CENTENNIAL BANK, Plaintiff, v. SERVISFIRST BANK INC., GREGORY W. BRYANT, GWYNN DAVEY, PATRICK MURRIN, and JONATHAN ZUNZ, Defendants Case No. 8:16-cv-88-T-36JSS United States District Court, M.D. Florida Filed January 06, 2017 Counsel Andrew James Ghekas, John A. Anthony, Lydia Marie Gazda, Stephenie Biernacki Anthony, Anthony & Partners, LLC, Dominic Anthony Isgro, Dale R. Sisco, P.A. D/B/A Sisco-Law, Rachel May Zysk, Eduardo A. Suarez, The Suarez Law Firm, P.A., Tampa, FL, for Plaintiff. John Morgan Brunson, Law Office of John Morgan Brunson, St Petersburg, FL, Michael Sansbury, Pro Hac Vice, Morgan B. Franz, William Thomas Paulk, Spotswood Sansom & Sansbury, LLC, Birmingham, AL, Sean Estes, Hoyer Law Group, LLC, Ailen Cruz, Wiand Guerra King, PL, Tampa, FL, for Defendant ServisFirst Bank Inc. George L. Guerra, Jared J. Perez, Peter B. King, Chemere Ellis, Guerra King P.A., Lawrence Joseph Dougherty, Ailen Cruz, Wiand Guerra King, Robert A. Stines, Freeborn & Peters LLP, Tampa, FL, Burton Webb Wiand, Law Office of Burton W. Wiand PA, Clearwater, FL, John Morgan Brunson, Law Office of John Morgan Brunson, St Petersburg, FL, for Defendant Gregory W. Bryant. Ailen Cruz, Lawrence Joseph Dougherty, Wiand Guerra King, PL, George L. Guerra, Peter B. King, Chemere Ellis, Jared J. Perez, Guerra King P.A., Robert A. Stines, Freeborn & Peters LLP, Tampa, FL, Burton Webb Wiand, Law Office of Burton W. Wiand PA, Clearwater, FL, for Defendant Patrick Murrin, Gwynn Davey. John Morgan Brunson, Law Office of John Morgan Brunson, St Petersburg, FL, Phillip J. Harris, Jackson Lewis P.C., Sean Estes, Hoyer Law Group, LLC, Chase Hunter Hale, Constangy Brooks Smith & Prophete LLP, Tampa, FL, Sean A. Douthard, Gregg Moran, Dade City, FL, for Defendant Jonathan Zunz. Jonathan Stidham, Stidham & Stidham, PA, Bartow, FL, for Defendant Dwayne R. Denny. Sneed, Julie S., United States Magistrate Judge ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PROTECTION FROM PRODUCTION OF INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENTS *1 THIS MATTER is before the Court on Patrick Murrin's and Gwynn Davey's (together, “Defendants”) Motion for Protection from Production of Indemnification Agreements (“Motion”) (Dkt. 210), and Plaintiff's response in opposition (Dkt. 213). For the reasons that follow, the Motion is granted. BACKGROUND In July 2016, the Court entered an order granting Plaintiff's motion to compel certain indemnification agreements from Defendants, who, at the time, were non-parties (“First Order”). (Dkt. 165.) In the First Order, the Court determined that Defendants could not withhold the indemnification agreements from production based on the assertion of the work product protection because Defendants, at the time of raising this defense, were not parties to the litigation. (Dkt. 165 at 8.) The Court, however, stayed Defendants’ production of the indemnification agreements pending the disposition of a pending motion to quash Plaintiff's subpoenas to Defendants, filed by Defendant ServisFirst Bank, Inc. (“ServisFirst”), in which ServisFirst argued that its assertion of the work product doctrine protected the indemnification agreements from production. (Dkt. 165.) On August 5, 2016, the Court entered an order denying ServisFirst's motion to quash Plaintiff's subpoenas to Defendants (“Second Order”). (Dkt. 172.) Accordingly, Defendants were obligated to produce the indemnification agreements upon entry of the Second Order. Two weeks after entry of the Second Order, on August 19, 2016, Defendants filed a motion seeking a stay of their production of indemnification agreements “until it is determined whether [Defendants] will become parties to this action.” (Dkt. 177.) At the time Defendants filed their motion to stay compliance, Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a second amended complaint was pending, in which Plaintiff sought leave to name Defendants as additional defendants. (Dkt. 149.) In October 2016, the Court entered an order granting motions to dismiss the amended complaint without prejudice to Plaintiff to file a second amended complaint and denied as moot Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a second amended