BANCA PUEYO, S.A., et al., Petitioners, v. LONE STAR FUND IX (U.S.), L.P., et al., Respondents Cause No. 3:18-mc-100-M United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division Signed September 25, 2020 Counsel Dawn Estes, Katherine M. Anand, Estes Thorne & Carr PLLC, Dallas, TX, Colin Steele, Peter Calamari, Lucas Bento, Pro Hac Vice, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, New York, NY, Paul P. Hughes, Pro Hac Vice, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, for Petitioners Banca Pueyo SA, Banco BIC Portugues SA, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA, BlackRock Inc, Carlson Capital LP, CQS (UK) LLP, DNCA Finance, Pacific Investment Management Company LLC, River Birch Capital LLC, TwentyFour Asset Management LLP, VR-Bank RheinSieg eG, Weiss Multi-Strategy Advisers LLC. Matthew W. Moran, George M. Kryder, Stefanie Jackson, Robert P. Ritchie, Vinson & Elkins LLP, Dallas, TX, for Respondents. Rutherford, Rebecca, United States Magistrate Judge ORDER *1 Respondents Lone Star Fund IX (U.S.), L.P., Lone Star Global Acquisitions, LLC, and Hudson Advisors, L.P.'s (collectively, “Respondents”) Renewed Motion to Quash Subpoenas (ECF No. 56) is before the Court. For the reasons stated, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Respondents' motion. Background This discovery dispute arises in the context of an attempt by Petitioners Banca Pueyo, S.A.; Banco BIC Português, S.A.; Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A.; BlackRock, Inc.; Carlson Capital, L.P.; CQS (UK), LLP; DNCA Finance; Pacific Investment Management Company, LLC; River Birch Capital, LLC; TwentyFour Asset Management, LLP; VR-Bank Rhein-Sieg eG; Weiss Multi-Strategy Advisers, LLC; and York Capital Management Global Advisors, LLC (collectively, “Petitioners”) to obtain information and materials for use in legal proceedings pending in Portugal. The following historical facts, drawn from the parties' submissions, are repeated here for background purposes only:[1] In 2014, Banco Espírito Santo, S.A., one of Portugal's largest banks at the time, was in danger of defaulting on its obligations. First Mot. Quash 9 (ECF No. 20). To avoid Banco Espírito's default, Banco de Portugal, the Portuguese Republic's central bank, and the Resolution Fund, an entity created to finance Banco de Portugal's “resolution measures,” established Novo Banco, S.A. and transferred certain assets from Banco Espírito to Novo Banco. Id. 10. In December 2014, Banco de Portugal and the Resolution Fund initiated the process to sell Novo Banco, but in September 2015, Banco de Portugal terminated the process. Id. Instead, in December 2015, Banco de Portugal “informed the market that it had retransferred certain of the notes” that were transferred from Banco Espírito to Novo Banco back to Banco Espírito. Id. In 2016, Banco de Portugal again began the process of selling Novo Banco, which it completed in March 2017 when it sold 75% of Novo Banco to Nani Holdings, SGPS, S.A. Id. Respondents Lone Star Fund IX (U.S.), L.P. (LSFIX), Lone Star Global Acquisitions, LLC (LSGA), and Hudson Advisors, L.P. assert they had little to no involvement in these events. Id. According to Respondents, LSGA was not formed until December 5, 2017. Id. LSFIX is only one of three entities comprising the private equity fund, Lone Star Fund IX; LSFIX has no employees, office space, or physical assets; and LSFIX owns only 14% in Nani Holdings. Id. 10-11. Additionally, Hudson Advisors provided only minor legal support regarding Nani Holdings' acquisition of Novo Banco, which included preparing an investment committee memorandum for Lone Star Fund IX concerning the financial merits of Nani Holdings investing in Novo Banco. Id. 11. In March and April 2016, 65 plaintiffs initiated five administrative proceedings against Banco de Portugal in the Lisbon Circuit Administrative Court, challenging the 2015 retransfer of assets from Novo Banco back to Banco Espírito. Id. 11-12. Banco de Portugal is the “public/governmental defendant” in these actions, while Banco Espírito, Novo Banco, and the Resolution Fund “are counter interested parties.” Id. 12. Banca Pueyo S.A., Banco BIC Português S.A., Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A., DNCA Finance, Pacific Investment Management Company LLC, TwentyFour Asset Management LLP, VR-Bank Rhein-Sieg eG, Weiss Multi-Strategy Advisers LLC, and River Birch Capital LLC are plaintiffs in these “retransfer” actions. Id. n.5. Whereas, BlackRock, Inc., Carlson Capital, L.P., CQS (UK) LLP, and York Capital Management Global Advisors, LLC are not. Id. n.6. The retransfer plaintiffs sent discovery requests to Banco de Portugal and Novo Banco. Id. To date, there appears to be no dispute concerning Banco de Portugal's compliance with those requests; Novo Banco has not responded to requests served on it; and there has been no ruling on the requests' “legal admissibility or merits.” Id. *2 In June 2017, 24 plaintiffs initiated five more administrative actions against Banco de Portugal in the Lisbon Circuit Administrative Court, challenging Banco de Portugal's decision to sell 75% of Novo Banco's shares to Nani Holdings. Id. Banco de Portugal and “the Resolution Fund are the governmental defendants in [those] actions,” and “Novo Banco, Nani Holdings, LSFIX, Lone Star Fund IX (Bermuda), L.P., and Lone Star Fund IX Parallel (Bermuda), L.P. are counter interested parties.” Id. DNCA Finance and River Birch Capital are the only Petitioners that are parties to these actions concerning Nani Holdings' acquisition of Novo Banco. Id. As of the filing of Respondents' first motion to quash, Banco de Portugal had “made certain information available to the Lisbon Circuit Administrative Court in these actions,” and “there [had] been no challenge to this production by any party,” nor had any “additional document productions ... been requested from [Banco de Portugal], the Resolution Fund, or any of the counter interested parties.” Id. 12-13. Last, the Lisbon Public Prosecutor's Office is allegedly investigating insider trading. Id. 13. However, “the proceeding is under investigative secrecy and ... no information ... is publicly available,” including, “who the defendant is ... , what the nature of the charges are, or what ... stage the proceeding is currently in.” Id. However, according to Respondents, Petitioners' Application (ECF No. 1) notes that an affected Petitioner filed an application to join that criminal proceeding, though the Application does not name the Petitioner. Id. Petitioners filed their “Ex Parte Application and Petition for an Order to Conduct Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782,” on December 21, 2018, seeking authorization to serve subpoenas on Respondents requiring their representatives to appear for depositions and to produce documents. The Court granted Petitioners' Ex Parte Application on January 14, 2019. Order (ECF No. 12). The Court further directed Respondents to file an appropriate motion to quash if they objected to the order granting the Application. Id. 6. Respondents subsequently filed their first motion to quash and for reconsideration of the Court's order granting the § 1782 Application. (ECF No. 20). On November 29, 2019, the undersigned determined that, because the District Court granted the § 1782 Application, the proper mechanism for challenging Petitioners' discovery requests was a motion to quash under Rule 45. Order (ECF No. 33). Thus, the undersigned considered the parties' arguments under Rule 45 and denied Respondents' first motion to quash. Id. Further, because they had not already done so, the undersigned ordered the parties to meaningfully confer regarding Respondents' specific objections to Petitioners' discovery requests and-directed the parties that if they failed to resolve the entire discovery dispute via conference, Respondents may file a renewed motion to quash under Rule 45 to address any remaining, specific objections—including any objection that the discovery requests are unduly burdensome. See id. 21. The undersigned also reconsidered whether Petitioners had met the statutory requirements to obtain discovery under § 1782 and determined that Petitioners' Application satisfied all the statutory requirements. Id. 12-18. The undersigned further considered Respondents' objections concerning the discretionary Intel factors. Id. 18-20 The undersigned found, however, that these objections would be best addressed in the context of a Rule 45 motion to quash and pretermitted a full review of the Intel factors. Id. 20. Again, the undersigned specifically noted that concerns related to the fourth discretionary factor, “whether the § 1782(a) request is ‘unduly intrusive or burdensome,’ ” would be addressed under Rule 45, if objections on that ground persisted after the parties meaningfully conferred on the specific requests at issue. Id. Respondents filed objections to the November 29, 2019 order, and the Court overruled them. Order (ECF No. 42). Despite participating in the required conference, the parties failed to reach an agreement. Thus, Respondents now file a renewed motion to quash Petitioners' subpoenas in their entirety. The renewed motion to quash is fully briefed and ripe for determination. Legal Standard *3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(d)(3) provides: the court for the district where compliance is required must quash or modify a subpoena that: (i) fails to allow a reasonable time to comply; (ii) requires a person to comply beyond the geographical limits specified in Rule 45(c); (iii) requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies; or (iv) subjects a person to undue burden. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A). Rule 45 also permits the court for the district where compliance is required to quash or modify a subpoena requiring “(i) disclosing a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information; or (ii) disclosing an unretained expert's opinion or information that does not describe specific occurrences in dispute and results from the expert's study that was not requested by a party.” Id. 45(d)(3)(B). “Generally, modification of a subpoena is preferable to quashing it outright.” Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 392 F.3d 812, 818 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). The moving party has the burden of proof on a Rule 45(d)(3)(A) motion to quash. See Wiwa, 392 F.3d at 818 (citing Williams v. City of Dallas, 178 F.R.D. 103, 109 (N.D. Tex. 1998)). Specifically, “[o]n a motion asserting undue burden, the moving party has the burden of proof to demonstrate that compliance with the subpoena would be unreasonable and oppressive.” MetroPCS v. Thomas, 327 F.R.D. 600, 609 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (quoting Wiwa, 392 F.3d at 818). “The moving party opposing discovery must show how the requested discovery was overly broad, burdensome, or oppressive by submitting affidavits or offering evidence revealing the nature of the burden.” Andra Grp., LP v. JDA Software Grp., Inc., 312 F.R.D. 444, 449 (N.D. Tex. 2015) (citing S.E.C. v. Brady, 238 F.R.D. 429, 437-38 (N.D. Tex. 2006); Merrill v. Waffle House, Inc., 227 F.R.D. 475, 477 (N.D. Tex. 2005)). However, “[w]hether a burdensome subpoena is reasonable must be determined according to the facts of the case, such as the party's need for the documents and the nature and importance of the litigation.” Wiwa, 392 F.3d at 818 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); accord Andra Grp., 312 F.R.D. at 449 (quoting Wiwa, 392 F.3d at 818). A court considers the following factors to determine whether a subpoena is unduly burdensome: “(1) relevance of the information requested; (2) the need of the party for the documents; (3) the breadth of the document request; (4) the time period covered by the request; (5) the particularity with which the party describes the requested documents; and (6) the burden imposed.” Wiwa, 392 F.3d at 818 (citation omitted). The relevance of a subpoena issued as a discovery tool, “for purposes of the undue burden test[,] is measured according to the standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1).” Andra Grp., 312 F.R.D. at 449 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (quoting Williams, 178 F.R.D. at 110). Rule 26(b)(1) provides “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). A subpoena for documents from a nonparty may be facially overbroad if it requests “ ‘all documents concerning the parties to [the underlying] action, regardless of whether those documents relate to that action and regardless of date’; ‘[t]he requests are not particularized’; and ‘[t]he period covered by the requests is unlimited.’ ” Andra Grp., 312 F.R.D. at 450 (quoting In re O'Hare, 2012 WL 1377891, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2012)) (citing Turnbow v. Life Partners, Inc., 2013 WL 1632795, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 2013)). Analysis *4 “Section 1782 does not establish a standard for discovery. Instead, it provides a threshold determination of whether to allow foreign litigants to enjoy discovery in U.S. courts in accordance with federal rules.” Tex. Keystone, Inc. v. Prime Nat. Res., Inc., 694 F.3d 548, 554 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (quoting Gov't of Ghana v. ProEnergy Servs., LLC, 677 F.3d 340, 343 (8th Cir. 2012)). This Court has already determined twice that Petitioners' Application meets § 1782's threshold and will not revisit that ruling. Order (ECF No. 12); Order (ECF No. 33). The Court's November 29, 2019 order instructed Respondents to file a renewed motion to quash under Rule 45 if they had any remaining, specific objections after conferring with Petitioners. Respondents filed a renewed motion to quash after the parties failed to reach agreement on any of the discovery requests. Respondents contend the Court should quash Petitioners' subpoenas because they (1) are overly broad and unduly burdensome, and (2) Respondent Hudson Advisors, the only Respondent to have a role with the acquisition, does not possess documents that are responsive to “reasonably tailored Requests.” Mot. 11, 23 (ECF No. 56). Accordingly, the Court evaluates Respondents' renewed motion under Rule 45. I. Respondents assert the subpoenas are overly broad and unduly burdensome and should be quashed specifically because: (1) “the Requests and Topics are not reasonably particularized”; (2) “Petitioners have not—and cannot—demonstrate that the information sought by these Requests is relevant and proportional to the needs of the Portuguese Proceedings”; (3) “Petitioners have not shown that they are unable to obtain any of the requested discovery from the parties to the Portuguese Proceedings”; (4) “the Subpoenas' extraterritorial requests would impose undue burdens on a non-party”; and (5) “the time period for the requests and deposition topics is not tailored to the needs of the Portuguese Proceedings.” Mot. 12-22. The Court first addresses Respondents' argument that the discovery is not adequately particularized and time-limited; then turns to whether the discovery seeks relevant information; and last addresses Respondents' arguments that Petitioners have not shown they are unable to obtain the requested discovery from the parties to the Portuguese proceedings and that the “extraterritorial requests” would be unduly burdensome. The Court considers Respondents' argument that only Hudson Advisors had a limited role with the acquisition and does not possess responsive documents to reasonably tailored requests, together with Respondents' other arguments implicating undue burden. i. Reasonable Particularity, Breadth of Request, and Time Period a. The Requests First, Respondents argue Request Nos. 1-9 are not particularized and constitute improper “fishing expeditions” because Petitioners request “ ‘[a]ny and all Documents and Communications’ relating to a litany of broad topics” and their requests “impose a date range that ‘begin[s] 1 August 2014, and continu[es] through the present,’ ” though the Portuguese litigation does not support “this unlimited date range.” Mot. 12, 22-23. Petitioners respond that the “Requests seek documents pertaining to discrete and carefully circumscribed topics which the Court has already found to be relevant” and that a request for “any and all documents,” related to a subject does not make the request per se overbroad. Pet'rs' Resp. 22 (ECF No. 60). Petitioners further contend that the requests are time-limited because “had Respondents simply complied with the Subpoenas at the time they were issued more than one year ago, the relevant time period would have spanned from August 1, 2014 to January 14, 2019,” and it has only now been extended “to just over five years” because Respondents have not yet produced the discovery. Id. 24-25. The Court sustains Respondents' objections in part and modifies the requests as explained below. As a preliminary matter, Respondents assert that on a motion to quash, “the subpoenaing party bears the initial burden to establish that the subpoenas seek discovery that is both relevant and proportional to the needs of the underlying case,” and cite nonbinding authorities. Mot. 15 & n.22. But at this procedural posture, on a Rule 45 motion to quash, “[t]he moving party opposing discovery must show how the requested discovery was overly broad, burdensome, or oppressive by submitting affidavits or offering evidence revealing the nature of the burden.” Andra Grp., 312 F.R.D. at 449 (citations omitted); see also McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Apffel, P.C. v. Quarles, 894 F.2d 1482, 1485 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating a “party resisting discovery must show specifically how ... each [discovery request] is not relevant or how each question is overly broad, burdensome or oppressive” (internal quotation marks omitted)). To determine whether a subpoena is unduly burdensome, among other factors, the Court considers “the breadth of the document request,” “the particularity with which the party describes the requested documents,” and “the time period covered by the request.” Wiwa, 392 F.3d at 818 (citation omitted). Therefore, Respondents bear the burden of demonstrating the requests are overbroad, not particularized, and cover an inappropriate time period to succeed on their motion. *5 Rule 45 governs “the use of subpoenas in relation to non-parties” and “motions to quash or modify or to compel compliance with such a subpoena.” Andra Grp., 312 F.R.D. at 447 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Isenberg v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 661 F. Supp. 2d 627, 629 (N.D. Tex. 2009)). And Rule 34 governs requests for production of documents from a party and states “[a]s provided in Rule 45, a nonparty may be compelled to produce documents and tangible things or to permit an inspection.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(c). Rule 34 also specifies that a document request “must describe with reasonable particularity each item or category of items to be inspected” or produced. Id. 34(b)(1)(A). And, “although Rule 34 governs document discovery from a party and not a non-party, this reasonable particularity requirement should apply with no less force to a subpoena's document requests to a non-party.” Andra Grp., 312 F.R.D. at 448 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(c); Wiwa, 392 F.3d at 818 (holding courts must consider “the particularity with which the party describes the requested documents,” among other factors, to determine whether a subpoena is unduly burdensome) (citation omitted)). And where a subpoena is not particularized and is facially overbroad, the Court “may find that a subpoena presents an undue burden.” Wiwa, 392 F.3d at 818 (citation omitted). A subpoena for documents from a nonparty may be facially overbroad where its “requests seek all documents concerning the parties to [the underlying] action, regardless of whether those documents relate to that action and regardless of date; [t]he requests are not particularized; and [t]he period covered by the requests is unlimited.” MetroPCS, 327 F.R.D. at 610 (quoting Am. Fed'n of Musicians of the U.S. & Can. v. Skodam Films, LLC, 313 F.R.D. 39, 45 (N.D. Tex. 2015)). The Court will discuss Respondents' objections with respect to each request. Concerning Request Nos. 1 and 2, Respondents object that by requesting “ ‘[a]ny and all Documents and Communications ... relating to the BES Resolution, the Retransfer Decision, the Transferred Notes, or the Retransferred Notes,’ as well as any and all communications with the Lone Star Funds Group, the Resolution Fund, BdP, Novo Banco, BES, the Government of Portugal, all European Regulatory Authorities, or ‘any Person’ ‘relating to those topics,’ ” they are not narrowly tailored to ‘ “ ‘categories of documents’ actually relevant to the Portuguese Proceedings.” Mot. 16. Respondents also argue that Request Nos. 1 and 2 should be limited to August 1, 2014, to December 29, 2015, because the “Retransfer Decision was completed on December 29, 2015,” and the “Retransfer Annulment Actions were filed promptly thereafter in March and April 2016.” Id. 23. Petitioners, however, urge that Request Nos. 1 and 2 are not overbroad because Respondents have an “obligation to ... produce all documents relating to those topics” that is “imposed independently by the Federal Rules.” Pet'rs' Resp. 22. The Court finds Request No. 1 facially overbroad and not appropriately time-limited. However, because “modification of a subpoena is [generally] preferable to quashing it outright,” Wiwa, 