INTERRA INTERNATIONAL, LLC, Plaintiff, v. MOHAMMED AL KHAFAJI and INTERVISION, LLC, Defendants CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 1:16-CV-1523-MHC United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division Filed September 18, 2020 Cohen, Mark H., United States District Judge ORDER *1 This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff Interra International, LLC (“Interra”)'s Motion to Exclude or Limit the Testimony of Paul Dopp (“Pl.'s Mot. to Exclude”) [Doc. 257]. I. BACKGROUND Interra's Fourth Amended Complaint (the operative complaint in this case) included claims for the following: false designation of origin and unfair competition under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012) against both Defendants (Count I); breach of contract against Mohammed Al Khafaji (“Al Khafaji”) (Count II); tortious interference with contract and business relations against Intervision, LLC (“Intervision”) (Count III); violation of the Georgia Deceptive Trade Practices Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-370 et seq. (2015), against both Defendants (Count IV); common law unfair competition against both Defendants (Count V); and fraud against both Defendants (Count VI). Fourth Am. Compl. [Doc. 72]. On March 21, 2019, and October 24, 2019, this Court issued two orders which resulted in the grant of summary judgment to Defendants on Interra's claims in Counts I and IV-VI. See March 21, 2019, Order [Doc. 242]; October 24, 2019, Order [Doc. 252]. Based on those rulings, the only remaining claims in this case are: • Interra's claims in Count II (except for reputational harm and punitive damages) against Al Khafaji; and • Interra's claim for tortious interference with the Al Khafaji Employment Agreement in Count III against Intervision. Mar. 21, 2019, Order; Oct. 24, 2019, Order. In support of its claims for damages, Interra relies on the report of Scott D. Hampton (“Hampton”). Expert Report of Scott D. Hampton (Feb. 26, 2018) [Doc. 114-15] (“Hampton Report”). Hampton offers his expert opinions regarding the monetary damages Interra seeks in this case, including: (1) Interra's purported lost profits due to Al-Khafaji's alleged breach of contract and Intervision's alleged tortious interference with contract and business relations; (2) Interra's purported lost profits due to Defendants' alleged trademark infringement and related state law claims; and (3) an accounting of Intervision's purported gross revenues related to its sales of Jannat-labelled chicken to Al-Majar Al-Kapyr (“Al Majar”) arising from Defendants' alleged trademark infringement and related state law claims. Id. To rebut the Hampton Report, Defendants rely on the expert report of Paul Dopp (“Dopp”). Report of Paul Dopp (Mar. 27, 2018) (“Dopp Report”) [Doc. 114-24]. The Dopp Report is the subject of Plaintiff's present Motion to Exclude.[1] II. LEGAL STANDARD In federal court, federal law applies to the admissibility of expert testimony. Flury v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 427 F.3d 939, 944 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that in diversity cases, the Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence in federal court); see also Hendrix ex rel. G.P. v. Evenflo Co., 609 F.3d 1183, 1193 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Although the standards for finding causation are governed by [state] law, we apply federal law to determine whether the expert testimony proffered to prove causation is sufficiently reliable to submit it to the jury.”). Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony and provides: *2 A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. FED. R. EVID. 702. The Supreme Court has directed that [u]nlike an ordinary witness, see Rule 701, an expert is permitted wide latitude to offer opinions, including those that are not based on firsthand knowledge or observation. See Rules 702 and 703. Presumably, this relaxation of the usual requirement of firsthand knowledge ... is premised on an assumption that the expert's opinion will have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993). Because Rule 702 permits a broader range of testimony, the Supreme Court has made clear that district courts must perform a critical “gatekeeping” function concerning the admissibility of all expert testimony to ensure that an expert witness's testimony is not only relevant, but reliable. United States v. Frazier, 387 F. 3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999); Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 n.7, 597). In particular, district courts are “charged with screening out experts whose methods are untrustworthy or whose expertise is irrelevant to the issue at hand.” Corwin v. Walt Disney Co., 475 F.3d 1239, 1250 (11th Cir. 2007). In performing this gatekeeping function, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has