CYNTHIA B. SCOTT et al., Plaintiffs, v. HAROLD W. CLARKE et al., Defendants Civil Action No. 3:12cv00036 United States District Court, W.D. Virginia Entered March 12, 2020 Hoppe, Joel C., United States Magistrate Judge REPORT & RECOMMENDATION nior United States District Judge Norman K. Moon, presiding. ECF No. 272. Having considered the parties' briefs, oral arguments, evidence, and the applicable law, I respectfully recommend an award of $923,660.90 in attorney's fees and $105,161.01 in costs. I. Background Nearly eight years ago, women at the Fluvanna Correctional Center for Women (“FCCW”) filed this lawsuit “seeking a remedy for pervasive constitutionally deficient medical care.” Scott v. Clarke, 355 F. Supp. 3d 472, 506 (W.D. Va.), amended by 391 F. Supp. 3d 610 (W.D. Va. 2019) (Moon, J.). “After two years of litigation, and days before a scheduled bench trial” on the merits, “the parties reached a settlement in principle. They spent the next ten months hashing out the details.” Id. at 478. (citation omitted). In September 2015, the parties jointly submitted a “detailed settlement agreement (‘Settlement Agreement’ or ‘the agreement’) to provide for constitutionally adequate medical care at FCCW.” Id. at 477; see id. at 477–79. “The point of the Settlement Agreement was to implement specific practices and standards to remedy [ongoing] constitutional shortcoming[s]” in both the quantity and quality of medical care provided to women housed at FCCW. Id. at 494; see also Scott v. Clarke, 2016 WL 452164, at *4 (W.D. Va. Feb. 5, 2016) (“[T]he Settlement Agreement addresses with particularity each of the problems Plaintiffs identified in their Complaint and fully developed in the record with the evidence supporting their ... motion for class certification and their ... motion for partial summary judgment.”). The agreement “sets out twenty-two standards governing FCCW,” plus “other discrete requirements” not relevant here. Scott, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 495. On February 5, 2016, “the Court entered a final judgment order that conclusively approved the agreement, declared it operative, and retained jurisdiction to enforce it.” Scott, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 477. “The final judgment order—drafted jointly by the parties and entered at their request—specifically ordered that the Settlement Agreement ... was effective as of that date,” id. at 492, its “implementation was to begin ‘no later than’ the effective date, and—unless otherwise provided—implementation was to be completed ‘within 30 days of’ the effective date,” id. at 495. “That deadline was March 6, 2016.” Id. at 502. As part of the agreement, the parties chose Nicholas Scharff, M.D., M.P.H., the former Chief Medical Officer of Pennsylvania's Department of Corrections, to serve as the court-approved Settlement Compliance Monitor. Scott, 2016 WL 452164, at *4. Dr. Scharff would visit FCCW four times a year (for at least three years) to speak confidentially with inmates and staff, inspect facilities, and review medical files and grievances as he deemed necessary to “provide a report reflecting the results of each visit to the parties.” Id.; see also Scott, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 501–02. His detailed reports were to “identify to the parties any areas or subjects” where the Virginia Department of Corrections (“VDOC”) was “not in compliance with the provisions of the settlement or Eighth Amendment standards,” and VDOC would “have 30 days from the date of such notice within which to correct any areas of noncompliance...” Scott, 2016 WL 452164, at *4. If the problem(s) persisted after 30 days, then Plaintiffs could file “a motion in this Court to enforce the settlement, seek contempt sanctions, or both.” Id. * On January 10, 2017, Dr. Scharff issued a written report of his visit to FCCW in early October 2016. See Pls.' Br. in Supp. Mot. for Order to Show Cause 12–13, ECF No. 266 (citing Pls.' Br. in Supp. Mot. for Order to Show Cause Ex. 6, ECF No. 266-6).[1] Although Dr. Scharff noted improved performance in “some areas” of medical care since his last report in September 2016, he “raised serious concerns” about “continuing deficiencies” in nurse staffing levels, medication administration, staff responses to medical grievances, and referrals to outside providers, among other things. Id. at 12 (citing Pls.' Br. in Supp. Mot. for Order to Show Cause Ex. 6, at 4–5, 18). In particular, FCCW nurses reportedly had “no way ... to chart the actual time of [medication] administration” in the electronic medical-records system, a practice that was both “contrary to pertinent regulations” and had been “resolved” at other facilities using the same record-keeping software. Pls.' Br. in Supp. Mot. for Order to Show Cause Ex. 6, at 4–5. Dr. Scharff also expressed concern that FCCW still had not implemented a sick-call process that was “both timely and effective.” See id. at 3–4. He could not be sure whether VDOC's failure to “address[ ] any of the most troublesome problems at FCCW” was “institutional inertia or simple lack of concern” on part of the officials charged with fulfilling VDOC's obligations under the Settlement Agreement. Id. at 20. Dr. Scharff “hoped to ... see clear evidence of improvement during the first quarter” of 2017. Id. “Failing such improvement,” however, he thought “the Court should consider whether this [Agreement] is, in fact, working effectively.” Id. In March 2017, Dr. Scharff opined that VDOC and FCCW were at best “partially compliant” with seventeen provisions or standards. See Pls.' Br. in Supp. Mot. for Order to Show Cause Ex. 7, at 17–21, ECF No. 266-7. On April 20, Plaintiffs' counsel sent written notice to Defendants' counsel identifying areas where VDOC or FCCW still had not complied with the Agreement's terms. See generally Pls.' Br. in Supp. Mot. for Order to Show Cause Ex. 2, at 1–17, ECF No. 266-2. On May 22, Defendants' counsel responded that FCCW was “not in breach ... [of] any of the provisions” cited. Pls.' Br. in Supp. Mot. for Order to Show Cause Ex. 9, at 10, ECF No. 266-9. On the contrary, FCCW and its contractor had “made tremendous progress in implementing the terms of the [S]ettlement [A]greement and, more importantly, changing the culture [surrounding] the provision of medical services to approximate much more a hospital culture.” Id. On September 6, “Plaintiffs filed their motion to show cause why Defendants should not be held in contempt for failing to abide by,” Scott, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 479, at least thirteen of the Agreement's standards covering everything from medical staffing, to emergency care and life-saving equipment, to conditions in FCCW's infirmary, see id. at 479–500. In December, after the parties briefed that motion, I adopted their joint request for an enforcement-phase schedule, which set the discovery deadline at May 1, 2018, followed by a week-long bench trial before Judge Moon to begin on June 11, 2018. Id. at 479 (citing ECF Nos. 303, 304). “For the next several months, the volume and intensity of discovery rivaled that of the hardest-fought merits litigation.” Id. I held a half-dozen conferences to resolve multiple discovery disputes, see ECF Nos. 315, 332, 350, 380, 383, 430, and allowed certain discovery tasks to continue past the May 1 deadline, ECF Nos. 386, 451. The parties should have resolved some of those disputes without the Court's help. See, e.g., Order of Apr. 4, 2018, ECF No. 338; Order of Apr. 12, 2018, ECF No. 352; Order of May 30, 2018, ECF No. 432. Meanwhile, both parties submitted to Judge Moon “numerous Daubert motions, motions in limine, and trial briefs.” Scott, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 479 (citing ECF Nos. 395, 397, 398, 401, 403, 411, 412, 414, 416). “Defendants even filed a motion for summary judgment,” id., with 61 exhibits totaling more than 650 pages, see ECF Nos. 417, 419, 420, 445, forcing Plaintiffs to file a response just twelve days before trial, see ECF Nos. 452, 453, 490. Judge Moon denied Defendants' motion as likely procedurally improper and, in any event, “exceptionally late.” Order of June 4, 2018, at 1, ECF No. 490. The five-day bench trial started on June 11, 2018. At the close of Plaintiffs' evidence, Judge Moon granted their motion to show cause, concluding there was “certainly a prima facie case that at least to some extent that the settlement ha[d] not been carried out” by Defendants. Scott, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 479 (quotation marks omitted). He asked both sides to file post-trial briefs with proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, ECF No. 519, which they did, ECF Nos. 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538. On January 2, 2019, Judge Moon issued a decision laying out his findings of fact and conclusions of law as to Plaintiffs' motion to hold Defendants in contempt. The parties are familiar with Judge Moon's decision, ECF No. 544, as well as his Memorandum Opinion of May 22, 2019, ECF No. 573. For now, it is enough to note that although “the Court ha[d] no authority to enforce the Settlement Agreement through contempt” because the final judgment order did not satisfy Rule 65(d)(1)'s substantive requirements, Scott 355 F. Supp. 3d at 491 (collecting cases), Judge Moon was convinced that Defendants had breached eight standards they were supposed to implement nearly three years earlier, see id. at 495–505.[2] “[T]he egregious facts surrounding many” of these violations—including that basic medical equipment was not readily accessible when Carolyn Liberato and Deanna Niece died at FCCW just days apart in July 2017, and that Andrea Nichols had to “wait three years for a colonoscopy while cancer rotted her body and invaded her liver”—showed Defendants had done little more than “talk about improving medical care at FCCW.” See id. at 503–04 & n. 23 (“Meeting minutes and self-congratulations do not provide adequate medical care to the women at FCCW whose lives and well-being depend on it.”). But the Settlement Agreement charged Defendants “with actually improving it, and doing so by adhering to the obligations they undertook” in the Agreement. Accordingly, Judge Moon fashioned a new injunction to enforce the breached standards. See id. at 493–506. Both parties filed Rule 59(e) motions pointing out aspects of relief that were no longer necessary and offering suggestions based on their and Dr. Scharff's expertise and familiarity with conditions on the ground. See id. at 505 (inviting the same). Plaintiffs filed this fee petition and supporting materials on June 12, 2019. ECF Nos. 582, 583, 583-1 to 583-39. They initially requested $1,879,627.93 in attorney's fees[3] plus $116,624.44 in costs. See Pls.' Br. in Supp. 35, 39. Defendants filed their brief in opposition and exhibits, ECF Nos. 602, 602-1 to 602-11, and Plaintiffs responded with a reply brief making “limited” cuts to LAJC's fee request, Pls.' Reply Br. 1, ECF No. 604. I held a hearing on November 1, 2019, at which both parties appeared by counsel. ECF No. 624. Afterwards, I asked Plaintiffs to file a supplemental brief clarifying their adjustments and documenting their final request for fees, which they did: • Deducted $38,675.40 for 189.10 total hours' worth of legal work (147.6), clerical tasks (39.10), and travel (2.40) billed by LAJC attorney Henry Young, Esq.; • Deducted $40,655.00 for 271.10 hours LAJC attorneys spent on clerical tasks;[4] • Deducted $4,101.30 for 18.60 hours spent revising timesheets; • Reduced their requested “paralegal” hourly rate from $150.00 to $125.00; and • Deducted $81,343.10 from LAJC's fee request for their volunteer and student interns. See Pls.' Supp'l Br. in Supp. 1–2, ECF No. 637. Plaintiffs now seek $1,630,759.03 in fees for fifteen attorneys, six paid support staff, one volunteer, and seven unpaid interns, roughly broken down as follows: Organization LAJC Wiley Rein Kelly & Crandall Consumer Litig. Assocs. Name or Position(s) Mary Bauer Brenda Castañeda Angela Ciolfi Rachel Deane Shannon Ellis Adeola Ogunkeyede Kimberly Rolla Abigail Turner Maggie Yates Volunteer Students (7) Ted Howard Support Staff (4) Kristi Kelly Casey Nash Support Staff (2) Leonard Bennett Elizabeth Hanes Craig Marchiando Hours Claimed 5,478.40 (att'y) 413.30 (para.) 232.00 (travel) 71.40 15.00 716.10 48.80 1,007.60 25.20 112.60 16.50 2,283.80 111.90 179.40 39.20 220.50 23.50 727.90 34.70 190.80 25.70 102.75 300.00 993.00 (att'y) 838.50 (para.) 993.00 838.50 157.80 (att'y) 3.30 (para.) 3.40 154.40 3.3 219.20 (att'y) 71.60 96.30 52.00 Hourly Rate(s) Claimed $220.50 (att'y) $125.00 (para.) $110.25 (travel) $220.50 $110.25 $220.50 $110.25 $220.50 $110.25 $220.50 $110.25 $220.50 $110.25 $220.50 $110.25 $220.50 $110.25 $220.50 $110.25 $220.50 $110.25 $125.00 $125.00 $220.50 (att'y) $125.00 (para.) $220.50 $125.00 $220.50 $125.00 $220.50 $220.50 $125.00 $220.50 $220.50 $220.50 $220.50 Total Fee(s) Claimed $1,239,772.58 $15,743.70 $1,653.75 $157,900.05 $5,380.30 $215,296.20 $2,778.30 $24,828.30 $1,819.13 $503,577.90 $12,336.98 $39,557.70 $4,321.80 $48,071.40 $2,590.88 $160,501.95 $3,825.68 $42,071.40 $2,888.43 $12,843.75 $37,500.00 $323,769.00 $218,956.50 $104,812.50 $35,411.55 $749.70 $34,045.20 $412.50 $48,487.95 $15,787.80 $21,234.15 $11,466.00 Exhibit ECF Nos. 583-1 to 583-30; 604 583-20 583-25; 583-26 583-18; 583-19 583-27; 583-28 583-3; 583-14; 604, at 21–24 583-15; 583-16 583-29; 583-30 583-1; 583-2 583-22 583-6; 604, at 21–22 583-7 to 583-13; 604, at 22–23 583-17; 604, at 27–38 583-17 583-31 to 583-35 583-36, 583-37 II. The Legal Framework “When a litigant files suit in a court in the United States, he or she will typically pay the costs associated with hiring an attorney. This is the ‘American Rule’ and it governs litigation in federal courts ‘absent explicit congressional authorization’ to the contrary.