John Baleja v. Northrop Grumman Space and Mission Systems Corp. Salaried Pension Plan, et al. Case No. ED CV 17-235-JGB (SPx) United States District Court, C.D. California Filed June 09, 2020 Counsel Elizabeth Rogers Brannen, Peter K. Stris, Victor A. O'Connell, Brendan Stephen Maher, John Randolph Stokes, Kenneth J. Halpern, Loren J. Beck, Stris and Maher LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Shaun P. Martin, University of San Diego Law School, San Diego, CA, Dana Erin Berkowitz, Stris and Maher LLP, New York, NY, Jhaniel N. James, Pro Hac Vice, Stris and Maher LLP, Tallahassee, FL, for John Baleja. C. William Phillips, Pro Hac Vice, Mark P. Gimbel, Pro Hac Vice, William E. O'Neil, Pro Hac Vice, Covington and Burling LLP, New York, NY, Christian J. Pistilli, Pro Hac Vice, Nicholas O. Pastan, Robert S. Newman, Pro Hac Vice, Covington and Burling LLP, Washington, DC, Mark Y. Chen, Mitchell A. Kamin, Mark Y. Chen, Covington and Burling LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Northrop Grumman Space and Mission Systems Corp. Salaried Pension Plan, et al. Pym, Sheri, United States Magistrate Judge Proceedings: (In Chambers) Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants' Motion for Protective Order [122] I. INTRODUCTION *1 On May 19, 2020, defendants Northrop Grumman Space and Mission Systems Corporation Salaried Pension Plan, Northrop Grumman Benefit Plans Administrative Committee, Northrop Grumman Corporation, and Doe defendants filed a motion for protective order regarding notices of deposition issued by plaintiff John Baleja. Docket no. 122. The motion is supported and opposed in a Joint Stipulation (“JS”). Defendants' arguments are further supported by the declaration of defense counsel William O'Neil (“O'Neil Decl.”) and exhibits thereto. Plaintiff's arguments are further supported by the declaration of plaintiff's counsel Shaun Martin (“Martin Decl.”) and exhibits thereto. On May 26, 2020, defendants filed a Supplemental Memorandum (“D. Supp. Mem.”) supported by the supplemental declaration of defense counsel (“O'Neil Supp. Decl.”), the declaration of defense expert Lawrence Sher (“Sher Decl.”), and additional exhibits. On the same day, plaintiff filed a Supplemental Memorandum (“P. Supp. Mem.”) supported by the supplemental declaration of plaintiff's counsel (“Martin Supp. Decl.”) and an additional exhibit. The court found a hearing on the motion would not be of assistance, and so vacated the hearing scheduled for June 9, 2020. The court now grants in part and denies in part defendants' motion for protective order for the reasons discussed below. II. BACKGROUND[1] This class action arises under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., and concerns retirement benefits that were accrued in the 1980s and 1990s. Plaintiff contends he and all other class members had their pensions unlawfully reduced by an offset calculation applied by defendants. Plaintiff and other class members are former employees of ESL Incorporated, and became employed by TRW, Inc., an aerospace and defense company, when it acquired ESL Incorporated in 1978. Plaintiff and other ESL employees were originally participants in the ESL Incorporated Retirement Fund (“ESL Plan”). This plan was terminated on December 31, 1984, and plaintiff and other ESL employees later received a distribution from the plan. TRW, Inc. established its own pension plan in 1981 (“TRW Plan”). On January 1, 1985, plaintiff and other former ESL employees were added to the 1981 version of the TRW Plan. The TRW Plan was later amended in 1986, and again in 1996. In 2002, Northrop Grumman Corporation acquired TRW, Inc. and assumed sponsorship of the TRW Plan, which it renamed the Northrop Grumman Space & Mission Systems Corporation Salaried Pension Plan (“Northrop Grumman Pension Plan”). Plaintiff contends he and other former ESL employees were not notified that their future pension benefits would be retroactively offset by distributions they had previously received. Plaintiff states the 1986 version of the TRW Plan did provide that each employee's benefits would be offset by some amount, but argues the exact amount was not provided and that over the course of the next decade, whatever offset that was applied, if any, was modest. Plaintiff contends the 1996 amendment to the TRW Plan incorporated a retroactive offset calculation (“ESL offset”) that devastated plaintiff's and other retirees' pensions. *2 Plaintiff contends the 1996 amendment relied on the following formula for the first time to calculate pension benefits. First, the calculation assumed that an employee's distribution from the ESL Plan grew at 8.5% per year until retirement age. Next, the value of the distribution was converted to a hypothetical annuity based on an 8.5% annual rate of return and mortality tables. Finally, the monthly payment from such a hypothetical annuity was deducted from a plan participant's monthly pension benefit. In plaintiff's case, this offset was applied such that an approximately $4,000 distribution he received in 1985 was assumed to have grown by 8.5% from 1985 to 2016 to a sum of approximately $50,000. This sum was then converted to a hypothetical annuity that would provide a monthly payment of $471.26. This monthly payment was