Minerva26

Amy Elizabeth Krekelberg, Plaintiff, v. Anoka County, et al., Defendants Case No. 13-cv-3562 (DWF/TNL) United States District Court, D. Minnesota Filed August 09, 2017 Counsel Sonia L. Miller-Van Oort and Jonathan A. Strauss, Sapientia Law Group PLLC, 120 South Sixth Street, Suite 100, Minneapolis, MN 55402, and Jeffrey M. Montpetit, SiebenCarey, 901 Marquette Avenue, Suite 500, Minneapolis, MN 55402 (for Plaintiff); Brian S. Carter and George H. Norris, Minneapolis City Attorney's Office, 305 South Fifth Street, Room 210, Minneapolis, MN 55415 (for Defendant City of Minneapolis and Movants Beth Mota, Gregory Wenzel, Clark Gossett, Joel Carlson, and Officer Mark Durand); and Robert I. Yount, Jardine, Logan & O'Brien PLLP, 8519 Eagle Point Boulevard, Suite 100, Lake Elmo, MN 55042 (for Defendant Matthew Olson). Leung, Tony N., United States Magistrate Judge ORDER *1 The Rules of Civil Procedure “should be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. The litigation of this case has been a textbook antithesis of Rule 1’s admonition. The unfortunate devolution of this case, however, is caused by reasons the Court believes are atypical of federal cases. The facts and law underpinning the complaint are decidedly manageable. Indeed, the Eighth Circuit has provided plentiful guidance as to the parameters of claims arising under the Driver's Privacy Protection Act (“DPPA”), 18 U.S.C. § 123 et seq. See, e.g., McDonough v. Anoka Cty., 799 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2015) (discussing the history, purpose, and applicability of the DPPA, as well as statute of limitations and qualified immunity); Tichich v. City of Bloomington, 835 F.3d 856, 867 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding that “sequential accesses occurring within a several-minute time span should be considered as one obtainment rather than several”). Rather, the confounding inability of Plaintiff and Defendant City of Minneapolis to engage in concepts of reasonable mutual compromise and communication has led to near-continuous cantankerous squabbling that has ground this litigation to a halt while fees and costs continue to mount. It is in this context that the Court must step in to end the squabbling, order the parties out of their litigation trenches to realize the admonition of Rule 1, and impose strict boundaries to govern the remainder of this litigation. Before the Court are several motions: (1) Motion to Quash Subpoenas by third parties Clark Gossett, Joel Carlson, Beth Mota, and Gregory Wenzel (collectively “Third-Party Officers”), (ECF No. 337); (2) Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions against Defendant Minneapolis under Rule 37(B)(2), (ECF No. 346); (3) Motion to Quash Subpoena by Officer Mark Durand, (ECF No. 405); and (4) Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Testimony of Minneapolis Deponents Gomez and Case and Motion for Sanctions, (ECF No. 414). To best understand the parties’ disputes, it is important to review the rancorous history of this litigation leading up to the filing of these motions. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff filed her lawsuit on December 17, 2013. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on June 16, 2015. (ECF No. 137). After several rounds of motions to dismiss and stipulations of dismissal, few of the original or amended defendants remain. Principally, Plaintiff maintains claims against the City of Minneapolis. On August 31, 2016, the Court lifted a stay imposed pending the decision on the motions to dismiss. (ECF No. 250). Next, on September 30, 2016,[1] the Court entered a Second Amended Pretrial Scheduled Order, setting a discovery and non-dispositive motions deadline of February 28, 2017, a dispositive motions deadline of September 1, 2017, and a trial-ready date of February 5, 2018. (ECF No. 257). *2 The present disputes trace their origins to a February 7, 2017 motions hearing. At that hearing the Court considered two motions:[2] Plaintiff's motion to amend the pretrial scheduling order and her motion to compel Minneapolis to respond to written discovery. Looking first at the discovery motion, Plaintiff “move[d] to compel Defendant Minneapolis to respond to various discovery, which she group[ed] into three categories,” including “the reasons and purposes for the accesses at issue,” “training information and documents,” and “prior conduct of the accessors bearing on the likelihood of improper conduct.” (Transcript of Feb. 7, 2017 Motions Hearing, at 52:15–24, ECF No. 345).[3] After reading into Plaintiff's discovery requests “certain limitations that are essentially implicit,” the Court ordered Minneapolis to respond to Plaintiff's discovery requests within 14 days. (Feb. 7, 2017 Tr. 52:25–54:17). In Plaintiff's motion to amend the pretrial scheduling order, Plaintiff sought “to conduct approximately 36 additional depositions as related to the City of Minneapolis” over the “three factual depositions per defendant and 15 nonparty factual depositions” already permitted in the Second Amended Pretrial Scheduling Order. (Feb. 7, 2017 Tr. 55:7–11). The Court found Plaintiff had not shown good cause “to modify the deposition limit imposed by the scheduling order,” particularly where “Minneapolis ha[d] offered an effective compromise position in which it agrees to provide signed interviews it performed relating to the lookups at issue in this case.” (Feb. 7, 2017 Tr. 55:12–18). The Court then ordered Minneapolis to “provide the signed interviews offered in its compromise position within 10 days.” (Feb. 7, 2017 Tr. 55:24–56:6). The Court found that these signed interviews “coupled with the discovery ordered produced today should provide in a proportionate manner the information [P]laintiff seeks as well as serve as a documentary check against the answers found in the internal investigation.” (Feb. 7, 2017 Tr. 55:24–56:6). In their motions, “Plaintiff and Defendant Minneapolis devote[d] much of their briefing towards who is to blame for the slow discovery in this case.” (Feb. 7, 2017 Tr. 56:7–14). The Court was “concerned with the slow start of discovery,” but the “reality remain[ed] that even without granting [P]laintiff's requested additional depositions, the parties would benefit from an extension of the time to complete depositions to April 1, 2017 in order for the orderly preparation and completion of [said] depositions.” (Feb. 7, 2017 Tr. 56:7–21). The Court did not extend any other discovery deadline. (Feb. 7, 2017 Tr. 56:15–21). Immediately following the formal motions hearing, the Court held an informal dispute conference with Plaintiff and Minneapolis concerning the need for an “attorney's eyes only” designation on documents Minneapolis was to produce and the deposition time allotted Defendants when deposing Plaintiff. (ECF No. 309). For the “attorney's eyes only” provision, Minneapolis asserted Plaintiff should not be able see the personnel and discipline files of her fellow Minneapolis police officers. The Court found no “attorney's eye only” provision was necessary in this case given the protective order already in place and given that the discovery ordered produced relates to DVS/BCA database use, instances of improper accesses of DVS/BCA databases, and disciplines or complaints concerning DVS/BCA database usage. For time allotted to depose Plaintiff, the Court found 15 hours sufficient time to permit the remaining defendants an adequate opportunity for inquiry. The parties had also originally submitted a third issue for informal resolution—whether Minneapolis would produce deponents without subpoenas—but Minneapolis withdrew its consent to the informal process. The Court did provide guidance, however, in an attempt to facilitate a compromise between the parties to prevent further motion practice. *3 Unfortunately, motion practice was not avoided and the Court's guidance went to waste, because nine days later on February 16, 2017, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking to compel various Minneapolis police officers to sit for deposition without subpoena because “Minneapolis refuse[d] to produce any of its officers for deposition without subpoena, instead demanding that Plaintiff personally serve each and every officer.” (Transcript of Feb. 22, 2017 Motions Hearing, at 16:18–24, ECF No. 332).[4] The Court found that the police officers are not “officers, directors[,] or managing agents of Defendant [Minneapolis] for purposes of Rule 30. Thus[,] their attendance at a deposition may be compelled only by subpoena.” (Feb. 22, 2017 Tr. 20:15–19). Because Plaintiff had only provided deposition notices, rather than subpoenas, the Court had no authority to compel the Minneapolis police officers’ attendance at a deposition. (Feb. 22, 2017 Tr. 20:20–23). The Court, however, directed Plaintiff to draft subpoenas for its depositions and then “provide [Minneapolis's] counsel with copies of the subpoenas.” (Feb. 22, 2017 Tr. 21:19–22:4). Minneapolis's counsel then could “accept service on behalf of the requested police officers or, if unwilling to do so, shall make the requested deponents available for service of the subpoenas.” (Feb. 22, 2017 Tr. 22:5–8). This meant Minneapolis's counsel was to inform Plaintiff “exactly when the officer is scheduled to work, the address of their scheduled work location, and at what time the officer is available to be personally served at their place of employment.” (Feb. 22, 2017 Tr. 22:8–12). Plaintiff was to serve subpoenas on any individuals she wished to depose that were no longer employed by the Minneapolis Police Department. (Feb. 22, 2017 Tr. 22:12–15). All of this service was to be “completed within seven days.” (Feb. 22, 2017 Tr. 22:15). The Court warned that failure to abide by the Order could result in sanctions or an award of expenses and costs pursuant to Rule 37. (Feb. 22, 2017 Tr. 22:16–18). Following the February 22, 2017 motion hearing, the Court held an informal dispute conference with Plaintiff and Anoka County—a defendant who has since been dismissed pursuant to a stipulation of dismissal, (see ECF Nos. 407, 408)—concerning Plaintiff's Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of