THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. ANGEL-LIA CRAWFORD, Defendant 1:19-CR-00170-RJA-MJR United States District Court, W.D. New York Filed January 14, 2021 Signed January 13, 2021 Counsel Timothy C. Lynch, Government Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office, Buffalo, NY, for The United States of America. Roemer, Michael J., United States Magistrate Judge REPORT, RECOMMENDATION and ORDER *1 This case was referred by the presiding judge, the Honorable Richard J. Arcara, to this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), to address non-dispositive discovery motions and to make a recommendation as to all suppression motions. Before the Court are omnibus motions by defendant Angel-Lia Crawford (“defendant”), including a motion to suppress, as well as various discovery demands. (Dkt. No. 116). For the following reasons, it is recommended that defendant's motion to suppress evidence be denied. The Court's decisions as to defendant's various discovery demands are also set forth in detail below. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On August 26, 2020, a Second Superseding Indictment was filed charging defendant and six co-defendants with 26 criminal charges which include allegations of drug trafficking, weapons possession, murder of a federal informant, conspiracy, and obstruction of justice, inter alia. Defendant Crawford is charged with the following: (1) obstruction of justice in a federal grand jury investigation on or about April 29, 2020, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1512(c)(2); (2) obstruction of justice in a federal grand jury investigation on or about April 29, 2020, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1503; and (3) making false declarations under oath in a proceeding before a federal grand jury on or about April 29, 2020, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1623(a). (Dkt. No. 70). Defendant has filed omnibus pretrial motions seeking discovery and other relief, as well as suppression of evidence. (Dkt. No. 116). The Government filed a response and made a cross-motion for reciprocal discovery. (Dkt. No. 123). Oral argument on the motions was held on December 15, 2020, at which time the Court considered the matter submitted for decision. DISCUSSION MOTION TO SUPPRESS Defendant moves to exclude cell phone geolocation data gained pursuant to a search warrant for Google records linked to an email account on the grounds that the evidence is unreliable. (Dkt. No. 116, ¶¶ 6-16). She seeks a Daubert hearing to assess the reliability of the scientific or technical reasoning and methodology used in this case. Defendant also requests that the Government provide a written summary of any expert witness that the Government intends to introduce at trial in compliance with Fed. R. Crim. P. 16. The admissibility of expert testimony in federal courts is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which provides that a witness may offer expert opinion testimony if: (a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. Under Rule 702, the Supreme Court directs that a trial judge[1] must make a preliminary assessment to ensure that expert testimony, and reasoning and methodology underlying the testimony, is scientifically valid and can be properly applied to the facts at issue. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993). Some of the factors relevant to determining whether a methodology is valid are: (1) whether a theory or technique can be (and has been) tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error; and (4) whether there is widespread acceptance of the theory or technique in the relevant scientific community. See id. at 593-94. Rule 702 is not limited to admissibility of scientific evidence alone, but also governs “technical” or “specialized” evidence which, by necessity, does not meet the rigors of scientific analysis, and the district court's gatekeeping function under Daubert extends to non-scientific testimony as well. United States v. Johnson, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39590, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2019) (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999)). The gatekeeping function requires the court to ascertain the reliability of an expert's methodology but does not necessarily require that a separate hearing be held in order to do so. See United States v. Williams, 506 F.3d 151, 161 (2d Cir, 2007). A Daubert hearing is not required “in ordinary cases where the reliability of an expert's methods is properly taken for granted.” United States v. Stevens, 219 Fed. Appx. 108, 109 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152). *2 Here, defendant submits that there are multiple methods that can be used to derive tracking information from cellular data, including cell-site location information (CSLI), satellite geolocation, and historical Wi-Fi location data. Defendant argues that not all of the available methodologies are reliable.[2] Defendant objects that the Government has not disclosed what theory was used to derive tracking information from the geolocation data records. The Government indicates that it is relying on “precise geolocation data” provided by Google for the subject email account indicating the approximate location of the defendant's cell phone during relevant times. At oral argument, the Government further specified that the location data was sourced from both Wi-Fi access points and satellite positioning, not CSLI methods. The records disclosed by the Government show timestamps, latitude and longitude coordinates, display radii, and source information. Defendant further argues that Google's use of historical WiFi data to track the location of a device cannot be reviewed for reliability when the source codes used by Google to construct its algorithms are unknown. Although the exact methodologies or principles used by Google to obtain this geolocation data are not yet disclosed, this Court is not inclined to find the scientific or technical validity of geolocation gained from Wi-Fi or satellite data to be so lacking in reliability that it should fail to pass the gatekeeping function of the Court under Daubert. Indeed, “[t]he use of cell phone records to locate a phone has been widely accepted in both federal and state courts across the country.” United States v. Jones, 918 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (collecting cases in the context of historical cell site analysis); see generally Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2017) (“cell phone location information is detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled”).