O. L. v. City of El Monte, et al Case No. 2:20-cv-00797-RGK (JDE) United States District Court, C.D. California Filed January 27, 2021 Counsel O. L., El Monte CA, pro se. Colin E. Barr, Terence Joseph Gallagher, Olivarez Madruga Lemieux O'Neill LLP, Los Angeles CA, Erin Renee Dunkerly, Amanda G. Papac, Tomas A. Guterres, Collins Muir Stewart LLP, South Pasadena CA, for City of El Monte. Early, John D., United States Magistrate Judge Proceedings: (In Chambers) Order re Plaintiff's Motions [Dkt. 151, 155] I. INTRODUCTION *1 On January 27, 2020, Plaintiff O.L. (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed this action alleging thirteen claims, including alleged civil rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dkt. 1. On March 19, 2020, Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint. Dkt. 40 (“SAC”). The Court granted in large part a motion to dismiss the SAC, dismissing or staying all claims except a single Section 1983 claim based upon an alleged Fourth Amendment violation against Defendants Lilian Jara (“Jara”) and Richard Ruiz (“Ruiz”) (collectively, “Defendants”). Dkt. 72. Defendants answered the SAC on August 14, 2020. Dkt. 80. Following a motion for a protective order regarding confidential information filed by Plaintiff (Dkt. 97, “Plaintiff's First Motion for Protective Order”), the Court, on October 30, 2020, entered a Protective Order governing the handling of confidential information. Dkt. 113 (“Protective Order”). On January 13, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Expand the Number of Permissible Interrogatories (Dkt. 151, “Interrogatory Motion”) with a Joint Stipulation (Dkt. 152) and supporting and opposing evidence (Dkt. 152-1 to 152-3), set for hearing on February 4, 2021. Neither party filed a timely supplemental memorandum with respect to the Interrogatory Motion under Local Rule 37-2.3. On January 15, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel Defendants to Provide Further Responses to Discovery (Dkt. 155, “Plaintiff's Fifth Motion to Compel”) with a Joint Stipulation (Dkt. 156) and supporting and opposing evidence (Dkt. 156-1 to 156-3), set for hearing on February 11, 2021. Neither party filed a timely supplemental memorandum with respect to the Plaintiff's Fifth Motion to Compel under Local Rule 37-2.3. The Court finds these Motions (Dkt. 151, 155) may properly be decided without further briefing and without oral argument and vacates the hearings set for February 4 and 11, 2021. The Court rules as follows. II. RELEVANT LAW A. Relevance for Discovery Purposes “Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Rule”) 26(b)(1). Relevance under Rule 26(b)(1) is defined broadly. See Snipes v. United States, 334 F.R.D. 548, 550 (N.D. Cal. 2020); V5 Techs. v. Switch, Ltd., 334 F.R.D. 306, 309 (D. Nev. 2019), aff'd sub nom. V5 Techs., LLC v. Switch, LTD., 2020 WL 1042515 (D. Nev. Mar. 3, 2020) (noting that relevance for discovery purposes remains broad even after the 2015 amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). Moreover, “[i]nformation within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Rule 26(b)(1). “Generally, the purpose of discovery is to remove surprise from trial preparation so the parties can obtain evidence necessary to evaluate and resolve their dispute.” Duran v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 258 F.R.D. 375, 378 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citations omitted). District courts have broad discretion in determining relevancy for discovery purposes. Mfg. Automation & Software Sys., Inc. v. Hughes, 2017 WL 5641120, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2017) (citing Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2005)). B. Rule 33 Interrogatories *2 Pursuant to Rule 33, a party may propound to another party up to 25 interrogatories relating to “any matter that may be inquired into under Rule 26(b).” Rule 33(a)(1), (2). “Each interrogatory must, to the extent it is not objected to, be answered separately and fully in writing under oath.” Rule 33(b)(3). “The grounds for objecting to an interrogatory must be stated with specificity.” Rule 33(b)(4). “Any grounds not stated in a timely objection unless the Court, for good cause, excuses the failure.” Id. “Parties cannot evade [the 25 interrogatory] presumptive limitation through the device of joining as ‘subparts’ questions that seek information about discrete separate subjects.” Rule 33(a) Advisory Committee Notes (1993 Amendment). The aim of the presumptive limitation “is not to prevent needed discovery, but to provide judicial scrutiny before parties make potentially excessive use of this discovery device.” Id. C. Rule 34 Requests for Production of Documents A party may serve on any other party requests, within the scope of Rule 26(b), to produce or permit