CHRISTOPHER ALFRED, Plaintiff, v. S.J. POWELL and KEITH MITCHELL, Defendants CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:03-CV-2683-RLV United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division Filed May 31, 2005 Counsel Ralph S. Goldberg, Goldberg & Cuvillier, P.C., Tucker, GA, for Plaintiff. DeKalb County, Decatur, GA, Pro Se. Amil Cabral Johnson, RS Johnson Legal, East Point, GA, Terri N. Gordon, Dekalb Co. Law Department, Viviane H. Ernstes, Office of DeKalb County Attorney, Decatur, GA, William J. Linkous, III, Gwinnett County Department of Law, Lawrenceville, GA, for Defendants. Vining Jr., Robert L., United States District Judge ORDER *1 The plaintiff filed the instant action alleging a deprivation of his constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, the defendant alleges that he was falsely imprisoned and maliciously prosecuted in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. This matter is before the court on the plaintiff's motion to compel [Doc. No. 23], the defendants' motion for a protective order [Doc. No. 24], the defendants' first motion to extend the time period in which to file a motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 28], and the plaintiff's motion for sanctions [Doc. No. 31]. I. DISCUSSION This case is the poster child for why courts do not like dealing with discovery disputes. Due to the conduct of both plaintiff's counsel and defendants' counsel, this court is left to expend its time and resources considering four motions and corresponding responses on issues that could have been prevented or easily resolved by prudence, reasonable communication, and professional courtesy. The plaintiff filed this action on September 9, 2003. On August 30, 2004, the defendant answered. On January 28, 2005, the plaintiff's counsel sent the defendants' counsel a letter in which he stated: Please find my notices of deposition [for the named defendants]. I am willing to reschedule the depositions, but by my count, Wednesday is the last date of discovery. I am willing to do the defendants' depositions in the afternoon of the 8th, the morning of the 9th, anytime on the 14th or the 18th with or without discovery extensions. Perhaps you have another day that works? Exhibit A to defendants' motion for a protective order. In the notices, the plaintiff's counsel listed February 2, 2005, as the date in which he planned on deposing the defendants. On. the same day defendants' counsel received plaintiff's counsel's letter, defendants' counsel responded in the following manner via facsimile and first class mail: I am in receipt of your letter dated January 28, 2005[,] that requested the depositions of the defendants in the above-listed matter. However, according to the District Court, discovery closed on January 27, 2005. Therefore, unless you have obtained a discovery extension from the Court, I do not believe your notices of deposition are proper. Exhibit B to defendants' motion for a protective order. In response to this letter, on February 1, 2004, the plaintiff's counsel sent the defendants' counsel a letter via facsimile which stated: Although I have heard from you, I am unaware of any order staying or quashing the notice of deposition. As you are no doubt aware, there is a requirement of an order from the Court before you can fail to show up for a deposition. See Hepperle v. Johnston, 590 F.2d 609, 613 (5th Cir. 1979). I therefore expect to take both depositions tomorrow. As I told you before, I am willing to reschedule the depositions for your convenience. Although plaintiff's counsel showed up to take the defendants' depositions on the day specified in the notice, the defendants did not appear at that time. *2 In their motion for a protective order, the defendants note that this court's website specifies that discovery in this matter ended on January 27, 2005, one day before the defendants were served with their notices for deposition. Furthermore, the defendants contend that plaintiff's counsel did not provide sufficient notice for their depositions, as he scheduled their depositions for one and one-half business days after receipt of the notices of deposition. Therefore, the defendants filed a motion for a protective order “to protect the Defendants from appearing to an insufficiently noticed deposition that was filed outside the discovery period.” Motion for protective order, p.3. Thus, although both parties concede that this case is on a four month discovery track, this court must first determine when the discovery period ended. This court notes that the defendants' counsel is correct in stating that this court's website lists January 27, 2005, as the last day for discovery. It appears this calculation is made by adding 150 days to the business day following the date in which the answer was filed. In this case, the defendants answered on August 30, 2004. Thus, if 150 days are added to August 31, 2004, the discovery deadline would be January 27, 2005. There is a problem with this approach, however, because the Local Rules calculate the discovery tracks in terms of months, rather than days. Northern District of Georgia Local Rule 26.2(A) addresses the commencement and calculation of the discovery period and provides: The discovery period shall commence thirty (30) days after the appearance of the first defendant by answer to the complaint, unless the parties mutually consent to begin earlier. Discovery proceedings must be initiated promptly so that discovery is initiated and completed (including the filing of answers and responses thereto) within the time limitations of the discovery track to which the case is assigned. The discovery tracks established in this court are: (1) zero (0)-months discovery period; (2) four (4) -months discovery period; and eight (8)-months discovery period. Furthermore, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a) notes, In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. Thus, when Rule 6 is read in conjunction with Local Rule 26.2(a), the discovery period actually commences 30 days after the business day immediately following the date in which the first defendant answered. It then lasts for four months. Thus, the discovery period ended on January 31, 2005,[1] four months and 31 days after the defendants filed their answer. First, this court notes that the plaintiff's counsel should not have waited until the eve of the discovery period's expiration to depose the defendants. Furthermore, one and one-half business days is not sufficient notice for a deposition. Although this court notes that plaintiff's counsel attempted to accommodate the defendants' schedule in his letter to defendants' counsel, he was forced to provide a short notice period by his procrastination in deposing the defendants. Next, this court notes that although defendants' counsel relied on the inaccurate discovery deadline listed on this court's website, the Local Rules trump whatever representations are otherwise made on the website. Thus, while defendants' counsel's mistake was understandable, it, nevertheless, was a mistake. Furthermore, defendants' counsel compounded this mistake by failing to work with the plaintiff's counsel to briefly extend the discovery deadline defendants' counsel mistakenly thought had expired to get the defendants' depositions completed. Therefore, this court DENIES the defendants' motion for a protective order and extends the discovery deadline in this case for 30 days from the date this order is docketed. *3 In addition, because both parties conduct contributed to this disagreement, this court DENIES the plaintiff's motion for sanctions and GRANTS the defendants' motion for an extension of time in which to file a motion for summary judgment. The parties shall have 50 days from the date this order is docketed to move for summary judgment. On January 31, 2005, the plaintiff filed a motion to compel in which he requested that this court compel the defendants to answer a number of interrogatories. After carefully considering the plaintiff's motion this court finds as follows: Interrogatories (1) - (4): these interrogatories are irrelevant and need not be answered; Interrogatories (6) - (7): the defendants are directed to answer these interrogatories to the best of their current abilities and amend such answers in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should they gain additional relevant information; Interrogatory (8): this interrogatory is vague and need not be answered; Interrogatory (9): this interrogatory is irrelevant and need not be answered. For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff's motion to compel [Doc. No. 23] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART; the defendants' motion for a protective order [Doc. No. 24] is DENIED; the defendants' first motion to extend the time period in which to file a motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 28] is GRANTED; and the plaintiff's motion for sanctions [Doc. No. 31] is DENIED. No further discovery extensions will be granted. SO ORDERED, this 31ST day of May, 2005. Footnotes [1] Although the actual date was January 30, 2005, this date fell on a Sunday; therefore, the deadline was the next business day.