392 F.3d at 818, the Court modifies the request to reflect a time period of August 1, 2014, through December 29, 2015. Respondents selected August 1, 2014, as a start date, and December 29, 2015, is the date of the retransfer decision. With respect to the subject matter, the Court finds Request No. 1 is appropriately limited to the “BES Resolution,” defined as “the August 2014 resolution action taken by the BdP by which Novo Banco was incorporated”; the “Retransfer Decision,” defined as “the December 2015 action taken by the BdP by which the Retransferred Notes were transferred from Novo Banco to BES”; the “Transferred Notes,” defined as “the senior notes transferred from BES to the newly formed Novo Banco as part of the BES Resolution”; and the “Retransferred Notes,” defined as “unsecured securities denoted by ISINs PTBEQBOM0010, PTBENIOM0016, PTBENJOM0015, PTBENKOM0012, and PTBEQKOM0019, which were transferred from BES to Novo Banco under the BES Resolution, and which were retransferred to BES as part of the Retransfer Decision.” Pet'rs' App. 19-23 (ECF No. 3-1). The Court, however, finds Petitioners' request for these documents and communications with respect to “any and all European Regulatory Authorities,” to be overbroad and modifies the definition of European Regulatory Authorities to mean, “the European Parliament, the European Central Bank, the European Commission, and anyone working on behalf of those institutions.” Last the Court finds subpart “h,” requesting documents and communications between “[a]ny Person and You” and parties that have already been mentioned, to be an overbroad catchall and quashes it. Request No. 1 now reads as follows: *6 Each Document and Communication from the period August 1, 2014, to December 29, 2015, in Your possession, custody or control relating to the BES Resolution, the Retransfer Decision, the Transferred Notes, or the Retransferred Notes, including Communications in Your possession, custody or control relating to these topics between: a. You and the Lone Star Funds Group; b. You and the Resolution Fund, including Communications with any of the Resolution Fund's constituent banks; c. You and the BdP; d. You and Novo Banco; e. You and BES; f. You and the Government of Portugal; and g. You and any and all European Regulatory Authorities, as defined by this order. See Resp'ts' App. 14 (ECF No. 56-5). The Court finds Request No. 2 facially overbroad because it is not appropriately time-limited and modifies it to reflect a time period of August 1, 2014, through December 29, 2015, for the same reason discussed above. The Court also finds the request in subpart “d” for “Documents and Communications relating to Your or any other person or entity's knowledge of the Retransfer Decision,” to be overbroad and modifies it to request only documents and communications “relating to Your knowledge of the Retransfer Decision.” Request No. 2 now reads as follows: Each Document and Communication from the period August 1, 2014, to December 29, 2015, in Your possession, custody or control relating to the Retransfer Decision, including: a. Documents and Communications relating to the BdP's authority to undertake the Retransfer Decision; including the BdP's authority pursuant to the RGICSF; b. Documents and Communications relating to any due diligence conducted by the BdP in relation to the Retransfer Decision; c. Internal or external Documents and Communications relating to the impact of the Retransfer Decision on BES's and/or Novo Banco's investors, including Documents and Communications demonstrating the identities of said investors, their status as qualified or non-qualified investors, and their nationalities; d. Documents and Communications relating to Your knowledge of the Retransfer Decision prior to its public announcement on December 29, 2015; and e. Internal or external Documents and Communications relating to Novo Banco's repurchase of some Retransferred Notes in weeks prior to the Retransfer Decision, including the reasons for the repurchase and the identities of the sellers, as well as Documents and Communications sufficient to demonstrate such sellers' status as qualified or non-qualified investors and their nationalities. See Resp'ts' App. 15-16 (ECF No. 56-5). Respondents object to Request No. 3 because it seeks “ ‘[a]ny and all Documents and Communications ... relating’ to ‘[Hudson Advisors’, LSGA's, or LSFIX's] selection as the counterparty for the Lone Star Acquisition,’ ” when “none of Respondents acquired Novo Banco, and Respondents' relationship to the acquirer is likewise known.” Mot. 17. Petitioners do not provide responses with respect to each individual request, but they argue “Respondents fail to demonstrate that any of the Requests ... are insufficiently particular or are otherwise overbroad, including as to time period.” Pet'rs' Resp. 21. The Court finds Request No. 3 facially overbroad because it is not appropriately time-limited. The Court modifies Request No. 3 to reflect a time period of August 1, 2014, through March 31, 2017, the date BdP selected Nani Holdings to acquire 75% of Novo Banco. See Mot. 23. Concerning Respondents' objection that no Respondent acquired Novo Banco, Respondents stated they “have done searches in the U.S. on [their] servers with [their] custodians,” and found few responsive documents. See Tr. (ECF No. 72) 72:22-25; 73:1-6. However, it is unclear whether these searches were exhaustive. If Respondents have no responsive documents to this request as modified, then they must respond accordingly, consistent with this order. Request No. 3 now reads: *7 Each Document and Communication from the period August 1, 2014, through March 31, 2017, in Your possession, custody or control relating to the BdP selecting you as the counterparty for the Lone Star Acquisition, including Documents and Communications relating to: a. The bidding and/or sale process; and b. Other investors who participated in any stage of the bidding process to acquire Novo Banco. See Resp'ts' App. 17 (ECF No. 56-5). Respondents object to Request Nos. 4 and 5 because they seek “ ‘[a]ny and all Documents and Communications relating to the [ ] Acquisition’ or ‘Novo Banco,’ ” and “Respondents' subjective valuations and analyses,” including “trade-secret information.” Mot. 17-18. Petitioners respond generally that “Respondents fail to demonstrate that any of the Requests ... are insufficiently particular or are otherwise overbroad, including as to time period.” Pet'rs' Resp. 21. The Court finds Request No. 4 facially overbroad with respect to subpart “m” and because it is not appropriately time-limited and modifies Request No. 4 to reflect a time period of August 1, 2014, through March 31, 2017, for the same reason as discussed above. The Court finds “Lone Star Acquisition,” defined as “the March 31, 2017 acquisition of 75% of Novo Banco by LSF,” is appropriately particularized; however, the Court also modifies “European Regulatory Authorities” in subpart “m” to mean “the European Parliament, the European Central Bank, the European Commission, and anyone working on behalf of those institutions,” as it did with respect to Request No. 1. Pet'rs' App. 20-21 (ECF No. 3-1). Request No. 4 now reads: Each Document and Communication from the period August 1, 2014, through March 31, 2017, in Your possession, custody or control relating to the Lone Star Acquisition and/or Your evaluation of the Lone Star Acquisition and the events leading up to it, including but not limited to Documents and Communications relating to: a. How You identified Novo Banco as a potential investment target; b. Valuations of BES and/or Novo Banco and the assets and liabilities of either (including the Transferred Notes and the Retransferred Notes) before and after the BES Resolution, including audit reports by You or independent auditors or valuers, including any “no creditor worse oft” reports and any communications with auditors, the BdP, or the Resolution Fund relating to the same; c. Risk analysis, scenario analysis, litigation contingency planning, and litigation exposure analysis relating to Novo Banco, the Retransferred Notes, and/or the Lone Star Acquisition; d. Alternatives to the BES Resolution and the Retransfer Decision; e. Novo Banco's litigation exposure resulting from the BES Resolution, the Retransfer Decision, and/or the Lone Star Acquisition; f. The legality of the BES Resolution, the Retransfer Decision, and/or the Lone Star Acquisition under any and all applicable laws; g. The BdP's obligation to maximize the sale value of Novo Banco in connection with the Lone Star Acquisition under any and all applicable laws; h. The requirement that the BdP carry out a public tender or a tender limited by prior qualification in connection with the sale of Novo Banco, including but not limited to pursuant to the CCPP and/or the RGICSF; i. Tender specifications for the tender and/or sale of Novo Banco; *8 j. The BdP's obligation to undertake a clear and transparent bidding process in connection with the Lone Star Acquisition, including pursuant to article 1(4) of the CCPP; k. Any presentations sent from the BdP and/or the Resolution Fund to You and/or any other potential buyers of Novo Banco; l. Any requirement that a sale of Novo Banco involve a sale of the totality of Novo Banco's share capital, rather than any percentage of that share capital; m. Any requirement for regulatory approval of the Lone Star Acquisition from European Regulatory Authorities; n. The Sale and Purchase Agreement (including any amendments thereto) for the Lone Star Acquisition; o. Any consideration you provided in connection with the Lone Star Acquisition and/or in exchange for a 75% stake in Novo Banco, and any discussion of how that consideration would be used by Novo Banco. See Resp'ts' App. 18-20 (ECF No. 56-5). The Court finds Request No. 5 facially overbroad because it is not appropriately time-limited and modifies Request No. 5 to reflect a time period of August 1, 2014, through March 31, 2017, for the same reason as discussed above. Request No. 5 now reads: Each Document and Communication from the period August 1, 2014, through March 31, 2017, in Your possession, custody or control relating to Novo Banco, including: a. Any Documents and Communications You have received from Novo Banco concerning its financial status, assets, liabilities, strategic plans, financial plans, and/or litigation exposure; b. Any liability management exercise (“LME”) conducted by Novo Banco in 2017 in relation to its senior bonds; including any documents and communications sufficient to show which party (You, Lone Star Funds Group, BdP, and/or others) required the LME as a condition for the sale of Novo Banco; c. Any Documents and Communications related to Novo Banco's creditworthiness, impairments, and write-off policies; d. Any Documents and