seeks the following attorneys' fees and expenses: (a) $101,313.50 for hearings related to ongoing production violations after entry of the Court's June 21, 2019 amended ESI discovery order (Doc. 271); (b) $35,198.30 for United's November 13, 2019 motion for sanctions; (c) $27,540.90 for United's time and effort to obtain production of the Great Plains database; (d) $23,749.50 for the supplement to United's motion for sanctions; (e) $37,340.50 for the November 18, 2020 hearing; (f) $145,936.13 for motions to compel filed by United and related hearings prior to its November 13, 2019 motion for sanctions; and (g) $11,834.00 for United's work on its application for attorneys' fees and expenses. Entity Defendants object to the fees sought on the following bases: (1) the extent to which the fees exceed the Court's Order (specifically, fees related to motions to compel United filed prior to its motion for sanctions); (2) United's failure to establish prevailing market rates; (3) excessive time and failure to exercise billing judgment; and (4) inclusion of travel-related expense and clerical, secretarial, or administrative work. In support, Entity Defendants submit the Declaration of Charles W. Gameros, Jr., whom it retained to opine as to the reasonableness of the attorneys' fees sought (Doc. 539). A. Fees Exceeding the Court's Order *3 United seeks $145,936.13 in attorneys' fees and expenses related to motions to compel it filed in November 2017, February 2018, March 2018, and October 2018, all of which occurred prior to the Court's entry of the amended ESI discovery order (Docs. 85, 116, 118, 227, 271). Entity Defendants object that United's request for time entries that pre-date the amended ESI discovery order fall outside of the Court's November 18, 2020 order. In resolving United's motion for sanctions, the Court considered the full extent of the Entity Defendants' continued failure to produce discovery in this case. However, because the nature of the motion concerned Entity Defendant's failure to comply with the Court's discovery orders, the sanctions award was limited to attorneys' fees and expenses related to those efforts.[3] Accordingly, the Court will not order an award of attorneys' fees and expenses related to the motions to compel United filed prior to the motion for sanctions. B. Failure to Establish Prevailing Market Rates Entity Defendants next object that United fails to produce satisfactory evidence that the requested attorney rates are in line with prevailing rates in the community for similar services by attorneys of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation. Entity Defendants assert that the Court instead should apply a single, blended hourly rate. Entity Defendants and Gameros, having reviewed United's application and the Kerew declaration, suggest a blended rate of $334 per hour, which is based on the highest rate billed for each attorney (Doc. 539, pp. 120-21). Generally, the reasonable hourly rate for a community is established through affidavits of other attorneys practicing in the community. See Tollett, 285 F.3d at 368. A court, however, also may use its own expertise and judgment to independently assess the reasonableness of an attorney's hourly rates. See Primrose Operating Co. v. Nat'l Am. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 546, 562 (5th Cir. 2004); Vanliner Ins. Co. v. DerMargosian, No. 3:12-cv-5074-D, 2014 WL 1632181, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2014). The Kerew declaration sets out the experience of the attorneys who have worked on this matter and their billing rates. Kerew, an equity member of WWHGD first and then SSMK, has practiced law since 1999 and has charged an hourly rate ranging from $365 to $475 for work performed on behalf of United in this case. Adam J. Sinton, also an equity partner at WWHGD first and then SSMK, has practiced law since 2012 and has charged an hourly rate ranging from $340 to $440 for his work in this case. Claire C. Murray, a partner at WWHGD, has practiced law since 2000 and has charged an hourly rate of $365 in this case. Joseph Minock, an equity member of WWHGD first and then SSMK, has practiced law since 2011 and has charged an hourly rate of $340. Steve W. Mooney, a partner at WWHGD, has practiced law since 1987 and has charged an hourly rate of $475. Benjamin D. Van Horn, an associate of WWHGD first and then SSMK, has practiced law since 2015 and has charged an hourly rate of $340. Nicole M. Bigman, an associate of WWHGD first and then SSMK, has practiced law since 2018 and has charged an hourly rate of $340. With respect to prevailing rates in the community for attorneys of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation, Kerew avers only that he knows that James Bell, lead counsel for Entity Defendants, “charges at least $595 per hour for his legal