developed “a rigorous three-part inquiry” to determine the admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702, that considers whether: (1) the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters he intends to address; (2) the methodology by which the expert reaches his conclusions is sufficiently reliable as determined by the sort of inquiry mandated in Daubert; and (3) the testimony assists the trier of fact, through the application of scientific, technical, or specialized expertise, to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1260 (quoting City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 562 (11th Cir. 1998)). “While there is inevitably some overlap among the basic requirements—qualification, reliability, and helpfulness—they remain distinct concepts and the courts must take care not to conflate them.” Id. “A district court's gatekeeper role under Daubert ‘is not intended to supplant the adversary system or the role of the jury.’ ” Maiz v. Virani, 253 F.3d 641, 666 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Allison v. McGhan, 184 F.3d 1300, 1311 (11th Cir. 1999)); accord Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596 (“Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”); Adams v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 760 F.3d 1322, 1332, 1334 (11th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted) (“Bias in an expert witness's testimony is usually a credibility issue for the jury.... The risk of bias would mean, at most, that [the expert's] testimony is to some extent ‘shaky,’ and shakiness goes to the weight of her testimony, not its admissibility.”). Rather, the Court's role as a gatekeeper under Daubert “is to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.” Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152. *3 The proponent of expert testimony “always bears the burden to show that his expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters he intended to address, the methodology by which the expert reached his conclusions is sufficiently reliable, and the testimony assists the trier of fact.” Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1260 (quoting McCorvey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 298 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal punctuation omitted)); see also Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe Cty., 402 F.3d 1092, 1107 (11th Cir. 2005) (explaining that it is the proponent's burden to lay the foundation for admission of expert testimony). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has cautioned that “[m]any factors will bear on the inquiry, and [there is no] definitive checklist or test.” Maiz, 253 F.3d at 665 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593). While Daubert and its progeny provide flexible guidelines for the admissibility of evidence under Rule 702, “expert testimony that does not meet all or most of the Daubert factors may sometimes be admissible” based on the particular circumstances of a specific case. United States v. Brown, 415 F.3d 1257, 1268 (11th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Scott, 403 F. App'x 392, 397 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152) (finding that the Daubert factors are only general guidelines and the trial judge has “considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable”); Quiet Tech. D C-8, Inc. v. Hurel-Dubois UK Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333, 1341 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding that the court should consider the Daubert factors “to the extent possible” but that “these factors do not exhaust the universe of considerations that may bear on the reliability of a given expert opinion, and a federal court should consider any additional factors that may advance its Rule 702 analysis”). A. Qualification There are various ways for determining whether an expert is qualified. “While scientific training or education may provide possible means to qualify, experience in a field may offer another path to expert status.” Frazier, 387 F.3d Fat 1260-61. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that an expert's qualification may be based on “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” See also FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note (2000 amends.) (“Nothing in this amendment is intended to suggest that experience alone ... may not provide a sufficient foundation for expert testimony.”). Thus, “there is no mechanical checklist for measuring whether an expert is qualified to offer opinion evidence in a particular field.” Santos v. Posadas de P.R. Assocs., 452 F.3d 59, 63 (1st Cir. 2006). Rule 702 requires an expert witness relying solely on experience to “explain how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts.” Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1261 (citing FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note (2000 amends.)). B. Reliability The district court has “substantial discretion in deciding how to test an expert's reliability and whether the expert's relevant testimony is reliable.” United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 1206, 1215 (11th Cir. 1999) (citation and quotation omitted). “[T]he proponent of the testimony does not have the burden of proving that it is scientifically correct, but that by a preponderance of the evidence, it is reliable.” Allison, 184 F.3d at 1312 (citation omitted). Thus, the inquiry into reliability must focus on “principles and methodology” and not the expert witness's conclusions. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. While an expert's qualifications may bear on the reliability of his proffered testimony, qualifications alone do not guarantee reliability. Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1261 (citing Quiet Tech. D C-8, 326 F.3d at 1341-42). Because “one may be considered an expert but still offer unreliable testimony,” it remains a basic foundation for admissibility under Rule 702 and Daubert that proposed expert testimony must be based on “good grounds.” Id. *4 Daubert delineates a list of “general observations” for determining whether expert testimony is sufficiently reliable to be admitted under Rule 702, including: (1) whether the theory in question can be and has been empirically tested; (2) whether the theory in question has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the theory's known or potential error rate and whether that rate is acceptable; and (4) whether the theory is generally accepted in the scientific community. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-594. The advisory committee notes for Rule 702 identify additional factors that courts consider in assessing the reliability of expert testimony: (1) Whether experts are proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and directly out of research they have conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they have developed their opinions expressly for purposes of testifying. (2) Whether the expert has unjustifiably extrapolated from an accepted premise to an unfounded conclusion. (3) Whether the expert has adequately accounted for obvious alternative explanations. (4) Whether the expert is being as careful as he would be in his regular professional work outside his paid litigation consulting. (5) Whether the field of expertise claimed by the expert is known to reach reliable results for the type of opinion the expert would give. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note (2000 amends.) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). If the witness is relying solely or primarily on experience, then the witness must explain how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts. The trial court's gatekeeping function requires more than simply taking the expert's word for it. Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1261 (internal quotation omitted) (citing FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note (2000 amends.) (emphasis added)). C. Helpfulness Finally, the court must assess whether the expert testimony is helpful to the trier of fact. This factor turns on whether the expert testimony “concerns matters that are beyond the understanding of the average lay person.” Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1262. “Proffered expert testimony generally will not help the trier of fact when it offers nothing more than what lawyers for the parties can argue in closing arguments.” Id. at 1262-63. III. ANALYSIS Defendants intend to rely on the expert testimony of Dopp as a rebuttal expert to Plaintiff's expert on damages, Hampton. Plaintiff seeks to exclude or limit the testimony of Dopp, arguing that (1) Dopp's critiques of Hampton are untested and unreliable, and (2) that Dopp cannot testify as to causation issues in this case. Mem. in Supp. of Pl.'s Mot. to Exclude or Limit the Test. of Paul Dopp (“Pl.'s Br.”) [Doc. 257-1] at 7-13. Plaintiff also argues that Dopp's supplemental report should be excluded because it was not provided in a timely fashion. Id. at 5-6. Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude does not contest Dopp's qualifications to testify as an expert so the Court's analysis will focus on the second and third factors outlined above (reliability and helpfulness).[2] A. Dopp's Failure to Provide an Alternative Opinion as to Plaintiff's Damages Does Not Compel the Exclusion of his Testimony as a Rebuttal Expert. *5 Plaintiff argues that Dopp did not test his own hypothesis against the facts of this case, rendering his testimony speculative, and his hypothesis untested and therefore unhelpful. Pl.'s Br. at 7-11. For example, Plaintiff points out that Dopp is critical of Hampton because he “should have considered ‘the impact of other factors on the alleged lost revenues/profits of Interra, such as increased competition[.]’ ” Id. at 7-8 (quoting Dopp Report at 23). Despite this criticism, when Plaintiff asked Dopp if other competitors actually impacted Plaintiff's sales, Dopp admitted that he just assumed they did have an impact and did not know which competitors impacted sales. Id. at 8. In response, Defendants argue that Plaintiff misunderstands the role of rebuttal experts. Defs.' Joint Resp. to Pl.'s Mot. to Exclude (“Defs.' Resp.”) [Doc. 266] at 9-13. Defendants argue that the purpose of a rebuttal expert is to “explain, repel, counteract, or disprove the evidence of an adverse party” and that Dopp's report and testimony meet this standard. Id. at 11 (quoting Frazier, 387 F. 3d at 1269). The Court agrees with Defendants. See ECO Sols., LLC v. Verde Biofuels, Inc., No. 4:09-CV-0125-HLM, 2012 WL 12899094, at *1 (N.D. Ga. May 2, 2012) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1269) (holding that “the purpose of rebuttal evidence is to explain, repel, counteract, or disprove the evidence of the adverse party, and the decision to permit rebuttal testimony is one that resides in the sound discretion of the trial judge”). The case of McSweeney v. Kahn is informative. In that case, the market value of a land trust was at issue and the defendant offered the testimony of an expert to attest to the value of the land trust. The plaintiff offered a rebuttal expert who did “not attempt to offer testimony concerning the value of the [land] trust ... , but instead simply critique[d] [the opposing] report.” McSweeney v. Kahn, No. 4:05-CV-0132-HLM, 2008 WL 6875017, at *9 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 4, 2008). The defendant moved to exclude the plaintiff's expert arguing that his testimony which was simply critical was “not helpful when it falls short of providing a reasonable alternative valuation that would allow the jury to assess the credibility of competing experts.” Id. The McSweeney court rejected this argument, recognizing that the role of the rebuttal expert was to offer critiques of the opposing expert's opinion and the rebuttal expert was not required to offer his own opinion as to the valuation of the land trust. Id. Similarly, this Court rejects Plaintiff's argument that Dopp's testimony should be excluded as unreliable and unhelpful because Dopp has failed to provide an alternative valuation of Plaintiff's damages. As a rebuttal expert, Dopp is permitted to offer testimony that is critical of Hampton and Hampton's Report without offering his own opinion as to the amount of Plaintiff's damages. Plaintiff has provided no case law to support the proposition that a rebuttal expert's report should be excluded as unreliable and unhelpful because that report failed to provide an alternative calculation of the amount of damages supported by the initial expert's report.[3] B. Dopp's Testimony Does Not Offer an Opinion as to Causation. *6 Plaintiff argues that the “heart of Dopp's testimony” is a criticism of Hampton's assumptions regarding causation, not Hampton's calculation of Plaintiff's damages. Pl.'s Br. at 11-13 (“[U]ltimately, the crux of his opinion is that Hampton should not have taken as true the facts Interra asked him to assume.”). Plaintiff argues that allowing Dopp to criticize Hampton for assuming causation will only confuse the jury and exceeds the scope of Hampton's testimony. As an example, Plaintiff points to Dopp's criticism that Hampton failed to analyze the sales of the customers that had done business with Intervision before and after Al Khafaji's employment and did not take into consideration that Interra continued to make sales to those customers. Pl.'s Br. at 12 (citing Dopp Report at 29). Plaintiff argues that Dopp is impermissibly criticizing Hampton's assumptions on causation. Id. Plaintiff does not cite to any law for the proposition that a rebuttal expert is not permitted to attack the underlying assumptions of a damage expert report, but instead relies on this Court's ruling on Defendants' motion to exclude the testimony of Hampton wherein the Court concluded that Hampton was entitled to make certain assumptions regarding liability: Hampton is presented as an expert on damages and is entitled to assume liability as to the other elements of the breach of contract claim. FieldTurf USA Inc. v. Tencate Thiolon Middle E., LLC, No. 4:11-CV-50-TWT, 2013 WL 12290896, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 5, 2013) (“His testimony is not excludable because he assumes that the Plaintiffs will prevail on their theory of liability. Every economic damages expert must assume that.”). If Interra fails to prove certain Intervision sales to Interra's customers were proximately