Communications related to any planned or actual debt finance or other loans for Novo Banco to deal with losses and impairments during the sale process; e. Your plans to capitalize Novo Banco; f. Restructuring plans for Novo Banco, including any global analysis of its economic and financial situation, including future scenarios, commercial strategy, capital ratio levels, and/or the possibility and terms of a possible restructuring of Novo Banco; g. Any Documents and Communications in Your possession, custody or control relating to Novo Banco's regulatory capital requirements in 2015 and 2016; and h. Any Documents and Communications You have received from Novo Banco in your capacity as majority shareholder thereof. See Resp'ts' App. 21-22 (ECF No. 56-5). Concerning Respondents' objection that producing materials responsive to Request Nos. 4 and 5 would require them to disclose trade secrets, the only document that Respondents specifically identify as containing trade secrets is the “Investment Committee Memorandum” (ICM). Resp'ts' App. 82 ¶ 14(c) (ECF No. 56-5) (“Almost the entirety of the ICM relates to matters I categorized as trade secrets in paragraph 20(d) of my previous declaration.”). In her Supplemental Declaration, Sarah York states that in addition to “protected trade secrets,” the ICM also “implicates foreign banking privileges and regulations,” such that if ordered to produce that document, Respondents would “need to employ Portuguese counsel to determine what banking privileges and other privileges and protections apply under Portuguese law so that appropriate information could be redacted.” Id. Petitioners respond that “Respondents do not offer any evidence in support of their claims that the ICM is a trade secret apart from wholly conclusory statements in the York Declarations.” Pet'rs' Resp. 31. *9 “The moving party has the burden to establish that the information sought is a trade secret or otherwise confidential, and that disclosure might be harmful.” Educ. Logistics, Inc. v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 2011 WL 1348401, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2011) (citing Cmedia, LLC v. LifeKey Healthcare, LLC, 216 F.R.D. 387, 390-91 (N.D. Tex. 2003)). And “[d]isclosure to a competitor is presumptively more harmful than disclosure to a noncompetitor.” Id. (citing Cmedia, LLC, 216 F.R.D. at 390-91). “No absolute privilege for confidential information or trade secrets exists.” Cmedia, LLC, 216 F.R.D. at 390 (citing Exxon Chem. Pats., Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 131 F.R.D. 668, 671 (S.D. Tex. 1990)). However, if the moving party meets its burden, “the burden then shifts to the party seeking discovery to show that the requested information is relevant and necessary.” Id. at 391 (citing Echostar Commc'ns Corp. v. The News Corp., 180 F.R.D. 391, 395 (D. Co. 1998)). “Even if the requested documents are relevant, discovery will not be permitted if the party seeking discovery fails to show need or if the potential harm caused by production outweighs the benefit.” Educ. Logistics, Inc., 2011 WL 1348401, at *2 (citing Cmedia, LLC, 216 F.R.D. at 391). Specifically, Ms. York states in her original Declaration, as referenced by her Supplemental Declaration, that the ICM “includes information such as proprietary valuations, risk analyses, and projected investment returns which are confidential and competitively sensitive and are not shared, even within Hudson Advisors, except to a very small group of people who would need to know this information as part of the investment committee process” and that such information “derives economic value from not being generally known.” First Mot. Quash App. 8-9 ¶ 20(d) (ECF No. 20-1). Ms. York continues that “[r]evealing the confidential, trade secret information contained in the [ICM] to the Petitioners, [many of whom compete with Respondents,] would give [them] ... an inequitable competitive advantage by allowing them to see the analytical framework and financial modeling used by Respondents and their affiliates to evaluate investment opportunities, risks, and returns.” Id. While the Court previously determined that “Respondents ha[d] not carried their burden under Rule 45(d)(3) because they failed to identify any specific discovery requests that are burdensome or require disclosing trade secrets” and refrained from ruling on the ICM's discoverability, Order 11 (ECF No. 33), Respondents' renewed motion makes clear that they object to Request Nos. 4 and 5 on the basis that they would require disclosing trade secrets. Mot. 18. Thus, the Court now considers this objection as it relates to the ICM and concludes that proprietary valuations, risk analyses, and projected investment returns that are not widely shared among Hudson Advisors' employees are likely trade secrets—Respondents narrowly carry their burden. The Court must then determine whether Petitioners have established the information in the ICM is relevant and demonstrated their need for it. Respondents themselves state the ICM is relevant, as Petitioners point out, when they argue “[a]lthough the ICM may technically be facially responsive to Petitioners' present ... requests[,] ... th[o]se requests should be quashed because Petitioners have not, and cannot ‘establish that their need for the ICM outweighs the Respondents' interest in nondisclosure.’ ” Id. 27 (brackets in original removed); see also Pet'rs' Resp. 31. Petitioners, however, make no mention of their need for the ICM in particular. Therefore, the Court will not permit discovery of it. To the extent Respondents object generally to Petitioners' request for their subjective evaluations, Rule 45 does not prohibit discovering “subjective evaluations.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3) (describing when a court may and must quash a subpoena). However, if Respondents wish to object to the discoverability of certain documents because they contain trade secrets or confidential information or privileged matter, they must lodge objections with respect to specific documents after examining responsive documents in their possession, custody, or control. See Mot. 17 (“And, worse yet, Petitioners' sub-requests specifically seek Respondents' subjective valuations and analyses.”). *10 Respondents object that Request No. 6 seeks “ ‘[a]ny and all Documents and Communications ... relating to Deutsche Bank acting in its role as financial advisor,’ ” because “[s]uch a broad request is not proportional to the needs of the Portuguese Proceedings.” Mot. 18. Again, Petitioners only respond generally that “Respondents fail to demonstrate that any of the Requests ... are insufficiently particular or are otherwise overbroad, including as to time period.” Pet'rs' Resp. 21. The Court finds Request No. 6 facially overbroad because it is not appropriately time-limited and modifies Request No. 6 to reflect a time period of August 1, 2014, through March 31, 2017, for the same reason as discussed above. Request No. 6 now reads: Each Document and Communication from the period August 1, 2014, through March 31, 2017, in Your possession, custody or control relating to Deutsche Bank acting in its role as financial advisor for the sale of Novo Banco, including but not limited to any and all Communications between You and Deutsche Bank acting in such capacity. See Resp'ts' App. 23 (ECF No. 56-5). Respondents object to Request No. 7 because it seeks “ ‘any and all’ documents relating to ‘any guarantees provided by the Government of Portugal, the Resolution Fund, or the BDP ... including ... the contingent capitalization mechanism.’ ” Mot. 18. The “Contingent Capital Agreement entered into in connection with the Acquisition has been publicly disclosed by Novo Banco,” so Respondents argue, “it is not proportionate to burden [them] with searching for, reviewing and producing, ‘any and all’ documents related to it.” Id. As stated, Petitioners respond generally that Respondents fail to demonstrate that any request is overbroad. Pet'rs' Resp. 21. The Court finds Request No. 7 facially overbroad because it is not appropriately time-limited and modifies Request No. 7 to reflect a time period of August 1, 2014, through March 31, 2017, for the same reason as discussed above. Request No. 7 now reads: Each Document and Communication from the period August 1, 2014, through March 31, 2017, in Your possession, custody or control relating to any guarantees provided by the Government of Portugal, the Resolution Fund, or the BdP to You or Novo Banco as part of the Lone Star Acquisition, including the contingent capitalization mechanism under which the Resolution Fund, as a shareholder of Novo Banco, undertakes to make capital injections in the event of certain cumulative conditions related to: (i) the performance of a limited set of assets of Novo Banco, and (ii) the evolution of the capitalization levels of the bank. See Resp'ts' App. 24 (ECF No. 56-5). The Court finds Respondents' objection that because the “Contingent Capital Agreement entered into in connection with the Acquisition has been publicly disclosed by Novo Banco,” it would be unduly burdensome to require them to search for, review, and produce documents related to that agreement to be a non sequitur: that the contingent capital agreement may be publicly available does not foreclose the possibility that Respondents possess documents related to it. Respondents' objection is, therefore, overruled. Respondents object to Request No. 8 because it seeks “ ‘any and all’ documents relating to ‘any indemnity,’ or ‘any undertaking ... to contribute additional capital ... following an adverse result of the existing litigation concerning the Retransfer Decision.’ ” Mot. 18. Respondents contend requests related to these topics are not proportional because “Petitioners have already obtained the transaction documents, including the applicable share purchase agreement, which presumably contain the terms of any agreements made as part of the Acquisition,” and “[i]nformation related to indemnities is also publicly disclosed.” Id. 18-19. Petitioners respond generally that Respondents fail to demonstrate that any request is overbroad. Pet'rs' Resp. 21. The Court finds Request No. 8 facially overbroad because it is not appropriately time-limited and modifies Request No. 8 to reflect a time period of August 1, 2014, through March 31, 2017, for the same reason as discussed above. Request No. 8 now reads: *11 Each Document and Communication from the period August 1, 2014, through March 31, 2017, in Your possession, custody or control relating to (i) any indemnity provided to Lone Star Funds Group or Novo Banco following an adverse result of the pending litigations concerning the Retransfer Decision, (ii) any undertaking by BdP or the Resolution Fund or the Government of Portugal to contribute additional capital to Novo Banco following an adverse result of the existing litigation concerning the Retransfer Decision, and (iii) any commitments of the BdP to reconfirm the Retransfer Decision following an adverse result of any pending litigation concerning the Retransfer Decision. See Resp'ts' App. 25 (ECF No. 56-5). Here, the Court finds Respondents' objection that Request No. 8 is overbroad because “Petitioners have already obtained the transaction documents,” “the applicable share purchase agreement,” and publicly disclosed information “related to indemnities,” similarly unavailing. The fact that Petitioners may have that information does not mean that Respondents do not possess related documents responsive to this request. Accordingly, Respondents' objection is overruled. Last, Respondents object to Request No. 9 because it seeks “ ‘[a]ny and all’ documents ‘relating to the Retransfer Decision Annulment Actions, the [ ] Acquisition Annulment Actions, or the Criminal Proceedings,’ ” and “ ‘[a] document request is not reasonably particular if it merely asks for documents related to a claim or defense in the litigation.’ ” Mot. 19. Petitioners contend Respondents fail to demonstrate that any request is overbroad. Pet'rs' Resp. 21. But “[a] document request is not reasonably particular if it merely asks for documents related to a claim or defense in the litigation.” Hinds v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 2007 WL 9710939, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2007) (citing Kidwiler v. Progressive Paloverde Ins. Co., 192 F.R.D. 193, 202 (N.D.W. Va. 2002)). Request No. 9 reads: Any and all Documents and Communications in Your possession, custody or control relating to the Retransfer Decision Annulment Actions, the Lone Star Acquisition Annulment Actions, or the Criminal Proceedings. See Resp'ts' App. 26 (ECF No. 56-5). Accordingly, the Court finds Request No. 9 is facially overbroad and quashes it. b. The Topics Respondents also contend Petitioners' deposition topics are not particularized and “seek to require Respondents to prepare [corporate representatives] on extraordinarily broad topics, including: ‘all communications between’ any of the Respondents and ‘the Resolution Fund, the BdP, Novo Banco, BES, the Government of Portugal, and any and all other European Regulatory Authorities’ (Topic 1); the ‘bidding and/or sale process’ (Topic 3); ‘[t]he [ ] Acquisition’ (Topic 4); ‘Novo Banco's financials’ (Topic 5); ‘Deutsche Bank's role in the sale of Novo Banco’ (Topic 6); and ‘[t]he Retransfer [ ] Annulment Actions, the [ ] Acquisition, and the Criminal Proceedings’ (Topic 11).” Mot. 14. Respondents argue these deposition topics are not narrowly tailored to “the issues at stake in the Portuguese Proceedings,” would not be admissible in the Portuguese proceedings, and are not appropriately time-limited. Id. 14, 23. Petitioners respond that “the Topics ... track the subject matter of the Requests,” and “Respondents fail to identify a single specific ... Topic which is overbroad or otherwise lacks particularity.” Pet'rs' Resp. 20, 26. The Court sustains Respondents' objections in part and modifies the topics as described below. Rule 30(b)(6) requires a party seeking to depose an organization to “describe with reasonable particularity the matters for examination.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). “For Rule 30(b)(6) to effectively function, the requesting party must take care to designate, with painstaking specificity, the particular subject areas that are intended to be questioned, and that are relevant to the issues in dispute. Otherwise, an overly broad Rule 30(b)(6) notice may subject the noticed party to an impossible task. If the noticed organization cannot identify the outer limits of the areas of inquiry noticed, compliant designation is not feasible.” Pauls v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 2016 WL 6397564, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 28, 2016) (quoting Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. P & H Cattle Co., 2009 WL 2951120, at *10 (D. Kan. Sept. 10, 2009)). Here, the noticed deposition topics are as follows: *12 1. The relationship between You, on the one hand, and any of the Resolution Fund, the BdP, Novo Banco, BES, the Government of Portugal, and any and all other European Regulatory Authorities, on the other, including all communications between You and those parties. 2. Your knowledge of and understanding of the Retransfer Decision, including but not limited to: a. Any due diligence You performed concerning the Retransfer Decision prior to acquiring Novo Banco. b. Your understanding of the impact of the Retransfer Decision on BES's and/or Novo Banco's investors. c. Your or any other person or entity's knowledge of the Retransfer Decision prior to it being announced publicly on December 29, 2015. 3. The process by which the BdP selected You as the counterparty for the Lone Star Acquisition, including but not limited to: a. The bidding and/or sale process. b. Other investors who participated in any stage of the bidding process to acquire Novo Banco. 4. The Lone Star Acquisition and the events leading up to it, including but not limited to: a. How you identified Novo Banco as a potential investment target. b. Valuations of BES and/or Novo Banco and its assets and liabilities (including the Transferred Notes and the Retransferred Notes) before and after the BES Resolution, including audit reports by you or independent auditors or valuers, including any “no creditor worse off” reports and any communications with auditors, the BdP, or the Resolution Fund relating to same. c. Risk analysis, scenario analysis, litigation contingency planning and litigation exposure analysis relating to Novo Banco, the Retransferred Notes, and/or the Lone Star Acquisition. d. Your understanding of alternatives to the BES Resolution and the Retransfer Decision. e. Your understanding of Novo Banco's litigation exposure resulting from the BES Resolution, the Retransfer Decision, and/or the Lone Star Acquisition. f. Your understanding of the legality of the BES Resolution, the Retransfer Decision, and/or the Lone Star Acquisition under any and all applicable laws. g. Your understanding of the BdP's obligation to maximize the sale value of Novo Banco in connection with the Lone Star Acquisition under any and all applicable laws. h. Your understanding of the requirement that the BdP carry out a public tender or a tender limited by prior qualification in connection with the sale of Novo Banco, including but not limited to pursuant to the CCPP and/or the RGICSF. i. Your understanding of the BdP's obligation to undertake a clear and transparent bidding process in connection with the Lone Star Acquisition, including pursuant to article 1(4) of the CCPP. j. Your understanding of any requirement that a sale of Novo Banco involve a sale of the totality of Novo Banco's share capital, rather than any percentage of that share capital. k. Your understanding of any requirement for regulatory approval of the Lone Star Acquisition from European Regulatory Authorities. l. The Sale and Purchase Agreement (including any amendments thereto) for the Lone Star Acquisition. m. Any consideration you provided in connection with the Lone Star Acquisition and/or in exchange for a 75% stake in Novo Banco, and how that consideration would be used by Novo Banco. 5. Novo Banco's financials, including but not limited to: *13 a. Nov [sic] Banco's financial status, assets, liabilities, strategic plans, financial plans, and/or litigation exposure; b. Any liability management exercise (“LME”) conducted by Novo Banco in 2017 in relation to its senior bonds, including any information as to which party (You, Lone Star Funds Group, BdP, and/or others) required the LME as a condition for the sale of Novo Banco. c. Your understanding of Novo Banco's creditworthiness, impairments, and write-off policies. d. Any planned or actual debt finance or other loans for Novo Banco to deal with losses and impairments during the sale process. e. Your plans to capitalize Novo Banco. f. Any plans you have for restructuring Novo Banco, including any global analysis of its economic and financial situation, including future scenarios, commercial strategy, capital ratio levels, and/or the possibility and terms of a possible restructuring of Novo Banco. g. Your understanding of Novo Banco's regulatory capital requirements in 2015 and 2016. 6. Deutsche Bank's role in the sale of Novo Banco acting as financial advisor. 7. Any guarantees provided by the Government of Portugal, the Resolution Fund, or the BdP to You or Novo Banco as part of the Lone Star Acquisition, including but not limited to the contingent capitalization mechanism under which the Resolution Fund, as a shareholder of Novo Banco, undertakes to make capital injections in the event of certain cumulative conditions related to: (i) the performance of a limited set of assets of Novo Banco, and (ii) the evolution of the capitalization levels of the bank. 8. Any indemnity provided to Lone Star Funds Group or Novo Banco following an adverse result of the pending litigations concerning the Retransfer Decision. 9. Any undertaking by the BdP or the Resolution Fund to contribute additional capital to Novo Banco following an adverse result of the existing litigation concerning the Retransfer Decision. 10. Any commitments of the BdP to reconfirm the Retransfer Decision following an adverse result of any pending litigation concerning the Retransfer Decision. 