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 734 F.3d 344, 349 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 814–15 (1994)). Congress has “partially abrogate[d] the American Rule” by granting district courts discretion “to award [reasonable] attorneys' fees from state coffers to the prevailing party in a [§ 1983] civil rights action.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)); see also Brandon v. Guilford Cty. Bd. of Elections, 921 F.3d 194, 198 (4th Cir. 2019). “But what Congress provides, Congress can adjust or take away.” Wilkins, 734 F.3d at 349. It did that for a certain class of civil rights cases where attorney's fees are authorized under § 1988—i.e., those brought by any person who was a prisoner when she filed suit—by setting limits on how the court calculates attorney's fees paid to a prevailing plaintiff. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)–(4); Wilkins, 734 F.3d at 349. As relevant here, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides that “[n]o award of attorney's fees ... shall be based on an hourly rate greater than 150 percent of the hourly rate established under [the Criminal Justice Act (‘CJA’), 18 U.S.C. § 3006A,] for payment of court-appointed counsel.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(3) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(1)). The parties do not contest that Plaintiffs were “the prevailing party” in the enforcement phase; that they are entitled to recover from Defendants reasonable attorney's fees and costs that were directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing injunctive relief ordered to cure the ongoing failure to provide constitutionally adequate medical care to the women at FCCW; and that the PLRA caps counsel's hourly rate at $220.50, with lower hourly rates for non-attorney support staff. See generally Pls.' Br. in Supp. 14–20; Defs.' Br. in Opp'n 3–11, 16; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988(b), 1997e(d). Plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating the amount sought is reasonable considering the facts in their case. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). * The Fourth Circuit follows a three-step process to calculate a reasonable attorney's fee award. See McAfee v. Boczar, 738 F.3d 81, 88 (4th Cir. 2014). First, the court determines the lodestar figure by multiplying the number of reasonable hours expended by a reasonable hourly rate. Id. Plaintiffs “bear[ ] the burden of ... documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates,” Project Vote/Voting for Am., Inc. v. Long, 887 F. Supp. 2d 704, 709 (E.D. Va. 2012) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437), and their counsel “should make a good faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary,” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. The court's decision about “what constitutes a ‘reasonable’ number of hours and rate,” Robinson v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 560 F.3d 235, 243 (4th Cir. 2009), is guided by twelve familiar factors: (1) the time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions raised; (3) the skill required to properly perform the legal services rendered; (4) the attorney's opportunity costs in pressing the instant litigation; (5) the customary fee for like work; (6) the attorney's expectations at the outset of the litigation; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount in controversy and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the case within the legal community in which the suit arose; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship between attorney and client; and (12) attorneys' fees awards in similar cases. Barber v. Kimbrell's, Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 226 n. 28 (4th Cir. 1978) (citing Johnson v. Ga. Hwy. Exp., Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974)); see also McAfee, 738 F.3d at 88–89 & n.5. Courts “indulge[ ] a ‘strong presumption’ that the lodestar number represents a reasonable attorney's fee” in the normal run of cases. McAfee, 738 F.3d at 88–89 (quoting Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 554 (2010)). Second, “the court must subtract fees for hours spent on unsuccessful claims unrelated to successful ones. Finally, the court should award some percentage of the remaining amount, depending on the degree of success” the plaintiff enjoyed. Id. at 88 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The court may apply the Johnson factors throughout this process as it deems reasonable and appropriate. See id. at 89. III. Discussion A. Lodestar Figure 1. Hourly Rates Plaintiffs seek recompence at $220.50 per hour for their attorneys; $125.00 per hour for their support staff, whether paid or volunteer[5]; and $110.25 per hour for the LAJC attorneys' case-related travel. See Pls.' Br. in Supp. 28–35; Pls.' Reply Br. 5–7; Pls.' Supp'l Br. in Supp. 2. They bear the burden “to show that the requested hourly rates are consistent with the prevailing market rates in the relevant community for the type of work” performed in this case. McAfee, 738 F.3d at 91 (quotation marks omitted). “The relevant market for determining the prevailing rate is ordinarily the community” where the district court sits. Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 31 F.3d 169, 175 (4th Cir. 1994). Here, the legal markets in central and western Virginia provide the benchmark for establishing reasonable hourly rates, even though some attorneys were brought in from larger cities outside this community. See Scott v. Clarke, 2014 WL 1463755, at *5–6 (W.D. Va. Apr. 15, 2014) (Moon, J.) (rejecting Plaintiffs' “plausible arguments why Washington, D.C. could be used as the relevant legal market to establish reasonable rates for counsel's services” on a successful motion to compel, but concluding that “[g]iven Mr. Howard's experience and qualifications, he [was] entitled to at least $400 per hour for his services in this legal community”); cf. Supinger v. Virginia, No. 6:15cv17, 2019 WL 1450530, at *3 (W.D. Va. Mar. 4, 2019) (Ballou, J.) (finding that the Western District of Virginia, which covers “Central and Southwest Virginia,” was relevant market for case filed in Lynchburg division), adopted as modified on other grounds, 2019 WL 1461071 (W.D. Va. Apr. 2, 2019) (Moon, J.). Prevailing hourly rates “may be established through affidavits reciting the fees of counsel with similar qualifications, information concerning fee awards in similar cases, and/or specific evidence of counsel's billing practice.” Freeman v. Potter, No. 7:04cv276, 2006 WL 2631722, at *4 (W.D. Va. Sept. 13, 2006) (citing Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1402 (4th Cir. 1987)). A court also may take “judicial notice of the rates awarded in prior cases and the court's own familiarly with the rates prevailing in the district.” Rogers v. Summit Receivables, No. 3:17cv69, 2018 WL 1161144, at *4 (W.D. Va. Mar. 5, 2018) (Conrad, J.) (quoting Farbotko v. Clinton Cty., 433 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 2005)); see, e.g., Scott, 2014 WL 1463755, at *5–6 (looking to counsel's declarations and hourly rates in similar cases). a. Attorneys Plaintiffs maintain that the “maximum hourly rate” established for CJA counsel during the “enforcement phase” in this case–—i.e., January 10, 2017 through May 31, 2019—was $147.00, which results in a “PLRA capped” hourly rate of $220.50 for their attorneys' time. Pls.' Br. in Supp. 19 (citing Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, The Judiciary FY 2018 Congressional Budget Summary 37 (rev. June 2017) (“[T]he maximum rate authorized in [the] statute is $147 per hour.”)).[6] Defendants do not contest this rate for most counsel, see generally Defs.' Br. in Opp'n 3–16, but they maintain that it is too high for work performed by Shannon Ellis, Esq., and Maggie Yates, Esq., who graduated from law school in 2015 and 2017, respectively, id. at 5. They propose Ms. Ellis's hourly rate should be cut to $110.25 because, according to their expert, the “prevailing rate for a second-year associate in the community with no prior experience litigating civil rights claims ... is $180/hour.” Id. at 5 (citing Defs.' Br. in Opp'n Ex. 1, Aff. of Jeffrey W. Rosen, Esq. 9–10, ECF No. 602-1). They do not explain, however, why Ms. Ellis is not at least entitled the $180 that Mr. Rosen considers to be “[a] reasonable and customary hourly rate” for second-year associates, Rosen Aff. 10, based on his familiarity with “rates utilized by lawyers throughout Virginia who handle this type of litigation,” id. at 3. See Defs.' Br. in Opp'n (“[H]er billable time is excessive and should be reduced by fifty percent.”). Defendants also do not propose an alternative hourly rate for Ms. Yates's work. See id.; Rosen Aff. 9–10. Plaintiffs counter that Ms. Ellis and Ms. Yates each graduated from prestigious law schools and had relevant substantive experience before they joined LAJC's legal team in 2017. See Pls.' Reply Br. 5–6 (citing Decl. of Shannon Ellis, Esq. ¶¶ 5–6 (June 12, 2019), ECF No. 583-3; Decl. of Angela Ciolfi, Esq. ¶ 58 (June 12, 2019), ECF No. 583-13; Aff. of David W. Thomas, Esq. ¶¶ 6–10 (July 26, 2019), ECF No. 604, at 18–19). Ms. Ellis also had three years' post-graduate legal experience by the time trial started in June 2018 and was instrumental in examining four witnesses, including VDOC's medical director. See id. Plaintiffs' unaffiliated expert, a well-respected and experienced attorney in Charlottesville who is “responsible for reviewing the hourly rates and billing practices of all the attorneys at [his] law firm,” opines that $220.50 per hour is reasonable (and low) for attorneys with comparable skills and experience. See Thomas Aff. ¶¶ 6–10 & n.1. Moreover, Judge Moon awarded $230 per hour for a third-year associate's work on this case in late 2013—more than three years before Ms. Ellis and Ms. Yates started working on the enforcement phase. Scott, 2014 WL 1463755, at *6. I find that $220.50 per hour for compensable work performed by any attorney in this case between January 2017 and June 2019 is reasonable and consistent with the PLRA's hourly rate cap for fees sought under § 1988.