Anoka County. (ECF No. 323). Additionally, on February 28, 2017, Defendant Matthew Olson moved for an order compelling Plaintiff to respond to or supplement various discovery requests. (ECF No. 326). On March 6, 2017, however, Defendant Olson withdrew that motion after reaching an agreement with Plaintiff. (ECF No. 334). The informal dispute between Plaintiff and Anoka County and Defendant Olson's withdrawn motion have no bearing on the issues before the Court presently, other than to demonstrate the quantity and quality of disputes the parties in this litigation have brought before the Court in such a short time period. With this background, the parties arrived at the present disputes. On March 6, 2017, Third-Party Officers moved to quash subpoenas. (ECF No. 337). These Third-Party Officers assert that service of subpoenas upon them was invalid for several reasons. Mota and Wenzel argue that they were served on March 3 and 6, 2017, respectively, after the March 1, 2017 deadline provided by the Court's February 22, 2017 Order. Gossett, Carlson, and Mota assert the subpoenas served upon them did not include requisite witness fees. On March 8, 2017, Plaintiff moved for sanctions against Minneapolis for its failure to comply with the Court's February 7 and 22, 2017 Orders. (ECF No. 346). On March 21, 2017, an additional third-party Officer Mark Durand moved to quash a subpoena, asserting he “joins the motion and briefing filed on behalf of other, similarly-situated third parties.” (ECF No. 405).[5] The Court held a hearing on March 22, 2017. (ECF No. 406). Before the Court could rule on the motions before it, however, Plaintiff and Minneapolis found themselves in yet another dispute. The Court received an email from Plaintiff on March 31, 2017, requesting immediate assistance at a deposition of one of Minneapolis's police officers where Minneapolis's counsel had instructed the deponent not to answer substantive questions. Minneapolis did not agree to informal resolution, so on April 19, 2017, Plaintiff moved to compel testimony of two deponents—Minneapolis Police Officer Jose Gomez and Minneapolis Police Commander Jason Case—as well as for sanctions against Minneapolis. (ECF No. 414). The Court then held another motion hearing on May 1, 2017. (ECF No. 428). Now, the Court turns to the process of untangling the bramble of motions before it. II. SUBPOENAS *4 The Court first turns to the subpoena dispute given that it helps guide the remainder of the disputes once decided. As noted above, Third-Party Officers moved to quash deposition subpoenas. (ECF No. 337). Officer Durand moved to quash a deposition subpoena as well, purporting to adopt the arguments of the Third-Party Officers. (ECF No. 405). To appropriately analyze the arguments of each of the Third-Party Officers, the Court needs to start at its February 22, 2017 Order. Plaintiff moved to compel “material employee witnesses” for deposition because Minneapolis refused to produce said employee witnesses without service of a subpoena. (ECF No. 311). Plaintiff asserted that the Minneapolis police officers it sought to depose are “under the control and direction of Minneapolis, so no subpoena is necessary for their attendance at a deposition.” (Feb. 22, 2017 Tr. 17:23–18:1). Minneapolis, in response, asserted that “Rule 30 requires a subpoena to compel a non-party unless that person is an officer, director or managing agent of a party.” (Feb. 22, 2017 Tr. 18:1–4). It followed, Minneapolis argued, that the deponents sought by Plaintiff needed to be served personally because they “are all rank and file police officers.” (Feb. 22, 2017 Tr. 18:4–6). Neither party challenged the relevancy of the depositions. (Feb. 22, 2017 Tr. 18:15–18). In looking at Rule 30(a), (b), and (g), the Court found that police officers are not “officers, directors[,] or managing agents of Defendant [Minneapolis] for purposes of Rule 30. Thus[,] their attendance at a deposition may be compelled only by subpoena.” (Feb. 22, 2017 Tr. 20:15–19). Because Plaintiff had only provided deposition notices, rather than subpoenas, the Court could not compel the Minneapolis police officers’ attendance at a deposition. (Feb. 22, 2017 Tr. 20:20–23). The Court noted, however, that the Minneapolis police officers that Plaintiff sought to depose are “not as distanced from this litigation as [Minneapolis] argue[d].” (Feb. 22, 2017 Tr. 20:23–25). Instead, the Minneapolis police officers were “intertwined with the parties,” including being named as defendants in an amended complaint which they subsequently moved to dismiss. (Feb. 22, 2017 Tr. 20:25–21:6). Additionally, “given their occupation as police officers, such individuals are at the command and behest of [Minneapolis].” (Feb. 22, 2017 Tr. 21:7–9). Moreover, as “unrefuted by Minneapolis, Plaintiff assert[ed] she has had difficulties with several service attempts earlier in this litigation that have resulted in costly service expenses.” (Feb. 22, 2017 Tr. 21:9–12). Thus, “given the approaching discovery deadlines and the parties’ and counsels’ apparent inability to be flexible and work together to resolve disputes to date,” the Court resolved the parties’ dispute pursuant to Rule 1. (Feb. 22, 2017 Tr. 21:13–18). Under that resolution, Plaintiff was ordered to draft subpoenas for its depositions and then “provide [Minneapolis's] counsel with copies of the subpoenas.” (Feb. 22, 2017 Tr. 21:19–22:4). Minneapolis's counsel then could “accept service on behalf of the requested police officers or, if unwilling to do so, shall make the requested deponents available for service of the subpoenas.” (Feb. 22, 2017 Tr. 22:5–8). This meant Minneapolis's counsel was to inform Plaintiff “exactly when the officer is scheduled to work, the address of their scheduled work location, and at what time the officer is available to be personally served at their place of employment.” (Feb. 22, 2017 Tr. 22:8–12). Plaintiff was to serve subpoenas on any individuals she wished to depose that were no longer employed by the Minneapolis Police Department. (Feb. 22, 2017 Tr. 22:12–15). All of this service was to be “completed within seven days.” (Feb. 22, 2017 Tr. 22:15). *5 Thus, it is clear that, within seven days of the February 22, 2017 motion hearing, Plaintiff was to (1) draft subpoenas for the depositions then (2) provide those subpoenas to Minneapolis’ counsel. Minneapolis’ counsel was to then either (1) accept service on behalf of the requested police officers, or, if unwilling to do so as the Court urged, (2) make the requested deponents available for service of the subpoenas. If Plaintiff was required to serve the deponents, Plaintiff needed to accomplish this service within seven days—March 1, 2017. This service requirement, however, was not thrust solely upon Plaintiff. Plaintiff was to draft and serve subpoenas. In turn, Minneapolis was to ensure its deponents could receive service in the allotted time should it refuse to accept service on their behalf. This meant providing Plaintiff the information as to “exactly when the officer is scheduled to work, the address of their scheduled work location, and at what time the officer is available to be personally served at their place of employment.” (Feb. 22, 2017 Tr. 22:8–12). The Court now turns to the parties’ actions following the February 22, 2017 Order. At 7:11 p.m. on Friday, February 24, 2017, Sonia Miller-Van Oort, counsel for Plaintiff, emailed Brian Carter, counsel for Minneapolis, indicating that since the parties were at an impasse in settlement discussions, Minneapolis “will be getting [Plaintiff's] deposition notices and subpoenas as ordered by the Court next week.” (Decl. of Brian S. Carter dated Mar. 6, 2017, at ¶ 1, Ex. 1, ECF No. 340). At 12:12 p.m. on Monday, February 27, 2017, Carter emailed Miller-Van Oort, stating: Regarding the subpoenas, per the Court's order you have until March 1 to complete service. Once we receive the subpoenas, we will get the shift information to you as quickly as possible, but, as an FYI, we will be getting the information from employees who work normal business hours and we anticipate up to a 24 hour turn-around time once we receive the subpoenas. (Carter Decl. dated Mar. 6, 2017, at ¶ 1, Ex. 1). Miller-Van Oort replied at 2:47 p.m. that same day, indicating: Just so we are all on the same page, I understand from Judge Leung's order that ... Plaintiff has to issue subpoenas for any Mpls employee (current or former) she seeks to depose. The Court ordered that we provide you a copy of the depo notice and subpoenas by Wednesday (3/1). You are to either accept service on behalf of the individuals, or if not, then you are to provide us with the time and place that they can be personally served. (Carter Decl. dated Mar. 6, 2017, at ¶ 2, Ex. 2). Carter responded eleven minutes later, indicating that the Court ordered Plaintiff to “complete any service by March 1, 2017,” and that, once provided with copies of the subpoenas, Minneapolis will provide information regarding the deponent's work schedule, location, and availability. (Carter Decl. dated Mar. 6, 2017, at ¶ 2, Ex. 2). At 4:09 p.m. on February 28, 2017, Jonathan Strauss, counsel for Plaintiff, emailed Carter with a list of 21 individuals[6] Plaintiff planned to depose, indicating that the notices and subpoenas would be sent over shortly. (Carter Decl. dated Mar. 6, 2017, at ¶ 3, Ex. 3). *6 On March 1, 2017, at 1:52 p.m., Carter provided a table “with the information that the Court ordered us to produce.” (Carter Decl. dated Mar. 6, 2017, at ¶ 3, Ex. 3).[7] Carter wrote that: As soon as we received the shift information for the witnesses you seek to depose, my office emailed the officers who are working today to inform them of the time that we anticipate they will be available for service. Because of the short time frame, we have not confirmed that they received our emails. Because today is the last day for Plaintiff to effect service, we have not specified when an officer is available for service if they are not working today. As previously noted, two of the officers on your list are no longer employed by the City. (Carter Decl. dated Mar. 6, 2017, at ¶ 3, Ex. 3).