TIMOTHY W. JONES, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN RIVER TRANSPORTATION CO., LLC and ARCHER-DANIELS-MIDLAND COMPANY, INC., Defendants No. 19-cv-2558-SHM-tmp United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division Filed June 17, 2020 Pham, Tu M., United States Magistrate Judge ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL *1 Before the court by order of reference is Defendant American River Transportation Co., LLC's motion to compel discovery responses, filed February 28, 2020. (ECF Nos. 29 & 30.) Plaintiff Timothy W. Jones filed a response on March 13, 2020. (ECF No. 31.) For the following reasons, the motion to compel is GRANTED. I. BACKGROUND On August 21, 2019, plaintiff Timothy W. Jones filed suit against defendants American River Transportation Co., LLC (“ARTCO”) and Archer-Daniels-Midland Company, Inc. under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104, for personal injuries. (ECF No. 1.) According to the complaint, defendants own and operate a fleet of vessels that move cargo along the Mississippi River. (Id. at 2.) Jones was a crew member on one of the ships in this fleet called the M/V Dan McMillan. (Id.) Jones was employed by defendants as a deckhand aboard the M/V Dan McMillan. (Id.) On October 11, 2017, the M/V Dan McMillan was moored at a floating fueling station on the Mississippi River near Memphis, Tennessee. (Id. at 3.) Jones alleges in his complaint that, while the ship was moored at the fueling station, “he tripped and fell due to an unseaworthy condition of the vessel and/or the negligence of Defendants.” (Id.) According to Jones's response to the motion to compel, In order to hold position to the fuel dock when taking on fuel, the crew of the M/V Dan McMillan used “face wires” which are spooled on winches mounted on the deck of the vessel. As the vessel takes on fuel, the crew will release some of the face wire from the winch to allow the vessel to lower in the water. During the process of releasing the face wires, one of the wires became entangled in the winch causing it to be suspended a few inches above the deck of the vessel and creating a tripping hazard. Timothy Jones, a deckhand aboard M/V Dan McMillan, was seriously injured when he tripped on the face wire. As a result of the fall, Mr. Jones, who was 34 years old at the time, broke his left hip and has undergone two surgeries, including a total hip replacement. (ECF No. 31, at 1.) ARTCO's motion to compel concerns Requests for Production No. 4, 17, and 18, as well as Interrogatories No. 16 and 20. (ECF No. 29, at 1-2.) Specifically, ARTCO asks that plaintiff be compelled to: (a) produce statements by ARTCO's employees or clearly state that no such statements have been obtained by plaintiff or anyone acting on his behalf (Request for Production No. 4); (b) provide his ex-wife's date of birth and Social Security number so that ARTCO can obtain tax returns from the IRS for the years 2014-2016 (Request for Production No. 17); (c) produce material from his Facebook account relating to the incident, his injuries, his physical activities, his claims, and his employment with ARTCO (Request for Production No. 18); (d) identify eyewitnesses by name (Interrogatory No. 16); (e) state whether he or anyone acting on his behalf have obtained statements from ARTCO employees and, if so, to identify those employees who took the statement (Interrogatory No. 20); and *2 (f) provide a signed and sworn attestation page for his interrogatory answers. (ECF No. 29, at 1-2.) II. ANALYSIS A. Scope of Discovery The scope of discovery is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), which provides that “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The party seeking discovery is obliged to demonstrate relevance. Johnson v. CoreCivic, Inc., No. 18-CV-1051-STA-tmp, 2019 WL 5089086, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 10, 2019). Upon a showing of relevance, the burden shifts to the party opposing discovery to show, with specificity, why the requested discovery is not proportional to the needs of the case. William Powell Co. v. Nat'l Indem. Co., No. 1:14-CV-00807, 2017 WL 1326504, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 11, 2017), aff'd sub nom. 2017 WL 3927525 (S.D. Ohio June 21, 2017), and modified on reconsideration, 2017 WL 4315059 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 26, 2017). Six factors are relevant to proportionality: (1) “the importance of the issues at stake in the action;” (2) “the amount in controversy;” (3) “the parties' relative access to relevant information;” (4) “the parties' resources;” (5) “the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues;” and (6) “whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). B. Waiver of Boilerplate Objections As a preliminary matter, ARTCO argues that Jones's boilerplate objections to the productions requests and interrogatories should be deemed waived. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require specificity with respect to objections to interrogatories and requests for production of documents. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4) & 34(b)(2). In this case, Jones incorporated a general objection into many of his responses to ARTCO's interrogatories and requests for production of documents. Jones objected to Requests for Production No. 4 and 18 as follows: “Objection. This Request for Production is overly broad and may seek documents which are protected, privileged, and not otherwise discoverable.” (ECF No. 29-9, at 2, 6.) Jones objected to Interrogatories No. 16 and 20 as follows: “Objection. This Interrogatory is overly broad and may seek information which is protected, privileged, and not otherwise discoverable.” (ECF No. 29-8, at 9, 11.) These general objections violate the specificity requirements of Rules 33 and 34. “[B]oilerplate objections are legally meaningless and amount to a waiver of an objection.” Sobol v. Imprimis Pharms., No. 16-14339, 2017 WL 5035837, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 26, 2017) (citing Strategic Mktg. & Research Team, Inc. v. Auto Data Sols., Inc., No. 2:15-CV-12695, 2017 WL 1196361, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2017) (“Boilerplate or generalized objections are tantamount to no objection at all and will not be considered by the Court.”)). Regarding the Requests for Production, Jones's boilerplate objections and responses also violate “Rule 34(b)(2)(C)'s requirement to indicate whether any responsive materials are withheld on the basis of an objection.” Id. at *4 (quoting Fischer v. Forrest, No. 14 CIV 1304-PAE-AJP, 2017 WL 773694, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2017)). Accordingly, the objections described above are deemed waived. C. Request for Production No. 4 *3 In Request for Production No. 4, ARTCO requested: “All statements or memoranda of statements obtained from defendants or any of their agents, employees, or representatives having knowledge concerning the facts of this case.” (ECF No. 29-1, 3.) Jones objected that the request for production is “overly broad and may seek documents which are protected, privileged, and not otherwise discoverable.” (ECF No. 29-9, at 2.) As discussed above, this objection is deemed waived. The only responsive document provided by Jones was the Incident Report completed by defendants. (Id.) In addition, the response stated that “Jones did not cause any written or recorded statements to be taken related to the injury to his hip.” (Id.) According to his response to the motion to compel, “the only ‘statements’ Mr. Jones has in his possession were taken by ARTCO and either produced by ARTCO or available on its company website.” (ECF No. 31, at 2.) As ARTCO points out, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3)(C), any party may obtain its own statement about the action or its subject matter. ARTCO additionally argues that it is entitled to statements obtained from its employees regardless of whether Jones, his counsel, or someone else acting on their behalf, caused the statements to be obtained. To the extent that any such statements exist and are in Jones's possession, he must produce them. D. Request for Production No. 17 In Request for Production No. 17, ARTCO requested that plaintiff “execute and return the attached authorizations: medical, employment, Social Security, military, worker's compensation records, and tax authorizations.” (ECF No. 29-1, at 4.) Jones objected that the request for production “seeks documents which are irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of any admissible evidence and also exceeds the scope of permissible discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” (ECF No. 29-9, at 6.) The only responsive documents provided were authorizations to obtain Social Security records and income tax returns. (Id.) Jones additionally stated that he had never served in the military or filed a worker's compensation claim for injury to his left hip. (Id.) Jones later provided the medical authorizations requested. (ECF No. 29-1, at 5.) The authorizations for income tax returns remain at issue. According to ARTCO, the initial income tax authorizations Jones provided did not include the date of birth and Social Security number of Jones's ex-spouse, without which ARTCO could not obtain tax returns from the IRS for years 2014-2016. (Id.) Because Jones has not responded to this request, ARTCO asks the court to compel Jones to complete two IRS authorizations: “one for the years that plaintiff filed tax returns in his name alone (2012, 2013, 2017, 2018) and one for the years he had filed jointly with his ex-wife (2014-2016).” (ECF No. 32-1, at 4.) ARTCO asserts that this information is relevant because Jones claims past and future wage loss under the Jones Act, which is calculated on an after-tax basis. See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 534 (1983); Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Leipelt, 444 U.S. 490, 493-94 (1980). ARTCO states that the W-2s in its possession do not identify earned income from other sources of employment or provide the amount of income taxes paid (as opposed to withheld) by Jones. (ECF No. 32-1, at 3.) Jones asserts that the information about his ex-spouse is not only irrelevant but also confidential, “and if relevant should be obtained from Mr. Jones' ex-wife.” (ECF No. 31, at 2-3.) Jones also notes that the social security records obtained likely include his reported earnings and that ARTCO can also subpoena the income tax returns from the IRS. (Id. at 3.) It is worth noting that Jones does not seem to dispute the discoverability of his tax returns. In fact, Jones previously provided a tax return authorization in responding to the initial request for production, but ARTCO could not obtain the documents for the years requested because the authorizations omitted the information regarding Jones's ex-spouse. Jones's arguments in response to the motion to compel center around alternative means of obtaining the information regarding his ex-spouse and the tax returns requested. The undersigned is satisfied as to the relevance of Jones's tax returns, and granting this request for production does not appear to place any undue burden on Jones. See Burrell v. Duhon, NO. 5:18-CV-00141-TBR-LLK, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91426, at *34 (W.D. Ky. May 31, 2019) (“[C]ourts typically find tax returns to be relevant in actions in which a party's income is in issue.”) (collecting cases). Accordingly, Jones is hereby directed to complete the two IRS authorizations requested by ARTCO: one for the years that plaintiff filed tax returns in his name alone (2012, 2013, 2017, 2018) and one for the years he had filed jointly with his ex-wife (2014-2016). E. Request for Production No. 18 *4 In Request for Production No. 18, ARTCO requested that plaintiff produce from his Facebook account, if any, “all material related to Plaintiff's employment with ARTCO, physical injuries, physical activity, or related to the subject incident and Plaintiff's claims in any way.” (ECF No. 29-1, at 5.) Jones objected that the request for production is “overly broad and may seek documents which are protected, privileged, and not otherwise discoverable.” (ECF No. 29-9, at 6.) As discussed above, this objection is deemed waived. Jones asserts that granting this Request for Production would give ARTCO “unfettered discretion to peruse through the entirety of Mr. Jones' private life and the private lives of others.” (ECF No. 31, at 3.) Yet, Jones also states that “he has not made any ‘posts’ to his Facebook account concerning his injuries or this litigation with ARTCO.” (Id.) In fact, Jones says he deactivated his Facebook account several months prior to the discovery request. (Id.) Therefore, according to Jones, “there is nothing to produce.” (Id.) If there is nothing to produce, Jones must attest to that fact in a formal response. F. Interrogatory No. 16 In Interrogatory No. 16, ARTCO requested that Jones respond by listing: [E]ach person ... who saw or otherwise witnessed the accident or any part thereof, saw or observed at the scene of the accident any physical facts or conditions or conduct of plaintiff, defendants, or employees of the defendants immediately before, during, or immediately after the accident; heard these defendants or any of these defendants' agents or employees at any time make any statement concerning the accident or your claimed injuries; has personal knowledge of the injuries and damages you are claiming; or has knowledge of relevant facts... (ECF No. 29-1, at 6.) Jones objected that the interrogatory is “overly broad and may seek information which is protected, privileged, and not otherwise discoverable.” (ECF No. 29-8, at 9.) As discussed above, this objection is deemed waived. Jones also stated that “the members of the crew of the M/V Dan McMillan present when the incident occurred are potential witnesses to the incident and the surrounding