[3] Moreover, defendant's challenges to several factors of the geolocation data go to the weight of the evidence as opposed to its admissibility. Where defendant's objections concern the weight of expected expert testimony, it is the province of the jury to decide what weight, if any, to give such testimony. See United States v. Fama, 12-CR-186, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174887, *10 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2012); see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596 (“Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”); United States v. Gladden, 11-CR-119, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144720 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2012) (denying motion for a Daubert hearing because the challenges made to expert conclusions went to the weight of the evidence, not to its admissibility); Joseph S. v. Hogan, 06-CV-1042, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76762, *6-7 (E.D.N.Y. July 15, 2011) (“In a jury trial, questions of reliability often go to weight rather than admissibility”). Here, the factors challenged by defendant include the display radius, or error margin, for each data point and the accuracy of the algorithm which examines the signal strength of Wi-Fi access points in proximity to the cell phone to determine the locus. In turn, the Government's counterarguments regarding those error margins and the effect of surveillance videos and other corroborating evidence address the weight of its conclusions. *3 Defendant also contends that the Government has not shown how the Google email address from which the data was extracted is connected to defendant. This argument lacks merit in light of the Government's representation the Gmail account from which the data is derived is the account defendant provided as her own during her testimony before the grand jury. To the extent defendant argues that geolocation data does not indicate who possessed the phone or device during the relevant times, such an argument also goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. The Government contends that a Daubert hearing is unwarranted because Agent Michael Hamilton, who plotted the geolocation points on a map, is not serving as an expert witness under Fed. R. Evid. 702. The Government explains that Agent Hamilton used the latitude and longitude information provided by Google to plot the points in a map program to determine the approximate location of defendant's cell phone. The Court agrees that Agent Hamilton's plotting of the Google-provided data points on a map does not involve “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge,” and therefore does not constitute expert testimony under Rule 702. Agent Hamilton's testimony regarding this is properly classified as lay testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 701. See United States v. Baker, 496 Fed. Appx. 201, 204 n. 1 (3d Cir. 2012) (upholding admission of lay witness testimony regarding operation of cell phone towers and witness's interpretation of cell site records); United States v. Feliciano, 300 Fed. Appx. 795, 801 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding that a witness who simply testified that, based on his review of cell phone records, the defendant's phone was near certain cell phone towers was not expert testimony). However, this Court is of the opinion that geolocation data such as this must be supported by expert testimony concerning the operation of the Wi-Fi, satellite, or other tracking method, and the interpretation of such data. See United States v. Natal, 849 F.3d 530 (2d. Cir. 2017) (holding that testimony on how cell phone towers operate must be offered by an expert witness). The Second Circuit has cautioned that the line between how cell phone towers operate and any other testimony on cell phone towers is frequently difficult to draw. Id. at 536. In this case, the Government represents that cell tower analysis was not used but it fails to provide caselaw stating that expert testimony is unnecessary for the use of Wi-Fi geolocation, in particular. The Court thus concludes that the evidence at issue here similarly requires expert analysis. As was directed by the Court at oral argument, the Government will need to provide an expert witness to explain and support the methods used by Google to obtain the geolocation data if it intends to use it as evidence at trial. It will be insufficient to call a Google representative to authenticate the records based only on accuracy under Fed. R. Evid. 901. Thus, the Court sees no need to hold a Daubert hearing at this juncture. However, the Court acknowledges that the Government's expert report has not yet been disclosed. The validity of the methodology used by the Government's expert witness may be open to attack at a later time. Accordingly, the Court denies defendant's request for a Daubert hearing without prejudice to renewal before the District Court and recommends that defendant's motion to suppress evidence be denied. Further, pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G), the Government is ordered to provide defendant a written summary of any expert testimony that the Government intends to use under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence during its case-in-chief at trial on or before April 1, 2021. OMNIBUS DISCOVERY DEMANDS Bill of Particulars *4 Defendant moves for a bill of particulars. (Dkt. No. 116, ¶¶ 6-9). She seeks particularization as to the following items, inter alia, (1) what material information was omitted from the grand jury; (2) the purpose with which defendant wrongfully impeded the administration of justice; (3) where defendant was alleged to have been with Joshua Jalovich at relevant times; and (4) how she impeded the investigation by testifying falsely. (Id.). The Government opposes the request. (Dkt. No. 123, pgs. 2-7). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(f) “permits a defendant to seek a bill of particulars in order to identify with sufficient particularity the nature of the charge pending against him, thereby enabling defendant to prepare for trial, to prevent surprise, and to interpose a plea of double jeopardy should he be prosecuted a second time for the same offense.” United States v. Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d 572, 574 (2d Cir. 1987). However, “[t]he Government may not be compelled to provide a bill of particulars disclosing the manner in which it will attempt to prove the charges, the precise manner in which the defendants committed the crimes charged, or a preview of the Government's evidence or legal theories.” United States v. Rittweger, 259 F. Supp. 2d 275, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). In determining whether a bill of particulars is warranted, a court is to consider “the complexity of the offense, the clarity of the indictment, and the degree of discovery otherwise afforded to defendants.” United States v. Shoher, 555 F. Supp. 346, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Further, it is well-settled that acquisition of evidentiary detail is not the purpose of a bill of particulars. United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 234 (2d Cir. 1990). The charges here are neither complex nor difficult to understand. They allege that, on specified instances, defendant obstructed justice in a federal grand jury investigation and made false declarations under oath in a grand jury proceeding. The Indictment provides substantial information, detailing the specific questions posed to defendant and the false answers given before the grand jury. Further, the Government submits that it has already provided considerable information about the charges to the defendant through the Criminal Complaint and voluntary discovery, including her grand jury testimony, Google geolocation records, surveillance video, autopsy photos and documents, evidence logs, crime scene photographs, phone records, ceil site records, lab reports, firearm reports, license plate reader information, and copies of all search warrants. (DM. No. 123, pg. 6). Rule 16 discovery has been provided. Defendant is not permitted to use a bill of particulars to learn evidentiary detail or the Government's legal theory. The Indictment plainly allows defendant to identify the charges against her, avoid surprise at trial, and interpose a plea of double jeopardy if necessary. For these reasons, defendant's request for a bill of particulars is denied. Rule 16 Discovery and Rule 12 Notice Defendant moves for discovery pursuant to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires that the Government disclose evidence and information upon request of a defendant. (Dkt. No. 116, ¶ 17). While Rule 16 was intended to provide for liberal discovery, a defendant is not entitled to discovery of “the entirety of the Government's case against him.” United States v. Percevault, 490 F.2d 126, 130 (2d Cir. 1974). Rule 16 provides that a defendant is entitled to the following: (1) a defendant's written, recorded or oral statements in the possession of the Government; (2) the defendant's prior record; (3) documents, objects, books, papers, photographs, etc. that will be used during the Government's case-in-chief; (4) reports of examinations or tests; (5) and information about expert witnesses in accordance with Federal Rules of Evidence 702, 703 and 705. See Fed, R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1). Rule 16 specifically exempts from disclosure “reports, memorandum, or other internal Government documents made by an attorney for the Government or other Government agent in connection with investigating or prosecuting the case.” See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(2). *5 Here, defendant has specifically requested, inter alia, all video and audio recordings; documents and tangible objects in the government custody or control; ail reports, photographs, and documents relating to the investigation; and all results or reports of physical or mental examinations and scientific tests, disclosure of names and identifies of expert witnesses. The Government submits that it has provided defendant with, or made available for inspection by defense counsel, all requested items, in its possession, that are relevant to this case and discoverable pursuant to Rule 1.6. (Dkt. No. 123, pgs. 14). Based upon the representations made by the Government, including that it will continue to provide discoverable evidence as it becomes available, the Court finds that the Government has complied with Rule 16. The Court therefore denies defendant's request as moot. The Government is reminded that its disclosure obligations continue up through and during trial. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(c). Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, defendant also moves for written notification of any evidence the government intends to use in its case-in-chief at trial. (Dkt. No. 116, ¶17). The Government has provided notice that it intends to use all items of evidence that the defendant has been provided with or been made aware of. (Dkt. No. 123, pg. 16). This branch of defendant's motion is denied as moot. Disclosure of Evidence Pursuant to Rules 404(b), 608 and 609 Defendant moves for disclosure of any evidence of prior crimes or bad acts the Government intends to introduce at trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). (Dkt. No. 116, ¶¶ 18-21). Defendant also moves for pretrial disclosure of impeachment evidence pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 608 and 609. (Id.) The Government states that it will provide reasonable notice in advance of trial of the general nature of prior uncharged crimes that it intends to use at trial under Rule 404(b). It further submits that it has no obligation to provide pre-trial notice of impeachment evidence under Rules 608 and 609 and will address same in its pre-trial memorandum to the District Court. The Government further states that, pursuant to Rule 404(b), it intends to introduce at trial, all prior criminal conduct acts or wrongs for the purpose of showing proof of a defendant's motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, and the absence of mistake or accident. The Government indicates it will provide this information in reasonable time in advance of trial and when directed by the trial judge. The Government states that should it become aware of additional Rule 404(b), Rule 608, or Rule 609 evidence, it will notify defendant in advance of trial. The Government is required to provide “reasonable notice in advance of trial” of the general nature of prior uncharged crimes or bad acts it intends to introduce against a defendant. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Rule 608 of the Federal Rules of Evidence does not contain the same pretrial notice requirement. Based upon the Government's representation that it will disclose bad act or impeachment evidence prior to trial, defendant's motion is denied as moot. The Court instructs that any disclosure should be done in accordance with the District Court's pretrial order. The issue of admissibility of evidence pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b), 608 and 609 is left to the determination of the District Court at the time of trial. Disclosure of Brady Material *6 Defendant moves for the disclosure of any favorable, exculpatory or impeachment materials pursuant to Brady, Giglio and their progeny.[4] (Dkt. No. 116, ¶¶ 22-26). The Government has an obligation to disclose exculpatory material, or material favorable to an accused as to either guilt or punishment, even when no affirmative request has been made. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Material “favorable to an accused” includes not only evidence that affirmatively tends to exculpate the defendant, but also information that impeaches the credibility of Government witnesses. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972). The test for materiality is whether “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). Evidence may be material for Brady purposes even if it is not admissible, as long as it could lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gill, 297 F.3d 93, 104 (2d Cir. 2002). “[A]s a general rule, Brady and its progeny do not require immediate disclosure of all exculpatory and impeachment material upon request by a defendant.” United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 146 (2d Cir. 2001). “[A]s long as a defendant possesses Brady evidence in time for its effective use, the government has not deprived the defendant of due process of law simply because it did not produce the evidence sooner.” Id. at 144. Here, the Government affirms its duty to provide defendant with exculpatory evidence, as well as evidence that the defense might use to impeach government witnesses at trial. (Dkt. No. 123, pgs. 18-20). The Government also indicates that it is aware of its obligations and responsibilities under Brady and acknowledges its continuing duty under Brady to produce such material. (Id.). The Government states that it will provide impeachment Brady material, i.e., promises of leniency or immunity agreements with government witnesses; plea and/or non-prosecution agreements and letters or memorandum of understanding regarding such; criminal arrest records of prosecution witnesses; immoral, vicious or criminal acts committed by witnesses; prior inconsistent statements; any payments to witnesses or family members thereof; and all other promises or consideration given by government personnel to government witnesses or family members thereof, in accordance with the schedule set by the District Court and no later than when the Government produces and delivers materials pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3500. (Id. at 4-5). Given the Government's representations, defendant's motion to compel the production of BradylGiglio material is denied. The Government is reminded of its continuing Brady obligations and, consistent with Coppa, the Government shall timely disclose any Brady and Giglio material to defendant. See United States v. Padovani, 14-GR-00224, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133400, *10 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2016). Early Disclosure of Witnesses and Jencks Act Materials *7 Defendant moves for early disclosure of witness names and statements prior to trial. (Dkt. No. 116, ¶¶ 27-31). The Government has no general duty to disclose the identities of its witnesses before trial. United States v. Bejasa, 904 F.2d 137, 139 (2d Cir. 1990). Section 3500 of Title 18 of the United States Code requires that the Government, on motion of defendant, disclose a Government witness's prior statements that are in the Government's possession and relate to the subject matter of the witness's direct testimony. See also Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957); Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.2 (procedure for producing a witness statement). A witness statement is defined as: (1) a written statement by a witness that is signed or otherwise adopted or approved by the witness; (2) a substantially verbatim recording or transcription of a witness's oral statement; or (3) any statement however taken or recorded made by the witness to the grand jury. 18 U.S.C. 3500(e). Statements are not required to be produced, by law, until after the witness has testified on direct examination, and the Court cannot mandate that they be produced sooner. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a); Fed. R. Crim. P 26.2(a). The Government indicates that it will disclose all 3500 material sufficiently prior to trial to allow defendants adequate time to prepare and, in accordance with the District Court's pretrial order, to permit the Court to conduct the trial in an orderly and efficient manner. In light of the Government's representations, defendants’ requests for early disclosure of witness statements are denied as moot. Bruton Request Defendant makes a request under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), for an order requiring the Government to redact any portions of any oral or written statements or confessions by any non-testifying co-defendants or co-conspirators that the Government intends to introduce at trial that may tend to inculpate the defendant. (Dkt. No. 116, ¶¶ 32-34), As a general rule, this type of motion is best considered by the trial judge. United States v. Anguiera, 11-CR-116, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51862, *2-3 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2012) (“[T]he relief sought for excluding non-testifying co-conspirator statements...[i]s better considered by the District Judge prior to trial and deferred for that consideration”). For this reason, the defendant's request is denied without prejudice to renew this motion before the District Court. Disclosure of Informant Identities Defendant moves for disclosure of the identity of any informant, the location of the informant, the criminal record, if any, of the informant, any prior testimony of the informant, any and all promises or considerations made to or given to the informant, any compensation given to the informant, including plea agreements, gang affiliations, if any, of the informant, and all evidence bearing on bias or credibility. (Dkt. Nos. 116, ¶¶ 42-43). In the alternative, defendants seek to have the above reports submitted to the Court for in camera review and subsequent disclosure to counsel. (Id.). In the absence of an order compelling production, defendants seek an order directing that all reports be sealed and entered into the record. (Id.). The Government objects to these requests on the grounds that defendants have not shown a particularized need for this information. (Dkt. No. 123, pgs. 20-21). The Government also argues that defendants face a heightened burden given that defendant is charges with obstructing the grand jury's investigation of the murder of a federal informant and providing false testimony before the grand jury. (Id.). The Government has a qualified privilege to withhold information concerning the names of confidential informants that it does not intend to call as witnesses. See Rovario v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-62 (1957) (the purpose of the privilege is to encourage citizens to report criminal activity). The informant's privilege must give way, however, if disclosure is essential to a defense or the fair determination of the case. United States v. Lilla, 699 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1983). To that end, a defendant seeking the identity of a confidential informant must make some evidentiary showing as to why disclosure is significant to determining defendant's guilt or innocence. See United States v. Jimenez, 789 F.2d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 1986) (explaining that defendants face a “heavy burden” of establishing that disclosure is essential to the defense); Lilla, 699 F.2d at 105 (“this requires some demonstration that in the absence of such disclosure the defendant will be denied a fair trial”); United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 871 (1982) (defendant need not show that the informant's testimony would actually be helpful to the defense, but instead “the events to which a witness might testify, and the relevance of those events to the crime charged”). *8 Defendant has not provided adequate reasoning as to why informant identities are material or necessary to her defense. Because this case involves the murder of a federal informant, there is significant concern for the safety of informants and witnesses. The Court does not find disclosure of informant identities essential to defendant's defense or a fair determination of the case. If and when an informant is to be called as a witness at trial, defendant will have access to his or her identity as well as all relevant impeachment material, prior statements, and notes of his or her interviews. In addition, if an informant reveals exculpatory information at any time, the Government has an ongoing duty to disclose this information in time for its effective use at trial. Thus, defendant's motion for disclosure of informant identities is denied. Preservation of Rough Notes Defendant moves for an order requiring the preservation of all police agency and/or investigative notes generated during the instant investigation. (Dkt. No. 116, ¶¶ 62-64). The Government maintains that it will endeavor to maintain these