complaint in light of the dismissal without prejudice. (Dkts. 193–196, 198.) Thereafter, on November 14, 2016, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint in which Defendants were named defendants. (Dkt. 199.) Accordingly, the Court denied the Defendants’ motion to stay compliance as moot. (Dkt. 203.) On the same day of entry of the order denying the motion to stay compliance, Defendants filed this Motion for protective order. (Dkt. 210.) ANALYSIS In the Motion, Defendants move for an order protecting them from producing the indemnification agreements pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). (Dkt. 210.) Pursuant to Rule 26(c)(1), a court may, “for good cause,” issue a protective order “to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,” including forbidding the disclosure or discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). Defendants argue that, because they “are now parties to this case, under the [Court's] analysis [in the First Order], they now have standing to raise their work-product objection to the production of the Indemnification Agreements.” (Dkt. 210 ¶ 12.) Because the Court has determined that the indemnification agreements constitute work product and that Plaintiff had not overcome this protection with a showing of substantial need (Dkt. 165 at 9), Defendants argue that good cause exists for issuance of a protective order. (Dkt. 210 at 3–4.) This is because, Defendants argue, the purpose of the work product doctrine is to protect the adversarial system, and a denial of the Motion would be prejudicial to Defendants by “putting them in the untenable and unfair position of having to produce their work product and compromising their defense.” (Dkt. 210 at 5.) *2 In response, Plaintiff argues that the Motion should be denied as untimely and because Plaintiff has shown substantial need for the indemnification agreements such to overcome any work product protection. (Dkt. 213.) As to Plaintiff's second argument, the Court has already determined that Plaintiff has not shown substantial need sufficient to overcome the work product protection. (Dkt. 165 at 9.) As to Plaintiff's first argument regarding untimeliness, Defendants were obligated to produce the indemnification agreements upon entry of the Second Order, on August 5, 2016. Defendants moved to stay this obligation on August 19, 2016, and, on the same day as the entry of the order denying the motion to stay as moot, filed this Motion for a protective order. (Dkts. 203, 210.) Defendants’ filing of the motion to stay, however, did not excuse them from complying with the First Order, absent an order granting the motion. See Middle District Discovery (2015) at § VII.B. And neither Defendants’ motion to stay nor this Motion for protective order were filed before Defendants’ date for compliance with the First Order. See Laughon ex rel. Laughon v. Jacksonville Sheriff's Office, No. 3:06 CV 692 J 25HTS, 2007 WL 1247305, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2007) (“A motion for a protective order is generally untimely if it is made after the date the discovery material was to be produced.”). Nonetheless, the Court finds that good cause exists to issue a protective order, protecting Defendants’ production of the indemnification agreements. The Court has determined that the indemnification agreements constitute work product and that Plaintiff has not made the requisite showing to overcome this protection. (Dkt. 165 at 9.) As Defendants argue, the purpose of the work product doctrine is to protect the adversarial system. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 512 (1947). Because Defendants are parties to this litigation, good cause exists to protect their production of materials constituting work product. See Chicago Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the good cause standard under Rule 26 “balances the asserted right of access against the other party's interest in keeping the information confidential”). Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Motion for Protection from Production of Indemnification Agreements (Dkt. 210) is GRANTED. DONE and ORDERED, in Tampa, Florida, on January 6, 2017.