EMORY GRANT, Plaintiff, v. CRST EXPEDITED, INC. and KARL O. BROOKS, Defendants CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:18-CV-433 United States District Court, E.D. Texas Filed July 22, 2020 Crone, Marcia A., United States District Judge MEMORANDUM AND ORDER *1 Pending before the court are Plaintiff Emory Grant's (“Grant”) Emergency Motion and Supplemental Emergency Motion to Quash Oral and Videotaped Deposition of Medical Management Group, LLC (“Medical Management”) and Access Care Accounts, LLC (“Access Care”) (#s 103, 106), filed on July 17, 2020, and July 21, 2020. Grant requests that the court quash the July 23, 2020, depositions of Medical Management and Access Care because Defendant CRST Expedited, Inc. (“CRST”) failed to provide adequate notice. Specifically, Grant complains that the listed place of deposition is “Oak Brook, Illinois and/or Zoom,” which “is impossible for Grant to determine where or how these depositions will take place ... mere days from the noticed deposition date.” Grant further contends that notice was not properly served on either entity. CRST filed a response and supplement (#s 107, 108), showing that Access Care was served on July 13, 2020, and advising the court that it was waiting for an affidavit stating that Medical Management was served on July 22, 2020. CRST subsequently agreed to reschedule the deposition due to issues with service. In addition, CRST indicates that it has provided Grant's counsel with the Zoom link for the depositions. Generally, a party may obtain discovery from a non-party by serving the non-party with a subpoena issued pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45. The court, however, may quash or modify a Rule 45 subpoena if it: “(1) fails to allow a reasonable time for compliance; (2) requires a person who is not a party to travel more than 100 miles from where the person resides; (3) requires disclosure of privileged or protected matter; or (4) subjects a person to undue burden.” Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 392 F.3d 812, 818 (5th Cir. 2004). The scope of discovery under a subpoena is the same as the scope of discovery under Rules 26(b) and 34. See FED. R. CIV. P 45(d)(1); Kendrick v. Heckler, 778 F.2d 253, 256 (5th Cir. 1985); Booth v. City of Dallas, 312 F.R.D. 427, 430 (N.D. Tex. 2015) (“When a subpoena is issued as a discovery device, relevance for purposes of the undue burden test is measured according to the standard of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 26(b)(1).” (quoting Williams v. City of Dallas, 178 F.R.D. 103, 110 (N.D. Tex. 1998))). Grant, as the moving party, “has the burden of proof to demonstrate ‘that compliance with the subpoena would be unreasonable and oppressive.’ ” Wiwa, 392 F.3d at 818 (quoting Williams, 178 F.R.D. at 109). General, boilerplate, and unsupported objections to discovery requests that fail to state their grounds with specificity are improper and result in waiver of those objections. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1), advisory committee note (2015) (Rule 26 does not “permit the opposing party to refuse discovery simply by making a boilerplate objection that is not proportional”); McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Apffel, P.C. v. Quarles, 894 F.2d 1482, 1485 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding boilerplate objections that interrogatories were “overly broad, burdensome, and oppressive” were “not adequate to voice a successful objection” and thus not valid); Star Creek Ctr., LLC v. Seneca Ins. Co., Inc., No. 4:17-CV-00607, 2018 WL 1934084, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2018) (holding plaintiff “waived several objections by making boilerplate ... objections”); Heller v. City of Dallas, 303 F.R.D. 466, 483-84 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (“So-called boilerplate or unsupported objections ... are likewise improper and ineffective and may [amount to] what the Fifth Circuit has described as ... Rambo tactics ....”); Enron Corp. Sav. Plan v. Hewitt Assocs., L.L.C., 258 F.R.D. 149, 159, 164-66 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (finding that boilerplate objections fail “to meet the specificity requirements” of Rule 34 or Rule 26). Objections that are untimely or lack specificity are “waived unless the court, for good cause, excepts the failure.” FED. R. CIV. P. 33(b)(4); see Enron Corp. Sav. Plan, 258 F.R.D. at 153, n.1 (applying Rule 33 requirements to both interrogatory and document request objections). *2 Grant provides some specific objections to the deposition topics at issue. First, Grant contends that CRST already has the Medical Lien Purchase Agreements (#107-1) which are relevant to the financial arrangements between Grant, his doctor, and Access Care. The documents do not appear to mention the various facilities at which Grant allegedly received treatment. Therefore, the objection is overruled. Second, Grant asserts that inquiries into the business dealings of SpineTech, Medical Management, and Access Care outside of Grant are not relevant. The court agrees and modifies the deposition notice and subpoena to allow inquiry into the entities' business dealings only to the extent that they pertain to Grant and his legal counsel in this case. Third, Grant objects to inquiries regarding rates received by SpineTech for services provided to patients other than Grant. Per the court's previous rulings, the objection is overruled. Finally, Grant objects to inquiries about communications between the various entities and Grant's counsel on the grounds of relevance and denies the existence of written communications. The court agrees and modifies the deposition notice and subpoena to allow inquiry into such communications only to the extent that they exist and pertain to Grant and his legal counsel in this case. Consistent with the foregoing analysis, Grant's Emergency Motion and Supplemental Emergency Motion to Quash Oral and Videotaped Deposition of Medical Management and Access Care (#s 103, 106) are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The deposition of Access Care shall go forward, as noticed, on July 23, 2020, at 10:00 a.m., at which time Access Care shall comply with the subpoena duces tecum, subject to the court's modifications above. The deposition of Medical Management may be rescheduled subject to the deadlines set forth in the court's Scheduling Order. SIGNED at Beaumont, Texas, this 22nd day of July, 2020.