JAMIE LEE ANDREWS, as Surviving Spouse of MICAH LEE ANDREWS, Deceased, and JAMIE LEE ANDREWS, as Administrator of the Estate of MICAH LEE ANDREWS, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. AUTOLIV JAPAN, LTD., Defendant CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 1:14-cv-3432-SCJ United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division Signed May 24, 2020 Counsel Gregory Robert Feagle, Ballard & Feagle, LLP, Tedra L. Cannella, Rory Allen Weeks, Butler, Wooten & Peak, LLP, William L. Ballard, Penn Law, LLC, Atlanta, GA, James Edward Butler, Jr., Butler, Wooten, Cheeley & Peak, LLP, Columbus, GA, for Plaintiff Jamie Lee Andrews. Douglas G. Scribner, Jenny Ann Hergenrother, William Joseph Repko, III, Alston & Bird, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant. Jones, Steve C., United States District Judge ORDER *1 This matter appears before the Court on Plaintiffs' “Response to the Court's 9/10/19 Order and Motion for Clarification,” (Doc. No. [410]) which the Court also construes as a motion for reconsideration and a motion for extension of time. The Court addresses the arguments as follows. Plaintiff states that the September 2019 order states that “Plaintiff shall file evidence” and she “has no idea how to construct such ‘evidence,’ as only her counsel can try to do so. Doc. No. [410]), p. 2. The Court notes that it usually understood that when a party is represented by counsel and there is an order by the Court to file a document, counsel is tasked with the responsibility of ensuring that the order is complied with in a timely matter. Next, Plaintiff's Counsel state that they do not know how to calculate the attorney's fees “caused by” Defendant's failure to timely produce the discovery documents at issue. The Court notes that its use of the “caused by” language is derived from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 and its order provided guideposts i.e., the fees incurred in seeking sanctions, the summary judgment briefing, and the Eleventh Circuit appeal. Doc. No. [407], p. 20. To the extent Plaintiff's Counsel thinks that Defendant's discovery failure/conduct “affected nearly everything Plaintiff's counsel have done in this case,” Plaintiff's Counsel must file the evidence first and the Court can make a decision as to causation thereafter. Next, Plaintiff asserts that she is under a contingency representation with Plaintiff's Counsel and that she has not “expended” any attorney's fees. Doc. No. 410], p. 4. Additionally, Plaintiff's Counsel state that they have not kept time records for this case, because of the contingency status. Id. at pp. 2–3. Plaintiff's Counsel also include citations and law firm policy statements about not wanting attorney's fees as a sanction, which the Court considers to be reconsideration arguments.[1] Id. First, the Court notes that attorney's fee sanctions are appropriate in contingency fee cases.[2] See, e.g., Swain v. Encore Med. Corp., No. CIV-A 3:04-174, 2006 WL 3692593, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 2006) (“That [plaintiff's counsel] is proceeding under a contingency fee agreement does not undermine the use of an hourly rate to calculate a sanction of attorney's fees.”); cf. Gotro v. R & B Realty Grp., 69 F.3d 1485, 1488 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that Congress's use of the words “actual expenses incurred,“ in the 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) context does “not limit the district court's discretion to award attorneys' fees to a contingency fee litigant.”). *2 Further, the Court recognizes that “counsel in contingent fee cases often do not maintain contemporaneous time records .....” See Gregory P. Joseph, Sanctions: The Federal Law of Litigation Abuse § 16 (2019). At least one court has deemed such practice “unwise,” but not unreasonable based on the nature of contingency fee arrangements. Monaghan v. SZS 33 Assocs., L.P., 154 F.R.D. 78, 84 (S.D. N.Y. 1994). The Court also recognizes Plaintiff's statement that she has not expended (or paid out) any attorney's fees due to her contingency arrangement. To this regard, the Court MODIFIES page 20 of its September 10, 2019 order (Doc. No. [407]) to VACATE the first paragraph of the conclusion section and substitute the following paragraph in its place: Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions (Doc. No. [343]) is GRANTED. The Court imposes upon Defendant Autoliv Japan, Ltd., the sanction of payment of Plaintiff's reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees caused by the Defendant's failure to timely produce the discovery documents at issue. Plaintiff, through her counsel of record, shall file evidence of the hours that her attorneys worked due to (or caused by) Defendant's failure to timely produce the discovery documents at issue (to include the hours that the attorneys worked to seek sanctions, brief the summary judgment opposition, and appeal to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals). Plaintiff, through Counsel, shall comply with the Court's order within THIRTY DAYS of the final day/adjournment of the bench trial. In conclusion, Plaintiff's motion for clarification (Doc. No. [410]) is GRANTED and the Court has provided clarifications herein. To the extent that Plaintiff's motion is also a request for additional time to file evidence of attorney's fees in response to the Court's September 10, 2019 order, the motion (Doc. No. [410]) is GRANTED for good cause shown. As stated above, Plaintiff, through Counsel, shall comply with the Court's order to file evidence within THIRTY DAYS of the final day/adjournment of the bench trial. To the extent that Plaintiff's motion is actually a motion for reconsideration, said request is DENIED as nothing persuades the Court to retreat from its prior decision to impose the sanction of an award of attorney's fees against Defendant for its discovery conduct. IT IS SO ORDERED this 4th day of May, 2020. Footnotes [1] Under Local Rule 7.2, motions for reconsideration are not to be filed “as a matter of routine practice,” but only when “absolutely necessary.” L.R. 7.2(E), NDGa. Such absolute necessity arises where there is “(1) newly discovered evidence; (2) an intervening development or change in controlling law; or (3) a need to correct a clear error of law or fact.” Boone v. Corestaff Support Servs., Inc., No. 1:11-CV-1175-RWS, 2011 WL 3418382, at * 2 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 3, 2011). [2] Plaintiff's Counsel also expresses some confusion about who receives the attorney's fee award and indicate that they have not had sufficient time to research the issue. Doc. No. [410], p. 4. The Court's cursory research yielded the following example cases. See, e.g., Swain v. Encore Med. Corp., No. CIV-A 3:04-174, 2006 WL 3692593, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 2006) (“The funds shall be paid directly to [plaintiff's counsel] upon a showing that any contingency payment [plaintiff's counsel] receives will be reduced by a like amount.”); Hamilton v. Ford Motor Co., 636 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that “absent a provision in the contract allocating Rule 37(b) awards of attorney's fees, the plain terms of the Retainer Agreement in this case provide that the one-third contingency fee is the sole source of compensation for the attorneys” and finding that the Rule 37(b) award should go to the plaintiff) and Stengel v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 116 F.R.D. 263 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (awarding a discovery sanction in the form of attorney's fees and requiring plaintiff's counsel to certify that the awarded fees would be credited on the payment of the contingent fee in the event of successful termination of litigation).