inspection of, among other things, “any designated documents or electronically stored information.” Rule 34(a)(1)(A). Such requests “must describe with reasonable particularity each item or category of items to be inspected ... [and] must specify a reasonable time, place, and manner for the inspection ....” Rule 34(b)(1)(A), (B). The party responding to a request for production must, “[f]or each item or category, ... either state that inspection ... will be permitted as requested or state with specificity the grounds for objecting to the request, including the reasons.” Rule 34(b)(2)(B). “An objection must state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection. An objection to part of a request must specify the part and permit inspection of the rest.” Rule 34(b)(2)(C). D. Rule 36 Requests for Admission Rule 36 provides that a “party may serve on any other party a written request to admit, for purposes of the pending action only, the truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1) relating to: (A) facts, the application of law to fact, or opinions about either; and (B) the genuineness of any described documents.” Rule 36(a)(1). “If a matter is not admitted, the answer must specifically deny it or state in detail why the answering party cannot truthfully admit or deny it.” Rule 36(a)(4). A denial “must fairly respond to the substance of the matter; and when good faith requires that a party qualify an answer or deny only part of a matter, the answer must specify the part admitted and qualify or deny the rest.” Id. If a party objects to a request for admission, it must state its grounds for the objection and “must not object solely on the ground that the request presents a genuine issue for trial.” Rule 36(a)(5). E. Motions to Compel Further Responses to Discovery A party who has propounded interrogatories, requests for production, or requests for admission or who has served a Rule 45 subpoena may seek an order regarding the sufficiency of responses or compelling further responses or production. See Rule 36(a)(6); Rule 37(a)(3)(B)(iii), (iv); Rule 45(d)(2)(B)(i). A party who files a discovery-related motion bears the initial burden of informing the Court, at a minimum, of which discovery requests or responses are the subject of the motion. See Local Rule 37-2.1 (requiring a joint stipulation in support of a discovery motion “must contain all issues in dispute” and, if, for example, the sufficiency of an answer to an interrogatory is at issue, “the stipulation must contain, verbatim, both the interrogatory and the allegedly insufficient answer, followed by each party's contentions as to that particular interrogatory, separately stated); see also Chester v. King, 2019 WL 4013354, at * 4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2019) (noting, “[a]t a minimum, as the moving party Plaintiff bears the burden of informing the court (1) which discovery requests are the subject of his motion to compel; (2) which of Defendant's responses are disputed; ....”). *3 “Upon a motion to compel discovery, the movant has the initial burden of demonstrating relevance.” United States v. McGraw–Hill Cos., 2014 WL 1647385, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2014) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Once the minimal showing of relevance is made, “[t]he party who resists discovery has the burden to show that discovery should not be allowed, and has the burden of clarifying, explaining, and supporting its objections.” DIRECTV, Inc. v. Trone, 209 F.R.D. 455, 458 (C.D. Cal. 2002); see also Hsingching Hsu v. Puma Biotechnology, Inc., 2018 WL 4951918, at *4 Cal. June 27, 2018) (“The party opposing discovery is ‘required to carry a heavy burden of showing’ why discovery should be denied.” (quoting Reece v. Basi, 2014 WL 2565986, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 6, 2014)); Oakes v. Halvorsen Marine Ltd., 179 F.R.D. 281, 283 (C.D. Cal. 1998). III. DISCUSSION A. The Interrogatory Motion The sole relief sought by Plaintiff in her Interrogatory Motion is for an order “to expand the number of permissible interrogatories.” Motion at 1. As that is the only issue before the Court, it is the only issue the Court will decide as to the Interrogatory Motion. The only apparent basis for Plaintiff's request to exceed the presumptive 25 interrogatory limit under Rule 33(a)(1) is her “pro se status,” and the Defendants have not shown they would suffer prejudice or undue burden by permitting Plaintiff to propound additional interrogatories. See Dkt. 152 at 4-5. The Court finds neither Plaintiff's pro se status, nor Defendants' purported failure to show prejudice or undue burden, individually or collectively, justify exceeding the otherwise presumptive limit on interrogatories here. Nor do other considerations make such an order warranted