then deducted from plaintiff's monthly pension benefit, such that instead of receiving approximately $1,000 per month, plaintiff became entitled to less than $600 per month. Plaintiff argues the offset is invalid because: (1) defendants provided defective notice of the offset when employees became participants of the TRW Plan; (2) defendants applied an illegal cutback to the TRW Plan in their 1986 amendment; and (3) defendants applied an illegal cutback to the TRW Plan in their 1981 amendment. Plaintiff and the remaining class members seek equitable relief and monetary damages. On November 22, 2019, plaintiff served a notice of deposition of defendant Northrop Grumman Corporation pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6). See O'Neil Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. 3. Defendant Northrop Grumman Corporation served its objections and responses to plaintiff's notice of deposition on December 6, 2019. Id. ¶ 5, Ex. 4. The Rule 30(b)(6) deposition went forward on January 20, 2020. Id. ¶ 6, Ex. 5. On March 31, 2020, plaintiff served a second notice of deposition of defendant Northrop Grumman Corporation under Rule 30(b)(6). Id. ¶ 2, Ex. 1. On April 2, 2020, plaintiff served his first notice of deposition of defendant Northrop Grumman Pension Plan under Rule 30(b)(6). Id. ¶ 3, Ex. 2. III. DISCUSSION Defendants seek a protective order preventing plaintiff from taking the Rule 30(b)(6) depositions of Northrop Grumman Corporation and Northrop Grumman Pension Plan. JS at 2-4. Defendants contend the deposition notice served on defendant Northrop Grumman Corporation is facially improper because this corporate defendant has already been deposed in this action, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) prohibits a party from taking a second deposition of a deponent without leave of court. Id. at 3. Defendants also argue the topics noticed for both depositions are beyond the scope of permissible fact discovery, and in the alternative request that the court limit the topics noticed for the depositions. Id. at 2-4. A. Legal Standard Rule 26(b) permits “discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). To be relevant, the information sought “need not be admissible in evidence”; however, it must be “proportional to the needs of the case.” Id. In determining the needs of the case, the court “consider[s] the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Id. A “relevant matter” under Rule 26(b)(1) is any matter that “bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351, 98 S. Ct. 2380, 57 L. Ed. 2d 253 (1978). *3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) allows a party to file a motion for a protective order “in the court where the action is pending,” and the court may “issue an order to protect a party or person from ... undue burden,” including an order “forbidding inquiry into certain matters, or limiting the scope of disclosure or discovery to certain matters.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Under this rule, courts may “for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). “For good cause to exist, the party seeking protection bears the burden of showing specific prejudice or harm will result if no protective order is granted.” Phillips ex. rel. Estates of Byrd v. General Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Beckman Indus., Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992)) (holding that “broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test”). B. Second Deposition of Defendant Northrop Grumman Corporation The parties first dispute whether a second deposition of defendant Northrop Grumman Corporation is permitted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 30(b)(6), a party may name a corporation as the deponent in a notice of deposition or subpoena, which must describe with reasonable particularity the matters for examination. The named organization must designate an individual to testify on its behalf, and the person designated must testify about information known or reasonably available to the organization. Rule 30(a)(2)(A)(ii) requires a party to obtain leave of court before taking a deposition if the deponent has already been deposed in the case. Defendants contend the prohibition in Rule 30(a) against multiple depositions applies equally to natural persons and corporations. JS at 8-9. Plaintiff argues the one-deposition limitation does not apply to corporate defendants, and even if it did, a protective order should not issue because plaintiff subsequently issued a deposition notice for a different corporate defendant covering the same topics, defendants failed to promptly file their motion, and good cause exists for a second deposition. Id. at 9-12. As an initial matter, plaintiff is correct that the Ninth Circuit has not yet ruled on the question of whether a corporation is a deponent subject to the one-deposition limitation set forth in Rule 30(a)(2)(A)(ii). See Heath v. Google LLC, 2018 WL 4491368, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2018) (“The Ninth Circuit has not decided whether a corporation is a ‘deponent’ subject to the limitations of Rule 30(a)(2)(A)(ii), or whether those limitations apply only to individual deponents. The district courts have taken