[8] Miller-Van Oort responded, asserting Plaintiff “disagree[d] with [Minneapolis's] interpretation of the service requirement.” (Carter Decl. dated Mar. 6, 2017, at ¶ 3, Ex. 3). Miller-Van Oort continued: Judge Lung [sic] was very clear in his order. We are to give you copies of subpoenas. If you g [sic] won't accept service, you are to give us information to get accomplished within 7days of us giving you subpoenas. The Court was further clear that sanctions would be in play if there was continued failure to cooperate. So, let's stop playing games. Please advise when and where we can get these people served this week. (Carter Decl. dated Mar. 6, 2017, at ¶ 3, Ex. 3). Carter responded asserting there is no “reasonable debate about the Court's order,” continuing: I note that you have changed your positions—in your email from Monday, February 27, you asserted that you had seven days to give us copies of the subpoenas. Now you are claiming that you have seven days to serve once you gave us the subpoenas. Neither interpretation makes any sense in light of the limited time left in discovery. And both of your alternative-interpretations are contradicted by the Court's minute entry.... On Monday, when we discovered that you misunderstood the Court's order, we informed you of your mistake immediately. Once we received the list of names from you, we provided the required information to you quickly and in full. I do not understand how you can interpret any of this as “playing games.” I also note that we expended great efforts to provide you with the information you received today quickly so that you had as much opportunity to serve the officers as possible given the fact that you waited a week to provide us with the list of names. (Carter Decl. dated Mar. 6, 2017, at ¶ 3, Ex. 3). *7 The Court turns to the parties’ compliance with the February 22, 2017 Order as to the each deponent. A. Beth Mota Mota was personally served on March 3, 2017. (Decl. of Sonia Miller-Van Oort in Support of Motions for Sanctions dated March 13, 2017 ¶ 4, ECF No. 391 (hereinafter “March 13, 2017 Miller-Van Oort Decl.”); see also ECF No. 339, at 5; ECF No. 390, at 2). Mota was served with witness fees on March 13, 2017, via service on counsel. (March 13, 2017 Miller-Van Oort Decl. ¶ 4). B. Gregory Wenzel Plaintiff's process server attempted to serve Wenzel on March 1, 2017 at 4:00 p.m., at the end of his shift. (ECF No. 380). Plaintiff's process server was told that Wenzel had “already left for the day.” (ECF No. 380). Wenzel claims that “[n]o one stopped by ... nor did [he] see anyone in the area when [he] left.” (Decl. of George H. Norris, at Ex. 8, ECF No. 397). Wenzel provides no information as to when he left work. (Norris Decl., at Ex. 8). Wenzel was then personally served on March 6, 2017 and furnished fees. (ECF No. 381; March 13, 2017 Miller-Van Oort Decl. ¶¶ 3–4). C. Clark Gossett Gossett was personally served on March 1, 2017 at 4:00 p.m. (ECF No. 364). Gossett was served again, and with witness fees, on March 7, 2017. (ECF No. 365; March 13, 2017 Miller-Van Oort Decl. ¶ 4). D. Joel Carlson Carlson was personally served on March 1, 2017, at 4:52 p.m. (ECF No. 358). Carlson was served with witness fees on March 13, 2017, via service on counsel. (March 13, 2017 Miller-Van Oort Decl. ¶ 4). E. Mark Durand Plaintiff's process server attempted to serve Durand on March 1, 2017 at 5:47 p.m. (ECF No. 359). Plaintiff's process server, who was informed Durand's shift ended at 6:00 p.m., was “told that [Durand] was out serving warrants and to try back later in the evening.” (ECF No. 359). When Plaintiff's process server “returned at 9:26 pm there was no one around according to a janitor who said he was the only one in the office.” (ECF No. 359; Decl. of Sonia Miller-Van Oort in Support of Motions for Sanctions dated March 8, 2017, at Ex. M, ECF No. 353 (hereinafter “March 8, 2017 Miller-Van Oort Decl.”) (explaining that Plaintiff's process server was told to return at around 9:45 p.m.)). Plaintiff's process server attempted service again on March 2, 2017 at 5:45 p.m., however “no one answered the buzzer but people were inside attending gym classes, one of them told us that [Durand] is not here right now.” (ECF No. 359). Durand was then personally served, “after furnishing proper fees,” on March 8, 2017. (ECF No. 360). F. Jose Gomez[9] Plaintiff's process server attempted to serve Gomez on March 1, 2017 at 4:30 p.m., “30 minutes prior to the time we were told his shift ends only to find that the office had closed at 4:00pm.” (ECF No. 362). At 4:55 p.m. on the same day, Plaintiff's process server left copies of the subpoena and a witness fee at Gomez's home with an adult residing therein. (ECF No. 361; March 13, 2017 Miller-Van Oort Decl. ¶ 4). Additionally, Gomez was personally served and provided fees on March 6, 2017. (ECF No. 363). G. Other Officers[10] *8 Plaintiff's process server attempted to serve Steve Wuorinen at 4:19 p.m. on March 1, 2017, arriving “40 minutes prior to the time we were told his shift ends only to find that the office had closed at 3:30 p.m.” (ECF No. 382). The building had no public access, so Plaintiff's process server “called the number on the door ... and it went to an automated system, [Plaintiff's process server] pressed 1 to speak with a supervisor and the call went unanswered.” (ECF No. 382). Wuorinen indicates he was not working that day as he took the day off. (Norris Decl., at Ex. 9; ECF No. 398). Plaintiff's process server attempted service again on March 3, 2017 at 3:27 p.m., but was “once again unable to get access and unable to reach anyone through the phone number posted.” (ECF No. 383). Plaintiff's process server attempted to serve Richard Hand at 4:30 p.m. on March 1, 2017, arriving “30 minutes prior to the time we were told his shift ends only to find that the office has closed at 4:00pm.” (ECF No. 366). Plaintiff's process server attempted to serve Hand on March 3, 2017, with an “officer at th[e] address indicat[ing] that [Hand] was not in the office and is rarely in the office.” (ECF No. 367). Plaintiff's process server attempted to serve Lucas Peterson on March 1, 2017 at 5:47 p.m. (ECF No. 376). Plaintiff's process server, who was informed Peterson's shift ended at 6:00 p.m., was “told that [Peterson] was out serving warrants and to try back later in the evening.” (ECF No. 376). When Plaintiff's process server “returned at 9:26 pm there was no one around according to a janitor who said he was the only one in the office.” (ECF No. 376; March 8, 2017 Miller-Van Oort Decl., at Ex. M (explaining that Plaintiff's process server was told to return at around 9:45 p.m.). Peterson asserts that he “stayed at [his] duty assignment until an hour past close up ... and waited.” (Norris Decl., at Ex. 11). Plaintiff's process server attempted service again on March 2, 2017 at 5:45 p.m., however “no one answered the buzzer but people were inside attending gym classes, one of them told us that [Peterson] is not here right now.” (ECF No. 376). Plaintiff's process server attempted to serve Johnny Mercil and Jarrod Silva on March 1, 2017 at 5:25 p.m., with information that their shifts ended at 6:00 p.m., (ECF Nos. 374, 378), and attempted to serve Robert Illetschko upon information that his shift ended at 5:30 p.m., (ECF No. 369). Plaintiff's process server was “told that [Mercil/Silva/Illetschko] is not in and that none of the officers works this late.” (ECF Nos. 369, 374, 378). Illetschko indicates the desk officer inadvertently “informed the process server that [Illetschko] was not at work to receive the subpoena.” (Norris Decl., at Ex. 12). That desk officer then text messaged Illetschko letting him know that a process server was looking for him. (Norris Decl., at Ex. 12). On March 3, 2017, Plaintiff's process server attempted to serve Mercil, Silva, and Illetschko again, along with Jennifer Lazarachic, providing the following narrative: A female officer answered the door, when the server asked for [Mercil/Silva/Illetschko/Lazarachic] her first response was that we are not allowed to serve [Mercil/Silva/Illetschko/Lazarachic]. Then she stated that [Mercil/Silva/Illetschko/Lazarachic] does not work at this location and then later stated that [Mercil/Silva/Illetschko/Lazarachic] was not working today. She was not wearing a badge or name tag and refused to provide her name. As the server was walking out she exclaimed “Good luck with that!” and the other officers present began to laugh. (ECF Nos. 370–72, 375, 379). Plaintiff's process server attempted to serve David Honican on March 3, 2017, with an officer indicat[ing] that [Honican] is not in this office, he works in either a specific school or possibly multiple schools, it was not clear to the server which.” (ECF No. 368). *9 Plaintiff's process server attempted to serve Oscar Macias on March 6, 2017. (ECF No. 373). An officer at the desk indicated Macias “does not work out of the office.” Plaintiff's process server was informed that “canine officers are not assigned to a specific station and work out of whichever station is deemed best ... any particular day.” (ECF No. 373). The officer at the desk “checked the computer and did not see [Macias] signed in at any other station and was unable to get [Macias's] schedule. He said he would pass on [Plaintiff's process server's] information to [Macias] and ask him to contact [Plaintiff's process server].” (ECF No. 373). Macias did not get in touch with Plaintiff's process server as of 24 hours later. (ECF No. 373). Plaintiff's process server attempted to serve Bryce Robinson on March 3, 2017 and was “told he was not working that day but would be there on 3/4 which is a Saturday.” (ECF No. 377). Plaintiff's process server was “unable to get a server there at that time.” (ECF No. 377). Plaintiff's process server attempted service on March 6, 2017, but was informed Robinson was “out of the country on vacation.” (ECF No. 377). H. Analysis Third-Party Officers and Durand move to quash the subpoenas served upon them. Mota and Wenzel argue that they were served after the March 1, 2017 deadline. Gossett, Carlson, and Mota assert the subpoenas served upon them did not include requisite witness fees. Durand moved to quash, but does not specifically describe upon which grounds he brings his challenge. The Court notes that Durand was served on March 8, 2017, and received fees, so the Court interprets his motion as challenging service after the March 1, 2017 deadline, like Mota and Wenzel. 