[7] Cf. Scott, 2016 WL 452164, at *18 (concluding that $211.50 per hour was a reasonable rate for legal work performed in 2011–2015 and consistent with the PLRA's hourly rate cap) (citing ECF No. 227, at 11–15 & nn. 4–7); Cab Siquic v. Star Forestry, No. 3:13cv43, 2016 WL 1650800, at *2 (W.D. Va. Apr. 22, 2016) (Conrad, J.) (concluding that LAJC's and another high-caliber Washington, D.C. law firm's proposed “rates ranging from $200 to $450 per hour” in non-prisoner litigation were reasonable); Scott, 2014 WL 1463755, at *6 (concluding Plaintiffs were entitled to fee awards of $400.00 per hour for Mr. Howard's work, and $230.00 per hour for a third-year associate's work, performed on a discovery motion in late 2013). b. Law Firm Support Staff Plaintiffs seek $125.00 per hour for work done by six support staff employed by Wiley Rein and Kelly & Crandall. Defendants assert that Plaintiffs cannot recover any fees for “clerical work,” and that, even if they could, “the rate for paralegal work should be reduced to $90/hour.” Defs.' Br. in Opp'n 5. Courts in this circuit agree that “because purely clerical tasks are ordinarily a part of a law office's overhead (which is covered in the hourly rate), they should not be compensated for at all,” even if billed at a lower “paralegal rate.” Two Men & A Truck Int'l, Inc. v. A Mover, Inc. 128 F. Supp. 3d 919, 929 (E.D. Va. 2015) (collecting cases). “Examples of clerical tasks include: filing documents with the court, issuing summonses, scanning and mailing documents, reviewing files for information, printing pleadings, organizing documents, creating notebooks or files, assembling binders, emailing documents, and making logistical telephone calls.” Brown v. Mountainview Cutters, LLC, 222 F. Supp. 3d 505, 514 (W.D. Va. 2016) (Conrad, J.) (citing Two Men & A Truck, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 929–30). Reasonable fees for non-clerical work performed by support staff, on the other hand, are allowed under § 1988 and the PLRA. See, e.g., Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 286–87 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1988); Duvall v. O'Malley, Civ. Act. No. ELH-94-2541, 2016 WL 3523682, at *14 (D. Md. June 28, 2016) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(3)); cf. Hyatt v. Barnhart, 315 F.3d 239, 255 (4th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “fees for paralegal time” are permitted under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), but “such fees are only recoverable to the extent they reflect tasks traditionally performed by an attorney and for which the attorney would customarily charge the client”). I find that $125.00 per hour is a reasonable rate for compensable work done by Wiley Rein's and Kelly & Crandall's litigation-support staff during the enforcement phase. See Pls.' Supp'l Br. in Supp. 1; Pls.' Reply Br. 7 (citing Brown, 222 F. Supp. 3d at 514 (awarding $125.00 per hour for paralegal work performed in Title VII case between 2013 and 2016)); Decl. of Theodore A. Howard, Esq. ¶¶ 14–15 (attesting that Wiley Rein's four support staff typically billed between $190.00 and $325.00 per hour for work done during the enforcement phase), ECF No. 583-17; Howard Decl. Ex. 2, Laffey Matrix (Paralegal/Law Clerk); Kelly Decl. ¶¶ 13–14 (attesting that Kelly & Crandall paralegal Julie Fitzgerald had “over twenty-nine years of paralegal experience” and typically billed at $225.00 per hour in June 2019, and that paralegal Jennifer Doughton had “over five years of experience in the legal field” and typically billed at $165.00 per hour during the same time); cf. Hurd v. Cardinal Logistics Mgmt. Corp., No. 7:17cv319, 2019 WL 6718111, at *4 (W.D. Va. Dec. 10, 2019) (Dillon, J.) (concluding that $125.000 per hour for paralegal or legal assistant services in a civil-rights case was reasonable and consistent with awards in similar cases within the district); Supinger, 2019 WL 1450530, at *3 & n.7 (concluding that plaintiff's proposed rate of $125.00 per hour for paralegal services, which Defendants did not contest, was reasonable for work performed in § 1983 action); Lusk v. Va. Panel Corp., 96 F. Supp. 3d 573, 580 (W.D. Va. Mar. 6, 2015) (Urbanski, J.) (using $125.00 per hour to calculate an award of fees for paralegals in civil-rights case). c. LAJC Pro Bono Support Staff Finally, Plaintiffs seek $125.00 per hour for work performed by seven graduate students (four law, three medical) and one retired psychologist who volunteered at LAJC in 2017–2018. See Pls.' Br. in Supp. 28–29; Pls.' Reply Br. 7; Pls.' Supp'l Br. in Supp. 1–2; Ellis Decl. ¶ 36. Counsel from LAJC explain that they rely on interns and volunteers to provide crucial, cost-effective litigation support because the legal-services organization does not have a team of paid paralegals. See Ellis Decl. ¶¶ 36–37; Ellis Suppl Decl. ¶ 2; Decl. of Brenda Castañeda, Esq. ¶ 18, ECF No. 583-25. The attorneys would have had to carry LAJC's entire workload in this case—and could have billed $220.50 per hour for much of their work—if it weren't for these pro bono assistants. Ellis Decl. ¶¶ 36–37; see Abusamhadaneh, 2013 WL 193778, at *38 (citing Spell, 824 F.2d at 1403). I have no doubt LAJC's interns and volunteers “may provide useful work at economical rates,” Lang v. Va. Beach Life Sav. Serv., Inc., No. 2:12cv574, 2013 WL 12095215, at *8 (E.D. Va. Aug. 23, 2013). See Castañeda Decl. ¶ 18; Decl. of Abigail Turner, Esq. ¶ 38, ECF No. 583-1. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs still must demonstrate that their requested hourly rate falls in line with prevailing market rates paid in this community for the type of work for which they seek an award. Robinson, 560 F.3d at 244. The Court would “abuse[ ] its discretion by awarding the hourly rates requested by [Plaintiffs] in the absence of satisfactory specific evidence of the prevailing market rates” in the Western District of Virginia for litigation-support staff “with similar skill and for similar work.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs have not cited any evidence or authority suggesting that $125 an hour is reasonable compensation for individuals who, unlike their law firms' support staff, have little (if any) professional legal training. See Triplett v. N.C. Dep't of Public Safety, No. 5:15cv75, 2017 WL 3840422, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 1, 2017) (plaintiff's request that work performed by firm's law-student intern be compensated at $135 per hour, the same rate awarded to its paralegal, was “unreasonable” because “law interns neither have the full training of [a] law graduate nor the experience of a paralegal”). Defendants' expert attests that “[t]he community standard is not to bill [for] work” done by students, Rosen Aff. 6, and Plaintiffs do not contest that position. Alternatively, Defendants argue “the rate for [all] paralegal work should be reduced to no more than $90/hour,” Defs.' Br. in Opp'n 6, which is at least closer to hourly rates recently awarded by district courts in this circuit, see, e.g., Tinsley v. City of Charlotte, 397 F. Supp. 3d 803, 810 (W.D.N.C. 2019) (awarding $135 per hour for firm's paralegal and third-year law student); Triplett, 2017 WL 3840422, at *3 (reducing rate from $135 to $75 per hour); Atkins v. Va. Dep't of Transp., No. 1:13cv57, 2015 WL 858870, at *3 (W.D. Va. Feb. 27, 2015) (reducing rate from $80 to $75 per hour); Lopez v. XTEL Constr. Grp., 838 F. Supp. 2d 346, 351 (D. Md. 2012) (reducing rate from $115 to $105 per hour); S.C. Citizens for Life, Inc. v. Krawcheck, No. 4:06cv2773, 2011 WL 13324484, at *3 (D.S.C. Sept. 30, 2011) (finding $65 per hour was a reasonable rate for third-year law student). “[G]iven that the VDOC Defendants are state actors being sued in their official capacities,” Scott, 2014 WL 1463755, at *5, I would be hard-pressed to recommend that the Commonwealth pay more than $30 per hour for a student intern's substantive work on this case, see Second Cir. Judicial Council Comm., Crim. Justice Act Rep. Policy & Proc. Manual 40 (2019) (setting “presumptive hourly rate[s]” of $13.00 to $28.00 for law students assisting CJA attorneys in Connecticut, New York, and Vermont); Standing Order No. 2011-13, In re: CJA Reimbursement for Paralegals & Law Clerks (W.D. Va. Sept. 27, 2011) (instructing that law clerks and “non-secretarial, paralegal and legal assistant professionals” assisting CJA attorneys in this judicial district may be reimbursed “up to” $50.00 per hour and $35.00 per hour, respectively), abrogated by Standing Order 2020-2 (W.D. Va. Mar. 3, 2020); cf. Essex v.Randall, No. Civ. A. DKC20033276, 2006 WL 83424, at *3 (D. Md. Jan. 11, 2006) (“To the extent that the law firm used this case as a learning experience for ... the first-year associate, her time should not billed.” (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434)). It is unnecessary to decide on an hourly rate today, however, because Plaintiffs also failed to show that any of LAJC's pro bono staff performed compensable tasks “reasonably necessary to the results obtained” for their clients in the enforcement phase. Cf. Lang, 2013 WL 12095215, at *4, *8 (approving requested rate of $100 per hour for work done by firm's law-student intern, where the rate was uncontested and supported by affidavits from both Lang's attorneys and “unaffiliated, well-credentialed local attorneys,” but excluding intern's total hours from lodestar calculation). Indeed, as explained in detail below, six contemporaneous records are so meager that I cannot even determine what kind of work the person did. See Denton v. PennyMac Loan Servs., 252 F. Supp. 3d 504, 522 (E.D. Va. 2017). Another record lists time spent on “Medical Records,” but says nothing about the tasks or activities performed. ECF No. 583-7. The most detailed timesheet documents a law student's “attendance at trial” and “large blocks of time devoted to researching basic legal concepts” or doing something with exhibits. Lang, 2013 WL 12095215, at *8. Nothing indicates Plaintiffs' attorneys would have billed this student's hours to a paying client. See Lang, 2013 WL 12095215, at *4, *8. They “also are not properly billed to one's adversary” under the fee-shifting statutes. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. Accordingly, I recommend that Plaintiffs' entire modified fee request for work performed by LAJC's pro bono support staff be excluded from the lodestar calculation. 2. Hours Claimed Next, Plaintiffs bear the burden of “documenting the appropriate hours expended” by their attorneys and support staff in the enforcement phase. Project Vote, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 709 (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437). There's no doubt this phase was “contentious—from both sides—and required extensive discovery and numerous motions,” Stultz v. Virginia, No. 7:13cv589, 2019 WL 4741315, at *1 (W.D. Va. Aug. 15, 2019), adopted as modified by 2019 WL 4740241 (W.D. Va. Sept. 27, 2019) (Moon, J.), years after Defendants should have fully implemented the Agreement's breached provisions, see Scott, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 500–05. I also agree that Defendants' habit of making demands and requests that either they later withdrew, see, e.g., ECF Nos. 373, 431, or were summarily denied, see, e.g., ECF Nos. 352, 460, drove up the amount of time everyone had to spend on this case. See generally Ciolfi Decl. ¶¶ 34–42. Nonetheless, all “[c]ounsel should make a good faith effort,” before submitting their billing records, to “exclude from [the] fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. Attorneys for LAJC and Wiley Rein, who together handled most work in the enforcement phase, see Ciolfi Decl. ¶¶ 43–53; Howard Decl. ¶¶ 12–15; Turner Decl. ¶¶ 19–20, did do this to some degree. For example, Mr. Howard, a senior partner at Wiley Rein, exercised the “same sort” of professional billing discretion he would exercise before submitting a bill to one of his firm's paying clients. Howard Decl. ¶ 13. He accordingly wrote off 161.00 hours of his time spent on issues Plaintiffs chose not to pursue at trial, tasks more properly characterized as administrative or clerical, and entries with inaccurate or insufficiently precise descriptions. Id.; see also Supp'l Decl. of Ted Howard, Esq. ¶ 2, ECF No. 604, at 27; id. Ex. 1, ECF No. 604, at 30–38. Mr. Howard also did not charge for his participation in weekly team conference calls. Certain LAJC attorneys wrote off their time spent doing press or publicity, working on Americans with Disability Act issues, see Turner Decl. ¶ 16; Castañeda Decl. ¶ 8; Ciolfi Decl. ¶ 53; “observing hearings or depositions at which [they] did not act as first- or second-chair” counsel, Ciolfi Decl. ¶ 53; Ellis Decl. ¶ 39; and working on tasks other people led, or “responding to legal questions from FCCW prisoners [that] did not specifically pertain to medical care injunctive relief,” Turner Decl. ¶ 16. In the end, however, Plaintiffs' billing records simply do not justify the number of hours spent on this case or awarding the amount of fees they seek. See Stultz, 2019 WL 4741315, at *1; Supinger, 2019 WL 1450530, at *3. * Adequate documentation requires “reliable contemporaneous recordation of time spent on legal tasks that are described with reasonable particularity” so the court can “weigh the hours claimed and exclude hours that were not reasonably expended.” Guidry v. Clare, 442 F. Supp. 2d 282, 294 (E.D. Va. 2006) (cleaned up). “Where the documentation of hours is inadequate, the district court may reduce the award accordingly.