different views on whether leave is required.”). The practice in this district has been that the second deposition of a corporate defendant is subject to the one-deposition limitation and requires leave of court before it may go forward. See, e.g. Burdick v. Union Sec. Ins. Co., 2008 WL 5102851, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2008) (“Plaintiff issued a second Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notices without leave of the court, despite the requirement of rule 30(b) (2)(B). The notice is thus invalid.”); Friedman v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc., 2008 WL 11338168, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2008) (“Accordingly, as a number of courts have held, a second deposition of a corporation requires leave of court before it may go forward.”). Whether that should continue to be the practice, or whether plaintiff should be given leave to take a second deposition of Northrup Grumman Corporation, are matters the court need not decide here. Although the parties frame their first discovery dispute as whether a second deposition of defendant Northrop Grumman Corporation should be permitted, it does not appear that plaintiff actually intends to proceed with both depositions. Indeed, plaintiff's counsel states in his Declaration that after the parties were unable to agree on whether the second deposition should proceed, he served a separate deposition notice for defendant Northrop Grumman Pension Plan on April 2, 2020 to “moot the dispute.” See Martin Decl. ¶ 7. Both notices of deposition list the same five topics to be covered. See O'Neil Decl. ¶¶ 2-3, Exs. 1 and 2. Plaintiff also states in his papers that the dispute is now moot, and only asks the court to require defendant Northrup Grumman Pension Plan to designate a witness. JS at 11, 41. Thus, although defendants assert plaintiff has refused to withdraw his notice of deposition directed at Northrup Grumman Corporation, at least in the instant papers he has done just that. *4 At this juncture then, the only deposition at issue is that of defendant Northrop Grumman Pension Plan, a defendant that has not previously been deposed. Accordingly, the court does not address plaintiff's arguments about whether good cause exists for a second deposition of defendant Northrop Grumman Corporation. Additionally, although plaintiff contends defendants simply refused to appear for their depositions, which were noticed for April 17 and 21, 2020, and did not move for a protective order until one month later, defendants maintain the parties agreed that at least one deposition would not proceed as planned because of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. JS at 11; D. Supp. Mem. at 2. Given the limited record before the court and the absence of any declarations from either side on this particular topic, the court will not deny the instant motion on this ground alone. C. Deposition Topics The heart of the parties' dispute centers on whether the topics listed in plaintiff's notices of deposition fall within the scope of permissible fact discovery. Plaintiff seeks testimony from a Rule 30(b)(6) deponent on the following five topics. 1. Topic No. 1 – Calculation of Pension Benefits for Class Members Who Terminated Their Employment Between January 1, 1985 and February 15, 1986 Plaintiff's Topic No. 1 seeks testimony on “[a]ll details regarding your calculation of the pension benefit to be received under the PLAN by any member of THE CLASS who terminated his or her EMPLOYMENT at any time between January 1, 1985 and February 15, 1986.” JS at 13. Defendants object to Topic 1 on the grounds that it is: (1) duplicative of topics covered during defendant Northrop Grumman Corporation's first deposition; (2) seeks information that is outside of defendants' possession, custody, or control, and/or that is not reasonably available to defendants; and (3) imposes an undue burden in that plaintiff requests “all details” of certain class members' benefit calculations. Id. at 14-17. Defendants further note the corporate representative who would testify at the deposition of defendant Northrop Grumman Pension Plan has already been deposed as defendant Northrop Grumman Corporation's representative. Id. at 4. Plaintiff argues Topic No. 1 was not covered in the earlier deposition, and properly seeks information that is uniquely available to defendants and pertains to facts at issue in this litigation. Id. at 17-20. Defendants' contention that Topic No. 1 seeks information outside of their possession, custody, or control is not well taken. Defendants contend no present employee participated in calculating benefits for TRW Plan participants who terminated their employment or began commencing benefits in the 1980s, and any information about historical calculations is contained in files that they have already produced in discovery. Id. at 16. In short, defendants argue they have “nothing to testify about, beyond what the documents produced in discovery show.” D. Supp. Mem. at 2. But as plaintiff argues, defendants' position is inconsistent with the nature of a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. See Louisiana Pac. Corp. v. Money Mkt. 1 Institutional Inv. Dealer, 285 F.R.D. 481, 486–87 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“The designee's role is to provide the entity's interpretation of events and documents.... It is not expected that the designee have personal knowledge as to all relevant facts; however, the designee must become educated and gain the requested knowledge to the extent reasonably available.... Corporations are not entitled to declare themselves mere document-gatherers.