here. First, as there two defendants, Plaintiff may propound a total of 50 interrogatories. Second, as the Court has noted in other orders, the issues remaining in this case are narrow. See, e.g., Dkt. 145 at 18 (sustaining Plaintiff's relevance objection to a request for production, finding the request sought documents “not relevant to the issues currently in the case relating to the scope of Plaintiff's consent to Jara”). Third, as Plaintiff has filed several motions to compel, the Court is familiar to an extent with how Plaintiff has used her 50 available interrogatories, and reiterates its prior findings here that Plaintiff has propounded several interrogatories that had little to no relevance to the remaining issues in the case. See, e.g., Dkt. 145 at 12-14; see also infra. Further, the Court has previously concluded that Plaintiff has shown a blatant disregard for her discovery obligations and obligations as a litigant in federal court. Dkt. 145 at 39. For the foregoing reasons, taking into account the considerations set forth in Rule 26(b)(1) and (b)(2) and recognizing that the purpose of Rule 33(a)(1)'s numerical limitation is “to provide judicial scrutiny before parties make potentially excessive use of this discovery device,” the Court finds an order providing Plaintiff with more than the 50 interrogatories she is presumptively permitted to propound unwarranted here. As a result, the Interrogatory Motion (Dkt. 151) is DENIED in its entirety. The Court will address Defendants' request for the payment of their reasonable attorney's fees incurred in defending against the motion (see Dkt. 152 at 4) below. B. Plaintiff's Fifth Motion to Compel By Plaintiff's Fifth Motion to Compel, Plaintiff seeks to compel Ruiz to further respond to Interrogatory Nos. 18 and 19 and Request for Production (“RFP”) No. 23, and Jara to further respond to Requests for Admission (“RFAs”) Nos. 39 and 40, Interrogatory Nos. 6-8 and 10, and RFP No. 11. To the extent the requests or response relate to common issues, the Court will discuss them together. Further, as the Court has ruled on many similarly discovery requests propounded by Plaintiff (see Dkt. 145), the Court incorporates the relevant analysis from that order. *4 Interrogatory No. 18 propounded upon Ruiz asks him to describe “from what year through what year” he spent more than 100 hours “receiving post-training on the Fourth Amendment.” Dkt. 156 at 6. Ruiz has previously described that he “never touched, reviewed, or accessed the contents of Plaintiff's cellphone.” Dkt. 145 at 14. Other than asserting generally that law enforcement personnel files may contain discoverable information in excessive force cases, an argument that has no bearing here, Plaintiff offers no argument for the relevance of stating the entire span of years during which Ruiz, a lieutenant with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, received Fourth Amendment “post-training,” when he never accessed or reviewed the contents of Plaintiff's cell phone. See Dkt. 156 at 7-8. Considering the only issues remaining in this case relate to an alleged search of Plaintiff's cell phone either without her consent or in excess of her consent and alleged damages flowing therefrom, and considering Ruiz's prior answers to interrogatories, this interrogatory does not meet even the broad definition of relevance and seeks information not proportional to the needs of the case under Rule 26(b). Plaintiff's Fifth Motion to Compel is denied as to this interrogatory. In response to Interrogatory No. 19, which asks Ruiz to identify every case in a 10 year period in which he was accused of misconduct or a civil rights violation, Ruiz, after interposing objections, answered “Not applicable,” which his counsel clarified, to the extent Plaintiff felt it was unclear, meant there were no such cases, so there were none he could identify. See Dkt. 156 at 10-11. As Ruiz has sufficiently answered, Plaintiff's Fifth Motion to Compel is denied as to this interrogatory. Plaintiff asks both Jara and Ruiz, in response to RFP Nos. 11 and 23 propounded to them, respectively, to produce all of their communications with the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office regarding Plaintiff, her criminal complaint against her alleged assailant, and the alleged assailant. Plaintiff does not make any proffer of relevance in support of her motion with respect to RFP No. 23 directed to Ruiz. See Dkt. 156 at 12-13. With respect to RFP No. 11 directed to Jara, Plaintiff asserts in a conclusory fashion that Jara's communications with the District Attorney's Office are “directly relevant to the reasonableness of a complete search and seizure of Plaintiff's electronic data.” Id. at 24. Plaintiff does not explain why all communications between Jara and the District Attorney's office relating