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. It may do so “(i) by identifying and disallowing specific hours that are not adequately documented, or (ii) by reducing the overall fee award by a fixed percentage or amount based on the trial court's familiarity with the case, its complexity, and the counsel involved.” Guidry, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 294. Defendants mostly took the former track: they submitted several “Master” charts highlighting each LAJC and Wiley Rein time entry they believe the Court should exclude to account for block billing (1,070.10 hours); unreasonably vague descriptions (1,100.70 hours); and time spent on clerical or other noncompensable tasks (296.10 hours).[8] Defs.' Br. in Opp'n 6– 9; see generally Rosen Aff. Ex. A 1–224 (LAJC insufficient detail), ECF No. 602-2; Rosen Aff. Ex. F 1–224 (LAJC block billing), ECF No. 602-7; Rosen Aff. Ex. G 1–41 (Wiley Rein block billing), ECF No. 602-8.[9] Defendants also highlighted countless entries on LAJC's attorney timesheets they believe show “redundant and unnecessary billing” for hours spent communicating or meeting with co-counsel, working on tasks unrelated to the enforcement litigation, and training staff or volunteers. Rosen Aff. 8; see generally Rosen Aff. Supp'l Ex. B, at 1–224 (communications), ECF No. 603; Rosen Aff. Ex. C, at 1–224 (team calls); Rosen Aff. Ex. D, at 1–224 (monitoring compliance), ECF No. 602-5; Rosen Aff. Ex. E, at 1–224 (duplicative work or attendance), ECF No. 602-6. Plaintiffs originally sought $1,663,844.48 for ten LAJC attorneys, one Wiley Rein attorney, and four Wiley Rein support staff. Defendants asked the Court to deduct $767,964.02 from that request, leaving a proposed loadstar amount of $895,880.46 for LAJC and Wiley Rein's hours. See Defs.' Br. in Opp'n 6–9. They also objected to Mr. Bennett billing nine hours for an all-day mediation in Charlottesville with five of his co-counsel. See Rosen Aff. 4. Otherwise, Defendants did not challenge any specific entries in timesheets submitted by Kelly & Crandall (two attorneys, two paralegals) or Consumer Litigation Associates (three attorneys), which joined Plaintiffs' legal team in late March 2018. See generally Defs.' Br. in Opp'n 6–10. I find that reducing Plaintiffs' hours by a fixed number or percentage is the fairer and more efficient approach in this case. See Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011); Stultz, 2019 WL 4741315, at *1. Having established “entitlement to an award” of attorney's fees in the enforcement phase, Fox, 563 U.S. at 838 (emphasis added), Plaintiffs' burden now is to produce appropriate documentation showing they've claimed a reasonable number of hours for their work, Spell, 852 F.2d at 767–68; Prison Legal News v. Stolle, 129 F. Supp. 3d 390, 399–400 (E.D. Va. 2015). “The essential goal in shifting fees” to a prevailing party “is to do rough were “a small fraction” of the time Wiley Rein devoted to the enforcement phase), with Rosen Aff. Ex. G, at 4–5, 40 (also highlighting entries by Bethany Corbin, Danielle Barondess, and Krystal Swendsboe). justice,” Fox, 563 U.S. at 838, and find “a fee that is sufficient to induce a capable attorney to undertake the representation of a meritorious civil rights case” without producing a windfall, Perdue, 559 U.S. at 552. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430 n.4. The billing records in this case are voluminous, internally inconsistent, and, in many instances, “impossible ... to cull in detail the justified [hours] from the unjustified” ones. Spell, 852 F.2d at 767. Thus, without setting out a line-by-line summary deleting every excessive entry, the following discussion strikes a balance between eliminating or reducing unreasonable entries where feasible and relying on my informed judgment to recommend reasonable, across-the-board reductions in other instances. See Fox, 563 U.S. at 838 (noting that “trial courts may take into account their overall sense of a suit, and may use estimates in calculating and allocating an attorney's time,” insofar as their goal is “not [to] achieve auditing perfection”). a. Bock Billing & Vague Descriptions Plaintiffs' billing records need “to provide some guidance in identifying” the time spent on compensable tasks. Denton, 252 F. Supp. 3d at 523 (quoting Buffington v. Baltimore Cty., 913 F.2d 113, 128 (4th Cir. 1990)). Block billing, the practice of grouping “several tasks together under a single entry[ ] without specifying the amount of time spent on each particular task,” is not sufficient. Guidry, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 294. Vague descriptions are also inadequate when the court cannot independently determine whether the amount of time claimed is reasonable. See id.; Supinger, 2019 WL 1450530, at *8 (“It is important to recognize that billing practices in the private sector may differ from those acceptable in a § 1983 case, as a fee-shifting statute requires transparency and consistency in determining fees to award to a prevailing party.”). Plaintiffs' records do reflect some unacceptable block billing. For example, LAJC's Litigation Director Abigail Turner routinely grouped different tasks—like meetings, responding to emails, researching issues, and drafting filings—into single entries without specifying how much time she spent on each activity. See, e.g., Turner Timesheet 1–7 (Jan. 26–27, Feb. 15, Feb. 21–22, Mar. 3, Mar. 8, May 1, and May 22, 2017); id. at 9 (June 20–21, 2017); id. at 11 (Aug. 3 and Aug. 16, 2017); id. at 15–16 (Mar. 8 and Mar. 18, 2018); id. at 20 (May 21, 2018). Attorneys at Kelly & Crandall and Consumer Litigation Associates also occasionally billed in blocks for their time, but it was fairly minor. See, e.g., K&C Mar. 2018 Timesheets (Ms. Nash billing 5.2 on hours on March 30 to review documents “re: case background and Rule 30(b)(6) deposition issues,” review motion for protective order and do “[l]egal research re: same,” and “[d]raft outline of motion opposition and email to team for review”), ECF No. 583-32; K&C Apr. 2018 Timesheets 2 (Ms. Nash billing 5.5 hours on April 12 to prepare for and attend telephonic hearing on discovery motions, and 2.0 hours on April 17 to research, draft, and discuss discovery objections); K&C May 2018 Timesheets 1 (Ms. Nash billing 9.0 hours to prepare for and attend telephonic hearing on discovery motions), ECF No. 583-34; CLA Timesheets 1 (Mr. Marchiando billing 9.4 hours on May 29, 2018 to review and make final edits on five motions to strike, draft motions for filing exhibits under seal, and file the same); id. at 3 (Ms. Hanes billing 4.5 hours on May 15, 2018 to “[r]esearch issues related to contempt and substantial compliance, draft summary of law”); id. at 6 (Ms. Hanes billing 1 hour on May 1, 2018 to “draft and file motion to amend scheduling order” and 2 hours to “research, review, and edit” reply brief supporting motion to compel); id. at 7 (Ms. Hanes billing 9.3 hours on April 26, 2018 to attend defense deposition in New York, including “travel to and from, preparation, and deposition time”), ECF No. 583-37. Wiley Rein's support staff followed the same approach, especially around the time of trial. See, e.g., Wiley Rein Timesheets 12 (Ms. White billing 7.0 hours on August 1, 2018 to review and revise citations in post-trial brief, prepare for filing, and file documents with the court, and 12.50 hours on August 6–7, 2018 to prepare courtesy copy of brief with exhibits, send to the court, and prepare notebook of cases cited in Defendants' post-trial brief); id. at 41–43 (Ms. Lynn billing 6.50 hours on March 20, 2018 to scan and download medical records, follow up about canceled records requests, send new requests, find information needed to serve subpoenas, and locate documents, and 42.25 hours on June 1–8 for “[g]eneral preparations for trial, pulling files, etc.”); id. at 44–47 (numerous block entries for Mr. Michel's time spent “coordinating” or “consulting” with others, “preparing” or “reviewing” documents, and “organizing” discovery materials), ECF No. 583-17. Conversely, Mr. Howard consistently indicated how long he spent on different tasks whenever he billed for blocks of his time. See generally id. at 14–16, 19–30. Thus, his entries do not raise concerns typically associated with block billing. The bigger flaw in Plaintiffs' billing records is that many entries are too vague to understand. Stultz, 2019 WL 4741315, at *6. The problem is especially prevalent in LAJC's and Wiley Rein's (except Mr. Howard) timesheets. All nine LAJC attorneys' records are replete with entries for time spent in meetings and on phone calls; see, e.g., Ciolfi Timesheet 2–30; Rolla Timesheet 1–3; “checking in” with each other; see, e.g., Deane Timesheet 2–9 (daily); Castañeda Timesheet 6–8; Ogunkeyede Timesheet 2–3; and reading or sending emails, see, e.g., Ciolfi Timesheet 2–28; Ellis Timesheet 2–96; Castañeda Timesheet 2–8, 10–21. Ms. Ellis's timesheet alone contains 390 unique entries labeled “Review and respond to case-related email,” all billed at the attorney rate of $220.50 per hour, that do not provide any information about the email's subject matter. See generally Ellis Timesheet 2–96. Altogether, Ms. Ellis spent more than 240 hours—or six full workweeks—just reading and responding to “case-related email.” That's almost $53,000 in attorney's fees. Ms. Ciolfi's records have about 40 unique entries that document her time spent reviewing Defendants' discovery production, see Ciolfi Timesheet 8, 10, 12–14, 18–20, 23, 27, but that “do not disclose the nature, volume, or relevance of the documents,” Route Triple Seven Ltd. v. Total Hockey, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 3d 607, 621 (E.D. Va. 2015). See Ciolfi Decl. ¶ 14 (noting LAJC devoted a “significant amount of time” to reviewing “the roughly 94,000 pages of discovery documents” from Defendants). Wiley Rein's billing records contain dozens of equally vague entries for its para-professionals' time spent reviewing documents and processing discovery requests. See Wiley Rein Timesheets 12, 41–43, 43–48, 48– 49 (White, Lynn, Michel, Williams). Mr. Howard, on the other hand, consistently described in sufficient detail both the subject matter and relevancy of his work. Plaintiffs' attorneys also claimed significant time “preparing” for meetings, phone calls, client visits, depositions, hearings, and trial. See, e.g., Bauer Timesheet 2; Castañeda Timesheet 2–8, 18–19; Ciolfi Timesheet 2–6, 8–10, 12–14, 16, 18–24, 26–27; Deane Timesheet 3–9; Ellis Timesheet 2, 4–5, 8, 10–18, 20–21, 23–24, 29–30, 32–36, 38–49; Howard Timesheet 16, 27–31, 33–39; Ogunkeyede Timesheet 3; Rolla Timesheet 2–3; Turner Timesheet 2–3, 5–8, 12, 16–17, 19–20, 23. “These entries provide no insight as to the particular tasks performed beyond preparing” for some other event, “nor do they indicate the specific reasons for such time spent.”