O.L., Plaintiff, v. CITY OF EL MONTE, et al., Defendant No. 2:20-cv-00797-RGK-JDE United States District Court, C.D. California, Western Division Filed May 28, 2021 Counsel O. L., El Monte, CA, Pro Se. Colin E. Barr, Terence Joseph Gallagher, Olivarez Madruga Lemieux O'Neill LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant City of El Monte, David Reynoso, Martha Tate, Michael Buckhannon. Erin Renee Dunkerly, Amanda G. Papac, Tomas A. Guterres, Collins and Collins LLP, Pasadena, CA, for Defendant County of Los Angeles, Alex Villanueva, Liliana Jara, Richard Ruiz, Jackie Lacey, Peter Cagney, Karen Thorp, June Chung. Early, John D., United States Magistrate Judge REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE *1 This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable R. Gary Klausner, United States District Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 and General Order 05-07 of the United States District Court for the Central District of California. I. PROCEEDINGS On January 27, 2020, Plaintiff O.L. (“Plaintiff”),[1] proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint arising out of the handling of her report of sexual assault. On March 19, 2020, Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and monetary damages against the City of El Monte (the “City”), the County of Los Angeles (the “County”), David Reynoso (“Reynoso”), Martha Tate (“Tate”), Michael Buckhannon (“Buckhannon”), Alex Villanueva (“Villanueva”), Liliana Jara (“Jara”), Richard Ruiz (“Ruiz”), Jackie Lacey (“Lacey”), Peter Cagney (“Cagney”), Karen Thorp (“Thorp”), June Chung (“Chung”), and Does 1-10. Dkt. 40 (“SAC”). The SAC asserts the following claims: • First Cause of Action: Equal Protection against all Defendants; • Second Cause of Action: Unreasonable Search and Seizure Against the County, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (“LASD”) officers, Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office (“LADA”) officials, and Doe Defendants; • Third Cause of Action: Gender-based Civil Conspiracy (42 U.S.C. § 1985) against all Defendants; • Fourth Cause of Action: Municipal Liability for Unconstitutional Policies, Customs, and Practices against all Defendants; • Fifth Cause of Action: Municipal Liability – Failure to Train, Supervise, and/or Discipline against all Defendants; • Sixth Cause of Action: Violation of Safe Street Act against the County, LASD officers, LADA officials, and Doe Defendants; • Seventh Cause of Action: Violation of Cal. Constitution Art. I § 7 – Equal Protection against all Defendants; • Eighth Cause of Action: Violation of Cal. Constitution Art. I § 13 – Unreasonable Search and Seizure against the County, LASD officers, LADA officials, and Doe Defendants; • Ninth Cause of Action: Violation of Cal. Constitution Art. I § 1 – Right to Privacy against the County, LASD officers, LADA officials, and Doe Defendants; • Tenth Cause of Action: Violation of Cal. Constitution Art. I § 28(b) – Victims' Bill of Rights against all Defendants; • Eleventh Cause of Action: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress against all Defendants; • Twelfth Cause of Action: Violation of Unruh Civil Rights Act against all Defendants; • Thirteenth Cause of Action: Violation of Tom Bane Act against the County and Jara; • Fourteenth Cause of Action: Negligent Supervising, Disciplining, and Retaining Employees against the City, the County, Reynoso, Villanueva, Lacey, and Doe Defendants; and • Fifteenth Cause of Action: Conversion/Claim and Delivery against the County, LASD officers, LADA officials, and Doe Defendants. On May 22, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. 43) enjoining the County, Villanueva, Jara, Ruiz, Lacey, Cagney, Thorp, Chung, and persons acting on their behalf from reading, exploring, using, copying, transferring, distributing, disclosing, or releasing Plaintiff's electronic data from her smartphone, other than her message conversations with an alleged assailant (“Alleged Assailant”). Dkt. 54. *2 Meanwhile, on May 19, 2020, the City, Reynoso, Tate, and Buckhannon filed a Motion to Dismiss the SAC. Dkt. 50 (“City Motion”). On the same date, the County, Villanueva, Jara, Ruiz, Lacey, Cagney, Thorp, and Chung also filed a Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. 51 (“County Motion”). On June 26, 2020, the undersigned Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”), recommending that the City Motion be granted and the County Motion be granted in part. Dkt. 66. Specifically, the Magistrate Judge recommended: (1) granting the City's and County's Motions and dismissing the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Causes of Action without leave to amend and with prejudice as to the City, the County, Reynoso, Tate, Buckhannon, Villanueva, Jara, Ruiz, Lacey, Cagney, Thorp, and Chung; and dismissing the Second Cause of Action without leave to amend and with prejudice as to the County, Villanueva, Cagney, Thorp, Chung, and Lacey; (2) denying the County's Motion as to the Second Cause of Action against Jara and Ruiz in their individual and official capacities; (3) dismissing all federal claims against Does 1-10 without leave to amend; (4) declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims against the City, the County, Reynoso, Tate, Buckhannon, Villanueva, Lacey, Cagney, Thorp, Chung, and Does 1-10 without prejudice to Plaintiff raising them in state court; (5) staying further proceedings with respect to the state law claims against Jara and Ruiz until further order of the Court; and (6) modifying the May 22, 2020 Preliminary Injunction and releasing Villanueva, Lacey, Cagney, Thorp, and Chung therefrom. Id. On July 31, 2020, the District Court accepted the R&R, with the exception that the Court did not, at that time, dismiss claims against Doe defendants to the extent such claims against such Doe defendants related to claims not dismissed by the Order. Dkt. 72. Pursuant to the Court's July 31, 2020 Order, the only remaining federal claim is the Second Cause of Action for unreasonable search and seizure. On August 14, 2020, Jara and Ruiz (“Defendants”) filed an Answer to the SAC. Dkt. 80. On April 21, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, contending she is entitled to judgment against Jara and Ruiz in their official capacity. Dkt. 217 (“Pl. MSJ” or “Plaintiff's Motion”). The Motion was accompanied by a Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law, Plaintiff's