circumstances as well as any person who participated in investigation of the incident or preparation of the incident report.” (Id.) ARTCO asserts that it is “entitled to know, by name, which individuals plaintiff knows or believes to have seen the incident.” (ECF No. 29-1, at 7.) In response, Jones asserts that his injury occurred on an ARTCO barge crewed by ARTCO employees, which, to the best of his knowledge, contained no passengers other than the ARTCO employees. (ECF No. 31, at 4.) Jones notes that after the incident, “ARTCO conducted an investigation, identified the witnesses, and took statements; therefore, ARTCO already knows who the identities of any potential witnesses which are identified in the documents that ARTCO has produced and pressing Mr. Jones for this information is simply an effort to harass.” (Id.) Jones additionally asserts that because ARTCO has refused to allow Jones to depose any ARTCO employees, Jones cannot verify who actually witnessed the incident. (Id.) Yet, even if Jones does not know or have the ability to recall answers to these interrogatories, “[l]ack of knowledge or the ability to recollect is, if true, a fair answer” to an interrogatory. Mohnsam v. Nemes, No. 3:17-CV-427-CRS-CHL, 2019 WL 3307233, at *4 (W.D. Ky. July 23, 2019) (quoting Weaver v. Mateer & Herbet, P.A., 277 F.R.D. 655, 658 (M.D. Fla. 2011)). This rule has limits — parties must make a reasonable effort to answer interrogatories, including reviewing information available to them. Weimar v. Geico Advantage Ins. Co., No. 19-2698-JTF-tmp, 2020 WL 249992, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 16, 2020). Jones has not demonstrated that ARTCO's request is unduly burdensome or was designed to harass. Accordingly, Jones must review the information available to him and provide an answer to this interrogatory by listing the names of individuals he knows to have seen the incident. G. Interrogatory No. 20 In Interrogatory No. 20, ARTCO requested that plaintiff state whether “he, or anyone acting on his behalf, have or know of any statements made by defendants' employees concerning the accident or his claimed injuries” and, if so, to identify the employee who provided the statement and provide other details concerning the statement such as the date it was taken, and the identity of the person who took the statement. (ECF No. 29-1, at 7.) Jones objected that the interrogatory is “overly broad and may seek information which is protected, privileged, and not otherwise discoverable.” (ECF No. 29-8, at 11.) As discussed above, this objection is deemed waived. The only responsive document listed in Jones's answer was the Incident Report completed by defendants. (Id.) In addition, the answer stated that “Jones did not cause any written or recorded statements to be taken regarding the incident of October 5, 2017.” (Id.) *5 ARTCO again argues that it is entitled to information about statements taken from its employees, “regardless of whether Mr. Jones, or his counsel, or someone else acting on their behalf, caused the statements to be obtained.” (ECF No. 29-1, at 8.) In response, Jones refers back to the arguments regarding Request for Production No. 4, asserting that “the only ‘statements’ were taken by ARTCO.” (ECF No. 31, at 4.) If this is Jones's answer to Interrogatory No. 20, he must attest to it under oath in a formal response. H. Sworn Attestation Page Lastly, ARTCO asks that Jones be required to provide a signed and sworn attestation page for his interrogatory answers. (ECF No. 29, at 2.) ARTCO asserts that plaintiff's initial interrogatory answers lacked any signature, and the subsequent signature page provided on February 5, 2020, was unsworn. (ECF No. 29-1, at 8.) As ARTCO points out, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33 dictates that “[e]ach interrogatory must, to the extent it is not objected to, be answered separately and fully in writing under oath.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3). In addition, “[t]he person who makes the answers must sign them, and the attorney who objects must sign any objections.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(5). Jones's response states that “[t]he lack of a Notary Page on the Attestation was an oversight by counsel and will be corrected.” (ECF No. 31, at 4.) Accordingly, the court grants ARTCO's request to have Jones provide a signed and sworn attestation page for his interrogatory answers. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons above, ARTCO's motion to compel is GRANTED. Jones is hereby directed to provide the responses outlined above within ten days from the entry of this order. IT IS SO ORDERED.