[10] Stultz, 2019 WL 4741315, at *6. Without this information, “it is impossible for the court to verify[,] as the statute requires[,] the reasonableness of the billings, either as to the necessity of the particular service or the total amount of time expended on a given task.” In re Meese, 907 F.2d at 1204 (cleaned up). Thus, I “must make a judgment in reducing the relevant number of hours forming the basis for a fee award.” Total Hockey, 127 F. Supp. 3d at 622. “Courts faced with excessively vague or inadequate descriptions of tasks” in fee petitions have reduced hours “by percentages ranging from 20% to 90%,” while block billing warrants a reduction “ranging from 10% to 20%.” Id. (collecting cases). Both are serious problems in this case, though vagueness is much more so than block billing. Accordingly, I recommend the Court reduce LAJC's attorney hours by 20% and the private law firms' attorney hours by 5% to account for block billing and vague descriptions of otherwise compensable work. For the same reasons, the number of paralegal hours claimed by their support staff (except for LAJC's interns and volunteer) should be reduced by 40%. Ms. Yates's timesheets and LAJC's pro bono billing records are so inadequate that they deserve their own reductions. As Defendants point out, Ms. Yates often used generic terms—like “meeting,” “call,” “emails,” “review documents,” and “exhibits”—to describe her work in the enforcement phase. See Yates Timesheet 1–4, ECF No. 583-22. Only a handful of her entries even “mention ... the [particular] subject matter of a meeting, telephone conference[,] or the work performed during hours billed.” In re Meese, 907 F.2d 1192, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see, e.g., Yates Timesheet 2 (Jan. 29, Feb. 9, Mar. 3, Mar. 15); id. at 3 (Mar. 29, May 1, May 18). And, while I can see Ms. Yates handled “significant amounts of document review in discovery” and “document/exhibit prep” during the five-day trial, Ciolfi Decl. ¶ 58; see Yates Timesheet 2– 4, none of her contemporaneous time entries “disclose the nature, volume, or relevance of th[ose] documents,” Total Hockey, 127 F. Supp. 3d at 621. Thus, I cannot assess whether she reasonably spent (at least) 44.6 attorney hours on “doc review” and “exhibits.” Yates Timesheet 2–3. See Total Hockey, 127 F. Supp. 3d at 621. The roughly 40 unique time entries labeled simply “call,” “meeting,” “emails,” or “hearing” pose the same problem. Accordingly, I recommend the Court cut Ms. Yates's hours by an additional 10%. The billing records from LAJC's eight pro bono support staff are exceptionally deficient. To start, five timesheets do not even have the timekeeper's name on them. ECF Nos. 583-8 to 583-10, 583-12, 583-13.[11] Of those five, only three contain any contemporaneous information about the kind of work the person (all law students, apparently) did during the enforcement phase. See, e.g., ECF No. 583-10, at 2 (billing 7.0 hours for “Memorandum-Good Faith in Civil Contempt Proceedings”); ECF No. 583-12, at 1–2 (billing 48.0 hours for “FCCW Visit[s],” including time spent on “prep,” “notes,” and reviewing medical records); ECF No. 583-13, at 1 (billing 4.0 hours for “[f]illing in Pre-trial Order with witnesses, review[ing] defendant answers and draft[ing] stipulated facts, review[ing] pre-trial brief and draft[ing] disputed issues section”). The other two just show that a medical student completed 30 hours of community service for LAJC over ten days the spring of 2018. ECF Nos. 583-8, 583-9. Medical student John Costello's timesheet lists time spent on “Orientation” (1.5 hours); “Front Desk” (8 hours); and “Medical Records” (23.5 hours) during the fall of 2017, ECF No. 583-7, but it does not include any contemporaneous notes about the actual tasks he performed, Guidry, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 294. Ms. Ellis later explained that the law students “assisted with numerous tasks,” like writing legal and fact memos, interviewing clients, and drafting parts of Plaintiffs' filings, while the medical students “primarily ... review[ed] client interview memos against the client medical records,” Ellis Decl. ¶ 36(b)–(d), and “highlight[ed] areas of concern that needed further investigation.” Supp'l Decl. of Shannon Ellis, Esq. ¶ 2(b)–(c) (July 26, 2019), ECF No. 604, at 22–23. She “estimate[d]” Mr. Costello, Mr. Dorsey, and Ms. Hour, spent “more than 90% of [their] time ... on substantive paralegal work rather than clerical duties,” id. 2(b)–(d), whereas Ms. Simmons's “work was entirely paralegal, including document review and drafting portions of filings,” id. ¶ 2(h). The students' timesheets do not support these estimates. Deborah Bremer volunteered for LAJC between February 28, 2017, and October 10, 2018. ECF No. 583-6, at 1–15. Her timesheets list the dates and hours worked. Most records had space to list the “[t]asks performed” on each date, id. at 7–15, but only one entry contains any information about the nature of her work. On October 3, 2018, Ms. Bremer spent thirty minutes “copying.” Id. at 15. Otherwise, it seems she used the “[t]asks performed” column to record the time she left LAJC's office for the day. See id. at 7–15. Moreover, Ms. Ellis's initial declaration indicated Ms. Bremer worked on purely clerical tasks like “collecting, scanning, ... filing,” and summarizing client records or correspondence and “returning original documents to [LAJC's] clients.” Ellis Decl. ¶ 36(a); accord Ellis Timesheets 6, 7, 8, 17, 20, 22, 60, 64, 68, 77 (describing Ms. Bremer as a “file clerk,” and documenting time spent with her on “filing/scanning training,” discussing “processing client letters,” editing work “on client letters/responses,” checking in about “medical records scans,” going over “how to process” institutional records, discussing “scanning priorities,” giving instructions on “scanning and summarizing” documents, training on “returning documents to clients, coordinating “to continue scanning,” and assigning “clerical” and “document processing tasks”). Ms. Ellis's later “estimate that more than 90% of [Ms. Bremer's] time was spent on substantive paralegal work rather than clerical duties,” Ellis Supp'l Decl. ¶ 2(a), is not persuasive when compared to her own records. Law student Taylor Mitchell kept the most detailed contemporaneous time records. As noted, however, those records show Mr. Mitchell spent most of his summer reviewing documents (17 hours); sitting in on meetings, phone calls, and depositions (17 hours); working with exhibits (39 hours); and, finally, attending the bench trial (58 hours). ECF No. 583-11. A few of Mr. Mitchell's “entries are just plain confusing.” Stultz, 2019 WL 4741315, at *6. For example, it appears he billed 14 hours for attending the trial's opening day on June 11, 2018. See id. at 3. Ms. Ciolfi, Mr. Howard, and Ms. Ellis billed only 7 hours, 12 hours, and 13.5 hours, respectively, for time spent in court that day. See Ciolfi Timesheet 29; Howard Timesheet 34; Ellis Timesheet 82. Regardless of these inconsistencies, nothing in the record suggests the attorneys would have billed Mr. Mitchell's hours to a paying client. Lang, 2013 WL 12095215, at *4, *8; cf. Wiley Rein Timesheets 12–14 (writing off 33.25 hours, or $9,808.75, for two summer law clerks' time spent researching discrete legal issues, drafting internal memoranda, revising briefs, and meeting with supervising attorneys). Thus, those hours “also are not properly billed to” the Commonwealth under the applicable fee-shifting statutes. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. Accordingly, I recommend that Plaintiffs' entire modified fee request for work performed by LAJC's pro bono support staff be excluded from the lodestar calculation. b. Clerical Tasks Defendants also objected to Plaintiffs' original fee request for $40,665.00 to cover 271.1 attorney hours spent on “self-described clerical work.” Defs.' Br. in Opp'n 8–9; see LAJC Hrs. & Fees Summ. 1. LAJC's timesheets have separate columns to report time spent on “attorney work,” billed at $220.50 per hour, and time spent on “clerical work,” billed at $150 per hour. Pls.' Br. in Supp. 28; LAJC Hrs. & Fees Summ. 1. There are some obvious inconsistences in their records, though, particularly in how attorneys billed for time spent requesting prison visits and medical records. See, e.g., Castañeda Timesheet 2–5, 7, 10–11 (billing 1.9 attorney hours, 1.0 clerical hour); Ellis Timesheet 3–11, 13–18, 20 (billing 12.8 attorney hours, 8.4 clerical hours from Jan. 23–June 1, 2017). LAJC attorneys also consistently billed $220.50 an hour for time spent emailing documents to co-counsel, scheduling depositions and client visits, making logistical phone calls, reviewing or updating to-do lists, and drafting meeting agendas. See generally Castañeda Timesheet 2–8, 17–18; Ciolfi Timesheet 2–17, 19–25, 27, 29; Deane Timesheet 2, 7; Turner Timesheet 3–8, 10–12, 14, 16–17, 19–23. While I recognize LAJC is a legal-services organization where attorneys typically handle their own administrative tasks, the Commonwealth should not have to compensate Plaintiffs for work that a private law firm would absorb as overhead rather than bill to a paying client. See Gonzalez v. Yoblendz Int'l, Civ. No. 15-6167, 2016 WL 9225573, at *1 (S.D. Fla. June 20, 2016) (“It is well-established that clerical work such as coordinating schedules and housekeeping matters are not to be included in an attorney's fee award, even if an attorney conducted those tasks.”). Plaintiffs' three private law firms billed $220.50 per hour for any work their attorneys performed, even if it fell “into the ‘gray area’ of tasks which may appropriately be performed by either an attorney or a paralegal,” Abusamhadaneh, 2013 WL 193778, at *38, and $125.00 per hour for work performed by their support staff. See, e.g., Bennett Decl. ¶ 18; CLA Timesheets 1– 10; Howard Decl. ¶¶ 11–15; Kelly Decl. ¶ 16; K&C Apr. 2018 Timesheet 1–2; K&C May 2018 Timesheet 1–2. “While the Fourth Circuit has upheld compensation at the full attorney rate for certain tasks in the gray area,” Abusamhadaneh, 2013 WL 193778, at *38 (citing Spell, 824 F.3d at 1401–02), these attorneys or their support staff still sometimes billed for tasks clearly falling into the “administrative or clerical” category, see, e.g., Wiley Rein Timesheets 12 (making case notebooks, filing motions); id. 42–43 (sending, scanning, or organize documents and files); CLA Timesheets 1–2, 5–7, 10 (block billing for both legal work and clerical tasks); K&C March 2018 Timesheet 1 (same); K&C April 2018 Timesheet 1 (same); K&C May 2018 Timesheet 1–2 (same). Plaintiffs properly withdrew their $40,665.00 “claim for LAJC clerical time,” but their voluntary reduction did not go far enough. Accordingly, I recommend the Court further reduce by 5% the number of attorney and paralegal hours claimed for the remaining clerical work to account for time that Plaintiffs “should not be compensated for at all.” Two Men & A Truck, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 929–30; see Brown, 222 F. Supp. 3d at 514. c. Overstaffing & Excessive Hours Next, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' decision to use “sixteen attorneys at four law firms spread across the Commonwealth and the District of Columbia” resulted in duplicated efforts when drafting or reviewing discovery and court filings; “excessive travel for ‘team’ meetings” and client meetings at FCCW; overbilling for multiple attorneys to attend or participate in conference calls, depositions, hearings, and other proceedings, including an all-day mediation and the five-day bench trial; and getting new attorneys “up to speed” throughout the enforcement phase. Defs.' Br. in Opp'n 8; see generally Rosen Aff. 3–5; id. Supp'l Ex. B, at 3– 223 (copy of LAJC invoice with “numerous” entries for “intra-counsel communications” highlighted); id. Ex. C, at 3–63, 65–84, 87–108, 110–14, 116–20, 122–26, 128, 130–36, 138, 140–43, 145–56, 159–70, 172, 174–75, 177, 180–82, 184–85, 187–90, 192, 194, 196–98, 201, 204–06, 223 (copy of LAJC “invoice with all of the entries for the Plaintiff ‘team’ calls highlighted”); id. Ex. E, at 3, 8, 13, 21, 27–28, 34–35, 42–43, 45–46, 51–52, 54, 56, 64, 67–69, 82, 84–85, 94, 97–98, 101–05, 