Declaration (“Pl. MSJ Decl.”), and exhibits. Defendants filed an Opposition (“Def. Opp.”) on May 6, 2021, together with a Statement of Genuine Disputes of Material Fact, evidentiary objections, a supporting declaration, and exhibits. Dkt. 230. On May 13, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Reply (“Pl. Reply”), a Reply to Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Uncontroverted Facts, evidentiary objections, a supporting declaration, and exhibits. Dkt. 233. Defendants filed their own Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment on April 21, 2021, together with a Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law, supporting declarations, and exhibits, contending that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Dkt. 216 (“Def. MSJ” or “Defendants' Motion”). On May 6, 2021, Plaintiff filed an Opposition (“Pl. Opp.”), a Response to Defendants' Statement of Uncontroverted Facts, a supporting declaration (“Pl. Opp. Decl.”), exhibits, and evidentiary objections. Dkt. 231. On May 13, 2021, Defendants filed a Reply, a Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Statement of Uncontroverted Facts, and evidentiary objections. Dkt. 232. The Motions came on for hearing on May 27, 2021 starting at 10:00 a.m. Counsel for Defendants appeared. No appearance was made by Plaintiff. Although Local Civil Rule 7-14 provides, in part, “[f]ailure of any counsel to appear, unless excused by the Court in advance pursuant to L.R. 7-15 or otherwise, may be deemed consent to a ruling upon the motion adverse to that counsel's position,”[2] the Court nonetheless considers the merits of both Motions despite Plaintiff's nonappearance at the hearing. For the reasons discussed below, the Court recommends that partial summary judgment be granted in Defendants' favor. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires summary judgment to be granted when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-248 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. *3 The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing a genuine triable issue. Id. at 324; see also Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). The nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (citation omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257. Summary judgment cannot be avoided by relying solely on conclusory allegations or speculation unsupported by facts. See Loomis v. Cornish, 836 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[M]ere allegation and speculation do not create a factual dispute for purposes of summary judgment.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). To show a genuine issue exists, the opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The Court may rely on the nonmoving party to identify specifically the evidence that precludes summary judgment. See Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). Summary judgment is appropriate if the nonmoving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. If the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of proof at trial, that party “must come forward with evidence which would entitle [her] to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.” C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Restaurants, Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). “In such a case, the moving party has the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact on each issue material to its case.” Id. A moving party who bears the burden of persuasion at trial must show that “the evidence is so powerful that no reasonable jury would be free to disbelieve it.” Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 890 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). The Court may not weigh evidence or make credibility determinations. Bator v. Hawaii, 39 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 1994). Inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587. However, “[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). Where, as here, “parties submit cross-motions for summary judgment, ‘[e]ach motion must be considered on its own merits.’ ” Fair Hous. Council of Riverside Cty., Inc. v. Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). However, the Court must consider all evidence properly submitted in support of cross-motions to determine whether the evidence demonstrates the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 1136-37. III. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS The parties assert numerous objections to the evidence submitted in connection with the Motions. “In motions for summary judgment with numerous objections, it is often unnecessary and impractical for a court to methodically scrutinize each objection and give a full analysis of each argument raised.” Capitol Records, LLC v. BlueBeat, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1200 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (citation omitted). Many of the objections here are garden variety evidentiary objections based on lack of foundation, lack of personal knowledge, misstatement of the evidence, confusion of issues, relevance, improper opinions, and violation of the “best evidence” rule. While these objections may be cognizable at trial, on a motion for summary judgment, evidence does not need to be in a form that is admissible at trial, Nev. Dep't of Corr. v. Greene, 648 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2011); Garlick v. Cty. of Kern, 167 F. Supp. 3d 1117, 1125 (E.D. Cal. 2016), and many of the objections are unnecessary as they are “duplicative of the summary judgment standard itself.” Burch v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1119 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (objections that evidence is “irrelevant, speculative, and/or argumentative, or that it constitutes an improper legal conclusion are all duplicative of the summary judgment standard itself”). When assessing evidence in connection with a motion for summary judgment, the Court must consider the admissibility of the evidence's contents, not its form. See Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003); see also JL Beverage Co. v. Jim Beam Brands Co., 828 F.3d 1098, 1110 (9th Cir. 2016). Accordingly, the parties' objections based on relevance, lack of foundation, lack of personal knowledge, improper authentication, improper lay opinion, improper expert opinion, improper