services in this practice area.” (Doc. 534-1, p. 4). *4 The Kerew declaration contains little evidence that the rates charged are in line with those prevailing in this community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation. However, consistent with this Court's expertise and judgment as to the market rate in this community for this work, the Court finds the hourly rates for partners Kerew, Sinton, Murray, Minock, and Mooney are reasonable. See, e.g., Miniex v. Houston Hous. Auth., No. 4:17-cv-0624, 2019 WL 4920646, at *7-*8 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 13, 2019). The Court, however, finds that United proffers no evidentiary support for the Court to find that $340 per hour is a reasonable rate in the community for the work of a five-year or two-year associate, when the same rate also is being charged for partner work on the case. Under these circumstances, the Court finds that the hourly rate for associates Van Horn and Bigman should be reduced by 20 percent to $272. See, e.g., S&H Indus., Inc. v. Selander, No. 3:11-cv-2988-M-BH, 2014 WL 1116700, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 20, 2014) (reducing associate hourly rate by 10 percent when party requesting attorneys' fees failed to submit documentation to determine community's prevailing market rate). C. Excessive Time and Failure to Exercise Billing Judgment Entity Defendants object generally that the time expended by United attorneys is excessive and duplicative and the decision to staff the case with multiple partners is “inefficient.” Entity Defendants also point to several time entries that it contends are vague, duplicative, and compound block-type entries. Noting the application does not show marked down time, Entity Defendants assert it does not properly reflect billing judgment. Entity Defendant request that the Court substantially reduce the fees sought in its award. According to his declaration, Kerew “reviewed over 10,000 billing entries and carefully selected items for inclusion” (Doc. 534-1). Attached to the declaration is a compilation of those items, with the fee rates for each attorney, hours of work performed by each attorney, and descriptions of that work together with expenses. The declaration, however, includes no evidence to show what time, if any, was written off. It is not sufficient for a fee applicant to simply state that the attorneys' fees sought reflect billing judgment. Keycorp v. Holland, No. 3:16-cv-1948-D, 2017 WL 606617, at *38 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2017) (citing Altec Capital Servs., LLC v. Weir Bros., No. 3-11-cv-3409-D, 2013 WL 866193, at *6-*7 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 2013)). “Billing judgment requires documentation of the hours charged and of the hours written off as unproductive, excessive, or redundant.” Saizan, 448 F.3d at 799. Because there is no evidence of any such write off, the Court finds that an additional 10 percent reduction in the requested attorneys' fees, after any other reductions based on Entity Defendants' specific objections, is appropriate. Keycorp, 2017 WL 606617, at *40 (citing Saizan, 448 F.3d at 800; SCA Promotions, Inc. v. Yahoo! Inc., No. 3:14-cv-957-O, 2016 WL 8223206, at *9-*12 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2016), rec. accepted, 2017 WL 514545 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2017); Hoffman v. L&N Arts, No. 3:10-cv-953-D, 2015 WL 3999171, at *5 (N.D. Tex. July 1, 2015)). The Court addresses Entity Defendants' specific objections to the attorneys' fees sought in turn. i. Time Entries for Hearings on Compliance with the Amended Protocol United seeks $101,313.50 in attorney's fees and expenses for 264.2 hours of work related to hearings on Entity Defendants' violations following entry of the amended ESI discovery order. Entity Defendants object that, within this category of fees, there are time entries spanning from September 27, 2019 through May 7, 2020 for a range of work with no link to any particular hearing. The Court agrees that United's application includes several entries that are unrelated to hearings. Indeed, United has included many time entries for time spent reviewing Entity Defendants' productions. Other entries reflect time spent on internal communications and communications with opposing counsel regarding the productions unrelated to any hearing. Having carefully reviewed each of the time entries, the Court finds that time totaling $18,681.80 for work spent for hearings on ongoing production violations following entry of the amended ESI discovery order is reasonable and, thus, falls within the scope of the Court's order.