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, although there is significant overlap between Topic No. 1 and topics covered during the January 20, 2020 deposition of defendant Northrop Grumman Corporation, on their face the topics are not identical. Defendants contend one of the topics covered during the January 20, 2020 deposition was defendants' “calculations of ESL retirees' benefits under the [TRW] Plan” and the deponent already answered plaintiff's questions on this topic. Id. at 15-16; O'Neil Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 4. The transcript from the January 20, 2020 deposition indicates that plaintiff asked several questions on this topic, including about the formula calculation applied by the TRW Plan on March 1, 1985 for individuals who retired on that date. Id. ¶ 4, Ex. 5 at 31:4-43:13. Broadly speaking, both topics seek information on the calculations of retirees' benefits under the TRW Plan. But plaintiff's Topic No. 1 appears to seek a wider universe of information of “all details” of these calculations for a more limited subset of employees – those who terminated their employment between January 1, 1985 and February 15, 1986. *5 Whether Topic No. 1 imposes an undue burden on defendants presents a somewhat closer question. Defendants argue Topic No. 1 subjects them to an undue burden by requesting information on “all details” regarding class members' benefit calculations. JS at 16-17. According to defendants, these calculations factor in myriad variables including a participant's date of birth, salary information, and years of service, and that no corporate representative could learn and retain these individualized details for some 83 former employees.[2] Id. at 17. Where a deposition topic seeks information that is beyond the capability of a Rule 30(b)(6) deponent to answer even with adequate preparation, it may be appropriate for that topic to be modified or quashed. See McCormick-Morgan, Inc. v. Teledyne Indus. Inc., 134 F.R.D. 275, 288 (N.D. Cal. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 765 F. Supp. 611 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (where a Rule 30(b)(6) topic calls for testimony so granular that “no human being ... could reliably and completely set forth [the] material,” the parties may be directed to seek that information through other means). Certainly if the deponent were expected to testify from memory as to the precise numerical calculations made for 83 class members, the topic would be unduly burdensome, if not impossible. But the court does not read Topic No. 1 as calling for this, and plaintiff says it does not. Instead, by seeking a witness who can testify to “all details” about the calculations, Topic No. 1 is fairly read as calling for the witness to be prepared to testify to the details of how such calculations were in fact made for that subset of class members, such as what interest rate was used to calculate any offset applied, along with other factors. Plaintiff states he does not intend to ask the witness to simply recite calculations, but instead intends to show the witness documents and ask her to explain how the listed benefits were calculated. JS at 19. As plaintiff notes, if there is no one at defendant Plan who can do this, that is relevant information which will bind defendants at trial. It is not unduly burdensome to require a defendant to explain its own documents and calculations at deposition, rather than requiring plaintiff to try to decipher them and only learn whether he is correct at trial. Accordingly, defendants' motion is denied as to Topic No. 1. 2. Topic No. 2 – Class Members' Ability to Calculate Their Pensions Based on Defendants' Disclosures Plaintiff's Topic No. 2 seeks testimony on “[t]he ability of each member of THE CLASS to calculate his or her pension entitlement under the PLAN based upon the disclosures made by [defendants].” Id. at 20. Defendants object to Topic No. 2 on the grounds that: (1) it seeks irrelevant information; (2) it seeks information that is outside of defendants' possession, custody, or control, and/or that is not reasonably available to defendants; (3) it is duplicative of topics covered during defendant Northrop Grumman Corporation's deposition; and (4) it is overbroad, disproportionate to the needs of the case, and imposes an undue burden on defendants because it seeks information on “each” class member's ability to calculate his or her benefits. Id. at 21-23. Plaintiff contends information about disclosures made by defendants to class members is relevant, and that he is entitled to question defendants about these disclosures. Id. at 23-25. Plaintiff further contends even if Topic No. 2 is somewhat duplicative of topics previously covered during defendant Northrop Grumman Corporation's deposition, good cause exists for revisiting the topic because the deponent largely