to Plaintiff, her criminal complaint, and her alleged assailant, are “directly relevant” to the reasonableness of a “search and seizure” of Plaintiff's electronic data. Further, Defendants have already testified that there was no “search” of her data, and the extent of the “seizure” was the download of a forensic copy that was placed in evidence, without being reviewed. See Dkt. 145 at 14, 26. Considering the issues remaining in this case and responses to discovery already provided, these RFPs do not meet even the broad definition of relevance and seeks information not proportional to the needs of the case under Rule 26(b). Plaintiff's Fifth Motion to Compel is denied as to these RFPs. In RFA No. 39 propounded to Jara, Plaintiff asks Jara to “Admit that lack of protest or resistance does not mean sexual consent, nor does silence mean consent.” Dkt. 156 at 15. In RFA No. 40, Plaintiff asks Jara to “Admit that affirmative sexual consent must be ongoing throughout a sexual activity and can be revoked at any time.” Id. at 17. Jara objected to RFA Nos. 39 and 40 on several grounds including relevance. Id. at 15, 17. Plaintiff argues these RFAs seek relevant admissions because “[a]s a sexual assault detective JARA's understanding of sexual assault reflects her decision making abilities and was one of the factors in her decision to conduct a complete search and seizure of Plaintiff's data.” Id. at 15-17. Plaintiff's proffer of relevance does not show how the RFAs are relevant to any remaining issue in the case. Plaintiff's Fifth Motion to Compel is denied as to RFA Nos. 39 and 40 propounded upon Jara. In Interrogatory No. 6, presumably propounded upon Jara based on Plaintiff's arguments, although the heading in the Joint Stipulation does not identify to whom it was propounded, Plaintiff asks for “all factual and legal basis that YOU needed to search Plaintiff's cell phone ....” Dkt. 156 at 18. The response, presumably by Jara, contains objections, including an objection that the Interrogatory assumes facts. Id. at 19. Plaintiff argues that the Interrogatory “only seeks to ascertain the legal and factual basis used by defendant in support of the search of plaintiff's smartphone. A legal basis must be supported by underlying facts and cannot stand alone in an analysis of the reasons for defendant's actions.” Id. Jara responds that she cannot answer a question that assumes a fact that did not occur. Id. Interrogatory No. 6 requires Jara to assume a fact that, at a minimum, is in dispute—namely, whether Jara searched Plaintiff's cell phone. As such, the objection is sustained, and Plaintiff's Fifth Motion to Compel is denied as to Interrogatory No. 6. See Spence v. Kaur, 2020 WL 7406294, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2020) (denying motion to compel interrogatories that assumed facts that may be in dispute). *5 Interrogatory Nos. 7 and 8, presumably propounded upon Jara based on Plaintiff's arguments, although the heading in the Joint Stipulation does not identify to whom they were propounded, ask Jara to “IDENTIFY what and who authorized YOU to conduct any related investigation into any non-criminal law enforcement matter through Plaintiff's smart phone, ...” and “[d]escribe in detail what non-criminal law enforcement matter YOU conducted investigation against [the alleged assailant] through Plaintiff's smart phone.” Dkt. 156 at 19-20. The responses, presumably by Jara, each contain objections, including an objection that the Interrogatories assume facts. Id. at 20, 21. Plaintiff argues that the language from the Interrogatories is taken from “the entry and search warrant form,” and argues that if Jara lacked authority to conduct a “non-criminal law enforcement” investigation, then the search warrant should be “deemed invalid.” Id. at 20-21. Jara responds that she cannot answer a question that assumes a fact that did not occur. Id. Interrogatory Nos. 7 and 8 each require Jara to assume a fact that, at a minimum, is in dispute—that is, whether any investigation of Plaintiff or her assailant was conducted “through Plaintiff's smart phone.” As such, the objection is sustained and the motion is denied as to Interrogatory Nos. 7 and 8. See Spence, 2020 WL 7406294, at *5. Finally, Interrogatory No. 10 propounded upon Jara asks “Provide the factual and legal basis that YOU did not allege Plaintiff signed the entry and search waiver form in YOUR opposition to Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, nor did YOU provide to the Court Plaintiff's signed the entry and search waiver form through YOUR opposition to Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction.” Dkt. 156 at 21-22. Jara asserted various objections, including “the Attorney Work Protect Privilege.” Id. at 22. Plaintiff argues the work product doctrine, as set forth in Rule 26, only applies