caused by Al Khafaji's action, then Hampton will have to adjust his calculation of lost profits accordingly. Further, Interra will not be permitted to rely on Hampton's testimony as evidence of proximate cause. Mar. 21, 2019, Order [Doc. 243] at 13 n.1. Plaintiff reasons that because Hampton is entitled to assume liability as a damages expert and because this Court has ruled as much, it follows that “[a]ll of Dopp's opinions regarding causation are therefore improper and must be excluded.” Pl.'s Br. at 12. However, just because this Court held that Hampton's Report is not inadmissible because he made certain assumptions regarding causation in arriving at a damages calculation, it does not follow that Dopp is precluded from challenging the assumptions made in Hampton's Report. “Other courts have found that it may be permissible to utilize a rebuttal expert to rebut assumptions of another expert.” Ohio St. Troopers Ass'n, Inc. v. Point Blank Enters., Inc., No. 18-CV-63130, 2020 WL 1666763, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2020) (citing Slicex, Inc. v. Aeroflex Colo. Springs, Inc., No. 2:04-CV-615 TS, 2006 WL 1932344, at *3 (D. Utah July 11, 2006) (“[T]he [c]ourt finds that Wagner has specialized knowledge and that he may be allowed to testify as a rebuttal expert witness in order to rebut the methodology and the assumptions used by [p]laintiff's expert.”) and Fuller v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., No. 1:11-CV-784-ODE, 2019 WL 5448206, at *22 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 3, 2019) (finding that the rebuttal expert attacked an assumption underlying the other expert's report and, consequently, declining to exclude rebuttal expert)). Nor does it follow that Dopp exceeds the scope of his permitted testimony as a rebuttal expert by challenging the assumptions made in Hampton's Report. Fuller, 2019 WL 5448206, at *22 (declining to exclude expert rebuttal report as outside the scope of his report where it attacked assumptions made within the initial expert's report). C. Dopp's Supplementary Schedule Plaintiff argues that Defendants belatedly produced a supplementary schedule to the Dopp Report on December 9, 2019, which purports to provide an accounting of Plaintiff's lost profits. Pl.'s Br. at 5-6 (referencing Dopp's supplementary schedule to the Report of Paul Dopp (“Supplementary Schedule”) [Doc. 258-1]). Plaintiff contends that the Supplementary Schedule must be excluded because it was produced eighteen months after Dopp's deposition where he “expressly and repeatedly disclaimed doing any lost profits calculations.” Id. at 6. Plaintiff argues that Defendants could have offered alternatives to Hampton's damages calculations during discovery, but declined to do so, and to offer alternatives now after discovery has closed is contrary to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. *7 Defendants respond that the Supplementary Schedule is merely a demonstrative exhibit prepared by Dopp, which “consists of a chart illustrating Mr. Dopp's expert opinions rebutting and critiquing certain of Mr. Hampton's purported lost incremental profits calculations in this case, including Mr. Hampton's failures to make proper adjustments to such calculations.” Defs.' Resp. at 15. Defendants argue that there is nothing new in the Supplementary Schedule and that “Dopp's opinions regarding this matter have already been expressed in his Report and deposition.” Id. (quoting Supplementary Schedule). Defendants also maintain that even if the Supplementary Schedule contained new information, it would be admissible as a supplemental submission under Rule 26(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 18-19. 1. The Supplementary Schedule is Not a Permissible Demonstrative Exhibit. The Supplementary Schedule is a chart that appears to take the lost incremental profit number relied upon in Hampton's Report ($8,410,991.00) and adjust it to reflect various costs and other factors for which Dopp contends Hampton failed to account. Supplementary Schedule. Defendants argue that Dopp's expert opinions shown in the Supplementary Schedule are not new, but are merely demonstrative of his previous criticisms of Hampton's loss incremental profits calculation. Defs.' Resp. at 15-18. In support of this proposition, Defendants cite to numerous provisions of the Dopp Report in which he discusses generally his criticisms of the Hampton Report. Id. For example, Defendants cite to Dopp's Report where it discusses his criticism that Hampton's Report fails “to consider certain avoided costs such as ocean and land freight.” Id. at 16 (citing, inter alia, Dopp Report ¶ 7). The Supplementary Schedule appears to quantify the ocean freight cost that Hampton's Report purportedly ignores at $3,831,175.00 and the land freight cost ignored at $1,481,723.00. Supplementary Schedule. However, the paragraph of the Dopp Report where Defendants contend that the “same opinions also are expressed” does not quantify these costs. Defs.' Resp. at 16 (citing Dopp Report ¶ 7).