responded that she did not have knowledge of the information. Id. *6 As an initial matter, the information sought appears relevant to potential defenses in this action. Defendants contend there is no requirement under ERISA that a summary plan document describing benefits include information that would permit each and every class member to calculate his or her individual pension entitlement, citing Stahl v. Tony's Bldg. Materials, Inc., 875 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1989). JS at 22. Yet, plaintiff's argument that disclosures about materials other than the summary plan document are relevant to establishing liability under ERISA is bolstered by arguments previously made by defendants themselves. See Martin Decl. ¶ 12, Ex. B at 13 (“[T]here is no question that other communications... are relevant to determining whether Defendants have breached their fiduciary duties.”). Furthermore, Topic No. 2 overlaps with, but is not entirely duplicative of, topics previously covered in defendant Northrop Grumman Corporation's deposition. Defendant Northrop Grumman Corporation was previously deposed on its communications with employees related to the TRW Plan, the ESL offset, and their benefits under the TRW Plan. JS at 22-23. In contrast, Topic No. 2 seeks information on “[t]he ability of each member of the class to calculate his or her pension entitlement under the plan based upon the disclosures made by [defendants].” Id. at 20. In short, it appears the first deposition inquired into what communications were made, and plaintiff now seeks information on whether those communications would have been sufficient for class members to calculate their own benefits. Although defendants contend Topic No. 2 implicates decades of communications and that they do not possess all of these past communications with class members, it does not follow that plaintiff should be precluded from asking questions about this topic whatsoever. Instead, the corporate representative may testify about that “information known or reasonably available to the organization.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). Yet, some narrowing of Topic No. 2 is warranted. As it is currently phrased, the request appears to seek granular information about thousands of individual class members that a corporate representative could not reasonably learn and retain. Some limitation that would still permit plaintiff to inquire into what defendants believe are the relevant disclosures and how those disclosures would permit a class member at a given time to calculate his or her pension entitlement is appropriate. Accordingly, the parties are ordered to meet and confer about the scope of Topic No. 2 before proceeding with the deposition. 3. Topic No. 3 – The Reduction in Pension Benefits Due to the ESL Offset Plaintiff's Topic No. 3 seeks testimony on “[t]he total amount of reduction in pension benefits due to members of THE CLASS as a result of the ESL OFFSET in the PLAN as applied by [defendants].” Id. at 26. Defendants object to Topic No. 3 on various grounds, but the court has no need to address most of them. First and foremost, defendants argue they lack the information sought because neither defendants nor their third-party plan administrator maintain a record of the ESL offset amount used in calculating class members' benefits. Id. at 27-30. Defendants state a third-party plan administrator generates a final benefit amount for an employee upon his or her retirement, but that the administrator does not maintain a record of the ESL offset used as part of the calculation. Id.; O'Neil Decl., Ex. 7 (“Mary O'Neill Decl.”) ¶¶ 3-5. Defendants further state determining the amount of an individual's reduction in pension benefits would require two pieces of information: (1) each class member's ESL offset amount; and (2) each member's gross pension benefit amount. Mary O'Neill Decl. ¶ 4. Defendants argue it would be difficult but technically possible to calculate each class member's ESL offset, but that it would be impossible to calculate the “total amount of reduction” in benefits because of missing gross pension benefit information for a sizeable percentage of the class. JS at 27-28; Mary O'Neill Decl. ¶¶ 7-10. *7 Plaintiff argues defendants' statements about their records are both “factually untrue and irrelevant” and maintains the data must be available to defendants. JS at 31-32. But in light of the Declaration of Mary Faith O'Neill, a manager in Northrup Grumman Corporation's Pension Administration department, stating under penalty of perjury that records of ESL offsets are not maintained and calculating the “total amount of reduction” would not be possible, the motion is granted as to Topic No. 3. 