to documents. Id. Jara, citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), disagrees. Jara's objection is sustained. Written discovery asking a party to explain legal strategies in connection with litigation or anticipated litigation is objectionable under Hickman. See Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Ent., Inc., 2010 WL 3705907, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2010) (denying motion to compel further responses to RFAs seeking admissions on litigation strategy, noting “[a]though courts most commonly apply the work product privilege to documents and things, the Supreme Court in [Hickman] made clear that disclosure of the opinions or mental processes of counsel may occur when nontangible work product is sought through depositions, interrogatories, and requests for admission.” (quoting United States v. One Tract of Real Prop. Together With All Bldgs., Improvements, Appurtenances, and Fixtures, 95 F.3d 422, 428 n.10 (6th Cir. 1996))). Interrogatory No. 10 asks Jara to explain her counsel's legal strategies in opposing a motion in this case, so it is objectionable and improper. Plaintiff's Fifth Motion to Compel is denied as to Interrogatory No. 10. Fort the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's Fifth Motion to Compel (Dkt. 155) is DENIED in its entirety. The Court will address Defendants' request for the payment of their reasonable attorney's fees incurred in defending against the Motions (see Dkt. 156 at 6) below. C. Defendants' Request for Expenses Defendants seek monetary sanctions of $1,000 or terminating sanctions in connection with the Interrogatory Motion (see Dkt. 152 at 4; Dkt. 152-3 at 3) and seek monetary sanctions of $1,750 or terminating sanctions in connection with Plaintiff's Fifth Motion to Compel (see Dkt. 156 at 6; 156-3 at 2). Plaintiff did not address the issue in her portion of either Joint Stipulation relating to the Motions. Nor, despite an opportunity to do so, did Plaintiff address Defendants' requests in a Local Rule 37-2.3 supplemental memorandum as to either motion. As both Motions are denied in their entirety, an award of Defendants' reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the Motions appears facially warranted. The Motions were not substantially justified, and, as discussed further below, the circumstances here do not appear to render such an award unjust. See Rule 37(a)(5)(B). As Defendants' requests were raised in the Joint Stipulation for each motion, Plaintiff had an opportunity to be heard on the issue in each instance but chose not to respond given that she did not file a supplemental memorandum as to either motion. *6 In a prior discovery motions in which Defendants were successful, the Court declined to award reasonable attorney's fees, finding as follows: However, because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis based on a showing that requiring her to pay the then-applicable $400 filing fee would prevent her from being able to pay for the necessities of life, and because the Court has no information to suggest Plaintiff's financial situation has changed, the Court finds an award of fees against Plaintiff would be unjust in this circumstance and, as it could not be paid, would not accomplish the purposes such an award is designed to accomplish. Nevertheless, Plaintiff is placed on notice that further violations of the Local Rules or of her obligations as a litigant in federal court, including her discovery obligations, and any violation of any Court orders, will likely result in a recommendation of adverse jury instructions, evidentiary sanctions, issue sanctions, and/or terminating sanctions, among other possible sanctions. Dkt. 145 at 39. Unlike the factual situation at the time of the prior order, here, the Court has received evidence that Plaintiff's financial situation has changed since her February 2020 in forma pauperis application. Defendants submitted as evidence of this change a Motion and Affidavit for Permission to Proceed in Forma Pauperis that Plaintiff filed in connection with an appeal to the Ninth Circuit in this case. Dkt. 152-3 at 10-16. In this motion, Plaintiff attested under penalty of perjury on October 5, 2020, that as of that date she received monthly unemployment benefits, had earned $4,850 per month in gross pay resulting from self-employment for the prior 24 months, had $1566 in cash, owns a vehicle, and incurs $665 in monthly expenses. Id. at 12-13, 16. Plaintiff also attested as of that date that she did not expect any major change to those monthly figures during the next 12 months. Id. at 16. Again, Plaintiff had an opportunity to dispute or contest any of the foregoing in a supplemental memorandum but did not do so. Therefore, whereas the Court previously had “no information to suggest Plaintiff's financial