legal conclusion, violation of the “best evidence” rule, inadmissible evidence, misstates evidence, and confuses the issues are overruled with two exceptions, as provided below. *4 Defendants object to the statement in Plaintiff's Declaration submitted in support of her Opposition to Defendants' Motion that “After Sergeant Peter Hish informed JARA that he did not see any written consent or search waiver JARA forged a search waiver and emailed it to Sergeant Peter Hish” on the grounds of lack of foundation, lack of personal knowledge, and misstating the evidence. See Pl. Opp. Decl. ¶ 9, page 6, lines 9-10; Defendants' Objections to Evidence Submitted by Plaintiff in Support of Opposition to Def. MSJ (“Def. Obj.”), Objection 5. To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to create a genuine issue of material fact by claiming that Jara forged the search waiver form, it is Plaintiff's burden to prove this allegation, see Johnson v. Roche, 2009 WL 720891, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2009), findings and recommendations adopted by 2009 WL 902261 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2009), and she has not presented any evidence demonstrating that Jara “forged” a document. The Court is not required to accept Plaintiff's assertion that Jara “forged” a document where Plaintiff does not profess to have witnessed any such alleged forgery and thus lacks foundation to claim Jara forged the document, and where such an assertion is contracted by the record as a whole, including Jara's testimony to the contrary, Plaintiff's acknowledgment that she voluntarily gave her cell phone to Jara with the password and consented to downloading information on her cell phone (Declaration of Amanda G. Papac in support of Def. MSJ [“Papac MSJ Decl.”], Exh. F (Excerpts from Plaintiff's Deposition) at 172:3-16; Pl. Opp. Decl. ¶ 6), and Plaintiff's representation that she signed a form at the time of the interview (Papac Decl., Exh. F at 173:21-174:25), which she has not provided. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 380; Bond v. Knoll, 2014 WL 7076901, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2014) (plaintiff's speculation that defendants' declarations and exhibits were fabricated was insufficient to defeat summary judgment). The Court sustains Defendants' objection to Plaintiff's unsupported allegation that Jara “forged” a search waiver form, but as discussed in Section IV, below, for the purposes of the consideration of the Motions, the Court accepts Plaintiff's assertion, made under penalty of perjury, that she did not sign the particular search waiver form at issue. For similar reasons, the Court sustains Defendants' objections to the statement, “Without my consent my message in Wechat was searched and translated by JARA instead of Detective Gerald Groenow,” in the same declaration on the grounds of lack of foundation and personal knowledge. See Pl. Opp. Decl. ¶ 13, page 7, lines 4-5; Def. Obj., Objection 7. As to the remaining objections, the Court overrules the parties' objections that the evidence is unfairly or unduly prejudicial, the evidence is misleading, and the evidence constitutes improper character evidence. Further, to the extent Plaintiff objects to the Court's consideration of the transcript from the June 25, 2020 hearing on the Motions to Dismiss, that objection is overruled. As to Plaintiff's objection to the consideration of excerpted portions of her deposition transcript on the ground that the copy submitted by Defendants does not reflect the corrections made after the deposition, Plaintiff has not cited any specific portion of the deposition transcript that is inaccurate, does not identify any portions of the transcript that were later corrected, and does not attach her errata sheet. Plaintiff's objection to the use of her deposition transcript is overruled. Finally, the Court addresses Plaintiff's references to Defendants' evidence as a “sham declaration” and “sham verified response.” “The general rule in the Ninth Circuit is that a party cannot create an issue of fact by an affidavit contradicting his prior deposition testimony.” Van Asdale v. Int'l Game Tech., 577 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266 (9th Cir. 1991)). This sham affidavit rule prevents “a party who has been examined at length on deposition” from “rais[ing] an issue of fact simply by submitting an affidavit contradicting his own prior testimony,” which “would greatly diminish the utility of summary judgment as a procedure for screening out sham issues of fact.” Kennedy, 952 F.2d at 266 (citation omitted); see also Van Asdale, 577 F.3d at 998 (stating that some form of the sham affidavit rule is necessary to maintain the principle that summary judgment is an integral part of the federal rules). Here, Plaintiff has presented no evidence that any of Defendants' witnesses testified inconsistently or that their declarations or verified responses are contradicted by earlier statements or testimony. As such, any objections based on Plaintiff's characterization of Defendants' evidence as “shams” are overruled. IV. UNDISPUTED FACTS To the extent certain facts are not mentioned in this Order, the Court has not relied on them in reaching its decision. The Court has independently considered the admissibility of the evidence underlying the parties' statements of fact and has not considered facts that are irrelevant or based upon inadmissible evidence. Additionally, the Court deems certain material facts undisputed where the parties have merely objected to an admissible material fact without citing any specific facts or evidentiary support showing a genuine triable issue. Unless otherwise indicated, the following material facts are undisputed. *5 On July 2, 2019, Plaintiff went to the LASD station in the City of Industry for an interview with Jara to provide information regarding her allegations that the Alleged Assailant raped her. Papac MSJ Decl., Exh. F at 142:9-143:14; Declaration of Liliana Jara filed in support of Def. MSJ [“Jara Decl.”] ¶ 3; Pl. MSJ Decl. ¶ 5. During this interview, Plaintiff showed messages on her cell phone to Jara regarding her conversations with the Alleged Assailant, and agreed to provide her cell phone to LASD to download certain messages. Papac Decl., Exh. F at 55:13-22, 144:24-145:18, 147:7-14, 171:3-172:2, 193:22-194:1; Papac Decl., Exh. I at 19:20-21:14; Jara Decl. ¶¶ 3-5, Exh. E; Pl. MSJ Decl. ¶ 5; Pl. Opp. Decl. ¶¶ 4-6. Plaintiff wrote down her cell phone password for Jara. Papac Decl., Exh. F at 172:3-22; Jara Decl. ¶ 4. The parties agree that Plaintiff signed a form during this interview confirming that Jara was taking possession of her cell phone, although the parties disagree regarding the nature and substance of this form. Plaintiff claims she merely signed a “receipt for property” while Defendants maintain that she signed an “Entry and Search Waiver,” granting the LASD consent to search her cell phone for information related to the case, including “text messages, photographs, videos, messages, [and] emails.” Pl. Mot. Decl. ¶ 8; Pl. Opp. Decl. ¶ 7; Jara Decl. ¶¶ 5-6, Exhs. A, E; Papac Decl., Exh. F at 173:21-176:19, 214:2-22. As the Court is not permitted to make credibility determinations on summary judgment, the Court accepts Plaintiff's assertion, made under penalty of perjury, that she did not sign the waiver form for purposes of the Motions, and therefore, has not considered the waiver form. After the interview was concluded, Jara submitted the cell phone into evidence storage so that the High Tech Task Force could conduct a forensic examination and download Plaintiff's cell phone data. Jara Decl. ¶¶ 8-9, Exh. C; Pl. MSJ Decl., Exh. 2. Jara submitted a request for the task force to search for “all data related to this case; specifically any communication between the victim ... via ‘WeChat’ or cell phone number ... any and all photographs, text messages, videos, or emails.” Pl. MSJ Decl., Exh. 2; Jara Decl. ¶ 8. At the time of Jara's request, she was notified that the task force would make a digital copy of the cell phone and conduct the examination from the digital copy. Pl. MSJ Decl., Exh. 2. On July 3, 2019, Jara advised Plaintiff that a forensic examination would be completed, which Plaintiff acknowledged without objection. Pl. Opp. Decl., Exh. 3. The High Tech Task Force obtained the cell phone from evidence storage on July 18, 2019 and downloaded Plaintiff's cell phone data onto a disk in a reader format (USB drive) “to allow the [investigating officer] to review the data extracted, and find any evidence pertaining to [her] case.” Jara Decl. ¶ 10, Exh. C; Pl. Mot. Decl., Exh. 3. Meanwhile, on August 5, 2019, the Santa Ana Police Department contacted Jara about an investigation they were conducting of Plaintiff in a criminal matter. Jara Decl. ¶ 14. They also informed Jara that Plaintiff published a GoFundMe webpage complaining about Jara. Id. On August 5, 2019, one of the investigators with the Santa Ana Police Department emailed Jara a link to the GoFundMe webpage, which Jara forwarded to Ruiz the same day. Declaration of Richard Ruiz filed in support of Def. MSJ (“Ruiz Decl.”) ¶ 2; Papac MSJ Decl., Exh. J (Interrogatory Response No. 5); Jara Decl. ¶ 14, Exh. D. Ruiz learned about the GoFundMe webpage through this email; he never touched, reviewed, or accessed the contents of Plaintiff's cell phone or the downloaded data. Papac Decl., Exh. F at 75:10-76:8; Papac Decl., Exh. J (Interrogatory Response No. 5); Ruiz Decl. ¶¶ 3, 5. On October 17, 2019, Jara retrieved Plaintiff's cell phone and the USB drive and transported them to the Walnut Sheriff's Station, where she placed the evidence in evidence storage. Jara Decl. ¶ 10, Exhs. B-C. The only time Jara viewed any contents on Plaintiff's cell phone was during the July 2, 2019 interview in Plaintiff's presence. Id. ¶ 12. After that interview, Jara did not access or search the contents of Plaintiff's cell phone or the data downloaded. She also did not translate any messages on Plaintiff's cell phone. Id.; Papac Decl., Exh. F at 177:12-179:25. Plaintiff retrieved her cell phone on October 21, 2019. Jara Decl., Exh. C; Papac Decl., Exh. F at 45:13-20, 191:19-24. V. DISCUSSION A. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment Plaintiff contends she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law against Jara and Ruiz in their official capacity because Jara unreasonably searched her messages with a friend and translated them into English and directed the High Tech Task Force to seize all electronic data from Plaintiff's cell phone without her consent in direct contravention of the LASD's policy against such seizure of evidence. Plaintiff maintains that the LASD's failure to train its officers regarding how to conduct a search and seizure of an electronic device and lack of supervision caused the constitutional deprivation at issue. Pl. MSJ at 6-8. Defendants maintain that Plaintiff is moving for partial summary judgment on a cause of action that no longer exists. Defendants note that Plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action for failure to train and supervise against the County, Jara, Ruiz, and other defendants was previously dismissed, and contend there is no legal basis for her to seek summary adjudication of this claim and in any event, her uncontroverted “facts” are not supported by competent evidence. Def. Opp. at 1, 3. The Court agrees. *6 Plaintiff may not move for summary judgment on a claim that has been previously dismissed from this action. Plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action for municipal liability based on the failure to train, supervise, and/or discipline was previously dismissed with prejudice in response to an earlier motion to dismiss. Dkt. 72. The R&R definitively found that “[t]he SAC [f]ail[ed] to [s]tate a [f]ederal [c]ivil [r]ights [c]laim [b]ased on [m]unicipal [l]iability” and recommended that these claims be dismissed with prejudice. Dkt. 66 at 15, 38. The District Court accepted this portion of the R&R and dismissed the Monell claims without leave to amend and with prejudice. Dkt. 72. As the Court dismissed Plaintiff's claim alleging the failure to train and supervise, Plaintiff may not seek summary judgment on this claim. See Gibson v. Beer, 2008 WL 5063878, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2008) (“Plaintiff may not seek summary judgment against non-parties or for claims/defendants that have previously been dismissed from this action.”), findings and recommendations adopted by 2009 WL 159282 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2009). Plaintiff maintains that she can proceed on her Monell claim because the Court did not dismiss the Second Cause of Action against Jara and Ruiz in their official capacity. Pl. Reply at 1. The SAC names all defendants “in their official