108, 110, 112–16, 118–19, 121–26, 128, 131–34, 136–43, 145– 47, 150–80, 182–95, 197, 199–224 (copy of LAJC invoice with entries relating to training attorneys, staff, and volunteers highlighted). Defendants also challenge Plaintiffs' decision to use January 10, 2017, as the “bright-line” start date for enforcement-phase billing because Plaintiffs did not file their contempt motion until September 2017. See Defs.' Br. in Opp'n 4–5 (“Nine months is an unreasonable amount of time for preparing a theory of a case and drafting a motion to show cause and supporting brief.”). They ask the Court to exclude all requested fees and costs incurred before May 2017, when Defendants responded to Plaintiffs' Notice Letter. Id. at 5. Mr. Rosen opines that “a case of this size” would “require multiple attorneys,” but that “the involvement of 16 attorneys is unquestionably excessive and resulted in duplication of effort and considerable time meeting and otherwise communicating with one another.” Rosen Aff. 5; see also id. at 8 (conceding that “communications among co-counsel” are “necessary” in cases like this, but concluding that “the extent of the billing” by Plaintiffs' counsel “is excessive and highlights the redundant and unnecessary billing”). He also rejects out of hand Ms. Ciolfi's sworn representation that Plaintiffs' litigation team “saved significant time” by assigning specific clients and potential witnesses to individual attorneys, Ciolfi Decl. ¶ 44, because, in his opinion, “assigning separate attorneys to witnesses necessitates additional significant—and unnecessary—attorney time to coordinate and reconcile the testimony and evidence from the witnesses.” Rosen Aff. 4–5; accord id. at 8 (“The practice of having witnesses' examinations among so many lawyers requires an unnecessary duplication of attorney billing” at trial). He does not point to any specific examples in LAJC's timesheets, but, in fairness, that's likely because the entries are too vague to discern how much time attorneys spent reconciling their respective witnesses. See Abusamhadaneh, 2013 WL 193778, at *22 (“Although multiple representation can be productive, there is also the danger of duplication, a waste of resources which is difficult to measure.”). Mr. Rosen does not offer an opinion about the enforcement phase's start date, or whether it was reasonable for Plaintiffs' counsel to start billing for work on this phase in January 2017. * * Defendants' objection to the billing start-date is not persuasive. For one, they rely entirely on two unpublished decisions where district courts (both outside this circuit) reduced attorney's fee awards sought for work performed several months before plaintiffs initiated their administrative appeals in federal district court. See Defs.' Br. in Opp'n 4 (citing A.V. ex. rel. Antunes v. Lemon Grove Sch. Dist., No. 3:16cv803, 2017 WL 2959242, at *6 (S.D. Cal. July 11, 2017) (seven months); R.L. v. Miami-Dade Cty. Sch. Bd., No. 07-20321-CIV, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58277, at *10–11 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 26, 2016) (five months)). Both cases were brought under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, which authorizes payment of attorney's fees “incurred in relation to the underlying administrative hearing” only if the prevailing plaintiff shows the work also was “involved in, or at least related to,” the later-filed lawsuit. R.L., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58277, at *5, *10 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(I)); see also A.V., 2017 WL 2959242, at *5 (citing Webb v. Cty. Bd. of Educ., 471 U.S. 234, 243 (1985)). The district courts denied fee requests for work done prior to the administrative hearing because “nothing” in counsel's billing records “suggest[ed] that the work [was] related to” the subsequent litigation. A.V., 2017 WL 2959242, at *6; see also R.L., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58277, at *10–11. Both courts awarded attorney's fees for work performed in the month before plaintiffs filed their complaints in federal court. See A.V., 2017 WL 2959242, at *6; R.L., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70389, at *6 (S.D. Fla. May 17, 2013). “The time that is compensable under § 1988 is that reasonably expended on the litigation.” Webb, 471 U.S. at 242. “[S]ome of the services performed before a lawsuit is formally commenced by the filing of a complaint are performed ‘on the litigation.’ Most obvious examples are the drafting of the initial pleadings and the work associated with the development of the theory of the case.” Id. Here, Plaintiffs' counsel logically explained how most of their claimed hours between January and May 2017 were related to developing their theory of the enforcement-phase litigation, drafting their motion to show cause and supporting brief, and procuring the numerous declarations and exhibits attached thereto. Compare Pls.' Reply Br. 4 (citing Turner Decl. ¶¶ 19–20; Ellis Decl. ¶¶ 7; Ogunkeyede Decl. ¶¶ 9–10), with A.V., 2017 WL 2959242, at *6 (“[N]othing in the entries, most of which are labeled as correspondence/communication with client and/or district, suggest that the work related to the drafting of the initial pleadings or development of the theory of the case.”). The tasks they performed beginning in the early spring of 2017 indicate their strategy shifted from monitoring compliance with the Settlement Agreement generally to seeking the Court's help enforcing specific standards and provisions. See, e.g., Ciolfi Timesheet 2 (Jan. 20, Feb. 16–17, Mar. 31, 2017); Howard Timesheet 15 (Jan. 20, Jan. 31, Feb. 13, Feb. 20–21, 2017); Turner Timesheet 2– 3 (Jan. 18, Feb. 15–16, Feb. 22, 2017). Moreover, Plaintiffs' ability to show that the VDOC Defendants should be held in civil contempt—which is what everyone understood this proceeding to be until Defendants first raised their Rule 65(d) argument in August 2018, Scott, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 479 n.4, 489–93—demanded significantly more work than drafting a complaint, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Accordingly, I do not recommend any reduction in the hours claimed solely based on when the work was performed. The crux of the lodestar calculation is whether the prevailing party's attorneys claimed a reasonable number of hours for their work on the litigation, not the number of lawyers or law firms involved. Elderberry of Webster City, LLC v. Living Ctrs.-Se., No. 6:12cv52, 2014 WL 3900389, at *5 (W.D. Va. Aug. 11, 2014) (Moon, J.) (“Reduction of hours is not warranted simply because a client has multiple attorneys.”); see, e.g., SunTrust Mortg., Inc. v. AIG United Guar. Corp., 933 F. Supp. 2d 762, 775–76 (E.D. Va. 2013) (focusing on the reasonableness of time expended by at least twenty-one attorneys with two firms and concluding that the information provided by the prevailing party showed that the matter was “for the most part, ... prudently staffed”). The decision to have sixteen attorneys work on the enforcement phase, without more, is neither “unquestionably excessive,” Rosen Aff. 5, nor inherently unnecessary, id. at 8. See Elderberry, 2014 WL 3900389, at *5. “However, if multiple attorneys bill for completing the same work product and the contribution of each attorney is not justified, the billed hours should be reduced for excessiveness.”[12] Crump v. U.S. Dep't of Navy ex rel. Mabus, 245 F. Supp. 3d 692, 713 (E.D. Va. 2017) (citing Rum Creek Coal, 31 F.3d at 180). “Generalized billing by multiple attorneys on a large case often produces unacceptable duplication,” Rum Creek Coal, 31 F.3d at 180, and frustrates the court's ability to make sure those attorneys made “a distinct contribution by their presence [at] or participation” in the work billed, Hudson v. Pittsylvania Cty., Va., No. 4:11cv43, 2013 WL 4520023, at *7 (W.D. Va. Aug. 26, 2013) (quotation marks omitted) (citing Martin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp., 48 F.3d 134, 1360 (4th Cir. 1995)). Plaintiffs' counsel routinely billed for time they and their colleagues spent in meetings, depositions, and court proceedings without demonstrating how each attorney contributed to the work. For example, several LAJC attorneys billed at least one hour every week for regularly scheduled calls with co-counsel. See, e.g., Castañeda Timesheet 2–15, 17 (35.1 hours); Ciolfi Timesheet 2, 6–7, 9–13, 15, 17, 19–20, 22, 24–25 (29.6 hours); Ellis Timesheet 2, 6–9, 12, 14– 17, 19, 21–22, 24, 27, 29, 31, 34–41, 43–44, 46–47, 49–53, 55, 58, 60–62, 64–68, 70, 72, 75, 78, 81 (58.4 hours); Ogunkeyede Timesheet 2–4 (19.3 hours); Rolla Timesheet 2–3 (29.5 hours); see also Ciolfi Decl. ¶ 43 (“[T]he litigation team conducted a standing weekly conference call during which case strategy, development, and assignments were managed.”). Ms. Castañeda, Ms. Ciolfi, and Ms. Ellis worked together in LAJC's Charlottesville office, while Ms. Ogunkeyde and Ms. Rolla worked in the Richmond office. See Ellis Decl. ¶ 5; Ogunkeyde Decl. ¶ 10; Rolla Decl. 3; Rolla Timesheet 3. This sampling alone equals 171.0 attorney hours spent on weekly conference calls, resulting in a requested fee of $37,903.95.[13] Only a few contemporaneous entries mention the call's subject matter, see, e.g., Ciolfi Timesheet 2, 6, 12, 15, 17, 22, 25, and Plaintiffs do not point to any such entries describing how an individual attorney's presence or participation made “a distinct contribution” to the call, Hudson, 2013 WL 4520023, at *7 (citing Martin, 48 F.3d at 1360). See Ciolfi Decl. ¶ 43. Whatever the perceived benefit of these team calls, see id., the Commonwealth should not have to compensate Plaintiffs for multiple lawyers' regular attendance when they have not justified those hours, Faircloth v. Colvin, No. 2:13cv156, 2014 WL 5488809, at *9 (E.D. Va. Oct. 29, 2014) (“When a task or issue does not require the use of multiple attorneys, the Court should ‘award fees for the time of one attorney.’ ” (quoting Cox v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 630, 636 (E.D. Va. 2001)). See also Trimper v. City of Norfolk, 58 F.3d 68, 76 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he law is clear that in seeking attorney's fees under [§] 1988, attorneys are under a duty to minimize expenses.”). Defendants also take issue with the fact that six Plaintiffs' attorneys (Bennett, Castañeda, Ciolfi, Ellis, Howard, Turner) billed 121.3 work hours ($26,746.65) for an all-day mediation in Charlottesville on May 16, 2018. See Rosen Aff. 5. At the hearing, counsel explained that mediation came up at the last minute before trial, and they wanted to make sure the attorney who knew the most about his or her “area of responsibility” would be there to best protect the class's interests. But see Joint Mot. for Disc. Plan 3 (Dec. 1, 2017) (“Parties shall conduct settlement talks and/or mediation: May 1–11, 2018”), ECF No. 303; Order Granting Joint Mot. for Disc. Plan & Pretrial Order 1 (Dec. 4, 2017) (same), ECF No. 404; CLA Timesheets 9 (Mr. Bennett and Ms. Ciolfi discussing “trial, settlement” on April 17, 2018); Order Granting Defs.' Mot. for Referral to Mediation (May 2, 2018), ECF No. 374. But, class counsel are all exceptionally well-qualified, and several of them were on the original litigation team in 2012–2014. See, e.g., Ciolfi Decl. ¶¶ 1–12, 47–49; Howard Decl. ¶¶ 1–10; Turner Decl. ¶¶ 2–19. Plaintiffs have not shown why two or three of their most experienced attorneys could not handle the mediation themselves. See Stultz, 2019 WL 4741315, at *7 (three attorneys billing 7.5 hours each to attend an unsuccessful mediation was excessive); Gagliastre v. Cap't George's Seafood Rest., No. 2:17cv379, 2019 WL 2288441, at *4, *6 (E.D. Va. May 29, 2019) (multiple attorneys billing each 7.0 hours to attend a successful mediation in class action case was excessive). Similarly, eight LAJC attorneys (Bauer, Castañeda, Ciolfi, Ellis, Ogunkeyde, Rolla, Tuner, Yates) billed 300.10 work hours ($66,172.05) and 37.5 travel hours ($4,125.00) to attend the bench trial in Charlottesville on June 11–15, 2018. Defendants correctly point out that Ms. Bauer billed 39.8 hours ($8,775.90) to attend all five days of trial, see Rosen Aff. 5; Bauer Timesheet 2, even though she only cross-examined a single expert witness on the final day, see Trial Tr. Vol. VII, at 78–83 (June 15, 2018), ECF No. 524.