[4] (See Doc. 534-1, p. 20 entries 3-7 & 16-18, p. 21 entry 10, p. 22 entries 13 & 14, p. 23 entries 8-12 & 19, p. 24 entries 8-9, 11-15, 18 & 21, p. 25 entries 1-6 & 9, p. 28 entries 20-21, p. 30 entries 14-16 & 21-22, p. 31 entries 1-4, 6-18 & 20-21, p. 32 entries 1, 7-8, 13-16 & 21, and p. 33 entry 4). ii. Time Entries Related to Motion for Sanctions and Supplement Thereto *5 United seeks $35,198.30, representing 85.7 hours of attorney time, for work on its motion for sanctions. According to Entity Defendants, the entries are “vague, duplicative, and excessive” and the application casts a wide net for related time entries. According to the Gameros declaration, the motion should have taken no more than fifteen hours to brief. The motion for sanctions is eighteen pages with a ten-page appendix and a proposed order (Doc. 323). United's reply brief is ten pages with a thirty-six-page appendix (Doc. 345). The time entries reflect that Sinton performed the required research and drafted the motion and reply. However, there also are entries for that work performed by two other partners, Kerew and Murray, and an associate. Law firms may save costs by dividing tasks on a project between attorneys with varying levels of experience. However, the time entries in this case do not reflect such an effort. Accordingly, the Court finds that the additional work, 15.1 hours totaling $5,391.50 (Doc. 534-1, p. 21 entries 5-8, 14-15 & 21, p. 22 entry 21, p. 29 entry 11, and p. 30 entries 7, 10 & 12), was duplicative and should be excluded. The Court also finds that the remaining 70.6 hours of attorney work on the motion and reply is excessive given the fact that the subject matter was not complicated. Accordingly, the Court finds that an additional 40 percent of the time should be excluded and calculates the appropriate lodestar as 42.36 hours at Sinton's rate of $423 per hour, for a total of $17,918.28. United seeks $23,749.50 for 61.9 hours of attorney time working on its supplement to the motion for sanctions. Noting the supplemental briefing consists of sixteen pages, much of which is “a rehash of previous argument,” accompanied by a seventy-nine-page appendix with a one-page declaration, Entity Defendants contend the billing is excessive. They assert the briefing should not have taken more than 20 hours, and a junior attorney or clerical staff should have generated the appendix. Van Horn and Kerew took the lead on the supplemental briefing. The Court finds that additional partner time totaling $3,560.00 for the same tasks is duplicative and must be excluded (Doc. 534-1, p. 36 entries 1, 3, 10-12 & 20, p. 37 entries 3 & 5, p. 38 entry 10). The Court further finds that time totaling $1,326.00 related to Entity Defendant's motion for leave to file a sur-reply, which was denied, also is excessive and must be excluded (Doc. 534-1, p. 39 entries 13, 15-17 & 21-23). The award must be reduced an additional $2,509.20 to reflect the reasonable associate billing rate of $272 per hour. Finally, the Court finds that an additional 40 percent of the remaining 50.2 hours of time should be excluded for the supplemental briefing as excessive for the task and calculates the appropriate lodestar as 7.98 hours at Kerew's rate of $475 per hour and 22.14 hours of Van Horn's time at the reasonable associate rate of $272 per hour, for a total of $9,812.58. iii. Time Entries Related to Production of the Great Plains Database United seeks $27,540.90 in attorneys' fees for 63.7 hours of work related to the June 3, 2020 hearing on production of the Great Plains database and subsequent efforts to obtain production of the database. Entity Defendants object that United seeks fees for time entries unlinked to either the June 2020 hearing or a subsequent September 2020 hearing, but the Court's order did not limit the award of fees to only those related to the hearings (see Doc. 530, p. 111). Nevertheless, the Court finds that $8,789.70 of requested attorneys' fees are for work unrelated to the hearings or United's efforts to obtain the database production. These entries, which must be excluded, are for time (1) reviewing the initial production and communications with opposing counsel well in advance of the June 2020 hearing (Doc. 534-1, p. 32 entries 9-11 & 17-20, p. 33 entries 3, 5 & 17-22), and (2) reviewing the September 2020 database production (Doc. 534-1, p. 37 entries 6-8, 10 & 12-23). Additionally, $440.00 must be excluded for an entry calculation error in the compilation (Doc. 534-1, p. 35 entry 4) and $625.60 must be excluded to reflect the reasonable hourly rate for an associate time entry (Doc. 534-1, p. 35 entry 18). Accordingly, the Court calculates the lodestar to be $17,685.60. iv. Time Entries for the November 18, 2020 Hearing *6 United seeks an award of $37,297.40 for 88.7 hours preparing for and attending the November 2020 hearing on its motion for sanctions. Entity Defendants object that these 88.7 hours are excessive and cumulative, especially considering the approximately 146 hours that United's