materials, should they exist, but also objects that this motion includes material that may exceed the Government's obligation under 18 U.S.C. § 3500 and Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.2. (Dkt. No. 123, pg. 22). The Court grants defendant's motion and directs the Government to arrange for the preservation of all rough notes and related information. Leave to File Additional Motions Defendant also moves to preserve her right to make further and additional motions. (Dkt. No. 116, ¶ 65). To the extent defendant intends to bring motions based upon new rulings, information, or evidence, her request for leave to file additional motions is granted. To the extent defendant intends to bring motions concerning issues that could have been raised prior to the previous motion deadline, defendant's request is denied without prejudice to bringing the motion upon a showing of good cause for the untimely filing. Government's Request for Reciprocal Discovery The Government moves for reciprocal discovery pursuant to Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure including the opportunity to inspect, copy or photograph books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects or copies or portions thereof which are in the possession, custody or control of the defendant and which the defendant intends to introduce as evidence at trial, as well as the results or reports of any physical or mental examinations or scientific tests or experiments made in connection with the case. (Dkt. No. 123, pgs. 22-23). The Government's motion for reciprocal discovery is granted, and defendant is reminded that her disclosure obligations continue up through and during trial. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(c). CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that defendant's motion to suppress be denied. (Dkt. No. 116). It is ordered that defendant's omnibus discovery demands are decided in the manner detailed above. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), it is hereby ordered that this Report, Recommendation and Order be filed with the Glerk of Court. Unless otherwise ordered by Judge Arcara, any objections to the recommendations portion of this Report, Recommendation and Order must be filed with the Clerk of Court within fourteen days of service of this Report, Recommendation and Order in accordance with the above statute, Rules 59(b), 45(a), and 45(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Local Rule of Criminal Procedure 59. Any requests for an extension of this deadline must be made to Judge Arcara. Failure to file objections, or to request an extension of time to file objections, within fourteen days of service of this Report, Recommendation and Order WAIVES THE RIGHT TO APPEAL THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER. See Small v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989). *9 The District Court will ordinarily refuse to consider de novo arguments, case law and/or evidentiary material which could have been, but were not, presented to the Magistrate Judge in the first instance. See Paterson-Leitch Co. v. Mass. Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 840 F.2d 985, 990-91 (1st Cir. 1988). Pursuant to Local Rule of Criminal Procedure 59(c)(2), written objections “shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings and recommendations to which objection is made and the basis for each objection, and shall be supported by legal authority.” Failure to comply with these provisions may result in the District Court's refusal to consider the objection. SO ORDERED. Footnotes [1] The decision to grant or deny a motion for a Daubert hearing, as well as authority to hold such a hearing, is within the province of a Magistrate Judge. See United States v. Gladden, 11-CR-119, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144720 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2012) (Scott, MJ) (denying motion for a Daubert hearing); United States v. Graham, 08-CR-6259, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39444 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2011)(Payson, MJ) (conducting a Daubert hearing regarding expert testimony on canine tracking and nitrate detection); but see United States v. Wilbern, 17-cr-6016, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143286, *3 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2019) (Feldman, MJ) (“Because the trial judge will also address the motion to Exclude Evidence and Order a Daubert hearing, as a motion in limine, that motion is likewise denied without prejudice to renew before [the District Judge].”) [2] It is noted that “granulization theory,” a specific method of historical cell site analysis not indicated to have been used in this case, has been held to be not reliable and has been excluded under Rule 702 and Daubert. See United States v. Evans, 892 F. Supp. 2d 949, 956 (N.D. Ill. 2012). [3] Although not federal law, the Court also finds State v. Pierce instructive on the question of reliability of Google Wi-Fi location data to track a defendant's movements. 222 A.3d 582 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 6, 2019) (unpublished). After conducting a Daubert hearing, the Superior Court of Delaware determined that an expert opinion based upon this technology was reliable and would assist the factfinder. See id. The Court also explained that the “underlying premise of Google Wi-Fi location data is the same as GPS and CSLI.” Id. at 586. A Wi-Fi positioning system relies upon Wi-Fi signals to determine the distances between a device and Wi-Fi signal access points. Id. Wi-Fi access points are devices that create a wireless local area network, such as a router in an office, business, or home, which projects a Wi-Fi signal to a designated area. Id. [4] Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).