capacities for declaratory and injunctive relief.” SAC ¶ 18. As Plaintiff concedes, however, “an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). “It is not a suit against the official personally, for the real party in interest is the entity.” Id. As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]here is no longer a need to bring official-capacity actions against local government officials, for under Monell ... local government units can be sued directly for damages and injunctive or declaratory relief.” Id. at 167 n.14. Thus, an “official capacity” suit is, in fact, a suit against the local government entity, which requires a showing that the entity itself was a “moving force” behind the alleged constitutional deprivation. See id. at 166. Here, the Court already found that the SAC failed to state a Monell claim against the County and dismissed the Second Cause of Action without leave to amend and with prejudice as to the County. The Court has repeatedly made clear the only operative claim is a single civil rights claim against Jara and Ruiz based on an assertion that they seized and searched Plaintiff's cell phone either without her consent or beyond her consent. See, e.g., Dkt. 145 at 33; Dkt. 162 at 5. A claim against Jara and Ruiz in their “official capacity” is functionally the same as a claim against the County, and must be treated as such. To the extent this claim was not explicitly dismissed before, the Second Cause of Action against Jara and Ruiz in their “official capacity” must be dismissed as the Court already found that Plaintiff failed to state a cognizable Monell claim against the County. See Grisham v. Cty. of L.A., 2018 WL 7501118, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2018) (“Because the claims against each Individual Defendant in his or her official capacity are, in all respects other than name, the same as the claims against the County, the dismissal of plaintiff's first four claims in the FAC as to the County for failure to state a claim pursuant to Monell is dispositive of plaintiff's first four claims in the FAC as to the Individual Defendants in their official capacities.”); Howard v. Contra Costa Cty., 2014 WL 824218, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2014) (because the complaint failed to state a Monell claim, individual defendant may not be held liable under Section 1983 in his official capacity). Accordingly, Plaintiff is not entitled to partial summary judgment.[3] B. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment *7 Defendants contend they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim because there is no evidence Jara searched Plaintiff's cell phone after her interview and Ruiz never touched, accessed, or searched Plaintiff's cell phone or the USB drive containing Plaintiff's cell phone data. Def. MSJ at 12-14. Additionally, Defendants contend they are entitled to qualified immunity as there is no “competent evidence to substantiate Plaintiff's unlawful search claims” and both Defendants acted “reasonably as to what they believed the law required of them relative to a consensual search of a victim's phone.” Id. at 14-18. In her Opposition, Plaintiff argues that Jara exceeded the scope of her consent to search only the Alleged Assailant's “incriminating messages” and Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity as the law was clearly established and “legitimate disputes exist as to whether Defendants were ‘plainly incompetent’ or ‘knowingly violat[ed] the law,’ or both.” Pl. Opp. at 7-9. 1. Fourth Amendment Claim In her Second Cause of Action, Plaintiff alleges that Jara and Ruiz violated her “Fourth Amendment right to be secure in her person against unreasonable searches and seizures.” SAC ¶ 173. She claims her “private information was subjected to analysis by LASD personnel without a warrant, valid consent, or exigent circumstances, in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights” and remains “in the possession of government agencies ....” Id. ¶¶ 174-175. She contends she did not consent to search the entire contents of her cell phone, but rather only to download the conversations between herself and the Alleged Assailant. Id. ¶¶ 71, 169, 171. She further alleges “Jara was well aware” that she “handed over her cell phone solely for Jara to download her conversations with” the Alleged Assailant and Ruiz “had personal knowledge of the illegal search and seizure” and “was part of it.” Id. ¶¶ 97, 169. Based on a conversation with Ruiz in which he referenced Plaintiff's GoFundMe webpage and a translation on her cell phone, Plaintiff claims Jara and Ruiz conducted an illegal search and seizure. See id. ¶¶ 96, 131. i. Applicable Legal Authority Under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, individuals have the right to be “secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Generally, law enforcement officials must obtain a warrant before searching the contents of a phone. Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. --, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401 (2014). Consent is a recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. United States v. Russell, 664 F.3d 1279, 1281 (9th Cir. 2012). However, “[t]he existence of consent to a search is not lightly to be inferred” and the government always has the burden of proving effective consent. United States v. Reid, 226 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). The scope of the search by consent is limited by the terms of its authorization. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980). Under the Fourth Amendment, the standard for measuring the scope of an individual's consent is “that of ‘objective’ reasonableness—what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the [person giving consent]?” Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991). ii. Analysis a. Jara As to a Fourth Amendment search, it is undisputed that the only search conducted by Jara was during the July 2, 2019 interview, which was done in Plaintiff's presence and with her consent. Although Plaintiff speculates that Jara later translated a WeChat message with her friend, Plaintiff presents no evidence to support this contention. Such speculation without any factual support is insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact. See Loomis, 836 F.3d at 997. As such, Jara did not conduct a “search” in violation of the Fourth Amendment. *8 At most, Jara caused the High Tech Task Force to download the information on Plaintiff's cell phone, creating a mirror image of the data and copying this information to a USB drive. The evidence submitted in support of Plaintiff's Motion reflects that regardless of the scope of Plaintiff's initial consent - whether it was limited to the WeChat messages with the Alleged Assailant or any evidence relating to the alleged assault - the LASD would need to make a digital copy of the entire cell phone to conduct any examination. See Pl. MSJ Decl., Exh. 2. While a digital copy of Plaintiff's cell phone data was created, there is no evidence that either the cell phone or this digital copy was searched after the July 2, 2019 interview. Given that Plaintiff voluntarily gave her cell phone to LASD, including providing Jara with the password to her cell phone, LASD's possession of the cell phone alone did not constitute a “seizure” in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff has not claimed otherwise. See Papac Decl., Exh. F at 55:13-16. Thus, Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim turns on whether downloading a copy of the data on Plaintiff's cell phone, which was never searched, constitutes a “seizure” in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Court need not decide whether Jara violated the Fourth Amendment when she directed the task force to download information on Plaintiff's cell phone, however, because even assuming a Fourth Amendment violation occurred, the law on the relevant issue was not clearly established and therefore, Jara is entitled to qualified immunity. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Qualified immunity balances two important interests–the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (citation and quotations marks omitted). Qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). It is available to government officials sued in their individual capacity. Wright v. Beck, 981 F.3d 719, (9th Cir. 2020). Such officials are entitled to qualified immunity unless: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional or federal statutory, and (2) the unlawfulness of his or her conduct was “clearly established at the time.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. --, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018) (citation omitted). Demonstrating the unlawfulness of the defendant's conduct was “clearly established” requires a showing that “at the time of the officer's conduct, the law was sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would understand that what he is doing is unlawful.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted); Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. --, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2018) (per curiam) (“An officer ‘cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right unless the right's contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant's shoes would have understood that he was violating it.’ ” (citation omitted)). “While there does not have to be ‘a case directly on point,’ existing precedent must place the lawfulness of the [conduct] ‘beyond debate.’ ” Villanueva v. California, 986 F.3d 1158, 1165 (9th Cir. 2021) (alteration in original) (quoting Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590). “[S]pecificity is especially important in the Fourth Amendment context, where the Court has recognized that it is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine ... will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts.” Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1152 (citation omitted). Plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the right allegedly violated was clearly established. Shafer v. Cty. of Santa Barbara, 868 F.3d 1110, 1118 (9th Cir. 2017). Whether copying data is a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment is “uncertain[ ].” 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 2.6(f) (6th ed. 2020); see also Note, Digital Duplications and the Fourth Amendment, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1046, 1047 (2016) (explaining that “it is not entirely settled that the government conducts either a search or a seizure when it makes a copy of locally stored data, and then retains that data without further reviewing it” (footnote omitted)); Michael W. Price, Rethinking Privacy: Fourth Amendment “Papers” and the Third-Party Doctrine, 8 J. Nat'l Sec. L. & Pol'y 247, 278 (2016) (whether copying data counts as a seizure is an “outstanding question”). Plaintiff does not provide any case with facts similar to those at issue here, where the court found that merely copying digital information without searching it constitutes a Fourth Amendment violation. The leading case on the question of whether copying is a seizure, Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324 (1987), concluded that police conduct in copying down the serial numbers on stereo equipment “did not constitute a seizure,” reasoning that “it did not ‘meaningfully interfere’ with the respondent's possessory interest in either the serial numbers or the equipment.” Since Hicks, it has been suggested by at least one commentator that electronic copying by the government should ordinarily be considered a Fourth Amendment seizure: *9 the Fourth Amendment power to seize is the power to freeze. That is, the seizure power is the power to hold the crime scene and control evidence. Generating an electronic copy of data freezes that data for future use just like taking physical property freezes it: it adds to the amount of evidence under the government's control. From the standpoint of regulating the government's power to collect and use evidence, generating an electronic copy is not substantially different from controlling access to a house or making an arrest. Each of these seizures ensures that the government has control over the person, place, or thing that it suspects has evidentiary value. As a result, copying Fourth Amendment protected data should ordinarily be considered a Fourth Amendment seizure. Orin Kerr, Fourth Amendment Seizures of Computer Data, 119 Yale L. J. 700, 709 (2010). However, the Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the issue in the digital context and lower courts have disagreed regarding whether copying data constitutes a seizure. See Brittany Adams, Striking a Balance: Privacy and National Security in Section 702 U.S. Person