4. Topic Nos. 4 and 5 – Class Members Whose Pension Benefits Were Reduced as Compared to Newly Hired Employees, and the Amount of the Reduction Plaintiff's Topic No. 4 seeks testimony on “[t]he number of persons in THE CLASS whose pension benefits under THE PLAN were reduced as a result of the ESL OFFSET in the plan as applied by [defendants] as compared to the pension benefit that would have been received by such persons had they been a NEW HIRE.” Id. at 34. Plaintiff's Topic No. 5 seeks testimony on “[t]he total amount of reduction in pension benefits due to members of THE CLASS as a result of the ESL OFFSET in the PLAN as applied by [defendants] as compared to the pension benefit that would be received by THE CLASS were the members thereof to be entitled to pension benefits under the PLAN no lower than would be received by such persons had they been a NEW HIRE.” Id. Defendants object to Topics 4 and 5 on the grounds that they: (1) seek information that does not exist and/or that is not reasonably available to defendants; (2) are unduly burdensome; (3) seek expert rather than fact discovery; and (4) are disproportional to the needs of the case. Id. Defendants argue Topics 4 and 5 seek testimony on a hypothetical situation in which class members had been treated as new hires under the TRW Plan rather than employees with previous years of service. Id. at 35-38. This hypothetical, according to defendants, would involve calculations that defendants have not historically performed and do not possess. Id. Defendants note that at this juncture, both parties' experts have performed some limited “new hire” calculations for some class members based on their benefit files but that such calculations do not exist for the class as a whole. Id. at 38. Plaintiff contends information on the “new hire” calculations may be inquired into because the information is relevant, defendants possess the information necessary to perform these calculations, and no expert witnesses are necessary for these calculations because they may be performed by lay employees. Id. at 39-40. Plaintiff further implies defendants may have destroyed the evidence necessary to perform these calculations during the pendency of this lawsuit, although cites no evidence of this. Id. Plaintiff's arguments in support of Topic Nos. 4 and 5 fail for largely the same reason as his arguments in support of Topic No. 3, and others. Defendants have provided a declaration stating under penalty of perjury that such “new hire” calculations do not exist and cannot be performed for all class members, and that even if the calculations were possible, they would require either marshaling defendants' Pension Administration Department for several weeks or retaining an expert. See Mary O'Neill Decl. ¶¶ 11-16. Additionally, as with Topic No. 3, Topic No. 5 would entail determining the class members' “total amount of reduction” in pension benefits. As discussed above, defendants maintain calculating the “total amount of reduction” in benefits is not possible. *8 Even assuming some of the requested calculations are possible, the court will not order defendants to undertake them. Although such work might be doable by lay employees, albeit with considerable effort, to require defendants to perform burdensome calculations for plaintiff about hypothetical scenarios would in essence be to require defendants to perform plaintiff's expert work for him. That is improper, and well beyond the proper and fair scope of a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. See Seaside Island Transp. v. Coastal Carriers LLC, 2019 WL 507485, at *4 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 8, 2019) (rejecting attempt to force 30(b)(6) deponent “to do the work that [requesting party] already knows is too burdensome to do itself”); see also DarbeeVision, Inc. v. C&A Marketing, Inc., 2019 WL 2902697, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2019) (“Courts have also disallowed 30(b)(6) testimony where the information sought is more properly within the purview of expert testimony.”) (citations omitted). Accordingly, defendants' motion is granted as to Topic Nos. 4 and 5. IV. ORDER IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants' Motion for Protective Order (docket no. 122) is granted in part and denied in part as set forth above. If in the future the parties encounter a discovery dispute they believe may be resolved informally on a telephonic conference with the Magistrate Judge, they may contact the Magistrate Judge's Courtroom Deputy Clerk to arrange such a call. Footnotes [1] The court draws part of the information in this section from the Second Amended Complaint (docket no. 48). [2] There is conflicting information in the record as to how many class members are at issue in Topic No. 1. Defendants' expert states in his Declaration that based on his review of the benefit files for all class members in this action, six class members retired between January 1, 1985 and December 15, 1986. See Sher Decl. ¶¶ 4-6. This is a broader range of time than that specified in Topic No. 1, which seeks information about class members who left employment between January 1, 1985 and February 15, 1986. Plaintiff contends the Declaration of defendants' expert Lawrence Sher indicates that approximately 100 employees left TRW, Inc. during the relevant time period, and the expert reviewed only six of these employees' files (see Martin. Supp. Decl. ¶ 2); however, that is not what the Sher Declaration states. Nonetheless, defendants' counsel also declares, based on a review of records, that 83 class members terminated their employment between January 1, 1985 and February 15, 1986. O'Neil Decl. ¶ 10. Thus, it appears the parties are in agreement that the benefits calculations for 83 or so class members are at issue in Topic No. 1.