UNITED ARTISTS CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. UNITED ARTIST STUDIOS LLC et al., Defendants Case No. 2:19-cv-00828-MWF-MAAx United States District Court, C.D. California Filed April 27, 2020 Counsel Paul A. Bost, Jill M. Pietrini, Sheppard Mullin Richter and Hampton LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff. Eric Sapir, Law Office of Eric Sapir, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants. Audero, Maria A., United States Magistrate Judge ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF UNITED ARTISTS CORPORATION'S MOTION TO COMPEL CORPORATE DEFENDANTS' WRITTEN RESPONSES AND DOCUMENTS RESPONSIVE TO PLAINTIFF'S SECOND SET OF REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION AND REQUEST FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS I. INTRODUCTION *1 On April 6, 2020, Plaintiff United Artists Corporation (“UAC”) filed its Motion to Compel Corporate Defendants' Written Responses and Documents Responsive to Plaintiff's Second Set of Requests for Production and Request for Reimbursement of Attorneys' Fees and Costs (“Motion”). (Mot., ECF No. 166.) In support of the Motion, UAC filed the Declaration of Paul A. Bost and accompanying exhibits A-F (“Bost Declaration”). (Bost Decl., ECF No. 166-2.) Despite two opportunities in which to do so, the Corporate Defendants have not filed an opposition to the Motion. On April 21, 2020, UAC filed its Reply Brief in Support of Its Motion to Compel Corporate Defendants' Written Responses and Documents Responsive to Plaintiff's Second Set of Requests for Production and Request for Reimbursement of Attorneys' Fees and Costs (“Reply”). (Reply, ECF No. 168.) At issue is UAC's request that the Court compel the Corporate Defendants[1] to serve written responses and produce documents responsive to UAC's second set of requests for production of documents, served on the Corporate Defendants on January 15, 2020 (“RFP-2”). (Bost Decl. ¶ 1, Exh. A.) Having considered UAC's briefs and the related record, the Court GRANTS UAC's Motion. II. BACKGROUND The background of UAC's claims against the Defendants is provided in detail in the Court's Order re: Motion for Preliminary Injunction against Defendants (“PI Order,” ECF No. 41),[2] and the Court does not repeat it here. In general, as stated in the operative First Amended Complaint, UAC brings federal and state trademark infringement and related claims against the Defendants for their alleged improper use of its “United Artists” mark in connection with, among other things, the Defendants' online film festival. (ECF No. 17.) On January 15, 2020, UAC served RFP-2 on the Corporate Defendants. (Bost Decl. ¶ 2, Exh. A.) UAC's RFP-2 sought written responses and documents responsive to Request Nos. 76 through 80. (Id.) Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(b)(2)(A), the responses of the Corporate Defendants were due no later than February 14, 2020. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(A). With the passage of that date without the Corporate Defendants' service of their discovery responses (Bost Decl. ¶ 3), UAC sent them a letter on February 18, 2020 requesting their responses to RFP-2, without objections, and an in-person meet-and-confer conference. (Id., Exh. B.) UAC did not receive a substantive response to its letter. (Bost Decl. ¶ 3.) *2 On March 4, 2020, UAC sent the Corporate Defendants a Request for Informal Telephonic Discovery Conference (“IDC Request”), which UAC ultimately submitted to the Court on the parties' behalf. (Id. ¶ 4, Exh. C.) In the IDC Request, UAC asks the Court to compel the Corporate Defendants to produce all documents responsive to RFP-2, withholding none on the basis of any objection, and to award UAC the attorneys' fees and costs expended in seeking said relief. (Id., Exh. C.) In addition, UAC sets forth details regarding its contentions and its efforts to obtain the Corporate Defendants' compliance with RFP-2. (Id.) The Corporate Defendants, in turn, ask the Court to delay addressing UAC's request until after the Court addresses UAC's earlier request that it hold the Corporate Defendants in contempt related to other discovery disputes. (Id.) In addition, the Corporate Defendants state: “Defendants cannot afford to expend legal fees and, thus, cannot comply with the discovery.” (Id.) On March 10, 2020, after conferring with the parties regarding their availabilities, the Court set a telephonic discovery conference for March 25, 2020. (ECF No. 160.) On March 20, 2020, pursuant to Order of the Chief Judge 20-042, and its activation of the Continuity of Operations Plan for the Central District of California (“COOP”), the Court took the March 25, 2020 telephonic conference off calendar until further notice. (ECF No. 162.) In lieu of the telephonic discovery conference, the Court ordered the parties to brief, pursuant to Central District of California Local Rule (“Local Rule”) 37-2.2, the issues raised in the IDC Request. (ECF No. 163.) Although the Court set a briefing schedule, the Court noted that if the Corporate Defendants did not cooperate in the preparation of the Joint Stipulation, the briefing would proceed pursuant to Local Rules 6-1, 7-9, and 7-10. (Id. at 2.)