Queries, 94 Wash. L. Rev. 401, 426-27 (2019); Digital Duplications and the Fourth Amendment, 129 Harv. L. Rev. at 1048 (explaining that case law provides no “conclusive answers” regarding whether mirror-imaging is subject to the Fourth Amendment); Price, 8 J. Nat'l Sec. L. & Pol'y at 279 (noting that the Supreme Court has “yet to weigh in on this question”). At least one district court in the Ninth Circuit has found that the act of copying computer data is not a seizure under the Fourth Amendment “because it did not interfere with Defendant's or anyone else's possessory interest in the data. The data remained intact and unaltered. It remained accessible to Defendant and any co-conspirators or partners with whom he had shared access. The copying of the data had absolutely no impact on his possessory rights.” United States v. Gorshkov, 2001 WL 1024026, at *3 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2001). Given the lack of existing precedent placing the constitutional issue beyond debate, it was not clearly established that merely copying Plaintiff's cell phone data without searching such information constituted a Fourth Amendment violation. Jara is entitled to qualified immunity in her individual capacity, and as explained in Section V(A), Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action against Jara in her official capacity is the same as a claim against the County, which was previously dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim. That finding is dispositive of Plaintiff's official capacity claim. b. Ruiz Defendants contend that Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action fails against Ruiz because Ruiz never touched, accessed, or searched Plaintiff's cell phone or the USB drive containing Plaintiff's cell phone data. Ruiz learned about Plaintiff's GoFundMe webpage through the Santa Ana Police Department, not through a search of Plaintiff's cell phone. Def. MSJ at 13-14. Plaintiff does not dispute these contentions. Rather, Plaintiff appears to contend that as Jara's supervisor, Ruiz is liable for failing to supervise her alleged misconduct. Pl. Opp. at 4, 6, 9. Plaintiff maintains that pursuant to LASD Policy and Procedures 5-04/000.10, only evidence essential to proving an offense shall be seized and the seizure of such evidence shall be scrutinized by supervisory personnel. Id. at 6. Plaintiff contends that personal information unrelated to the underlying offense was seized without any supervision. Id. She claims that because Jara sent Ruiz the GoFundMe webpage, this “suggests that JARA and RUIZ had close communication and kept RUIZ updated regarding the investigation of Plaintiff's complaint.” Id. at 9. According to Plaintiff, Ruiz “had ample opportunities but failed his supervisory duty as required by LASD Policy and Procedures 5-04.000.10[.]” Id. *10 Defendants counter that Plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action for failure to train and supervise was dismissed against Ruiz without leave to amend and that this claim lacks merit. Def. MSJ at 14. The Court agrees that Plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action for “Municipal Liability – Failure to Train, Supervise, and/or discipline” was dismissed without leave to amend and with prejudice as to the County, Ruiz, Jara, among others. Dkt. 72. Further, even if the Court considered Plaintiff's theory of liability, she has not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact as to the Second Cause of Action against Ruiz. As framed by the SAC, Plaintiff seeks to hold Ruiz liable because he allegedly had “personal knowledge of the illegal search and seizure and he was part of it.” SAC ¶ 97. However, Plaintiff has presented no evidence that Ruiz “was part of” the alleged constitutional deprivation or had “personal knowledge” of it. As previously explained, “[g]overnment officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Rather, “each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.” Id. at 677. “A defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 ‘if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.’ ” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). A causal connection can be established “by setting in motion a series of acts by others” or “knowingly refusing to terminate a series of acts by others, which the supervisor knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury.” Id. at 1207-08 (citations and alterations omitted). “A supervisor can be liable in his individual capacity for his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation; or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Id. at 1208 (citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that Ruiz was personally involved in a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights or that Ruiz's alleged deficient supervision had any direct causal connection to the alleged constitutional violation. It is undisputed that Ruiz did not personally access or search Plaintiff's cell phone and there is no evidence substantiating Plaintiff's allegation that Ruiz had “personal knowledge” of the alleged constitutional violation. Plaintiff cannot avoid summary judgment simply by citing evidence that Jara sent Ruiz a copy of the GoFundMe webpage and alleging in conclusory fashion that Jara updated Ruiz regarding the investigation of Plaintiff's complaint and failed in his “supervisory duty.” See Pl. Opp. at 9. Plaintiff has presented no evidence showing that Ruiz was personally aware of the alleged constitutional violation. Rivera v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 331 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data cannot defeat summary judgment.”), amended by 340 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 2003). Based on the foregoing, drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact exists as to her Fourth Amendment claim against Ruiz. Ruiz is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 2. State Law Claims Defendants also request that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's remaining state law claims. Def. MSJ at 18-19. On July 31, 2020, the District Court accepted the R&R, wherein the Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims against the City, Buckhannon, Reynoso, Tate, the County, Cagney, Chung, Lacey, Thorp, and Villanueva and stayed the state law claims against Jara and Ruiz until further order of the Court. Dkt. 72. That stay