1. Service After the March 1, 2017 Deadline Plaintiff argues that the February 22, 2017 Order required Minneapolis to “make the individual deponents available for service within seven days of receiving the subpoenas from Plaintiff's counsel, and Plaintiff was to take steps to effectuate service on those individuals within that timeframe.” (ECF No. 348, at 6). Minneapolis asserts that the February 22, 2017 Order required Plaintiff to complete service by March 1, 2017. Minneapolis is correct. Plaintiff was ordered to draft subpoenas for its depositions then “provide [Minneapolis's] counsel with copies of the subpoenas.” (Feb. 22, 2017 Tr. 21:19–22:4). Minneapolis's counsel then could “accept service on behalf of the requested police officers or, if unwilling to do so, shall make the requested deponents available for service of the subpoenas.” (Feb. 22, 2017 Tr. 22:5–8). This meant Minneapolis's counsel was to inform Plaintiff “exactly when the officer is scheduled to work, the address of their scheduled work location, and at what time the officer is available to be personally served at their place of employment.” (Feb. 22, 2017 Tr. 22:8–12). Plaintiff was to serve subpoenas on any individuals she wished to depose that were no longer employed by the Minneapolis Police Department. (Feb. 22, 2017 Tr. 22:12–15). All of this service was to be “completed within seven days.” (Feb. 22, 2017 Tr. 22:15). Thus, the plain meaning of the February 22, 2017 Order was that Plaintiff had to complete service within seven days of February 22, 2017, that is, by March 1, 2017, if Minneapolis refused to accept service of said subpoenas. The February 22, 2017 Order required counsel for the parties, particularly Plaintiff's counsel, to act in an expeditious manner. The Court recognizes that the March 1, 2017 deadline required a substantial undertaking in a short period of time, but as recognized at the multitude of hearings over the preceding months, the parties were pressing against imminent discovery deadlines. The swift deadline was intended to provoke a showing of haste by dawdling parties. Indeed, the Court had already extended several deadlines to allow for substantial discovery to be completed. (See Feb. 7, 2017 Tr. 56:7–21) (extending deadline to complete depositions to April 1, 2017). Plaintiff waited until the eleventh hour, however, to attempt to comply with the February 22, 2017 Order. Plaintiff cannot now turn to her incorrect interpretation of the February 22, 2017 Order to entirely alleviate her self-inflicted woes. *10 Moreover, Plaintiff's arguments concerning the February 22, 2017 Order are internally inconsistent and inconsistent with the record. Plaintiff asserts that, following the February 22, 2017 hearing, her “legal team analyzed and conferred to determine who should be deposed in view of the recent discovery rulings, information and documents produced by parties since February 7, 2017, and examination of Plaintiff during her first day of deposition.” (ECF No. 348, at 10; March 8, 2017 Miller-Van Oort Decl. ¶ 7). On February 16, 2017, Plaintiff moved to compel “material employee witnesses” for deposition because Minneapolis refused to produce said employee witnesses without service of a subpoena. (ECF No. 311). The Court is hard pressed to understand how Plaintiff can now claim she required extensive planning following the February 22, 2017 hearing to determine which individuals she sought to depose when she moved to compel those individuals to be deposed without a subpoena one week prior. If Plaintiff did not know which individuals she wished to depose prior to the February 22, 2017 hearing, it would question the propriety of bringing the motion in the first instance. And, as Minneapolis indicates, if Plaintiff were allowed seven days to provide the subpoenas to Minneapolis, then seven additional days to serve the deponents should Minneapolis not accept service, that would have left an insufficient amount of time to complete the many depositions Plaintiff sought. Mota was served on March 3, 2017, Wenzel was served on March 6, 2017, and Durand was served on March 8, 2017. Accordingly, Mota, Wenzel, and Durand were served following the March 1, 2017 deadline. As such, Plaintiff failed to comply with the February 22, 2017 Order as relates to Mota, Wenzel, and Durand. 2. Witness Fees Under Rule 45(b), service of a subpoena requires delivering a copy to the named recipient “and, if the subpoena requires that person's attendance, tendering the fees for 1 day's attendance and the mileage allowed by law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(b)(1). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b), a deponent “shall be paid an attendance fee of $40 per day for each day's attendance.” “Failure to tender the appropriate sums at the time the subpoena is served invalidates the subpoena.” 9A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2454 (3d ed. 2017); see, e.g., CF & I Steel Corp. v. Mitsui & Co. (U.S.A.), Inc., 713 F.2d 494, 496 (9th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he plain meaning of Rule 45[ (b)(1) ] requires simultaneous tendering of witness fees and the reasonably estimated mileage allowed by law with service of a subpoena.”); ARAMARK Corr. Serv., LLC v. Cook Cty., 2012 WL 3792225, at *2 (D.S.D. Aug. 31, 2012) (holding a subpoena was not properly served and, therefore, invalid, where only $23.33 was tendered at time of service); see also Tribulak v. Minirth-Meier-Rice Clinic, 111 F.3d 135 (8th Cir. 1997) (table) (citing CF & I Steel Corp., 713 F.2d at 496, in holding that district court did not abuse discretion in quashing subpoenas which were not accompanied by the witness fee). Mota was not served witness fees when she was served on March 3, 2017. Witness fees were subsequently provided to Mota's counsel on March 13, 2017. Gossett, who was served March 1, 2017, was not served with witness fees until March 7, 2017. Carlson was served March 1, 2017, while witness fees were subsequently provided to Carlson's counsel on March 13, 2017. There is no indication that Plaintiff was prevented in some manner from serving witness fees along with her subpoenas, given that Gomez was properly served on March 1, 2017. Accordingly, the subpoenas served upon Mota, Gossett, and Carlson did not comply with Rule 45(b) because they were not accompanied by the requisite witness fees. 3. Minneapolis’ Compliance As noted above, the February 22, 2017 Order required the parties to act in an expeditious manner. Implicit in this tight deadline was the requirement that all parties work diligently and cooperatively. Unfortunately, this did not occur. On the contrary, the parties’ actions, inactions, delays, accusations, and counter-accusations are prime exemplars of indecision and non-cooperation. The March 1, 2017 deadline required a substantial undertaking in a short period of time by both parties. Just as Plaintiff cannot escape the ramifications of the February 22, 2017 Order or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Minneapolis cannot drag its feet in an effort to derail this litigation and avoid participating in discovery. Moreover, just as Plaintiff must be held to strict compliance with the February 22, 2017 Order, Minneapolis must be held to equal standards. *11 Under the February 22, 2017 Order, once Minneapolis received Plaintiff's subpoenas, Minneapolis's counsel then could “accept service on behalf of the requested police officers or, if unwilling to do so, shall make the requested deponents available for service of the subpoenas.” (Feb. 22, 2017 Tr. 22:5–8). This meant Minneapolis's counsel was to inform Plaintiff “exactly when the officer is scheduled to work, the address of their scheduled work location, and at what time the officer is available to be personally served at their place of employment.” (Feb. 22, 2017 Tr. 22:8–12). Minneapolis indicated to Plaintiff that Wuorinen, Mota, and Carlson would be available towards the beginning of their shifts. (Carter Decl. dated Mar. 6, 2017, at ¶ 3, Ex. 3). While for Silva, Hand, Durand, Illetschko, Gomez, Gossett, Mercil, Peterson, Todd Sauvageau, and Wenzel, Minneapolis indicated they would be available at the end of their shifts. (Carter Decl. dated Mar. 6, 2017, at ¶ 3, Ex. 3). Minneapolis did not make Honican, Lazarachic, Amber Digideo-Englund, Matthew McLean, Robinson, or Macias available for service within the allotted time period for service. (Carter Decl. dated Mar. 6, 2017, at ¶ 3, Ex. 3). Plaintiff's process server encountered difficulties serving the deponents on March 1, 2017. For example: Wenzel was not present when Minneapolis said he could accept service because he had “already left for the day”; Durand was not present when Minneapolis said he could accept service; Gomez was not at the original location Minneapolis said he would be to accept service because the office closed earlier than Minneapolis said it would; Wuorinen was not present because the office Minneapolis said he would be at closed one and one half hours earlier that Minneapolis had reported; Hand was not at the original location Minneapolis said he would be to accept service because the office closed earlier than Minneapolis said it would, and Plaintiff's process server later learned that he was “rarely in the office”; Peterson was not present when Minneapolis said he could accept service; and Mercil, Silva, and Illetschko were not in the office, with the process server being told “none of the officers work this late.” While not pertaining to the March 1, 2017 service deadline, when Plaintiff's process server again attempted to serve Mercil, Silva, and Illetschko, as well as Lazarachic who was unavailable March 1, 2017, the process server received a jumble of rationale for why service was not allowed: that the process server