attorneys already had worked on the motion and supplement thereto. Entity Defendants maintain that preparation for and attendance at the hearing should have taken no more than 20 hours. The compilation shows that a substantial amount of work on the applicable legal issues and factual background relevant to the hearing had already been completed in connection with the motion and supplement. The Court also notes that, with respect to an award on a previous motion for sanctions, United sought compensation for only 14.5 hours of work preparing for, attending, and travel to the hearing on the motion (Docs. 275, 289, 290 & 505). To be sure, there is considerably more at issue with respect to the second motion for sanctions at issue now, and additional preparation time is only reasonable. The Court, however, finds that 88.7 hours of work for the November 2020 hearing was both cumulative of prior work and excessive. Accordingly, the Court finds that the attorneys' fees related to preparing for and attending the hearing should be reduced by 40 percent and calculates the appropriate lodestar as 27.3 hours at Kerew's rate of $475 per hour, 6.24 hours at Sinton's rate of $440 per hour, .78 hours at Minock's hourly rate of $340 per hour, and 18.9 hours at the reasonable associate rate of $272 per hour for work by Bigman and Van Horn, for a total of $21,119.10. v. Time Entries for United's Application for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses United seeks fees of $11,834.00, representing $7,854.00 for 23.1 hours of associate work and $3,980.00 for 8.6 hours of partner work, on its application. Entity Defendants assert the application should have taken no more than 15 hours. The Court finds that four entries for Sinton's review of the hearing transcript, invoices, and draft declaration (Doc. 534-1, p. 40 entries 14, 15, 18, & 24) are duplicative of Kerew time entries for the same work and should be excluded. And, although preparing the application required review of a large number of attorney billing entries, it otherwise was an uncomplicated, straightforward task. The application consists of ten pages summarizing the fees sought, a five-page declaration, and the compilation of applicable time entries. The Court finds that, in addition to the remaining 5.6 partner hours, the application should have taken no more than ten hours for an associate to prepare. Accordingly, the Court excludes an additional 13.1 hours of associate time. The Court calculates the lodestar to be $5,507.00, representing 10 hours of associate time at $272 per hour and 5.6 partner hours at $475 per hour. In sum, the Court finds the loadstar for the cumulative categories of reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses totals $90,724.36. As discussed above, the Court will reduce this award by 10 percent for United's failure to present evidence of its attorneys exercising billing judgment, for a total lodestar figure of $81,651.92. The Court also has considered the Johnson factors with respect to each of the categories, but because the lodestar is presumed to be reasonable and should be modified only in exceptional cases, the Court finds no adjustment is required.[5] 2. Allocation of Sanction and Motion to Withdraw *7 James S. Bell, PC, Entity Defendants' law firm, moves the Court to assess the sanctions award against it – and not the Entity Defendants. Specifically, James Bell, on behalf of his firm, “accepts responsibility for the sanctionable conduct” and “agrees to pay the attorney's fees” (Doc. 546, p. 1). And, citing an irreconcilable conflict between the Entity Defendants and the firm, Bell requests that the Court allow the firm to withdraw from this case. In a response, United asks the Court to disregard Bell's admission of responsibility, assess the sanctions against the firm and Entity Defendants jointly and severally, or conduct a hearing on the matter of responsibility (Doc. 547). Entity Defendants also filed a response (Doc. 549). They agree that the firm bears sole responsibility for any violations and, to the extent the Court desires further evidentiary support, request leave to submit a brief in camera to demonstrate they lack culpability while preserving attorney-client and work product privileges. Rule 37(b)(2)(C) gives the Court broad discretion in choosing whether to impose sanctions against the “disobedient party, the attorney advising that party, or both.