[14] Finally, although Defendants do not raise the issue, I find Plaintiffs' records show some overbilling for attorneys to second-chair depositions. See Doe v. Alger, No. 5:15cv35, 2018 WL 4655749, at *9 (W.D. Va. Sept. 27, 2018) (Dillon, J.). Mr. Bennett billed just over six hours to attend Ms. Turner's seven-hour deposition of Defendants' nursing expert witness. See CLA Timesheets 3; Turner Timesheet 18. Ms. Castañeda, who second-chaired Ms. Bauer's deposition (3.8 hours) of another defense witness, billed five hours for this work. See Castañeda Timesheet 16; Bauer Timesheet 2. At the hearing on their petition, Plaintiffs' counsel explained they needed the second attorney to help with voluminous paper exhibits. I disagree. A single attorney, especially one with Ms. Turner's decades of legal experience and intimate familiarity with this litigation, see Turner Decl. ¶¶ 2–5, “should have been able to handle the deposition[ ] ... without assistance during the deposition itself, even if there were a substantial number of documents,” Doe, 2018 WL 4655749, at *9. Some attorneys also billed too much time “preparing” for telephonic discovery hearings or drafting relatively straightforward motions. Cf. Doe, 2018 WL 4655749, at *9 (discussing time spent on motion for summary judgment). On April 12, 2018, Ms. Nash billed 5.5 hours to “[p]repare for” and attend a telephonic hearing on Defendants' motion for protective order related to Plaintiffs' scheduled Rule 30(b)(6) depositions and other discovery disputes. K&C Apr. 2018 Timesheets 2. The hearing lasted one hour, sixteen minutes. ECF No. 350. Ms. Nash's entries do not explain why a mid-level associate with “significant federal litigation experience ... in dozens of complex[ ] class-action cases,” Kelly Decl. ¶ 12, billed more than four hours to prepare for oral argument on briefs that she personally drafted, see K&C Apr. 2018 Timesheets 1 (entries of Apr. 2–3). The decision to reduce hours based on unjustified overstaffing or duplicative attorney efforts “falls soundly within the district court's proper discretion in determining an attorney's fee award” under § 1988. Trimper, 58 F.3d at 76–77. Plaintiffs took an “all hands on deck” approach to staffing the enforcement phase. Pls.' Reply Br. 10. While this was their choice, see Abusamhadaneh, 2013 WL 193778, at *38 (noting that “there is no single, correct way to staff every lawsuit”), there still “should be some appreciable benefit in terms of efficiencies as a result of expertise” or division of labor, Doe, 2018 WL 4655749, at *9. “Here, rather than efficiencies, the court sees unreasonable numbers of hours spent” in team meetings and on tasks that could have been accomplished by one experienced attorney. Doe, 2018 WL 4655749, at *9. Accordingly, I recommend the Court further reduce by 20% the number of attorney hours claimed by all counsel to account for duplicative efforts, overstaffing, and otherwise excessive hours. d. Other Johnson Factors The above analyses takes into account evidence of the time and labor expended on the enforcement phase (first Johnson factor); the skill required to properly perform the legal services rendered (third factor); the customary fees for like work (fifth factor); time limitations imposed by the clients or other circumstances, especially multiple prisoner's life-threatening medical conditions and Defendants' often unpredictable behavior during the litigation (seventh factor); the experience, reputation, of ability of the attorneys and other staff seeking reimbursement (ninth factor); and the nature and length of the professional relationship between class counsel and at least some of their clients (eleventh factor). See Turner Decl. ¶¶ 20–24. As for the other factors, Defendants argue Plaintiffs achieved limited success because “the Court found violations of only 8 of the 17 standards” they identified in their motion to show cause and “awarded almost none of the relief” they requested, including holding Defendants in civil contempt. Defs.' Br. in Opp'n 13, 15. The first point has some merit, but is better addressed at the next step when separating out time spent on unsuccessful claims not related to the successful ones. The second point overlooks “the egregious facts surrounding many” of the eight standards Defendants breached, Scott, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 504; see also id. at 480–84, 495–500, Judge Moon's rejection of Defendants' numerous arguments why the Court could not or should not enforce those standards three years after Defendants agreed to fully implement them, see id. at 493–94, 495–96, 500–06; Scott v, 391 F. Supp. 3d at 617–19, and the significance of the relief crafted to remedy (again) specific, systemic shortcomings in medical care at FCCW. Defendants avoided civil contempt this time because the Court was “bound by the Fourth Circuit's clear statements” in three published decisions that Rule 65(d) is mandatory. Scott, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 493. Faced with an injunctive order that “explain[ed] what it [was] enjoining or requiring” by referring, rather than expressly incorporating, the Settlement Agreement's terms, the Court had no choice but to conclude that contempt was off the table for now. Id. at 491; see id. at 491–93. Class counsel still achieved excellent results for the women who are housed at FCCW. See id. at 505–06. And, as Judge Moon made clear, their quest to remedy “pervasive constitutionally deficient medical care” now stretched into its seventh year only because Defendants had “upheld neither their Eighth Amendment obligations nor the Settlement Agreement they reached to effectuate those obligations.” Id. at 506. Defendants' opposition brief does not mention any of the other Johnson factors (two, four, six, ten, twelve) as a basis for reducing Plaintiffs' proposed lodestar figure. See generally Defs.' Br. in Opp'n 6–10. Plaintiffs' attorneys submitted declarations explaining why these factors weigh in their favor, see, e.g., Ciolfi Decl. ¶¶ 13–14; Bennett Decl. ¶¶ 23–26; Turner Decl. ¶¶ 28–38, and I generally agree with those positions. e. Summary of Adjustments Plaintiffs bear the burden of documenting the appropriate hourly rates for their attorneys and support staff and the number of hours expended on the litigation considering the facts and circumstances of this case. While Plaintiffs' counsel made some effort to exclude from their fee request hours that were excessive, redundant, unnecessary, or otherwise not properly billed to a paying client, their records do not justify the number of hours spent on the enforcement phase— despite achieving excellent results for their clients. Accordingly, I recommend the following adjustments to their original lodestar figure: • Reduce by 45% the number of hours claimed by the LAJC attorneys to account for block billing and unacceptably vague descriptions (20%); overstaffing, duplicative efforts, and excessive hours spent on preparation (20%); and attorney time spent on non-compensable tasks (5%). • Further reduce by 10% the number of hours claimed by Ms. Yates to account for excessively vague descriptions of her work. • Reduce by 25% the number of hours claimed by all attorneys at Wiley Rein, Kelly & Crandall, and Consumer Litigation Associates to account for minimal block billing and vague descriptions (5%), plus overstaffing, duplicative efforts, and excessive hours spent on preparation (20%). • Reduce by 45% the number of paralegal hours claimed by the law firms' support staff to account for bock billing and unacceptably vague descriptions of their work (40%); and time spent on non-compensable clerical tasks (5%). • Exclude all hours claimed by LAJC's pro bono support staff to account for excessive and unacceptably vague descriptions of work that counsel would not have billed to a paying client (100%). The new lodestar figure (rounded to the nearest .10) breaks down accordingly: Organization LAJC (attorney/travel) Wiley Rein; Kelly & Crandall; Consumer Litig. Assocs. Combined New Lodestar Names or Positions Bauer, Castañeda, Ciolfi, Deane, Ellis, Ogunkeyde, Rolla & Tuner Yates Pro Bono (8) Attorneys (6) Support Staff (6) Attorneys (15) LAJC Travel (9) Law Firm Support Staff (6) Hours Claimed 5,287.60 225.30 190.80 25.70 402.75 1,370.00 841.80 6,848.40 251.00 841.80 Reasonable Hours 2,908.20 225.30 85.90 25.70 0.00 1,027.50 463.00 4,021.60 251.00 463.00 Reasonable Rate $220.50 $110.25 $220.50 $110.25 N/A $220.50 $125.00 $220.50 $110.25 $125.00 Reasonable Fee Award $641,258.10 $24,839.30 $18,940.95 $2,833.40 $0.00 $226,563.80 $57,875.00 $886,726.80 $27,672.80 $57,875.00 $972,274.60 B. Minor Reduction for Unrelated Unsuccessful Claims The next step is to make any appropriate reductions for Plaintiffs' counsels' time spent on unsuccessful claims unrelated to the successful claims. Robinson, 560 F.3d at 244. As noted, Defendants argued Plaintiffs achieved limited success in part because Judge Moon “found violations of only 8 of the 17 standards” Plaintiffs identified in their show cause motion. Defs.' Br. in Opp'n 13. While much of Plaintiffs' success in the enforcement phase “involve[d] a common core of facts,” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435, showing Defendants' continued failure to provide constitutionally adequate medical care to the women at FCCW, Plaintiffs lost on some claims that are factually distinguishable. The co-pay policy is the most notable example, but even it had significant factual overlap with the successful claims. Unfortunately, their billing records are so vague that it is impossible to figure out how much time each attorney or paralegal spent on those requests. Accordingly, I recommend the Court reduce the new lodestar figure by 5%, or $48,613.70, to account for time spent on unsuccessful claims unrelated to the successful ones. This results in a total recommended award of $923,660.90. C. Determination of Final Award The last step is to award some percentage of the lodestar figure to Plaintiffs depending on their degree of success. McAfee, 738 F.3d at 88. Typically, adjustments made at this step concern whether to increase the award because the lodestar figure is deemed insufficient to compensate the prevailing party based on its success. See, e.g., id. Because “there is a ‘strong presumption' that the lodestar is reasonable,” however, such upward departure is warranted only in rare circumstances. Perdue, 559 U.S. at 554. Plaintiffs do not request an enhancement. Accordingly, I recommend they be awarded $923,660.90 for reasonable attorney's fees incurred in enforcing the Settlement Agreement. D. Costs & Expenses “The great weight of authority in this circuit and others clearly establishes that a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to compensation for reasonable litigation expenses under § 1988.” Daly v. Hill, 790 F.2d 1071, 1084 (4th Cir. 1986) (collecting cases). This includes “reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the attorney, which are normally charged to a fee-paying client, in the course of providing legal services.” Spell, 852 F.2d at 771 (quoting Northcross v. Bd. of Educ. of Memphis City Schs., 611 F.2d 624, 639 (6th Cir. 1979)). The fee applicant must provide adequate documentation to receive an award of litigation expenses. Trimper, 58 F.3d at 77. Furthermore, “[a]n expense award, like an attorney's fee, must adequately compensate counsel without resulting in a windfall. Prevailing attorneys must exercise ‘billing judgment,’ for expenses ‘not properly billed to one's client also are not properly billed to one's adversary pursuant to statutory authority.’ ” Daly, 790 F.2d at 1084 n.18 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434). Plaintiffs seek reimbursement for $116,624.44 in litigation-related costs, broken down as follows (1) LAJC: $10,156.45, mostly for medical-record requests, postage, parking or ride-share fees, mileage, and commercial flights and lodging for out-of-state depositions; (2) Wiley Rein: $84,615.64, primarily for discovery-related costs like deposition transcripts and electronic storage; (3) Kelly & Crandall: $79.62 for shipping charges; and (4) Consumer Litigation Associates: $21,772.73, primarily for paying a court reporter and private mediator and for flights to New York, Delaware, and Charlottesville. See generally Ciolfi Decl. ¶ 59; LAJC Cost Rep., ECF No. 583-23; Howard Decl. ¶ 17; Wiley Rein Cost Rep., ECF No. 583-17, at 10; Kelly Decl. ¶ 17; Bennett Decl. ¶ 22. They have not submitted any receipts or invoices from outside vendors. Defendants correctly point out that Mr. Bennett is claiming some portion of $8,400 to reimburse CLA for flights from Newport News to Charlottesville, which is just over a two-hour drive. Defs.' Br. in Opp'n 10 (citing Bennett Decl. ¶ 22). LAJC's billing records indicate Mr. Bennett and Ms. Turner flew in CLA's private plane to Georgetown, Delaware for Dr. Welch's deposition. See Turner Timesheet 18. I agree Defendants should not have to pay for their flight when it would have taken them fewer than five hours (222.8 miles) to drive there. Moreover, although Mr. Bennett attested to his firm's “Reimbursable Expenses” under penalty of perjury, his declaration does not contain any information breaking down the cost of each flight or justifying the “travel and other related expenses ... including office rental” for the Moorjani deposition. Thus, the court cannot rely on that information to determine whether these expenses are, in fact, reimbursable under the statutes. See Haught v. Louis Berkman, LLC, No. 5:03cv109, 2006 WL 344917, at *4 (N.D. W. Va. Feb. 13, 2006) (citing Trimper, 58 F.3d at 77). Accordingly, I recommend the Court exclude $11,463.43 from Plaintiffs' requested costs. IV. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, having deemed $923,660.90 the proper lodestar figure and $105,161.01 the appropriate amount of recoverable litigation costs under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988 and 1997e(d), I respectfully recommend that the presiding District Judge GRANT Plaintiffs an overall award of $1,028,821.91. Notice to Parties Notice is hereby given to the parties of the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C): Within fourteen days after being served with a copy [of this Report and Recommendation], any party may serve and file written objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as provided by rules of court. A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. Failure to file timely written objections to these proposed findings and recommendations within 14 days could waive appellate review. At the conclusion of the 14 day period, the Clerk is directed to transmit the record in this matter to the Honorable Norman K. Moon, Senior United States District Judge. The Clerk shall send a copy of this Report and Recommendation to the parties. ENTERED: March 12, 2020 Footnotes [1] Pinpoint citations to documents filed on the electronic case docket use the header page numbers generated by CM/ECF. [2] Plaintiffs did not present enough evidence to show Defendants breached six other standards, including those covering medical co-pays, “care and conditions in the infirmary,” terminally ill inmates, and infectious diseases. Id. at 500. [3] More specifically, Plaintiffs sought: • $1,319,112.98 for 6,240.50 hours' worth of legal work (5,626.50), clerical tasks (271.10), and travel (342.90) by ten attorneys from Legal Aid Justice Center (“LAJC”) in Charlottesville and Richmond, Virginia, billed at hourly rates of $220.50 for legal work, $150.00 for clerical tasks, and $110.25 for travel; • $302,239.35 for 1,370.70 hours' worth of legal work and travel, billed at $220.50 per hour, by six attorneys from Wiley Rein, LLP in Washington, D.C.; Kelly & Crandall, PC in Fairfax, Virginia; and Consumer Litigation Associates, PC in Newport News, Virginia; • $133,005.60 for 894.8 hours' worth of paralegal-type work, billed at $150.00 per hour, done for LAJC by seven unpaid graduate-student interns (four law, three medical) and one volunteer; and • $126,270.00 for 841.8 hours' worth of paralegal-type work, billed at $150.00 per hour, done by six paid support staff at Wiley Rein and Kelly & Crandall. See generally Pls.' Br. in Supp. 28–35; LAJC Hrs. & Fees Summ. 1, ECF No. 583-24. [4] Plaintiffs also included Mr. Young's share of the total clerical hours (39.10) and fee request ($5,865.00) in this deduction, effectively twice subtracting those numbers from their proposed lodestar calculation. [5] Plaintiffs originally sought between $150.00 and $220.50 per hour for work performed by paralegals and volunteers, but only LAJC and Wiley Rein later “reduce[d] their request to recover for appropriate paralegal time to from $150/hour to $125/hour.” Pls.' Reply Br. 7. “[C]onsistentcy in approach dictates a reduction,” Pls.' Supp'l Br. in Supp. 2, in Kelly & Crandall paralegals' higher hourly rates, as well. See Decl. of Kristi C. Kelly, Esq. ¶¶ 13–16, ECF No. 583-16. Accordingly, I understand Plaintiffs' position as seeking $125 per hour for all work done by anyone who is not an attorney. [6] Plaintiffs used “the same calculation methodology,” Pls.' Br. in Supp. 19 n.5, in explaining that the parties' “negotiated resolution of $1.5 million was based on a fee demand that was calculated utilizing an hourly rate of $211.50 as contemplated by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(3),” Scott, 2016 WL 452164, at *18. Judge Moon approved the negotiated award on February 5, 2016. ECF No. 261. [7] The six attorneys from Wiley Rein, Kelly & Crandall, and Consumer Litigation Associates billed $220.50 per hour for any work they performed, even if it fell “into the ‘gray area’ of tasks which may appropriately be performed by either an attorney or a paralegal,” Abusamhadaneh v. Taylor, No. 1:11cv939, 2013 WL 193778, at *38 (E.D. Va. Jan. 17, 2013) (citing Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei, 491 U.S. 274, 286–87 (1989)). LAJC's timesheets have separate columns for time spent on “attorney work,” billed at $220.50 per hour, and time spent on “clerical work,” billed at $150 per hour. Pls.' Br. in Supp. 28; LAJC Hrs. & Fees Summ. 1. Plaintiffs withdrew their “claim for all LAJC clerical time,” knocking off $40,665.00 from their original fee request. Pls.' Supp'l Br. in Supp. 1; see LAJC Hrs. & Fees Summ. 1. As explained below, however, their billing records still show dozens of administrative and clerical tasks, most billed by attorneys at $220.50 per hour, that should have been cut as a matter of sound billing discretion. Accordingly, a small overall reduction in the number of hours claimed is warranted to account for time spent on non-compensable tasks. [8] Plaintiffs later withdrew their claim for the LAJC attorneys' self-identified “clerical” time, or 271.1 hours billed at $150.00 per hour. Pls.' Supp'l Br. in Supp. 1; see LAJC Hrs. & Fees Summ. 1. As explained below, however, their records are still replete with “attorney” time spent on purely administrative tasks like making to-do lists and scheduling meetings. This warrants a minor reduction in the number of hours claimed. [9] A few entries Mr. Rosen highlighted in Wiley Rein's timesheets are for hours that Plaintiffs expressly wrote off before submitting their fee petition. Compare Howard Decl. ¶¶ 13–16 (seeking compensation only for Ted Howard, Hannah Lynn, Paul Michel, Rachel Williams, and Elizabeth White, whose hours [10] Most of the contested “research” and “editing” entries, on the other hand, contain enough contextual information about the question, document, or filing at issue for the Court to ascertain what the attorney was doing and whether the hours claimed are reasonable. See, e.g., Rosen Aff. Ex. A, at 2–3, 6, 9, 13–14, 19, 22, 27 (Turner); id. at 35–36 (Ciolfi); id. at 98 (Deane). [11] These timesheets probably belong to Calvin Dorsey, Sarah Hour, Collin Hunt, Shivani Patel, and Amie Simmons, respectively. See Ellis Decl. ¶ 36(c)–(e), (g)–(h); Rosen Aff. ¶ 10(d). Mr. Dorsey and Ms. Hour are medical students who each spent 30 hours “volunteer[ing] as a paralegal on [this] case from January– March 2018.” Ellis Decl. ¶ 36(c), (d). Mr. Hunt, Ms. Patel, and Ms. Simmons are law students who interned with LAJC in 2017–2018. See Ellis Decl. ¶ 36(f)–(h). Ms. Simmons had just completed her first year of law school. Id. ¶ 36(f). Plaintiffs do not say how far along the other students were in their professional programs. [12] Defendants cite Judge Ballou's report and recommendation in Supinger v. Virginia, 2019 WL 1450530 (W.D. Va. Mar. 4, 2019), to support their assertion that Plaintiffs “are not entitled to compensation for the time spent by new counsel familiarizing themselves with the case.” Defs.' Br. in Opp'n 8. In Supinger, the prevailing plaintiff sought attorney's fees for hours billed both by his original attorneys, who withdrew from the case fairly early on due to a conflict of interest, and by the two new attorneys who handled his case though discovery, summary judgment, appeal, and settlement. See 2019 WL 1450530, at *1, *7. Judge Ballou concluded the new attorneys “appropriately billed time[ ] for getting up to speed on the case,” including time spent reviewing court filings and consulting with counsel in related cases. Id. at *7. “Under § 1988,” however, “it is inappropriate to charge the losing party with the time necessary for replacement counsel to reach the level of familiarity with the case for which original counsel has already been compensated.” Id. (emphasis added). In other words, those state-actor defendants “should not have to compensate Supinger's counsel twice for efforts spent on the case before the representation changed— once for [his] original counsel, and then again for [his] new counsel.” Id. Taking that “consideration into account [when] analyzing duplication of efforts,” Judge Ballou recommended no reduction in the original attorneys' hours and “only an additional 5% reduction” in the hours sought by their replacements. Id. Judge Moon adopted this recommendation over Supinger's objection. Supinger, 2019 WL 1461071, at *4 (“Defendants should not have to compensate Plaintiff's counsel twice for efforts spent on the case due to a change in representation.” (citing Personhuballah v. Alcorn, 239 F. Supp. 3d 929, 949 (E.D. Va. 2017)). Here, Plaintiffs primarily billed for 14.70 hours that three additional (not replacement) attorneys spent reviewing case materials on March 30, 2018, so each of those attorneys could then perform specific tasks and participate in certain aspects of this case's enforcement phase. See CLA Timesheets 11 (Mr. Bennett billing 5.1 hours, and Ms. Hanes billing 4.4 hours, to review pleadings, settlement agreement, and other filings); K&C Mar. 2018 Timesheet 1 (Ms. Nash billing 5.2 hours to review case background and perform other tasks). Unlike the attorneys in Supinger, Plaintiffs' original counsel, who were intimately familiar with the case, continued to lead the litigation team and have not yet been compensated for hours claimed by the new attorneys. See Ciolfi Decl. ¶¶ 47–49; Turner Decl. ¶¶ 19, 21, 25. Thus, Defendants are not being asked “to compensate [Plaintiffs'] counsel twice for efforts spent on the case before” they added more attorneys. Supinger, 2019 WL 1450530, at *7. I also find that the time billed was reasonable considering the complexity of the case and how quickly the new attorneys needed to start working on their assigned motions and other responsibilities. [13] Other LAJC attorneys also billed $220.50 an hour for time they spent on some of the same weekly calls. See, e.g., Turner Timesheet 11, 13–15, 18, 20–22; Yates Timesheet 2–3. CLA attorneys Mr. Bennett and Ms. Hanes together billed 4.50 hours ($992.25) for time they spent on four conference calls, CLA Timesheets, 5, 7, 11–12, but that redundancy is negligible compared to LAJC's pervasive over-billing for this type of work. [14] Plaintiffs also claim 22.2 attorney hours ($4,895.10) for time Ms. Bauer spent preparing for and deposing this expert witness shortly before trial. See Bauer Timesheet 2.