has not been lifted. As such, it is inappropriate to dismiss these claims at this time, particularly given that the parties have had no opportunity to conduct discovery regarding such claims. Nonetheless, the Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction over these remaining claims. *11 When a federal court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, it may, at its discretion, decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 640 (2009). “[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988); see also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law. Certainly, if the federal law claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well.” (internal footnote omitted)); Jones v. Cmty. Redevelopment Agency of the City of L.A., 733 F.2d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 1984) (“When federal law claims are dismissed before trial, ... pendant state claims also should be dismissed.”). As a matter of comity, in light of the recommended dismissal of the only remaining federal claim, the Court should decline to hear the remaining exclusively state law claims in the SAC and dismiss those claims without prejudice. C. The Doe Defendants Should Be Dismissed Without Prejudice Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1) provides that the “plaintiff is responsible for having the summons and complaint served within the time allowed by Rule 4(m) and must furnish the necessary copies to the person who makes service.” Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: “If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court – on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff – must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time. But if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate period.” Plaintiffs bear the burden to establish good cause. Tucker v. City of Santa Monica, 2013 WL 653996 at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2013). The “good cause” exception to Rule 4(m) applies “only in limited circumstances” and is not satisfied by “inadvertent error or ignorance of the governing rules.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Townsel v. Cty. of Contra Costa, 820 F.2d 319, 320 (9th Cir. 1987) (ignorance of Rule 4 is not good cause for untimely service). Plaintiff was advised on August 17, 2020 that the deadline for seeking to amend a pleading or to join other parties, including to name a Doe defendant was September 28, 2020 absent a showing of good cause. The Court cautioned that it would “recommend dismissal of any party not timely served or identified by name by that time.” Dkt. 81 (“Scheduling Order”) at 3. Plaintiff has twice requested to extend the deadlines in the Scheduling Order. Plaintiff's September 8, 2020 Motion to Amend the deadlines in the Scheduling Order was granted in part on September 8, 2020, and the Court extended the deadline to October 28, 2020. Dkt. 94. Plaintiff was again advised that the Court would “recommend dismissal of any party not timely served or identified by name by that time.” Id. at 4. Plaintiff's second motion to amend the Scheduling Order was denied on October 30, 2020 because Plaintiff did not show good cause to modify the Scheduling Order. Dkt. 112. The deadline for service of the Doe defendants has long since expired and Plaintiff has yet to identify and serve these defendants, despite the opportunity to conduct discovery. Plaintiff did not move for leave to amend the SAC to name these defendants and she has not shown good cause to extend the time for serving the Doe defendants. Accordingly, dismissal pursuant to Rule 4(m) is appropriate. *12 By this Report, Plaintiff is placed on notice of the recommended dismissal of the Doe defendants; if Plaintiff believes she can show “good cause” for her failure to properly name and serve these defendants, she should make that showing in Objections to the Report and Recommendation. D. Defendants' Motion for Sanctions On April 26, 2021, Defendants filed a Motion for Terminating Sanctions, seeking an order terminating this action due to Plaintiff's spoliation of evidence and failure to comply with court ordered discovery. Dkt. 223 (“Motion for Sanctions”). In light of the Court's recommendation on Defendants' Motion, the Motion for Sanctions should be denied as moot. VI. RECOMMENDATION IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the District Court issue an Order: (1) approving and accepting this Report and Recommendation; (2) granting Defendants' Motion in part, granting partial summary judgment and dismissing Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action with prejudice; (3) denying Defendants' Motion as to the state law claims; (4) declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims and dismissing these claims without prejudice; (5) denying Plaintiff's Motion; (6) dismissing the remaining Doe defendants without prejudice; (7) denying Defendants' Motion for Sanctions (Dkt. 223) as moot; (7) discharging the Preliminary Injunction; and (8) directing that Judgment be entered accordingly. Footnotes [1] On February 28, 2020, Plaintiff was granted approval to proceed using her initials. See Dkt. 27. [2] Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 1-3, “[p]ersons appearing pro se are bound by these rules, and any reference in these rules to ‘attorney’ or ‘counsel’ applies to parties pro se unless the context requires otherwise.” [3] The Court also notes that as the party moving for summary judgment, Plaintiff “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for [her] motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which [she] believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (citation omitted). The district court is not required to search the record for evidence to support a motion for summary judgment. Robles v. Agreserves, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 3d 952, 966 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (“[t]he parties have the obligation to particularly identify material facts”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); cf. Keenan, 91 F.3d at 1279 (explaining that the district court is not required to “scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact” (citation omitted)). Even if the Court could consider the Motion, Plaintiff did not cite to the relevant portions of the record to support her assertions that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.