was not allowed to serve these individuals; that the individuals did not work at the location; that the individuals were not working in that location that day; and then observing a room of police officers laughing at Plaintiff's process server's attempts at service. While the Court is not enamored with Minneapolis’ decision to forgo accepting service on behalf of its own current police officers and requiring personal service upon 21 deponents, it is not that decision which garners reprimand. If the Court were to look at any one of these service attempts in isolation, it would be unlikely to find any wrongdoing. Would that the Court had the luxury of viewing these incidents in a vacuum. Rather, the information Minneapolis provided to Plaintiff was not in full compliance with the letter and spirit of the Court's February 22, 2017 Order. Minneapolis did not make Honican, Lazarachic, Digideo-Englund, McLean, Robinson, or Macias available for service for the March 1, 2017 deadline. Minneapolis was required to “make the requested deponents available for service of the subpoenas.” Minneapolis told Plaintiff these individuals were “[n]ot working today.” Nowhere in the Court's February 22, 2017 Order provided any exception to Minneapolis's requirement that it make these individuals available for service. Thus, Minneapolis did not comply with the February 22, 2017 Order as relates to Honican, Lazarachic, Digideo-Englund, McLean, Robinson, and Macias. *12 Minneapolis indicated Wuorinen, Mota, and Carlson would be available towards the beginning of their shifts. Carlson was served on March 1, 2017, and the Court has no information that Plaintiff even attempted to serve Mota on March 1, 2017. It follows that there is no violation as relates to Carlson, and the Court has no information to conclude any violation as relates to Mota. As for Wuorinen, Plaintiff's process server attempted service only to find that the building closed and, unbeknownst to the process server, Wuorinen was not even working that afternoon. Thus, Minneapolis did not comply with the February 22, 2017 Order as relates to Wuorinen. Minneapolis indicated Silva, Hand, Durand, Illetschko, Gomez, Gossett, Mercil, Peterson, Sauvageau, and Wenzel would be available towards the end of their shifts. Gossett was served on March 1, 2017, albeit without witness fees. Durand and Peterson were not present when Minneapolis indicated, albeit they were still working. Wenzel had left before his shift ended. Gomez was not present at the end of his shift, and his office closed one hour earlier than Minneapolis had reported; Plaintiff had to serve Gomez at his home. Hand was not present at the end of his shift, and his office closed one hour earlier than Minneapolis had reported. Mercil, Silva, and Illetschko were not present over thirty minutes before their shifts ended, with Plaintiff's process server being told “none of the officers works this late.” Thus, Minneapolis did not comply with the February 22, 2017 Order as relates to Durand, Peterson, Wenzel, Gomez, Hand, Mercil, Silva, and Illetschko. The Court has no record before it that Plaintiff has attempted to serve Sauvageau and, accordingly, makes no finding that Minneapolis failed to comply with the February 22, 2017 Order as relates to Sauvageau. Finally, Minneapolis reported Blake Moua and Daniel Horn were no longer employed by the Minneapolis Police Department. Per the February 22, 2017 Order, Plaintiff was to serve subpoenas on any individuals she wished to depose that were no longer employed by the Minneapolis Police Department. Thus, Minneapolis had no specific obligations under the February 22, 2017 Order pertaining to these two individuals. In sum, Minneapolis failed to comply with the February 22, 2017 Order as relates to Honican, Lazarachic, Digideo-Englund, McLean, Robinson, Macias, Wuorinen, Durand, Peterson, Wenzel, Gomez, Hand, Mercil, Silva, and Illetschko. Minneapolis complied with the February 22, 2017 Order as relates to Mota, Gossett, Carlson, Sauvageau, Moua, and Horn. Despite Minneapolis's noncompliance with the February 22, 2017 Order for 15 out of the 21 of the requested deponents, Plaintiff was eventually able to serve Mota, Wenzel, Carlson, Gomez, Gossett, and Durand—albeit outside the March 1, 2017 deadline or without the requisite witness fees as discussed above, save for Gomez who was served properly in time. 4. Resolution Now, the Court must determine how to resolve the subpoena dispute. Plaintiff insists the Third-Party Officers and Durand must assert one of four grounds under Rule 45(d)(3) to quash the subpoenas served upon them. Under that rule, a court may quash or modify a subpoena that: “(i) fails to allow a reasonable time to comply; (ii) requires a person to comply beyond the geographical limits specified in Rule 45(c); (iii) requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies; or (iv) subjects a person to undue burden.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A). Plaintiff's argument overlooks the structure of Rule 45 itself, which enumerates two other circumstances in which a court may quash a subpoena. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(B). More importantly, however, Plaintiff's ability to conduct discovery, and consequently her ability subpoena individuals to sit for depositions, expired on February 28, 2017 under the Second Amended Pretrial Scheduling Order. (ECF No. 257, at 1). This means that Plaintiff's only authority to serve deponents on March 1, 2017 stemmed from the Court's February 22, 2017 Order. Therefore, any subpoenas served by Plaintiff that failed to comply with the February 22, 2017 Order were invalid ab initio. *13 As for the individuals Plaintiff has served with subpoenas, Plaintiff failed to comply with the February 22, 2017 Order as relates to Mota, Wenzel, and Durand in that she served these individuals beyond the March 1, 2017 deadline. Minneapolis failed to comply with the February 22, 2017 Order concerning Wenzel and Durand, but not Mota. Plaintiff failed to comply with Rule 45(b) when serving Mota, Gossett, and Carlson. Minneapolis complied with the February 22, 2017 Order as to these three individuals. Accordingly, the subpoena issued to Mota is invalid for failure to comply with the February 22, 2017 Order. Further, the subpoenas issued to Mota, Gossett, and Carlson are invalid for failure to comply with Rule 45(b). As a result, the subpoenas issued to Mota, Gossett, and Carlson must be quashed. Neither Minneapolis nor Plaintiff complied with the February 22, 2017 Order as relates to Wenzel and Durand. The Court's decision as to Wenzel and Durand, as well as the individuals Plaintiff has been unable to serve subpoenas upon and whom Minneapolis failed to comply with the February 22, 2017 Order—Honican, Lazarachic, Digideo-Englund, McLean, Robinson, Macias, Wuorinen, Peterson, Hand, Mercil, Silva, and Illetschko—is discussed below. Plaintiff moves for sanctions concerning Minneapolis’ noncompliance with the February 22, 2017 Order. (ECF No. 346). Rule 37 provides courts with the discretion to impose sanctions for failure to comply with court orders and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 37, if a party “fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery,” a court may enter an order that includes the following: (i) directing that the matters embraced in the order or other designated facts be taken as established for purposes of the action, as the prevailing party claims; (ii) prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses, or from introducing designated matters in evidence; (iii) striking pleadings in whole or in part; (iv) staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed; (v) dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part; (vi) rendering a default judgment against the disobedient party; or (vii) treating as contempt of court the failure to obey any order except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A). Rule 37 sanctions are “not merely to penalize those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to deter those who might be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such a deterrent.” Nat'l Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976) (per curiam). The district court has “a large measure of discretion in deciding what sanctions are appropriate for misconduct.” Hutchins v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 116 F.3d 1256, 1260 (8th Cir. 1997). The Eighth Circuit has “repeatedly stressed that the ‘sanction imposed by the district court must be proportionate to the litigant's transgression ...’ ” Smith v. Gold Dust Casino, 526 F.3d 402, 405 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Rodgers v. The Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 135 F.3d 1216, 1219 (8th Cir. 1998)) (emphasis in original). A court's discretion to issue Rule 37 sanctions “is bounded by the requirement of Rule 37(b)(2) that the sanction be ‘just’ and relate to the claim at issue in the order to provide discovery.” Hairston v. Alert Safety Light Products, Inc., 307 F.3d 717, 719 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Avionic Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 957 F.2d 555, 558 (8th Cir. 1992)). “ ‘[T]he district court's discretion narrows as the severity of the sanction or remedy it elects increases.’ ” Sentis Group, Inc., 559 F.3d at 898 (quoting Wegener v. Johnson, 527 F.3d 687, 692 (8th Cir. 2008)). As concluded above, Minneapolis failed to comply with the February 22, 2017 Order as relates to Wenzel, Durand, Honican, Lazarachic, Digideo-Englund, McLean, Robinson, Macias, Wuorinen, Peterson, Hand, Mercil, Silva, and Illetschko. While Plaintiff ultimately served Wenzel and Durand after the March 1, 2017 deadline, these two individuals were not made available for service by Minneapolis in accordance with the February 22, 2017 Order. The Court must decide upon an appropriate sanction to impose. *14 After careful consideration, the Court finds that Minneapolis's failure to comply with the February 22, 2017 Order warrants the following sanction: (1) Minneapolis, through its counsel of record, shall: (i) accept service on behalf of Wenzel, Durand, Honican, Lazarachic, Digideo-Englund, McLean, Robinson, Macias, Wuorinen, Peterson, Hand, Mercil, Silva, and Illetschko; or (ii) make any individual listed in the preceding subparagraph whom Minneapolis's counsel refuses to accept service available at the Minneapolis City Attorney's Office at 9:00 a.m. on August 18, 2017 to accept personal service of Plaintiff's deposition subpoenas. (2) The scheduling order shall be amended, in relevant part, as follows: (i) Plaintiff, with Minneapolis and the deponents’ full participation and cooperation, shall complete the depositions of Wenzel, Durand, Honican, Lazarachic, Digideo-Englund, McLean, Robinson, Macias, Wuorinen, Peterson, Hand, Mercil, Silva, and Illetschko on or before October 6, 2017. These depositions are limited to four hours each; (ii) expert discovery shall be completed on or before October 18, 2017; (iii) non-dispositive motions relating to expert discovery shall be filed and served no later than October 18, 2017; and (iv) dispositive motions shall be filed, served, and scheduled on or before December 15, 2017.[11] This sanction resets the parties to status quo ante their disputes-run-amok ground this lawsuit into stalemated trench warfare. The Court finds this sanction appropriate to the parties’ actions concerning the subpoena dispute insofar as Minneapolis is not permitted to escape the depositions by reason of its noncompliance with the February 22, 2017 Order, and Plaintiff is not rewarded for its tardy partial compliance with that Order. To be clear, Plaintiff is not permitted any other depositions other than those specifically delineated in this Order.[12] III. REMAINING DISCOVERY ISSUES Two additional discovery disputes remain. First, Plaintiff seeks sanctions for Minneapolis's alleged non-compliance with discovery the Court ordered on February 7, 2017. Second, Plaintiff seeks to compel the testimony of deponents Gomez and Case following a dispute at their depositions. A. Discovery At the February 7, 2017 motions hearing, Plaintiff “move[d] to compel Defendant Minneapolis to respond to various discovery, which she group[ed] into three categories,” including “the reasons and purposes for the accesses at issue,” “training information and documents,” and “prior conduct of the accessors bearing on the likelihood of improper conduct.” (Feb. 7, 2017 Tr. 52:15–24). After reading into Plaintiff's discovery requests “certain limitations that are essentially implicit,” the Court found “the discovery dispute more or less disappears.” (Feb. 7, 2017 Tr. 52:25–53:9). The Court ordered Minneapolis to respond to Plaintiff's discovery as follows: (1) “Interrogatory No. 8 is limited to accesses by employees of the City of Minneapolis in the Minneapolis Police Department that remain at issue in this case and whose alleged lookups serve as the basis for the remaining claims in this lawsuit”; (2) “Request for Production No. 2 and Interrogatory No. 5 are limited to the bases for Minneapolis's defenses of the accesses by employees of the City of Minneapolis that remain at issue in this case. Minneapolis need not identify the defenses it intends to raise at trial”; (3) Interrogatory No. 4 was limited in similar fashion to Request for Production No. 2 and Interrogatory No. 5; and (4) “Interrogatory Nos. 9 and 13 are limited to City of Minneapolis employees in the Minneapolis Department from 2007 to present and only relating to DVS/BCA databases.” (Feb. 7, 2017 Tr. 52:25–54:8). The Court noted that while Defendant “made a privilege argument as to some responsive information,” there was not “enough information before [the Court] to conclude that privilege does or does not apply.” (Feb. 7, 2017 Tr. 54:9–12). Minneapolis was ordered to respond to Plaintiff's discovery within 14 days. (Feb. 7, 2017 Tr. 52:25–54:17). *15 Concerning Plaintiff's request “to conduct approximately 36 additional depositions as related to the City of Minneapolis” over the “three factual depositions per defendant and 15 nonparty factual depositions” already permitted in the Second Amended Pretrial Scheduling Order, the Court found Plaintiff had not shown good cause “to modify the deposition limit imposed by the scheduling order,” particularly where “Minneapolis ha[d] offered an effective compromise position in which it agrees to provide signed interviews it performed relating to the lookups at issue in this case.” (Feb. 7, 2017 Tr. 55:7–18). The Court then ordered Minneapolis to “provide the signed interviews offered in its compromise position within 10 days.” (Feb. 7, 2017 Tr. 55:24–56:6). The Court found that these signed interviews “coupled with the discovery ordered produced ... should provide in a proportionate manner the information [P]laintiff seeks as well as serve as a documentary check against the answers found in the internal investigation.” (Feb. 7, 2017 Tr. 55:24–56:6). Moreover, at the informal dispute conference immediately following this hearing, the parties and Court discussed the personnel and discipline files of Plaintiff's fellow Minneapolis police officers. The Court noted that the discovery ordered produced relates to DVS/BCA database use, instances of improper accesses of DVS/BCA databases, and disciplines or complaints concerning DVS/BCA database usage. In discussing the aforementioned compromise position, Minneapolis reported the following to the Court at the February 7, 2017 hearing: Assistant Minneapolis City Attorney Norris: We put forward the ability to provide our work product investigations of these officers, which would have dealt with key issues related to each lookup. This was the internal investigations that were done after the complaint was filed. We think that was a very fair offer to put forward and would have dealt with some of this proportionality issue. Court: That internal investigation, do you know if it covers all 61 [deponents] that [are] being sought? Norris: I believe that it does, Your Honor. We could confirm that if we needed to make sure. Court: What are some of the questions that are asked during that? Norris: Certainly. I will say that we gave a highlight in our brief. We've produced three or four of those transcripts to plaintiff, so they have examples in front of them. They're asking questions such as do you remember doing the lookup, was it for a law enforcement purpose, did you allow somebody else to use your DVS log-in. The questions are the key questions that are at issue in this case. Court: Did you ask them in that internal audit whether they know the plaintiff, Krekelberg? Norris: Yes, and the extent of the relationship if there was one. (Feb. 7, 2017 Tr. 24:4–25:5). Plaintiff asserts that, since February 7, 2017, Minneapolis has produced only the following to Plaintiff: (1) internal affairs statements, but not full files, concerning accesses at issue in this case, along with summaries of those officers’ training records; (2) the complete internal affairs file relating to Lazarachic's access; (3) a slide presentation from February 2014 entitled “2014 MPD Supervisors In-Service Training: Minneapolis City Attorney's Office Legal Update”; and (4) some work schedules and emails referenced in internal affairs files. (Decl. of Katie Tholkes ¶¶ 2–8, ECF No. 349; March 8, 2017 Miller-Van Oort Decl. ¶¶ 4–6, 17–19). The Court now turns to Minneapolis's compliance with the February 7, 2017 Order. The Court separates its analysis into two components: supplemental discovery and internal affairs investigation files. Regarding supplemental discovery, Minneapolis contends it “served supplemental interrogatory responses, including a response to Interrogatory No. 8.” (ECF No. 396, at 1; Norris Decl. ¶¶ 5–7, 9–20). Following Minneapolis's response, Plaintiff's counsel informed the Court that an error committed by a newly-hired paralegal caused Plaintiff to assert Minneapolis did not supplement its discovery responses. (ECF No. 402). Nonetheless, Plaintiff continued to assert Minneapolis's discovery responses were insufficient at the hearing, shifting her argument from Minneapolis provided no supplementation to Minneapolis's supplementation was couched in hypothetical terms and thus nonresponsive in some manner. This is a prime example of the shoot-from-the-hip litigation that has dragged this lawsuit into a quagmire. *16 The problem and solution are decidedly simple: Minneapolis has either responded to Plaintiff's discovery or it has not. And, the Court concludes, it has not responded fully. For example, when asked to identify the law-enforcement purpose for the lookup at issue via Interrogatory No. 8, Minneapolis responded: In general terms, there are a variety of law enforcement purposes that could have led to the lookups of Plaintiff's data. These purposes include traffic stops; moving vehicle accident investigations; internal affairs investigations; other police investigations; an officer's need to refresh his or her recollection of Plaintiff's identity because of some law enforcement or other work-related activity with Plaintiff; an officer's desire to recognize Plaintiff, a fellow law enforcement officer who covered an overlapping jurisdiction. (Norris Decl., at Ex. 6, at 4) (emphasis added). Other answers were more punctilious; “As repeatedly disclosed to Plaintiff, the City does not have a Personnel Manual—it maintains an ‘MPD Policy & Procedures Manual.’ ” (Norris Decl., at Ex. 6, at 5). Moreover, Minneapolis asserted work product privilege for other answers, refusing to provide internal investigation files with responsive information. (Norris Decl., at Ex. 6, at 5–6). To Minneapolis’ credit, it does cite some bates-labeled documents in addition to these responses, but these responses are inadequate. Pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii), the Court orders that Minneapolis, in defending against Plaintiff's claims for the remainder of this lawsuit, may not rely upon any discovery not produced prior to this Order. To be clear, Minneapolis is not prevented from relying upon any discovery resulting from the depositions or expert discovery that will take place following the issuance of this Order. The Court finds this an appropriate, proportionate, and just sanction in that it prevents Minneapolis from using any discovery it has not provided Plaintiff, and it deters future litigants from withholding discovery. Turning to the internal affairs investigation files, Minneapolis asserts that the Court only ordered production of “the signed interviews from the [internal affairs] files.” (ECF No. 396, at 8). The Court disagrees. Minneapolis did not describe solely “signed interviews,” but rather the internal investigations concerning the lookups at issue in the complaint. As described by Minneapolis, the “signed interviews” constituted the internal investigation file, and the Court referred to the “signed interviews” as such. The Court did not have an example of an internal investigation file before it when making that decision. Moreover, as contemplated at the informal dispute conference, the signed interviews and the internal affairs investigation files were one in the same. Now, the parties have provided a full internal investigation file of one officer and the statement portions of others for the Court's review. (Compare March 8, 2017 Miller-Van Oort Decl., at Ex. E (only the statement portions of internal investigation files), with Tholkes Decl., at Ex. D (internal affairs investigation file of Young, including statement), and Apr. 19, 2017 Decl. of Sonia Miller-Van Oort, at Exs. F, G). The full internal investigation file could reasonably contain information that is plainly relevant to Plaintiff's claims. Accordingly, the full internal investigation files relating to the alleged lookups at issue should be provided to Plaintiff pursuant to the February 7, 2017 Order and Plaintiff's discovery requests underpinning that Order. *17 Minneapolis, however, asserts that the work-product privilege protects these documents from production. Minneapolis asserts that, once it received the First Amended Complaint, the Minneapolis City Attorney's Office requested investigations “for several reasons, including to prepare for the litigation and determine if there were any policy violations by the officers.” (Aff. of DeChristopher J. Granger ¶ 3, ECF No. 399; see Norris Decl. ¶ 4; Decl. of Brian S. Carter date Apr. 26, 2017 ¶ 4, ECF No. 414; ECF No. 427). Minneapolis asserts “policy violations could potentially create conflicts of interest between the City if Minneapolis and the individual, named officers.” (Granger Aff. ¶ 4; Norris Decl. ¶ 4; Apr. 26, 2017 Carter Decl. ¶ 4; ECF No. 427). The work product doctrine was designed to prevent “unwarranted inquiries into the files and mental impressions of an attorney,” and recognizes that it is “essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel.” Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510–11 (1947). Work product comes in two forms: ordinary work includes “raw factual information,” while opinion work product “includes counsel's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories.” Baker v. General Motors Corp., 209 F.3d 1051, 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). “Ordinary work product is not discoverable unless the party seeking discovery has a substantial need for the materials and the party cannot obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)). Opinion work product, on the other hand, “enjoys almost absolute immunity and can be discovered only in very rare and extraordinary circumstances, such as when the material demonstrates that an attorney engaged in illegal conduct or fraud.” Baker, 208 F.3d at 1054 (citing In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 336 (8th Cir. 1977)). “[T]here is no work-product immunity for documents prepared in the regular course of business rather than for purposes of the litigation.” 8 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2024 (3d ed. 2017). The party asserting the privilege “bear[s] the initial burden of establishing a factual basis for their assertion. The party asserting the privilege meets this burden by providing the reviewing court with a detailed privilege log and explanatory affidavit of counsel setting forth a factual basis for the privilege.” Falkner v. General Motors Corp., 200 F.R.D. 620, 622 (S.D. Iowa 2001) (citing In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 925 (8th Cir. 1997)). If the party successfully asserts the privilege, “the burden shifts to the party compelling discovery to establish ‘substantial need’ and ‘undue hardship’ in obtaining the privileged materials.” Falkner, 200 F.R.D. at 622 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)). Minneapolis cannot show that the internal affairs investigation files are work product. While Minneapolis asserts the investigations were commenced to, in part, determine if Minneapolis had any conflicts of interest with the officers that would prevent representation by the Minneapolis City Attorney's Office, there is no indication of that purpose anywhere in the files. Rather, the internal affairs investigation files focus solely on the determination of whether the officer violated Minneapolis Police Department policy. These are ordinary business records for police departments and, as such, are not protected by the work-product privilege. Simply put, the internal affairs investigation files are not providing “unwarranted inquiries into the files and mental impressions of an attorney.” Even if the internal affairs investigation files constituted ordinary work product, they would be discoverable. Plaintiff has a substantial need for these documents in that they explain Minneapolis's reasons for the alleged lookups at issue in this litigation. It provides an explanation for the lookups much closer in time to the lookup than any deposition or trial testimony could. Moreover, the internal affairs investigation files serve as a check on the reliability of any testimony provided by the individuals accused of improperly accessing Plaintiff's driver's license information. Plaintiff cannot discover this information by other means given the sheer quantity of individuals involved and the limitation of depositions. *18 Accordingly, Minneapolis shall produce, within seven days of this Order, the full internal affairs investigation files related to DVS/BCA database accesses by employees of the City of Minneapolis in the Minneapolis Police Department that remain at issue in this case. To the extent no internal affairs investigation files exist pertaining to the lookups at issue, such as for Hendrickson, Johnson, and Krebs, who had retired from the Minneapolis Police Department prior to the investigations being conducted, Minneapolis shall certify to Plaintiff that no such internal affairs investigation file exists. B. Testimony of Deponents Gomez and Case During the depositions of Case and Gomez, Minneapolis's counsel instructed these deponents not to provide testimony related to Minneapolis's officers’ accesses of Krekelberg or anything related to the internal affairs investigations conducted about those accesses on grounds that such information is protected from disclosure under the work product doctrine. Plaintiff also asserts that Case, Minneapolis's Rule 30(b)(6) deponent, was unprepared to testify on several noticed deposition topics. (See ECF No. 416, at 10–12) (listing topics). As concluded above, Minneapolis's assertion of the work product privilege fails. As such, it was improper for Minneapolis to assert this privilege at the depositions of Case and Gomez. Because it was inappropriate to assert the privilege, the Court finds it appropriate, proportionate, and just to permit Plaintiff to depose Case and Gomez again. Plaintiff, with Minneapolis and the deponents’ full participation and cooperation, shall complete the depositions of Case and Gomez on or before October 6, 2017. These depositions are limited to six hours each. IV. REQUESTS FOR FEES Throughout their motions, Plaintiff and Minneapolis ask that expenses, fees, and sanctions be imposed on the opposing party under various federal rules. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 (fee awards in compelling discovery); Fed. R. Civ. P. 30 (permitting sanction, including award of fees and expenses, for impeding, delaying, or frustrating a deposition); Fed. R. Civ. P 45 (sanctions for subpoena that imposes undue burden or expense on a person). The Court denies all requests for fees and expenses. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 (no need if circumstances make award unjust); Fed. R. Civ. P. 30 (sanction is permissive); Fed. R. Civ. P 45 (Court can determine appropriate sanction). The parties in this case have morphed the rules-driven process of a lawsuit into an unrecognizable kerfuffle fueled by mutual distrust and a paucity of reasonable compromise. The merits of the underlying dispute appear lost to the ether, while the parties struggle as if over a global conflagration on issues that well may not change the trajectory of either parties’ probabilities of ultimately prevailing and bringing this long-running litigation to a merciful close. The parties should not be recompensed for the consequences of such actions. As a prophylactic against further cantankerous litigation by both parties, and to enforce the admonition of Rule 1, the Court needs to take one step further than denying the parties’ present request for fees. Plaintiff and Minneapolis are hereby prohibited from seeking their expenses and attorney's fees related to any of the motions decided in this Order, (ECF Nos. 337, 346, 405,414), and the costs of service of subpoenas related to the February 22, 2017 Order.