Wendy Rago v. Select Comfort Retail Corporation, et al. Case No. ED CV 19-2291-FMO (SPx) United States District Court, C.D. California Filed September 08, 2020 Pym, Sheri, United States Magistrate Judge Proceedings: (In Chambers) Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Defendant Prudential's Production of Documents and Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition [70] I. INTRODUCTION *1 On August 6, 2020, plaintiff Wendy Rago filed a motion to compel defendant Prudential Insurance Company of America to produce documents and appear for a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. Docket no. 70. The motion is a refiling of a motion plaintiff previously withdrew, and incorporates the previously filed papers. As such, the parties' respective positions are contained in a joint stipulation (“JS”), which was filed on July 15, 2020. Docket no. 60. Plaintiff's motion is supported by the declaration of plaintiff's counsel Arnold P. Peter (“Peter Decl.”) and exhibits. Defendant's opposition to plaintiff's motion to compel is supported by the declaration of Prudential's counsel Jason A. James (“James Decl.”) and exhibits. The court found a hearing on the motion would not be of assistance, and so vacated the hearing scheduled for September 1, 2020. The court now grants in part and denies in part plaintiff's motion to compel as described below for the reasons that follow. II. BACKGROUND On May 4, 2020, plaintiff Wendy Rago filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) alleging that her former employer, defendant Select Comfort Retail Corporation, wrongfully terminated her employment. Plaintiff's autoimmune deficiency condition flared up in March 2017, and plaintiff requested a leave of absence. JS at 1. On May 9, 2017, defendant Select Comfort advised plaintiff that she would remain an employee, and Select Comfort would assess whether there was an open position for her when she was cleared to return to work. Id. But less than a month later, on May 31, 2017, Select Comfort terminated plaintiff's employment. Id. In the letter of termination, Select Comfort claimed that plaintiff was deemed to have “voluntarily resigned” because she failed to provide its third-party administrator with information it requested. Id. Plaintiff alleges defendant Prudential was the third-party administrator for implementation of leaves of absence for Select Comfort's employees, such as plaintiff, who requested a leave of absence form of reasonable accommodation due to a medical disability. SAC ¶ 3. On October 17, 2019, plaintiff took the deposition of defendant Select Comfort's human resources representative Sara Dudley, who authored the letter terminating plaintiff's employment. JS at 1. Dudley testified that she relied entirely on online records maintained by Prudential allegedly indicating that Prudential mailed requests for medical certifications to plaintiff and plaintiff never responded. Id. But plaintiff alleges she regularly and consistently provided medical certifications and all requested documentation from her physicians. Id. Plaintiff further alleged that Prudential was her “joint employer” because “it entered into a contractual relationship with Select Comfort under which Select Comfort delegated and Prudential assumed the sole responsibility to accept, process, approve, and manage Select Comfort's leave of absence policy. Id. at 1-2. On December 5, 2019, defendant Prudential provided plaintiff's counsel with a copy of Prudential's file regarding its administration of plaintiff's leave claim. James Decl. ¶ 10. On April 22, 2020, plaintiff served a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice on Prudential. JS at 18. On July 8, 2020, Prudential also provided plaintiff with a copy of the Administrative Services Agreement (“ASA”) documenting the relationship between Prudential and Select Comfort as it relates to Prudential's role as a third-party leave administrator pursuant to a stipulated protective order entered on that date. James Decl. ¶ 11. *2 During the meet and confer process, defense counsel proposed that the parties stipulate to continue the case deadlines given Prudential's pending motion to dismiss and Select Comfort's pending motion to compel arbitration, but plaintiff rejected that offer. Id. ¶ 13. On June 29, 2020, the parties participated in a telephonic conference to discuss plaintiff's motion to compel and other issues. JS at 28. Plaintiff proceeded with filing the instant motion to compel in the form of a joint stipulation on July 15, 2020, but later withdrew the motion. Plaintiff re-filed the motion to compel based on the joint stipulation on August 6, 2020. III. DISCUSSION Plaintiff maintains that defendant Prudential's liability to plaintiff is predicated on the duties it assumed as defendant Select Comfort's third-party administrator for leaves of absence. See JS at 2-3. As such, plaintiff seeks to compel Prudential to provide (1) documents relating to policies and procedures for processing leave claims for employees of Select Comfort, and (2) a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of Prudential regarding the administration of plaintiff's leave claim. Id. Rule 26(b) permits “discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). To be relevant, the information sought “need not be admissible in evidence”; however, it must be “proportional to the needs of the case.” Id. In determining the needs of the case, the court “consider[s] the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Id. A “relevant matter” under Rule 26(b)(1) is any matter that “bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351, 98 S. Ct. 2380, 57 L. Ed. 2d 253 (1978). Relevancy should be “construed ‘liberally and with common sense’ and discovery should be allowed unless the information sought has no conceivable bearing on the case.” Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 610 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (quoting Miller v. Pancucci, 141 F.R.D. 292, 296 (C.D. Cal. 1992)). A party may request documents “in the responding party's possession, custody, or control.