11. The Retransfer Decision Annulment Actions, the Lone Star Acquisition Annulment Actions, and the Criminal Proceedings. Pet'rs' App. 14-18 (ECF No. 3-1). The Court finds the topics and Respondents' objections to the topics generally track the requests and Respondents' objections to the requests. Accordingly, the Court's rulings on Respondents' objections to the topics are largely consistent with the Court's rulings on Respondents' objections to the requests. Concerning Respondents' time-period objections, Respondents argue Topics 2 and 9-11, concerning the retransfer decision, should “have a date range of no longer than August 1, 2014 through December 29, 2015.” Mot. 23. And Topics 1 and 3-8, concerning the acquisition, “should have a date range of no longer than August 1, 2014 through March 31, 2017.” Id. The instructions accompanying the topics state “[u]nless the Matter for Examination explicitly states otherwise, the date range for each Matter for Examination shall be the period beginning 1 August 2014, and continuing through the present.” Pet'rs' App. 18 (ECF No. 3-1). *14 The Court finds that Topic 2 is not appropriately time-limited and modifies it to have a date range of August 1, 2014, through December 29, 2015, which is consistent with the time limits of the requests, as modified. The Court further finds Topic 2, subpart “c,” facially overbroad in that it requires the corporate representative to testify to “any other person or entity's knowledge,” and modifies it to read “Your knowledge of the Retransfer Decision prior to it being announced publicly on December 29, 2015.” While “[t]he duty to present and prepare a Rule 30(b)(6) designee goes beyond matters ... in which that designee was personally involved,” corporate representatives must be prepared to testify concerning matters within the corporate knowledge of the organization, not within the knowledge of any other person or entity. See Robinson v. Nexion Health At Terrell, Inc., 312 F.R.D. 438, 441 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (“[B]ecause under Rule 30(b)(6), the designated witness acts as the agent for the corporation, if a certain fact is within the collective knowledge or subjective belief of the organization, the designee should be prepared on the issue by the organization and allowed to testify as to it even if it is not within her direct personal knowledge.”); Brazos River Auth. v. GE Ionics, Inc., 469 F.3d 416, 433 (5th Cir. 2006) (“We agree with BRA that Cajun violated rule 30(b)(6) by failing to prepare Grigsby with respect to issues that although not within his personal knowledge, were within the corporate knowledge of the organization, such as whether BRA had presented a warranty claim to Cajun.”). Topic 9 relates to BdP or the Resolution Fund's contributing additional capital to Novo Banco in the event of “an adverse result of the existing litigation concerning the Retransfer Decision,” and Topic 10 relates to any commitment of the BdP to “reconfirm the Retransfer Decision following an adverse result of any pending litigation concerning the Retransfer Decision.” The Court finds both Topics 9 and 10 to be appropriately time-limited by the topics' instructions since they concern ongoing litigation. The Court quashes Topic 11 as not adequately particularized. Topic 11, similar to Request No. 9, acts as a catch-all topic only naming the “Retransfer Decision Annulment Actions, the Lone Star Acquisition Annulment Actions, and the Criminal Proceedings,” which are defined to mean the “the administrative appeals filed on March 29, 2016 before the Portuguese Administrative Court challenging the Retransfer Decision,” “the actions filed on June 29, 2017 before the Portuguese Administrative Court seeking to annul the Lone Star Acquisition,” and “the criminal proceedings filed in Lisbon, Portugal, file no. 2904/17.2T9LSB, in which petitioners allege that certain Portuguese companies unlawfully sold their holdings in the Retransferred Notes prior to the Retransfer Decision on the basis of insider information,” respectively. Pet'rs' App 19, 21, 22 (ECF No. 3-1). But “[f]or Rule 30(b)(6) to effectively function, the requesting party must take care to designate, with painstaking specificity, the particular subject areas that are intended to be questioned, and that are relevant to the issues in dispute.” Pauls, 2016 WL 6397564, at *4 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Topic 11 only generally identifies the Portuguese litigation as a subject. Accordingly, the Court quashes Topic 11 as facially overbroad. The Court finds that Topics 1 and 3 are not appropriately time-limited and modifies them to have a date range of August 1, 2014, through March 31, 2017, which is consistent with the modified requests' time limits. And consistent with the Court's treatment of the requests, the Court finds Topic 1's request for testimony related to Petitioners' relationship between “any and all other European Regulatory Authorities” to be overbroad. The Court modifies Topic 1 to read “any European Regulatory Authorities,” and modifies the definition of European Regulatory Authorities to mean, “the European Parliament, the European Central Bank, the European Commission, and anyone working on behalf of those institutions.” Topic 8 concerns “[a]ny indemnity provided to Lone Star Funds Group or Novo Banco following an adverse result of the pending litigations concerning the Retransfer Decision”; because it relates to ongoing litigation, it is appropriately time-limited. Additionally, the Court finds Topics 4-7 are appropriately time-limited by the topics' instructions. The Court also modifies “European Regulatory Authorities” in Topic 4, subpart “k,” in the same way as Topic 1 and finds Topics 5-7 adequately particularized. *15 Respondents also argue the “Topics should be quashed in their entirety because the requested depositions would be inadmissible in the Portuguese Proceedings.” Mot. 13. Specifically, Respondents contend “[d]eposition testimony is only admissible in certain circumstances in Portuguese courts and is never admissible without an agreement of all parties to the Portuguese Proceedings,” thus rendering any benefit Petitioners might gain in conducting them outweighed by the Respondents' burden in preparing for them. Id. 13-14. Petitioners dispute Respondents' assertion and contend that the “deposition testimony would be admissible in the Portuguese Proceedings.” Pet'rs' Resp. 24. Rule 30(a)(1) provides that a “deponent's attendance may be compelled by a subpoena under Rule 45.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(1). Thus, “[w]hen a subpoena is issued as a discovery device,” under Rule 45, “relevance for purposes of the undue burden test is measured according to the standard of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 26(b)(1).” Andra Grp., 312 F.R.D. at 449 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Williams, 178 F.R.D. at 110). Rule 26 provides that “[i]nformation within [the] scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). In other words, Rule 26 states that information need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable, without distinction between an American or international tribunal. Accordingly, the Court finds this consideration does not bear on whether the topics are unduly burdensome or should be quashed. ii. Relevance Respondents contend that Petitioners have not and cannot demonstrate that their discovery requests seek relevant information, proportional to the needs of the Portuguese litigation. Mot. 15. Specifically, Respondents contend that Request Nos. 1 and 2 are “not reasonably tailored or proportional to the matters ... at issue in the Retransfer Decision Annulment Actions,” and Request Nos. 3-9 are “not reasonably tailored or proportional to the matters ... at issue in the Acquisition Annulment Actions.” Id. 15-16. Petitioners respond that the Court has already found their discovery requests seek relevant information and that Respondents have not met their burden to show otherwise. Pet'rs' Resp. 19-21. But the Court finds that these are objections to the requests' breadth or lack of particularity, and not their relevance, which the Court already remedied by modifying Request Nos. 1-8 and quashing Request No. 9. One of the factors the Court considers in determining whether a subpoena presents an undue burden is the “relevance of the information requested,” Wiwa, 392 F.3d at 818 (citation omitted), and it is Respondents' burden to demonstrate the discovery seeks information that is not relevant. See Heller v. City of Dallas, 303 F.R.D. 466, 490 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (citation omitted) (“A party resisting discovery must show specifically how each interrogatory or document request is overly broad, unduly burdensome, or oppressive.”). “When a subpoena is issued as a discovery device, relevance for purposes of the undue burden test is measured according to the standard of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 26(b)(1).” Andra Grp., 312 F.R.D. at 449 (quoting Williams, 178 F.R.D. at 110). And Rule 26(b)(1), as amended effective December 1, 2015, provides that, “[u]nless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable. MetroPCS, 327 F.R.D. at 609 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)). Here, Respondents argue that Request Nos. 1 and 2 seek irrelevant information concerning the “Retransfer Annulment Actions,” because “Petitioners contend that they are seeking documents to ‘understand and evaluate [BdP's] reasoning behind and purported justifications for the Retransfer Decision’ for the purpose of determining whether BdP violated the principle of proportionality, misused power, or engaged in discriminatory conduct,” but Request Nos. 1 and 2 are not limited to these matters. Mot. 15. Instead, Respondents assert, “Petitioners demand ‘[a]ny and all Documents and Communications ... relating to the BES Resolution, the Retransfer Decision, the Transferred Notes, or the Retransferred Notes,’ as well as any and all communications with the Lone Star Funds Group, the Resolution Fund, BdP, Novo Banco, BES, the Government of Portugal, all European Regulatory Authorities, or ‘any Person’ ‘relating to these topics.’ ” Id. 16. As mentioned, under Wiwa, the Court considers six factors to determine whether it finds a subpoena unduly burdensome, including the “relevance of the information requested.” Considering the relevance factor alone, the Court again finds the information the requests seek is relevant to the Portuguese litigation. See Order 14 (ECF No. 33) (“Here, the Court finds the Application sets forth which Portuguese proceeding each Petitioner is a party to and the requested document's relevance to that proceeding.”). *16 Respondents also argue that Request Nos. 3-9 seek irrelevant information concerning the “Acquisition Annulment Actions” because “Petitioners contend they are seeking documents to help determine: (1) ‘whether the BdP observed the Tender Specifications,’ (2) ‘the legality of the bidding and/or sale process,’ (3) ‘whether the BdP gave adequate consideration to other offers made during that [sale] process,’ and (4) whether ‘BdP and/or Resolution Fund granted favourable treatment and/or conditions ... that were not provided for or disclosed in the Tender Specifications,’ ” but Request Nos. 3-9 are also not limited to these matters. Mot. 16. Instead, Respondents assert “Petitioners make sweepingly broad requests for any documents with any relation whatsoever to the Acquisition or the entities involved in it, including requests that seek documents in no way relevant to the issues identified by Petitioners as the reason for the Requests.” Id. 16-17. Respondents object to Request Nos. 3-9 because they seek “any and all documents” related to certain topics. The Court, however, finds that these are objections to the requests' breadth or lack of particularity, and not their relevance, which the Court already remedied by modifying Request Nos. 1-8 and quashing Request No. 9. Accordingly, Respondents' objections concerning the relevance of