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C); Sample v. Miles, 239 F. App'x 14, 19-20 (5th Cir. 2007); Nguyen v. Louisiana State Bd. of Cosmetology, No. CV 14-80-BAJ-RLB, 2016 WL 3654393, at *3 (M.D. La. Jan. 5, 2016). “Sanctions under Rule 37 are limited to specific discovery violations, serving foremost to penalize misconduct, especially when levied against an attorney personally.” Nguyen, 2016 WL 3654393 at *10 n.14. Because Bell, on behalf of his firm, “takes full responsibility for any and all violations the Court has found in connection with the motion for sanctions,” the Court agrees that the sanctions should be entered solely against the firm. See, e.g., Atkinson v. Volusia County Sch. Bd., No. 615-cv-619-Orl-40DCI, 2016 WL 6524410, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 3, 2016); Long v. E. New Mexico Univ. Bd. of Regents, No. CIV 13-380 RB/SMV, 2015 WL 13662875, at *4 (D. N.M. Apr. 29, 2015). United asserts that such a resolution disregards the Court's prior finding on the record of “bad behavior attributable to Entity Defendants.” The record, however, shows that the Court, more than once, directed counsel to inform Entity Defendants about the discovery problems and that failure to comply would result in sanctions (Docs. 232-1, p. 5 & 530, p. 109). The record also demonstrates that Bell, despite rarely appearing at hearings personally, previously acknowledged his responsibility for production problems (Doc. 345-1, p. 16). Under these circumstances, and given Bell's representations in the motion as an officer of the Court and the Court's discretion under Rule 37, the Court finds the firm responsible for paying the sanctions award. United also expresses a concern that the firm may not be financially viable because Bell created a new law firm this year. Based on Bell's representations, the Court fully expects timely compliance with this Order. The Court further finds that the firm, having satisfied the requirements of Local Rule 83.12, should be withdrawn as counsel for Entity Defendants. The Law Offices of R. Ritch Roberts, III and Sorrels Hagood, both also counsel of record, shall continue to represent Entity Defendants in this case. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, United's Application for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses (Doc. 535) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Motion to Allocate Attorney's Fees Against James S. Bell, PC and Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for The Entity Defendants (Doc. 546) is GRANTED. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that James S. Bell, PC is required to, by 21 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS ORDER, pay United $81,651.92 for United's reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses as described above. It is further ORDERED that James S. Bell, PC is withdrawn as counsel for Entity Defendants. *8 SO ORDERED; signed September 15, 2021. Footnotes [1] Entity Defendants are defendants Next Health, LLC, Medicus Laboratories, LLC, United Toxicology, LLC, and American Laboratories Group, LLC (Doc. 538, p. 5). [2] At the hearing, the Court mistakenly referred to the June 3, 2020 hearing as the “June 9, 2020 hearing.” [3] Judge Karen Scholer, who previously presided over this case, entered the ESI discovery order in July 2018 (Doc. 164). In October 2019, United filed Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions and Brief in Support (Doc. 227), asserting Entity Defendants disregarded the ESI discovery order. Judge Scholer denied the motion as moot pursuant to an agreement between the parties, but directed counsel to advise Entity Defendants that continued noncompliance would result in sanctions (ECF 323-1 at 4). Judge Scholer entered the amended ESI discovery order in June 2019 (Doc. 271). In August 2019, United moved to compel compliance with the amended order (Doc. 275). Magistrate Judge Rebecca Rutherford held a hearing, granted the motion to compel, and ordered further production (Doc. 290). She also found that United was entitled to an award of its reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses and subsequently entered an order awarding United $9,462.96 (Doc. 505). Accordingly, the Court finds that United already has received an appropriate award for Entity Defendants' noncompliance with the Court's applicable discovery orders through September 2019, when Magistrate Judge Rutherford heard and ruled on the August 2019 motion to compel. [4] These time entries correspond to United's attorneys' preparation and attendance at hearings on November 5, 2019 (Doc. 314), November 14, 2019 (Doc. 325), November 20, 2019 (Doc. 334), January 8, 2020 (Doc. 351), March 3, 2020 (Doc. 378), and March 4, 2020 (Doc. 380). The Court has reduced the total for these time entries to correct two calculation errors in the compilation (Doc. 534-1, p. 22 entries 13 and 14) and to reflect the reasonable hourly rate of $272 per hour for the related associate billing (Doc. 534-1, p. 23 entry 10). [5] Entity Defendants urge the Court that Johnson factors 1, 2, and 3 require a reduction in fees. However, the Court has addressed Entity Defendant's arguments in its analysis of the reasonableness of the fees in calculating the lodestar.