[4] Nor do the figures quantifying the ocean and land freight costs appear in the transcript of Dopp's deposition. See Dep. Tr. of Paul Dopp (Apr. 16, 2018) (“Dopp Dep.”) [Doc. 151]. The same is true for the figures listed in the Supplementary Schedule for adjustments made to Hampton's damage calculation related to the improperly attributed sales to Teeba Farms, Al-Majar Al Kapyr, and Intervision's prior customers. In other words, the Dopp Report criticizes the Hampton Report in general terms for failing to account for these factors, but the Dopp Report does not provide the specific dollar figure associated with the criticisms that is delineated in the Supplementary Schedule. Nor do the figures quantifying the other factors forming the bases of the adjustments in Supplementary Schedule appear to be discussed in the Dopp deposition transcript. See Dopp Dep. The Court cannot conclude that the Supplementary Schedule is merely a demonstrative exhibit with no new information when the adjustment figures it introduces do not appear in the Dopp Report and were not discussed in Dopp's deposition.[5] 2. The Supplementary Schedule Does Not Comply with Rule 26(e). *8 Defendants maintain that the Supplementary Schedule would be admissible as a supplemental submission under Rule 26(e)(2), which provides For an expert whose report must be disclosed under Rule 26(a)(2)(B), the party's duty to supplement extends both to information included in the report and to information given during the expert's deposition. Any additions or changes to this information must be disclosed by the time the party's pretrial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(3) are due. FED. R. CIV. P. 26. The Court finds that the proposition that Defendants can supplement their expert report with specific figures quantifying the adjustments they contend need to be made to the Hampton damages calculation over a year after the close of expert discovery “is a tortured and self-serving interpretation of what the Rule allows.” Cochran v. Brinkmann Corp., No. 1:08-CV-1790-WSD, 2009 WL 4823858, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 9, 2009), aff'd sub nom., Cochran v. The Brinkmann Corp., 381 F. App'x 968 (11th Cir. 2010). This is especially true when Dopp discounted the need to provide any specific calculation of how the Hampton damage calculation should be adjusted. When asked if his damage calculation would be lower than Hampton's, Dopp opined: “It's not my job to calculate damages. I haven't gone and said let me take his flaw, fix it all, put some Band-Aids on it, twist it around this way, deduct this, add that, and this is what he should have done. That's not my job.” Dopp Dep. at 181; see also id. at 122 (“I wasn't asked to do damages. That was Mr. Hampton's role.”). Under these circumstances, where Defendants have failed to provide the figures Dopp is purporting to provide quantifying the adjustments to Hampton's damages calculation and has presented them for the first time in an exhibit produced over a year after expert discovery closed, the Court finds good grounds to exclude the Supplementary Schedule. The purpose of expert reports and a deadline for serving them is to put an opposing party on notice of what it must contend with at trial. [Defendants' strategy of waiting until pretrial disclosures are due to submit an expert] report amendment defeats the purpose of the report requirement and the order of this Court, which was to end discovery and fix for the parties the evidence and opinions with which they would have to contend at trial so a trial could be fairly and efficiently conducted. That effort would be hopelessly and unfairly frustrated if the Court allowed [Defendants'] tactic in this case. Rule 26(e) requires a party to supplement a report it finds was “incomplete or inaccurate.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(e)(1)(A). It is not a device to allow a party's expert to engage in additional work, or to annul opinions or offer new ones to perfect a litigating strategy. Cochran, 2009 WL 4823858, at *5. Defendants' interpretation of Rule 26(e) thwarts the principles of fairness embodied in Local Rule 26.2(c): Any party who desires to use the testimony of an expert witness shall designate the expert sufficiently early in the discovery period to permit the opposing party the opportunity to depose the expert and, if desired, to name its own expert witness sufficiently in advance of the close of discovery so that a similar discovery deposition of the second expert might also be conducted prior to the close of discovery. *9 Any party who does not comply with the provisions of the foregoing paragraph shall not be permitted to offer the testimony of the party's expert, unless expressly authorized by Court order based upon a showing that the failure to comply was justified. LR 26.2(c), NDGa. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) requires that an expert's report to contain “a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express,” “the facts or data considered by the witness in forming them,” and “any exhibits that will be used to summarize or support them.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B). Defendants failed to comply with these requirements by failing to provide the Supplementary Schedule to Plaintiff during discovery. Nor did Defendants even attempt to quantify the dollar amount by which they are now contending the Hampton damages calculation should be adjusted. In fact, Defendants' expert specifically stated that he was not providing an alternative damage calculation. Accordingly, Defendants are not permitted to use the Supplementary Schedule at trial. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff Interra International, LLC's Motion to Exclude or Limit the Testimony of Paul Dopp [Doc. 257] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion is GRANTED so as to exclude the use of Defendants' Supplementary Schedule [Doc. 258-1] at trial. In all other respects, the motion is DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED this 18th day of September, 2020. Footnotes [1] Neither Plaintiff nor Defendants requested that the Court hold a Daubert hearing on the instant Motion. The record contains more than sufficient information to allow the Court to evaluate the instant Motion without a hearing. The Court finds that a Daubert hearing would not materially assist the Court in resolving the issues presented by the instant Motion, and concludes that no Daubert hearing is required. [2] In its reply brief, Plaintiff asserts for the first time that Dopp is not qualified to offer testimony on the factors that impact Interra's and Intervision's sales because they do not have anything to do with his expertise. Reply Mem. in Supp. of Pl.'s Mot. to Exclude [Doc. 268] at 10. The Court will not entertain this argument as it is a new argument raised for the first time in Plaintiff's reply brief. See Hill v. Oil Dri Corp. of Ga., 198 F. App'x 852, 856 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider limitations issue raised for the first time in plaintiffs' reply brief); J-B Weld Co., LLC v. Gorilla Glue Co., No. 1:17-CV-3946-LMM, 2018 WL 1989308, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 12, 2018) (citation and quotation omitted) (“The general rule is that arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are not properly before a reviewing court.”). [3] The cases cited by Plaintiff are inapposite as they involve the exclusion of primary experts' opinions, not rebuttal experts. See McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1300 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted) (excluding the plaintiff's medical expert on causation where he “has not tested his own theory nor determined any error rate associated with it”); Whelan v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., No. 1:12-CV-22481-UU, 2013 WL 5595938, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2013) (excluding the plaintiff's expert's testimony where he “offers no methodology by which one can determine whether there was sufficient light directed at the single step”); Sumner v. Biomet, Inc., No. 7:08-CV-98 HL, 2010 WL 4736320, at *4 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 16, 2010), aff'd, 434 F. App'x 834 (11th Cir. 2011) (excluding the plaintiff's expert's testimony on causation where he “did not test the particle ejection theory, and was unable to suggest any ideas as to how the ejection of the metal fragments could have occurred.”) [4] Paragraph 7(f) of the Dopp Report states that “[t]he Hampton Report damage methodology fails to consider and properly quantify all avoided costs, thus understating avoided costs resulting in the overstatement of lost profits.” Dopp Report ¶ (7)(f). In addition to not quantifying the amount of avoided costs not accounted for, this paragraph does not specifically delineate the types of costs (i.e. ocean and inland freight costs). See id. [5] Nor does the Supplementary Schedule fit the definition of a permissible “summary” exhibit contemplated by Rule 1006 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 1006 (“The proponent may use a summary, chart, or calculation to prove the content of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs that cannot be conveniently examined in court. The proponent must make the originals or duplicates available for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at a reasonable time and place. And the court may order the proponent to produce them in court.”).