WILBURT RIVERA and DINGY DENTS, LLC, Plaintiffs, v. JACK PARKER; EXECUTIVE AUTO SALES AND SERVICE, LLC; AND CHERIE PARKER, Defendants CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 1:20-CV-3210-SCJ United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division Signed May 04, 2021 Counsel Christine S. Tenley, McGlinchey Stafford, PLLC, New Orleans, LA, Joseph Alexander Little, IV, Pro Hac Vice, Burr & Forman LLP, Nashville, TN, Juan M. Rodriguez, Kevin Robert Stone, Burr & Forman LLP, Atlanta, GA, Patrick Alfred Reid, Pro Hac Vice, Burr & Forman, LLP, Tampa, FL, for Plaintiffs. Eric G. Maurer, Norman Andrew Crain, Thomas Horstemeyer, LLP, Evan M. Altman, Office of Evan M. Altman, Brian S. Goldberg, Leo Kogan, Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants. Jones, Steve C., United States District Judge ORDER *1 This matter appears before the Court on Defendants' Contested Motion for Entry of a Confidentiality Protective Order Covering Both Parties and Non-Parties/Third Parties. Doc. No. [77]. In their motion, Defendants assert that their “proposed blanket Confidentiality Order covering both parties and non-parties/third-parties alike is needed for the efficient and inexpensive progression of this case based on Defendants having identified many third parties from whom Defendants need discovery that is likely to be deemed confidential or business sensitive by the producing non-party/third party.” Doc. No. [77], pp. 1–2. Defendants assert that it is unlikely that these non-parties/third parties will produce the information at issue without filing their own motion for a confidentiality protective order or Defendants having to file a motion to compel production under a protective order protecting the sensitive documents to be produced. Doc. No. [77-1], pp. 13–16.[1] In addition and in support of their motion, Defendants cite to Rules 1 and 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure concerning administering the rules to secure the “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action” and good cause for protecting a party during the discovery process from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden and expense. Doc. No. [77-1], p. 8. Defendants also cite to prior stipulated protective orders that contain similar non-party provisions as the one they request. Id. at p. 10. Defendants further assert that Plaintiffs' opposition to their proposed protective order is “unnecessary and wasteful” and urge the Court to sanction Plaintiffs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. Id. at p. 2. The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for review. Doc. Nos. [77]; [88]; [94]. A review of the briefing shows that the parties' dispute concerns one paragraph, i.e., Paragraph 14 of Defendants' proposed confidentiality protective order. Doc. No. [77-1], p. 6. Defendants assert that “the clear reasons for entry of a blanket protective order covering both parties and non-parties include judicial efficiency, reduced litigation costs, and expediency resulting from not having to repeatedly come to this Court for multiple individual protective orders or motions to compel with regard to each third party subpoena and discovery request.” Doc. No. [77-1], p. 9. *2 In opposition, Plaintiffs state that they “should not be forced to enter into a Protective Order and compromise their rights to object to any third-party subpoenas issued by Defendants in the future.” Doc. No. [88], p. 5. Plaintiffs state that “[i]f, and when, a subpoena is issued to a third party, the proper procedure for that third party, if necessary, is for the third party to object to the production of certain documents by filing a motion for protective order and/or motion to quash.” Doc. No. [88], p. 3. Plaintiffs also cite case law where a district court declined to enter a protective order to cover unknown third-parties on the ground that the risk identified by the movant was “too speculative.” See Kraft Foods Glob., Inc. v. Dairilean, Inc., No. 10 C 8006, 2011 WL 1557881, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2011). After review of the parties' arguments, in the absence of binding authority, the Court declines to exercise its discretion to enter a blanket protective order to include third-parties. See In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 820 F.2d 352, 357 (11th Cir. 1987) (“A district court has broad discretion when fashioning protective orders.”) (citations omitted). Plaintiffs are correct that all of the prior protective orders (cited by Defendants) that contain a term similar to the term that Defendants seek were entered on consent or stipulation of the parties. In the absence of Plaintiffs' willingness to consent, the most just, fair and efficient way to proceed is to abide by the rules of civil procedure already in place. As correctly noted by Plaintiffs, those rules require the filing of a motion for protective order or motion to quash for any objectionable discovery requests. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) and 45. These specific rules govern over the more general language of Rule 1 relied upon by Defendants and any other interpretation would render Rule 26 and 45 superfluous, which this Court declines to do. Cf. In re Tetracycline Cases, 107 F.R.D. 719, 727 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (“Reference to the general rules of construction suggests that any interpretation which makes a federal rule superfluous is to be avoided.”) (citation omitted). CONCLUSION Defendants' Contested Motion for Entry of a Confidentiality Protective Order Covering Both Parties and Non-Parties/Third Parties (Doc. No. [77]) is DENIED. The Court will enter a protective order without the disputed Paragraph 14. As there is some merit to each parties' position, Defendants' request for Rule 37 sanctions is DENIED and Plaintiffs' request for fees is DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED this 4th day of May, 2021. Footnotes [1] Defendants provide the following illustrative examples of third-party discovery that “will likely be confidential”: (1) Atlanta Dent Company/Dent Wizard International (payment and employment records for Plaintiff); (2) Enterprise (relationship with Plaintiffs, amount paid, purchase orders/invoices and other confidential financial and business sensitive information); (3) American Express/Navy Federal Credit Union/financial institutions (credit card records and bank information for Plaintiffs); (4) accountants (business sensitive confidential information); and (5) Terrill Albright (financial transactions with Plaintiffs since 2017).