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1). A request is adequate if it describes items with “reasonably particularity”; specifies a time, place, and manner for the inspection; and specifies the form or forms in which electronic information is to be produced. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b). “Thus, a request is sufficiently clear if it places the party upon reasonable notice of what is called for and what is not.” Richmond v. Mission Bank, 2015 WL 1637835, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2015) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The responding party must respond in writing and is obligated to produce all specified relevant and nonprivileged documents, tangible things, or electronically stored information in its “possession, custody, or control” on the date specified. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a). Alternatively, a party may state an objection to a request, including the reasons. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(A)-(B). In moving to compel the production of documents, the moving party has the burden of demonstrating “actual and substantial prejudice” from the denial of discovery. Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(iv). A. The Court Will Not Here Stay Discovery *3 Before reaching the merits of the instant discovery dispute, the court addresses the parties' dispute as to whether a stay of discovery is appropriate until defendant's motion to dismiss the SAC is resolved. See JS at 9-15, 19-24. In response to plaintiff's request for production of documents and Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, defendant Prudential argues there is good cause to issue a short stay of further discovery pending the court's resolution of the motion to dismiss the SAC, because defendant's pending motion will potentially dispose of all claims against Prudential in this action. Id. at 9-15. A stay of discovery is a case management issue reserved for the District Judge, who controls the scheduling in this case. As such, any request to stay discovery must be filed with the District Judge in this matter rather than the Magistrate Judge. See, e.g., Pom Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 2009 WL 10655253, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2009) (“The fact that the 4AC is ‘untested’ does not, absent a stay of discovery by the District Judge, prevent discovery with respect to the allegations in the 4AC.”); Clark v. Time Warner Cable, 2007 WL 1334965, at *2, n.1 (C.D. Cal. May 3, 2007) (a motion to stay discovery presents a case management issue that should be resolved by the presiding judicial officer in the case). Further, as plaintiff points out, the court's most recent Standing Order in this matter specifically states that “absent exceptional circumstances” discovery shall not be stayed while any motion is pending, including any motion to dismiss or motion for protective order.” See JS at 20; docket no. 38 at 2. The Standing Order directs the parties to “conduct any necessary discovery as soon as possible, as the court is not inclined to grant any extensions of the discovery or other case-related deadlines.” Id. For these reasons, the court will not here stay discovery pending the court's resolution of defendant's motion to dismiss the SAC. The court therefore turns to the merits of the disputes. B. The Court Will Not Compel a Prudential to Produce Additional Documents Responsive to RFP No. 4 In plaintiffs' Request for Production of Documents (“RFP”) number 4, plaintiff seeks “documents referring or related to the Prudential Insurance Company of America's policies and procedures as to the processing of leave of absence requests by employees of Select Comfort Retail Corporation from January 1, 2017 to present.” JS at 6. In response, defendant raised the following objections: (1) it is overbroad and unduly burdensome; (2) it seeks information that is not proportional to the needs of the case; (3) it is vague and ambiguous as to the phrase “policies and procedures as to the processing of leave of absence requests by employees of Select Comfort”; (4) it seeks documents that are protected by the attorney-client privilege and attorney-work product doctrine; and (5) it seeks confidential trade or business data or other non-public proprietary, or confidential documents protected from disclosure. Id. Plaintiff maintains that RFP No. 4 seeks relevant information, because details of the duties related to leave administration that Select Comfort contractually delegated and Prudential assumed are a central component of the case, since it will establish the duties Prudential owed to plaintiff. Id. at 7. Plaintiff contends these documents will show whether Prudential assumed the duty to engage with plaintiff in the interactive process under California law, and whether Prudential followed its own policies. Id. at 7-8. Although defendant raises various objections in its response to RFP No. 4, it chiefly argues the information plaintiff seeks is wholly irrelevant and not proportional to the needs of the case, since plaintiff does not challenge Prudential's decision on her leave claim in her SAC. Id. at 15-16; James Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 2 at ¶¶ 7-13. *4 The documents plaintiff seeks appear at best of limited relevance to the instant case. Plaintiff's factual allegations primarily relate to her employment with Select Comfort, Select Comfort's employment decision, and what Select Comfort allegedly relied upon in its decision to terminate her. See James Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 2 ¶¶ 7-13. With respect to Prudential, plaintiff alleges that in deciding to terminate plaintiff, Select Comfort relied on Prudential's records indicating plaintiff never responded to requests for medical certifications, which plaintiff disputes. Id., Ex. 2 ¶ 13. In terms of plaintiff's claims, Prudential's status as a defendant appears to depend on plaintiff's contention that Prudential is a joint employer. But even if Prudential is found to be a joint employer, Prudential's policies and procedures in processing leave requests appears to be a tangential issue. Even assuming the documents sought are of some relevance, they