Request Nos. 1-8 are overruled. iii. Need for Documents and Burden Imposed Last, Respondents argue the requests should be quashed because “Petitioners have not shown that they are unable to obtain any of the requested discovery from the parties to the Portuguese Proceedings”; “the Subpoenas' extraterritorial requests would impose undue burdens on a non-party”; and even so, “[o]nly one Respondent had a limited role with the Acquisition and the documents it possesses are not responsive to reasonably tailored Requests.” Mot. 19, 21, 23. Concerning the Respondents' objection that Petitioners have not shown they are unable to obtain the discovery from parties to the Portuguese litigation, Respondents specifically state “[w]here the information sought by a subpoena is available from ... a party to the litigation, any interest the subpoenaing party may have in obtaining said information from a non-party is far outweighed by the burden imposed.” Resp'ts' Reply 7 (ECF No. 62) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Petitioners respond that “Rule 45 explicitly contemplates the use of subpoenas in relation to non-parties,” and that Respondents “attempt to wish Rule 45 out of existence.” Pet'rs' Resp. 29 (internal quotation marks omitted). To support their position that Petitioners must first request the discovery from parties to the litigation, Respondents cite Rembrandt Patent Innovations v. Apple, Inc., 2015 WL 4393581, at *1 (W.D. Tex. July 15, 2015), in which the court granted Samsung Austin Semiconductor, LLC's motion to quash the Rembrandt plaintiffs' subpoena because “the information at issue [was] available from Apple, a party to the litigation,” and “any interest [the Rembrandt] Plaintiffs [had] in obtaining said information from a non-party [was] far outweighed by the burden imposed.” Id. But Petitioners distinguish Rembrandt because it “involve[d] [a] situation[ ] in which a party to a litigation could have sought the discovery from its adversary in that litigation,” whereas here, “Petitioners are seeking discovery for use in a proceeding Respondents are not a party to under a statute which was enacted to establish a mechanism for doing exactly that (i.e. Section 1782).” Pet'rs' Resp. 30 n.19. Petitioners also note that the first Intel factor might prohibit § 1782 discovery with respect to Respondents, were they parties to the Portuguese proceedings. Id. While Rembrandt does not concern a discovery matter that originated in a § 1782 application, see Rembrandt, 2015 WL 4393581, at *1 (“This discovery dispute arises from a lawsuit filed by Plaintiffs against Apple, Inc.... for patent infringement [under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f).]”), and § 1782 specifically permits discovery from nonparties, see Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 264 (2004) (“First, when the person from whom discovery is sought is a participant in the foreign proceeding (as Intel is here), the need for § 1782(a) aid generally is not as apparent as it ordinarily is when evidence is sought from a nonparticipant in the matter arising abroad.”), “the normal federal discovery rules appl[y] once [a plaintiff] ma[kes] the requisite showing in its Section 1782 application.” Tex. Keystone, Inc., 694 F.3d at 556 (citing Heraeus Kulzer, GmbH v. Biomet, Inc., 633 F.3d 591, 597 (7th Cir. 2011) (Posner, J.) (noting that “with objections based on the fact that discovery is being sought for use in a foreign court cleared away, section 1782 drops out”)). “Therefore,” in the Fifth Circuit, “the fact that a case involves a discovery request pursuant to [§ 1782] is not a distinguishing factor for assessing the request on the merits,” even though discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and § 1782 may implicate different policy considerations. Id. *17 Here, both the undersigned and the District Court previously determined “Petitioners' Application satisfies § 1782's statutory requirements.”[2] Order 17 (ECF No. 33); Order 6 (ECF No. 12). The District Court found Intel's discretionary factors[3] weighed in favor of granting the Application, and the undersigned explained that she would “address concerns related to the fourth discretionary factor, whether the § 1782(a) request is unduly intrusive or burdensome, under Rule 45, if objections with respect to specific discovery requests persist after the parties' conference.” Order 20 (ECF No. 33) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because § 1782's statutory factors have been met, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure control the Court's analysis. The Court now considers Respondents' undue-burden concerns under Rule 45. See Tex. Keystone, Inc., 694 F.3d at 554 (explaining once the district court granted Texas Keystone's Section 1782 application, “the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governed the underlying discovery requests”). Concerning whether Petitioners must first show they are unable to obtain the requested discovery from parties to the Portuguese proceedings, Petitioners contend “there is no requirement that Petitioners exhaust foreign discovery avenues.” Pet'rs' Resp. 30 n.19. Indeed, “Section 1782 does not require [an applicant] to seek discovery in the foreign jurisdiction before seeking the assistance of a district court.” LEG Q LLC v. RSR Corp., 2017 WL 3780213, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2017) (quoting In re Application of HydroDive Nigeria, Ltd., 2013 WL 12155021, at *4 (S.D. Tex. May 29, 2013)); see also In re Metallgesellschaft AG, 121 F.3d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1997) (citation omitted) (“Similarly, we have held that a district court may not refuse a request for discovery pursuant to § 1782 because a foreign tribunal has not yet had the opportunity to consider the discovery request.”). But whether a subpoena is unduly burdensome under Rule 45 “raises a question of the subpoena's reasonableness, which ‘requires a court to balance the interests served by demanding compliance with the subpoena against the interests furthered by quashing it.’ ” Positive Black Talk Inc. v. Cash Money Recs., Inc., 394 F.3d 357, 377 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting 9A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2463 (2d ed. 1995)), abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 166 (2010) (Thomas, J.). And that “balance of the subpoena's benefits and burdens calls upon the court to consider whether the information is necessary and unavailable from any other source.” Id. (quoting 9A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2463 (2d ed. 1995)); accord Rembrandt Pat. Innovations, 2015 WL 4393581, at *1. *18 Here, Respondents assert—and Petitioners do not dispute—that “ ‘some of the documents and information that have been requested in the Subpoenas ... have also been requested’ from BdP and the Resolution Fund, two Portuguese governmental entities that are parties to the Portuguese Proceedings”; “the parties in Portugal all agree that BdP is required to produce an ‘administrative file’ related to the Retransfer Decision and the Acquisition”; “the non-privileged documents have been produced” in the Portuguese litigation; and that if parties to the Portuguese proceedings refuse to produce certain documents, “Portuguese courts can impose ‘serious consequences.’ ” Mot. 20. Petitioners do not have any need for documents they have already requested and obtained from parties to the Portuguese litigation. Any interest Petitioners have in obtaining these same documents from Respondents is outweighed by the burden imposed. See Wiwa, 392 F.3d at 818 (citation omitted) (listing “the need of the party for the documents” as the second factor in determining whether a subpoena is unduly burdensome). Accordingly, the Court will not require Respondents to produce documents that are responsive to discovery requests served in the Portuguese litigation. Next, Respondents also argue the discovery is unduly burdensome because of “the Subpoenas' extraterritorial requests.” Mot. 21 (“Respondents seek to obtain documents related to the Underlying Events that are held by foreign affiliates of Respondents in foreign countries ....”). Petitioners assert that the Federal Rules “allow for parties to seek and obtain any information within a respondent's possession, custody, and control, wherever located (including what Respondents term ‘ “Foreign” discovery.’)” Pet'rs' Resp. 26-27. As the undersigned noted in her November 29, 2019 order, courts have treated the issue of whether § 1782 authorizes the discovery of documents held outside the United States inconsistently. Order 17 (ECF No. 33) (citing Kestrel Coal Pty. Ltd. v. Joy Glob., Inc., 362 F.3d 401, 404 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbook, J.) (noting that “although § 1782(a) does not say whether the evidence must be present in the United States, one commentator has written: ... ‘Section 1782 should not be used to interfere with the regular court processes in another country’ ”); In re Barnwell Enters., 265 F. Supp. 3d 1, 14 (D.D.C. 2017) (“[A] split in authority has developed over whether section 1782 authorizes the discovery of documents held outside the United States, albeit with an abundance of authority finding no express authorization [for permitting it].”); In re Grupo Unidos Por El Canal, S.A., 2015 WL 1810135, at *9 (D. Colo. Apr. 17, 2015) (“Courts routinely hold that § 1782 does not authorize a district court to order production of documents ‘located in’ foreign countries.”); but see In re del Valle Ruiz, 939 F.3d 520, 524 (2d Cir. 2019) (“We are next tasked with deciding whether § 1782 may be used to reach documents located outside of the United States. We hold that there is no per se bar to the extraterritorial application of § 1782, and the district court may exercise its discretion as to whether to allow such discovery.”); Sergeeva v. Tripleton Int'l Ltd., 834 F.3d 1194, 1200 (11th Cir. 2016) (declining “to adopt such a provincial view [(that discovery is limited to documents held domestically)] given that the statutory text authorizes production of documents ‘in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’ ”)). But because the Fifth Circuit holds that § 1782 establishes a “threshold determination of whether to allow foreign litigants to enjoy discovery in U.S. courts in accordance with federal rules,” see Tex. Keystone, Inc., 694 F.3d at 554 (quoting Gov't of Ghana, LLC, 677 F.3d at 343), the relevant inquiry is not where documents are located but which documents are within Respondents' possession, custody, or control. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1), 45(a)(1)(A)(iii). The Fifth Circuit has held that a subpoena requesting all documents to which an individual “has access” is overbroad because Rule 34 requires only the production of documents in that person's possession, custody, or control. Wiwa, 392 F.3d at 821; see also WesternGeco LLC v. Ion Geophysical Corp., 2010 WL 2266524, at *2 (S.D. Tex. June 2, 2010) (denying plaintiff's motion to compel with respect to an entity because in light of Wiwa, “even assuming [that entity] does have access to documents in the possession of its affiliates—this is insufficient to establish possession, custody, or control as required under the Federal Rules”). “[W]hether one entity has ‘control’ over material in the actual possession of another entity, the meaning of the phrase ‘possession, custody, or control’ is the same whether the issue arises out of a subpoena issued pursuant to Rule 45 or a request for production under Rule 34.” Sarl v. Samsung Telecommc'ns Am. LLC, 2014 WL 12776170, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 1, 2014) (citing Goh v. Baldor Elec. Co., 1999 WL 20943, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 1999); Addamax Corp. v. Open Software Found., Inc., 148 F.R.D. 462, 468 (D. Mass. 1993); 9A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2456 (3d ed. 2013)). *19 Under Rule 34, “documents are considered to be under a party's control for discovery purposes when that party has the right, authority, or practical ability to obtain the documents from a nonparty to the suit.” Hoffman v. L&M Arts, 2013 WL 12284632, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2013) (Fitzwater, J.) (quoting Shell Glob. Sols. (US) Inc. v. RMS Eng'g, Inc., 2011 WL 3418396, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2011)). “Under this principle, discovery can be sought from one corporation regarding materials that are in the physical possession of another, affiliated corporation.” Shell Glob. Sols., 2011 WL 3418396, at *2 (citing SEC v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 194 F.R.D. 469, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)). But the party seeking discovery bears the burden to show “that the other party has control over the documents sought.” S. Filter Media, LLC v. Halter, 2014 WL 4278788, at *5 (M.D. La. Aug. 29, 2014) (citing Estate of Monroe v. Bottle Rock Power Corp., 2004 WL 737463, at * 10 (E.D. La. Apr. 2, 2004)); see also Shell Glob. Sols., 2011 WL 3418396, at *2. “Typically, ... to establish control over documents in the possession of a non-party,” the party seeking discovery must show “that there is a relationship, either because of some affiliation, employment or statute, such that a party is able to command release of certain documents by the non-party person or entity in actual possession.” S. Filter Media, LLC, 2014 WL 4278788, at *5 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Courts apply the following factors to determine “whether one corporation may be deemed under control of another”: (a) commonality of ownership, (b) exchange or intermingling of directors, officers or employees of the two corporations, (c) exchange of documents between the corporations in the ordinary course of business, (d) any benefit or involvement of the nonparty corporation in the transaction, and (e) involvement of the non-party corporation in the litigation. Shell Glob. Sols., 2011 WL 3418396, at *2 (citing Super Film of Am., Inc. v. UCB Films, Inc., 219 F.R.D. 649, 655 (D. Kan. 2004)); accord United My Funds, LLC v. Perera, 2020 WL 1225042, at *8 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 2020). “The particular form of a corporate relationship does not exclusively govern whether a corporate party controls documents.” Shell Glob. Sols., 2011 WL 3418396, at *2 (citations omitted) (noting “[c]ourts applying these factors have ordered the production of documents from a litigating parent corporation's subsidiary, from a litigating subsidiary corporation's parent, and from a litigating corporation's sister corporation”). Here, Respondents clarified through conferences with Petitioners that Petitioners seek documents “held by foreign affiliates,” which the Court understands to mean documents in the actual possession of Respondents' foreign affiliates. Mot. 21. Respondents do not concede that those documents are in their possession, custody, or control, and instead assert that they would have to ask their affiliates to produce them to Respondents before they could be turned over to Petitioners. See Tr. 31:13-14 (“And we said, even if we had custody and control [of ‘foreign documents’], which we don't concede ...”); Tr. 70:3-6 (“But as to how many documents, how many legal issues, those we have not made the ask. We don't know whether they [the foreign affiliates] would—how they would respond to the ask.”). Petitioners argue “even if ... discovery of ‘Foreign’-based documents were not permitted here, Respondents must produce documents within their possession, custody, or control pursuant to the Federal Rules, if that [sic] Respondents have the ‘legal right or practical ability to obtain’ it.” Pet'rs' Resp. 28. And, Petitioners assert, “[e]ach of the domestic Respondents has the ‘practical ability’ to obtain any responsive discovery held by their affiliates and subsidiaries, even if those affiliates and subsidiaries are located abroad.” Id. 29. But Petitioners do not explain how Respondents are in control of or controlled by their affiliates, nor do they discuss any of the previously mentioned factors for evaluating control with respect to corporate relationships. Accordingly, the Court finds the record insufficient to determine whether Respondents control any documents that may be in the possession, custody, or control of their affiliate entities. Petitioners have not met their burden to establish Respondents' control over any documents not within Respondents' immediate possession, custody, or control—that is, those documents that Respondents would have to ask permission from an affiliated entity in actual possession to obtain. Therefore, the Court will only require Respondents to produce those documents responsive to the requests, as modified by this order, within their immediate possession, custody, or control and not in the actual possession, custody, or control of any corporate affiliate. *20 Moreover, Respondents explain the additional burden involved in producing documents in the actual possession, custody, or control of their corporate affiliates, via Ms. York's Supplemental Declaration, in which she explains that “foreign affiliates of Global Acquisitions were responsible for the origination of the Novo Banco Investment, and foreign affiliates of Hudson Advisors were responsible for the due diligence and analysis process.” Resp'ts' App. 86 (ECF No. 56-5). She states that “[s]earching for, reviewing, and producing such documents would be extraordinarily burdensome and expensive,” because “many of the documents may not be written in English” and would require retaining foreign counsel and translators; “transfer of information stored on foreign servers is possibly subject to the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation”; the documents “are likely to involve” Portuguese and foreign privilege law; and “even if [such information] could be disclosed, ... [it] could be more easily obtained through the Portuguese proceedings where Portuguese lawyers and Portuguese courts can determine the applicability of Portuguese banking privileges.” Id. 86-87. Petitioners do not dispute that Respondents would be required to employ foreign lawyers to review and gather responsive documents or that the documents would have to be translated prior to delivery to lawyers in the United States, who would then review the documents again to determine responsiveness and assess privilege issues. Even without an estimate of how much this extra work would cost, the Court determines it represents an undue burden. Thus, even if Respondents controlled responsive documents in the actual possession of their corporate affiliates, the Court would not compel their production. Last, Respondents object that “[o]nly one Respondent had a limited role with the Acquisition and the documents it possesses are not responsive to reasonably tailored Requests.” Mot. 23. Petitioners respond that “Respondents' belief that the discovery in their control is not responsive to the Subpoenas or is protected from disclosure as privileged has no bearing on whether the Subpoenas should be quashed.” Pet'rs' Resp. 30. “Of course, ‘[a] party or non-party cannot produce what it does not have.’ But reporting that [it] does not have requested records in its possession, custody, or control is the stuff of a written response to the requests in the [ ] Subpoena, not a basis to quash the request.” Nasufi v. King Cable, Inc., 2017 WL 3334110, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2017) (quoting ORIX USA Corp. v. Armentrout, 2016 WL 4095603, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2016)). If Respondents do not possess responsive documents, they must respond accordingly. If Respondents possess responsive documents that are privileged, they must produce a privilege log. Therefore, the Court overrules this objection. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Respondents' Renewed Motion to Quash Subpoenas (ECF No. 56). SO ORDERED. Footnotes [1] The Court recited these background facts in its November 29, 2019 order denying Respondents' first motion to quash. Order (ECF No. 33). [2] A § 1782(a) application must satisfy three statutory requirements before a district court may grant assistance: “(1) the person from whom discovery is sought must reside or be found in the district in which the application is filed; (2) the discovery must be for use in a proceeding before a foreign tribunal; and (3) the application must be made by a foreign or international tribunal or any interested person.” Bravo Express Corp. v. Total Petrochems. & Ref. U.S., 613 F. App'x 319, 322 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tex. Keystone, Inc., 694 F.3d at 553). [3] The discretionary factors include: “(1) whether ‘the person from whom discovery is sought is a participant in the foreign proceeding,’ because ‘nonparticipants in the foreign proceeding may be outside the foreign tribunal's jurisdictional reach’ and therefore their evidence may be ‘unobtainable absent § 1782(a) aid’; (2) ‘the nature of the foreign tribunal, the character of the proceedings underway abroad, and the receptivity of the foreign government or the court or agency abroad to U.S. federal-court judicial assistance’; (3) ‘whether the § 1782(a) request conceals an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other policies of a foreign country or the United States’; and (4) whether the § 1782(a) request is ‘unduly intrusive or burdensome.’ ” Bravo Express Corp., 613 F. App'x at 323-24 (quoting Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 264-65).