situation had changed,” the Court now does have such information. Plaintiff's October 2020 motion to the Ninth Circuit reflect she had $1,566 cash on hand and a positive monthly cash flow of more than $4,000 per month. Thus, the sole basis for the Court's prior finding that an award of expenses against Plaintiff would be unjust because there was no information that her financial situation would permit her to pay such an award no longer exists. Rather, there is now substantial evidence to support a finding that Plaintiff can pay an award of $2,750, the combined expenses sought by Defendants in the two Motions. With respect to Defendants' alternative request for terminating sanctions, the Ninth Circuit has held that in addition to willfulness or bad faith, courts must consider: “(1) the public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court's need to manage its dockets; (3) the risk of prejudice to the party seeking sanctions; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.” Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of Beverly Hills, 482 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Jorgensen v. Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906, 912 (9th Cir. 2003)). This test is “not mechanical.” Id. at 1098. Nor must a district court “make explicit findings regarding each of these factors.” Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 958 (9th Cir. 2006). Rather, the test “provides the district court with a way to think about what to do, not a set of conditions precedent for sanctions or a script that the district court must follow.” Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 482 F.3d at 1096. “What is most critical for case-dispositive sanctions, regarding risk of prejudice and of less drastic sanctions, is whether the discovery violations ‘threaten to interfere with the rightful decision of the case.’ ” Id. at 1097. Thus, terminating sanctions are appropriate where a “pattern of deception and discovery abuse” makes it impossible for a district court to conduct a trial “with any reasonable assurance that the truth would be available.” Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Nat. Beverage Distribs., 69 F.3d 337, 352 (9th Cir. 1995). “A defendant suffers prejudice if the plaintiff's actions impair the defendant's ability to go to trial or threaten to interfere with the rightful decision of the case.” Adriana Int'l Corp. v. Thoeren, 913 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1990). In evaluating the availability of lesser sanctions, the Ninth Circuit considers: “(1) did the court explicitly discuss the feasibility of less drastic sanctions and explain why alternative sanctions would be inappropriate, (2) did the court implement alternative sanctions before ordering dismissal, and (3) did the court warn the party of the possibility of dismissal before actually ordering dismissal?” Id. at 1412-13. *7 Here, considering the foregoing factors, although the Court has previously warned Plaintiff about the possibility of dismissal for her continued discovery violations and filing of unsupported discovery motions, the Court finds that terminating sanctions, at this time, are still not warranted. Still, Plaintiff is, again, placed on notice that her improper conduct during the discovery phase of this case, including propounding discovery requests that are not relevant and beyond the limits of discovery allotted and in filing discovery motions that lack a supportable basis in law or fact, if it continues, will show that lesser sanctions are not feasible to deter such actions and will likely result in a recommendation of terminating sanctions for future discovery abuses. However, the Court does find that an award of reasonable expenses including attorney's fees incurred in defending against the motions payable by Plaintiff to Defendants is warranted. Such award is limited to reasonable attorney's fees actually incurred. If Defendants continue to seek an award of attorney's fees, Defendants are ordered to submit, within three court days from the date of this Order, admissible evidence regarding the actual rates and time spent, per task, with descriptions, that each attorney spent in defending against the Motions, not including meet and confer times. Plaintiff may file a response to such submission within three court days of its filing. No further briefing or argument will be permitted on the issue absent further order from the Court. IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Interrogatory Motion (Dkt. 151) and Fifth Motion to Compel (Dkt. 155) are DENIED in their entirety. As to Defendants' requests for reasonable attorney's fees actually incurred in defending against the motions, the parties are ordered to comply with the briefing procedures set forth in Section III(C), above. IT IS SO ORDERED.