are not proportional to the needs of the case. Plaintiff does not explain why she needs additional documents regarding Prudential's policies and procedures as to the processing of leave of absence requests by employees of Select Comfort when defendant already produced to plaintiff a copy of Prudential's leave file, which documents in detail the administration of plaintiff's leave claim and the grounds for Prudential's decisions. See James Decl. ¶ 10. Prudential also provided plaintiff with the ASA, which documents the relationship between defendants Prudential and Select Comfort as it relates to Prudential's role as a third-party leave administrator pursuant to the stipulated protective order entered in this action. Id. ¶ 11. Both the ASA and the leave file appear to address the duties related to leave administration that Select Comfort contractually delegated and Prudential assumed. See JS at 7. Prudential undoubtedly has additional documents related to its policies and procedures for processing leave requests by Select Comfort employees, but Prudential maintains that to conduct a full search for such documents would be costly. See JS at 17. Were Prudential's policies and procedures for processing such requests a central issue in this case – or even clearly an issue at all – requiring Prudential to undertake a search for all of them may have been warranted. But here, requiring such a search would burden Prudential disproportionately to the needs of the case. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion to compel defendant Prudential to produce additional documents responsive to RFP No. 4 is denied. C. The Court Will Compel Prudential to Sit for a Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition Plaintiff also seeks to compel defendant Prudential to appear for a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition regarding the administration of plaintiff's leave claim through the period of March 4, 2017 to September 3, 2017. JS at 18-19. Specifically, plaintiff seeks to depose defendant Prudential on the following subjects: (1) plaintiff's leave of absence request; (2) processing of plaintiff's leave of absence request; (3) denial of plaintiff's leave of absence request; (4) Prudential's policies and procedures as to the processing of leave of absence requests for employees of Select Comfort for the period of January 1, 2017 to the present. Id. Plaintiff's deposition notice also seeks the following documents: (1) documents referring or related to plaintiff's leave of absence request; (2) documents referring to processing of plaintiff's leave of absence request; (3) documents referring or related to the denial of plaintiff's leave of absence requests; and (4) documents referring or related to Prudential's policies and procedures as to the processing of leave of absence requests by employees of Select Comfort. Id. The information plaintiff seeks from Prudential with a 30(b)(6) deposition overlaps with what it seeks with RFP No. 4, and is of questionable relevance for the same reasons. But the deposition plaintiff seeks to take goes beyond RFP No. 4, with the deposition topics and documents requested focusing more on plaintiff's particular leave request. The deposition would give plaintiff the opportunity to question the witness regarding the ASA and leave file already produced, among other things. This is fair in light of plaintiff's allegations. As such, whether the topic generally ultimately proves relevant, this is a reasonable topic for deposition, and it is not unreasonable to require Prudential sit for the deposition. *5 Prudential's main argument against the deposition is simply that discovery should be stayed, which the Magistrate Judge will not do. Although Prudential challenges the relevance, the burden associated with the deposition is different than asking Prudential to search for every document responsive to RFP No. 4, and more warranted. The court will relieve Prudential of the requirement that it produce at deposition the fourth category of documents sought – documents referring or related to Prudential's policies and procedures as to the processing of leave of absence requests by employees of Select Comfort – for the same reasons the court is not compelling Prudential to respond to RFP No. 4, since these are the same documents. But Prudential must produced the first three categories of documents sought at the deposition, and be prepared to testify on all four subjects noticed. To require Prudential to sit for this deposition is proportional to the needs of the case. Plaintiff's motion to compel defendant Prudential to appear for a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition is therefore granted, as limited above. D. The Court Will Not Order Sanctions Plaintiff's motion to compel also includes a request for sanctions in the amount of $8,800 in attorneys' fees based upon sixteen hours of drafting and editing the joint stipulation on the instant motion to compel at an hourly rate of $550. Peter Decl. ¶ 2. Defendant also seeks sanctions in the amount of $4,277 in attorneys' fees based upon 9.4 hours spent researching and drafting the opposition papers at an hourly rate of $455.00. James Decl. ¶ 14. Rule 37(a)(5) provides that the prevailing party on a discovery motion is entitled to an award of its reasonable expenses incurred in bringing or opposing the motion, including attorney's fees, except no payment should be ordered if: (1) the motion was filed before the moving party made a good faith effort to resolve the dispute; (2) the losing party's position was substantially justified; or (3) other circumstances make award of expenses unjust. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5). As described above, the court is here granting in part and denying in part plaintiff's motion to compel. The court finds the parties' disputes are legitimate. As such, sanctions are not warranted. IV. ORDER For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's motion to compel defendant Prudential to produce documents and sit for a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition (docket no. 70) is granted in part and denied in part, as described above.