[13] V. CONCLUSION The Court takes no joy in sanctioning the parties or using unadorned oratory to convey its disappointment in the parties’ actions to date. The federal courts were not put in place to name the victor of some existential military conflict, but to serve as arbiters to disputes governed and resolved by the rule of law and reason. There is no requirement that those involved agree on outcomes, but the parties must respect the Court's orders, the rules of procedure, and the parameters of the adversarial process. Of no less import, the parties must align themselves to the letter and spirit of Rule 1 and the concepts of proportionality and civility embraced in the Rules of Civil Procedure. *19 The Court does not impute malice or intent to obfuscate into the actions of parties to date. Rather, the Court believes the parties may have lost sight of disputes that may truly decide the underlying merits, instead focusing on procedural and technical battles. Oddly enough, the parties have also, at times as noted above, taken too lax a view of the procedural rules that govern litigation, leading to avoidable delays. The Court hopes that, through this Order, the parties will be able to conclude this litigation in an expeditious, efficient, and courteous manner. Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 1. Third-Party Officers’ Motion to Quash Subpoenas, (ECF No. 337), is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows: the subpoenas issued to Beth Mota, Clark Gossett, and Joel Carlson are quashed. 2. Officer Mark Durand's Motion to Quash Subpoena, (ECF No. 405), is DENIED. 3. Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions against Defendant Minneapolis under Rule 37(B)(2), (ECF No. 346), is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows: a. Minneapolis, through its counsel of record, shall: (i) accept service on behalf of Wenzel, Durand, Honican, Lazarachic, Digideo-Englund, McLean, Robinson, Macias, Wuorinen, Peterson, Hand, Mercil, Silva, and Illetschko; or (ii) make any individual listed in the preceding subparagraph whom Minneapolis's counsel refuses to accept service available at the Minneapolis City Attorney's Office at 9:00 a.m. on August 18, 2017 to accept personal service of Plaintiff's deposition subpoenas. b. The scheduling order shall be amended, in relevant part, as follows: (i) Plaintiff, with Minneapolis and the deponents’ full participation and cooperation, shall complete the depositions of Wenzel, Durand, Honican, Lazarachic, Digideo-Englund, McLean, Robinson, Macias, Wuorinen, Peterson, Hand, Mercil, Silva, and Illetschko on or before October 6, 2017. These depositions are limited to four hours each; (ii) expert discovery shall be completed on or before October 18, 2017; (iii) non-dispositive motions relating to expert discovery shall be filed and served no later than October 18, 2017; and (iv) dispositive motions shall be filed, served, and scheduled on or before December 15, 2017. c. Minneapolis, in defending against Plaintiff's claims for the remainder of this lawsuit, may not rely upon any discovery not produced prior to this Order. Minneapolis is not prevented from relying upon any discovery resulting from the depositions or expert discovery that will take place following the issuance of this Order. d. Minneapolis shall produce, within seven days of this Order, the full internal affairs investigation files related to DVS/BCA database accesses by employees of the City of Minneapolis in the Minneapolis Police Department that remain at issue in this case. To the extent no internal affairs investigation files exist pertaining to the lookups at issue, Minneapolis shall certify to Plaintiff that no such internal affairs investigation file exists. 4. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Testimony of Minneapolis Deponents Gomez and Case and Motion for Sanctions, (ECF No. 414), is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows: Plaintiff, with Minneapolis and the deponents’ full participation and cooperation, shall complete the depositions of Case and Gomez on or before October 6, 2017. These depositions are limited to six hours each. 5. All prior consistent orders remain in full force and effect. 6. Failure to comply with any provision of this Order or any other prior consistent order shall subject the non-complying party, non-complying counsel and/or the party such counsel represents to any and all appropriate remedies, sanctions and the like, including without limitation: assessment of costs, fines and attorneys’ fees and disbursements; waiver of rights to object; exclusion or limitation of witnesses, testimony, exhibits, and other evidence; striking of pleadings; complete or partial dismissal with prejudice; entry of whole or partial default judgment; and/or any other relief that this Court may from time to time deem appropriate. *20 Date: August 8, 2017 Footnotes [1] The parties submitted a Stipulation to Amend Pretrial Scheduling Order, (ECF No. 256), on September 29, 2016. [2] The Court also considered a third motion, Defendant City of Minneapolis’ Motion to Amend Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Scheduling Order, (ECF No. 305), but that motion was simply to amend a single sentence in Minneapolis’ 28-page opposition brief. It had no bearing on the substance of the dispute. [3] The transcript of the hearing contains the oral order of the Court, so it is cited herein. The minute entry, (ECF No. 307), and corresponding text order, (ECF No. 308), also encapsulate the Court's order. But, as told to the parties at the hearing, the oral order governs. (See ECF No. 307 (“The oral record made by the Court at the hearing is incorporated by reference as if fully restated herein.”); Feb. 7, 2017 Tr. 57:13–16) (“It is so ordered. A text order will be issued incorporating by reference the findings and rulings of the Court made on this oral record today without further written order.”)). [4] The transcript of the hearing contains the oral order of the Court, so it is cited herein. The minute entry, (ECF No. 321), and corresponding text order, (ECF No. 322), also encapsulate the Court's order. But, as told to the parties at the hearing, the oral order governs. (See ECF No. 321 (“The oral record made by the Court at the hearing is incorporated by reference as if fully restated herein.”); Feb. 22, 2017 Tr. 22:25–23:3) (“[I]t is so ordered. A text order will be issued incorporating by reference the findings and rulings of the Court made on this oral record today without further written order.”)). [5] Officer Durand does not clarify whether his motion is based on time for service, lack of a witness fee, or another reason. Therefore, the Court does not group Officer Durand with the collective “Third-Party Officers” and will address his motion separately from the motion of Third-Party Officers. [6] The 21 individuals are: (1) Amber Digideo-Englund; (2) Matthew McLean; (3) Beth Mota; (4) Joel Carlson; (5) Jose Gomez; (6) Clark Gossett; (7) Johnny Mercil; (8) Bryce Robinson; (9) Lucas Peterson; (10) Oscar Macias; (11) Blake Moua; (12) Daniel Horn; (13) Todd Sauvageau; (14) Gregory Wenzel; (15) Jarrod Silva; (16) Steve Wuorinen; (17) Richard Hand; (18) Mark Durand; (19) David Honican; (20) Robert Illestschko; and (21) Jennifer Lazarachic. [7] The information provided indicated that the 21 deponents were available for service as follows: Deponents (19) David Honican, (21) Jennifer Lazarachic, (1) Amber Digideo-Englund, (2) Matthew McLean, (8) Bryce Robinson, and (10) Oscar Macias were “Not working today.” Deponents (11) Blake Moua and (12) Daniel Horn were “No longer employed.” Deponents (16) Steve Wuorinen, (3) Beth Mota, and (4) Joel Carlson were available “At beginning of shift after any roll call and as duties permit.” Finally, deponents (15) Jarrod Silva, (17) Richard Hand, (18) Mark Durand, (20) Robert Illestschko, (5) Jose Gomez, (6) Clark Gossett, (7) Johnny Mercil, (9) Lucas Peterson, (13) Todd Sauvageau, and (14) Gregory Wenzel were available “At end of shift, as duties permit.” (Carter Decl. dated Mar. 6, 2017, at ¶ 3, Ex. 3). [8] Around the same time, Carter emailed the deponents, as shown in this email to Deponent (16) Steve Wuorinen, indicating that Plaintiff's counsel in a lawsuit may attempt to serve you with a subpoena today. Specifically, this is regarding the lawsuit by Plaintiff Amy Krekelberg. As you may know, Plaintiff alleges that numerous Minneapolis Police officers accessed her driver's license data contrary to provisions in the Driver's Privacy Protection Act. Plaintiff has identified you as a witness she would like to depose. Last week, the Court issued an order requiring Plaintiff to subpoena you if she sought to compel your attendance at a deposition. Plaintiff did not inform us that she wished to depose you until yesterday at 4:10 p.m., and, pursuant to the Court's order, today is the last day Plaintiff can serve you. The Court also ordered the City to provide Plaintiff with your shift assignment, shift hours, work address, and a time that you would be available for service during your shift so that Plaintiff could attempt service at your work. We will provide this information to Plaintiff shortly. We will inform Plaintiff that you will be available, as your official duties permit, today at the beginning of your shift—if you have roll call, we will inform Plaintiff that you will be available just after the completion of roll call. Accordingly, at that time today you may expect Plaintiff's process server to ask for you at the public reception area at your work location. If there is no public reception area at your work address, please check around the public areas adjacent to your work address for Plaintiff's process server at the specified time. If you are served, please let me know immediately via email. (Carter Decl. dated Mar. 6, 2017, at ¶ 4, Ex. 4). [9] Gomez does not join the Third-Party Officers’ or Durand's motions to quash subpoenas, but is the subject of a motion to compel testimony. [10] These other officers are not part of the Third-Party Officers’ or Durand's motions to quash subpoenas. The information concerning Plaintiff's service attempts, however, is relevant to the Court's analysis on the several pending motions. [11] The Court will issue an amended scheduling order encompassing these changes. [12] Other than delay and additional expenditure of time, budgets, and other scarce resources, query what has been gained by Minneapolis’ tactical decision not to cooperate with Plaintiff in arriving at a more cost effective and common sense resolution of the service issues. Query, too, what Plaintiff has lost with its indecision and incaution. [13] This does not include costs related to service of subpoenas pursuant to this Order.