TAISSA ACHCAR-WINKELS, RAY ACHCAR-WINKELS, individually and as Parents and Next Friends of S.A., a minor, Plaintiffs, v. LAKE OSWEGO SCHOOL DISTRICT, an Oregon municipal corporation, et al, Defendants Case No. 3:15-cv-00385-ST United States District Court, D. Oregon Filed December 11, 2015 Counsel Jeffrey M. Dorem, Pro Hac Vice, Betts, Patterson & Mines, Seattle, WA, Leta E. Gorman, Gorman Law, LLC, Portland, OR, for Plaintiffs. Blake H. Fry, Beth Plass, Karen M. Vickers, Matthew A. Levin, Markowitz Herbold PC, Christopher Brady Marks, Robert D. Scholz, Kristin M. Welsh, MacMillan Scholz & Marks P.C., Portland, Or, Lucas W. Reese, Garrett Hemann Robertson P.C., Salem, OR, for Defendants. Stewart, Janice M., United States Magistrate Judge ORDER INTRODUCTION *1 Pursuant to FRCP 45, defendant, Suzanne Young (“Young”), has filed a Motion to Quash a Subpoena to Cellco Partnership dba Verizon Wireless (“Verizon”) (docket #69). That subpoena requests Verizon to produce by December 2, 2015,[1] “all subscriber information/text messages from April 1, 2014, through April 1, 2015, regarding subscriber Suzanne Young and cell number [redacted].” Young objects to the subpoena as overly broad because it is not limited to particular senders, receivers, or topics and may contain privileged communications to her spouse, insurer, attorneys, or medical providers. Plaintiffs oppose the motion on the grounds that Young has no standing to object to a subpoena to a non-party, has waived any privacy protections through her contract with Verizon, has not met her burden to show that the responsive documents will contain privileged information, and, even if they do, is not entitled to review the responsive documents prior to production because she had withheld other relevant documents. For the reasons set forth below, Young's motion is granted. DISCUSSION I. Standing “Ordinarily a party has no standing to seek to quash a subpoena issued to someone who is not a party to the action, unless the objecting party claims some personal right or privilege with regard to the documents sought.” Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F Supp2d 965, 973 (CD 2010) (citations omitted). Young asserts that she has a privacy interest and privilege with respect to the records sought by plaintiffs' subpoena. Because jurisdiction is based on diversity, the substantive law of the forum state, Oregon, governs the assertion of Young's privacy rights. See, e.g., Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F3d 994, 1005 (9th Cir 2001); Home Indem. Co. v. Lane Powell Moss & Miller, 43 F3d 1322, 1326 (9th Cir 1995); see also FRE 501 (“[I]n a civil case, state law governs privilege regarding a claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision.”). Under Oregon law, a party “clearly ha[s] a cognizable privacy interest in the content of his telephone calls.” State v. Johnson, 340 Or 319, 336, 131 P3d 173, 184 (2006), citing ORS 133.724 (setting out requirement that police obtain judicially issued warrant to intercept a telephonic communication). Also under federal law, as discussed below, Young has an enforceable expectation of privacy in the content of her electronic communications. Moreover, Young asserts that privileged information may be contained within the text messages. Given that the subpoena requests all text messages sent and received over a one year period of time, it is understandable that Young not to be able at this point to specify the recipients, senders, and topics that fall with a privilege without first having the records to review. Contrary to plaintiffs' contention, Young did not waive her expectation of privacy by agreeing to Verizon's terms of use. Verizon's Privacy Policy only permits disclosure pursuant to “valid legal process,” which is the subject of this motion, and also refers to the “Cable Act” which “permits the disclosure of customer names and addresses as long as a subscriber has been provided with the opportunity to prohibit or limit this disclosure and the disclosure does not reveal, directly or indirectly, the subscriber's viewing or other uses of the cable or other services provided.” Gorman Decl. (docket #71), Ex. 2, p. 2. It does not expressly permit Verizon to disclose any other information, including the content of Young's communications, without her consent. *2 Accordingly, Young has standing to move to quash the subpoena. II. Stored Communications Act Neither Young nor plaintiffs address the federal statute that governs the disclosure of text message content. The Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), 18 USC §§ 2701-12, which comprises part of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, generally prohibits “ ‘providers’ of communication services from divulging private communications to certain entities and/or individuals.” Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., 529 F3d 892, 900 (9th Cir 2008), rev'd on other grounds by City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 US 746 (2010) (reversing on Fourth Amendment grounds only). “The SCA provides different prohibitions depending on whether the communications provider is classified as an ‘electronic communication service’ or a ‘remote computing service.’ ” Mintz v. Mark Bartelstein & Assocs., Inc., 885 F Supp2d 987, 991 (CD Cal 2012), quoting 18 USC § 2702(a). According to the Ninth Circuit, “wireless communications providers such as [Verizon] are properly classified as an ‘electronic communication service.’ ” Id, citing Quon, 529 F3d at 901. Thus, under the SCA, Verizon “must comply with the rules applicable to electronic communication services and ‘shall not knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of a communication while in electronic storage by that service,’ unless one of the specifically enumerated exceptions in 18 USC § 2702(b) apply.” Id, quoting 18 USC § 2702(a)(1). None of the exceptions listed in 18 USC § 2702(b) apply here unless any plaintiff is “an addressee or intended recipient of such communication or an agent of such addressee or intended recipient” under 18 USC § 2702(b)(1), or unless Verizon obtains “the lawful consent of the originator or an addressee or intended recipient of such communication” pursuant to 18 USC § 2701(b)(3). The subpoena is broad and not narrowly drawn to fall within either of those exceptions. Moreover, plaintiffs clearly do not have Young's consent and do not represent that they have the consent of other individuals with whom Young communicated. And even if plaintiffs are an addressee or recipient of any of Young's communications, they “would already have possession of the text messages and would not need to subpoena them.” Mintz, 885 F Supp2d at 993. “The SCA does not contain an exception for civil discovery subpoenas.” Id at 991, citing Crispin, 717 F Supp2d at 976 (rejecting argument that the SCA permits the disclosure of the contents of communications pursuant to a civil discovery subpoena); Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 FRD 346, 350 (ED Mich 2008) (“[A]s noted by the courts and commentators alike, § 2702 lacks any language that explicitly authorizes a service provider to divulge the contents of a communication pursuant to a subpoena or court order.”). Accordingly, the SCA prohibits Verizon from disclosing the content of any text messages sought by plaintiffs' subpoena. In contrast to the content of electronic communications, the SCA permits electronic communication service providers to “divulge a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the contents of communications) ... to any person other than a governmental entity.” 18 USC § 2702(c)(6). Plaintiffs are not governmental entities. Therefore, the SCA does not prohibit Verizon from disclosing Young's “subscriber information” to plaintiffs. So-called “subscriber information” includes the date, time, originating and receiving telephone number, and duration for incoming and outgoing calls. Such information does not implicate any privacy interest and, according to Verizon's Privacy Policy, may be disclosed. *3 However, the subpoena is overly broad. It seeks “subscriber information” for Young's cell phone number over a period of one year, much of which is irrelevant to any claim or defense in this case. At a minimum, the subpoena should be limited to relevant dates and originating and receiving telephone numbers. Plaintiffs have submitted no evidence that Verizon lacks the capability of responding to a more narrowly drawn subpoena requesting only relevant records. In conclusion, in response to plaintiffs' subpoena, the SCA prohibits Verizon from disclosing any of the text messages, but not relevant “subscriber information.” Because the subpoena is not limited to relevant subscriber information, it must be quashed. The court notes that ordinarily “the SCA does not prevent [plaintiffs] from obtaining this information through other means.” Mintz, 885 F Supp2d at 994. Instead of issuing a subpoena to Verizon, plaintiffs could have sought Young's cell phone records by serving a request for production of documents on Young pursuant to FRCP 34. Moreover, plaintiffs or others had the legal right to obtain documents from Verizon reflecting the content of their text messages to or from Young based on their status as the “addressee,” “intended recipient” and/or “originator” of the communications. See 18 USC § 2702(b)(1); Duran v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 258 FRD 375, 379 (CD Cal 2009). However, the deadline for completing discovery in this case was December 2, 2015. ORDER Based on the foregoing, defendant Young's Motion to Quash a Subpoena to Cellco Partnership dba Verizon Wireless (“Verizon”) (docket #69) is GRANTED, and plaintiffs' subpoena to Verizon is QUASHED. Footnotes [1] It is unclear whether the parties advised Verizon to delay compliance with the subpoena based on the pending motion.