[3] In addition, the Court advised the Corporate Defendants that their “failure to respond to UAC's motion [could] be construed as consent to the granting of the motion” pursuant to Local Rule 7-12. (Id.) Finally, the Court advised the parties that the “failure of any counsel to comply with or cooperate in the [forestated] procedures [could] result in the imposition of sanctions” pursuant to Local Rule 37-4. (Id.) On April 6, 2020, UAC filed its Motion. (Mot.) In the accompanying Bost Declaration, Mr. Bost declares that the Corporate Defendants had failed to timely return to UAC their portion of the Joint Stipulation. (Bost Decl. ¶ 10.) In addition to an order compelling the Corporate Defendants' responses to RFP-2, the Motion seeks attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $3,747.00. (Mot. 8.) The Motion set a hearing date of May 5, 2020. (Id. at 1.) Based upon that hearing date and the local rules, the Corporate Defendants' opposition to the Motion became due April 14, 2020, and UAC's reply on the Motion became due April 21, 2020. See C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-9, 7-10, respectively. On April 13, 2020, pursuant to Order of Chief Judge 20-05 extending the COOP through June 1, 2020, the Court vacated the May 5, 2020 hearing date until further notice. (ECF No. 167.) The Court ordered that the Corporate Defendants' opposition remained due on April 14, 2020, and that UAC's reply remained due April 21, 2020. (Id.) On April 21, 2020, UAC filed its Reply through which it (1) informs the Court that the Corporate Defendants failed to timely file their opposition to the Motion; and (2) increases its request for attorneys' fees and costs by $361.00 (for a total of $4,108.00) to account for the legal fees expended by UAC in preparing the Reply. (See generally, Reply.) On April 22, 2020, in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and the reported difficulties that parties and their counsel are experiencing in communicating with each other, the Court sua sponte granted an extension of time for the Corporate Defendants to file their opposition and, if the Corporate Defendants filed such an opposition, for UAC to file a further reply, if any. (ECF No. 169.) Mindful of the imminent May 8, 2020 non-expert discovery cutoff date, the Court extended the Corporate Defendants' time to file the opposition to April 24, 2020, and UAC's time to file a reply to April 28, 2020. (Id. at 2-3.) Again, the Court cautioned the Corporate Defendants that their failure to timely file an opposition could be construed as their consent to the granting of the Motion pursuant to Local Rule 7-12. (Id.) Also, again, the Court cautioned the parties that their counsel's failure to comply with, or cooperate in, the forestated procedures could result in the imposition of sanctions pursuant to Local Rule 37-4. (Id., at 3.) *3 As of the date of this Order, the Corporate Defendants have not filed an opposition to UAC's Motion. Nor has the Court been advised that they have served responses or produced documents responsive to UAC's RFP-2. As such, the matter stands ready for decision. III. LEGAL STANDARDS Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 34”) governs the scope and procedure for the production of documents. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a). It allows a party to ask another party to produce and permit the party making the request to inspect and copy any designated documents, or to inspect and copy, test, or sample any tangible things which constitute or contain matters within the scope of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) (“Rule 26(b)”) and which are in the possession, custody or control of the party upon whom the request is served. Id. A party receiving these types of discovery requests has thirty days in which to respond with written responses and a production of documents (if any responsive, non-privileged documents exist), or objections. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(A), (C). Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 37”) permits a party to file a motion for an order compelling discovery if another party fails to respond to discovery requests, provided that the motion to compel includes a certification that the movant has, in good faith, conferred or attempted to confer with the party failing to respond to the requests. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1). In light of the history detailed above, the Court is satisfied that UAC has satisfied this prerequisite to a motion to compel. IV. ANALYSIS A. The Discovery Requests at Issue This discovery dispute focuses on five document requests propounded by UAC on the Corporate Defendants, as set forth verbatim below: Request No. 76: All documents reflecting the finances of each of Defendants, including, but not limited to, financial statements, balance sheets, income statements, equity statements, cash flow statements, profit and loss statements, and general ledgers, from January 1, 2015 to the present, including drafts thereof, and all back-up materials used to create the financial statements. Request No. 77: All documents supporting or evidence the information contained in each of Defendants' financial statements, including all documents reflecting, concerning or evidencing each of Defendants' income, expenses, deductions, assets and liabilities, from January 1, 2015 to the present. Request No. 78: Copies of each of Defendants' federal and state tax returns from 2015 to the present. Request No. 79: All documents supporting or evidencing the information contained in each of Defendants' federal and state tax returns, including all documents reflecting, concerning or evidencing each of Defendants' income, expenses, deductions, assets and liabilities, from 2015 to the present. Request No. 80: Documents sufficient to identify any accountants, bookkeepers, or other financial professional retained by any of Defendants from 2015 to the present. B. Discussion 1. The Scope of UAC's Discovery Is Proper. Rule 34, and a party's document requests based thereon, are limited by Rule 26, which sets forth the permissible parameters of discovery: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. *4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). While permissible discovery is broad, its scope is not without bounds. As further stated in Rule 26: [T]he court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or (iii) the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1). Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). UAC's RFP-2 seeks Corporate Defendants' financial documents, including tax returns (Request Nos. 76 and 78), the documents underlying those documents (Request Nos. 77 and 79), and documents sufficient to identify Corporate Defendants' accountants, bookkeepers, or other financial professional (Request No. 80). UAC contends that the documents sought through these requests are relevant to the issues in the case for three reasons. The Court addresses each in turn. a. Relevance to UAC's Claim for Disgorgement of Profits First, UAC argues that the documents sought through RFP-2 are relevant to its claim for disgorgement of the profits earned by the Corporate Defendants' through their alleged use of intellectual property infringing on UAC's trademarks and trade names. (Mot. 5.) The Court agrees. Specifically, the Court finds that the financial documents sought through RFP-2 are relevant to the inquiry of damages attributable to the Corporate Defendants' alleged infringement. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (plaintiff establishing a violation of the Lanham Act is entitled to recover, among other things, defendant's profits; “[i]n assessing profits the plaintiff shall be required to prove defendant's sales only; defendant must prove all elements of cost or deduction claimed”) Although UAC concedes that the Corporate Defendants have produced some of the bank statements and some of the PayPal records UAC earlier sought (Bost Decl. ¶ 6), the Court agrees with UAC that it should not be limited, in its efforts to prove its damages, to the financial information selectively produced by the Corporate Defendants. (Mot. 6); see, e.g., Koninklijke Philips Elecs. N.V. v. KXD Tech., Inc., No. 2:05-cv-01543-RLH-GWF, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17540, at *20-21 (D. Nev. Mar. 12, 2007) (Defendants ordered to produce financial statements and tax returns as “relevant to the issue of determining the damages attributable to the Defendants' alleged infringement.... Plaintiff should not be forced to rely on what Defendants selectively identify as relevant financial information.”); Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1056 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (finding financial information in tax returns relevant to damages sought under Lanham Act). The Court's recognition of the California state privilege protecting tax returns from disclosure, see Webb v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Cal. 2d 509, 513 (1957), does not change its conclusion with respect to Request No. 78, which specifically seeks the Corporate Defendants' tax returns. Because the information contained in the tax returns relates to both UAC's federal and state claims, federal privilege law applies. See Platypus Wear, Inc. v. K.D. Co., 905 F. Supp. 808, 811 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (where evidence goes to both state and federal claims, federal courts apply federal privilege policies, rather than state privilege law). Under federal law, tax returns are not privileged and are generally discoverable in private litigation. Young v. United States, 149 F.R.D. 199, 201 (S.D. Cal. 1993); see also St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208, 218-19 (1961) (although tax returns are made confidential within the government bureau, copies in the hands of the taxpayer are subject to discovery). b. Relevance to UAC's Claim for Punitive Damages *5 Second, UAC argues that the documents sought through RFP-2 are relevant to its punitive damages claims as they are likely to reveal the net worth of the Corporate Defendants. (Mot. 6.) The Court agrees. It is well established that “a defendant's current net worth and financial condition is ‘clearly relevant to the issue of punitive damages.’ ” LL B Sheet 1, LLC v. Loskutoff, No. 16-cv-02349-BLF (HRL), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179371, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2016) (citing Vieste, LLC v. Hill Redwood Dev., No. C-09-04024 JSW (DMR), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29137, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2011)); see also City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 270 (1981) (“[E]vidence of a tortfeasor's wealth is traditionally admissible as a measure of the amount of punitive damages that should be awarded ....”). In considering whether California Civil Code section 3295 (“Section 3295”) would bar this discovery, the Court concludes it does not. Section 3295 prohibits pretrial discovery by a plaintiff as to a defendant's profits gained by virtue of the wrongful conduct at issue or a defendant's financial condition except upon a finding, “on the basis of the supporting and opposing affidavits presented, that the plaintiff has established that there is a substantial probability that the plaintiff will prevail” on the punitive damages claim. Cal. Civ. Code § 3295(c). However, discovery is a procedural matter governed in the federal courts by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, because federal, rather than state, procedural law applies here, and because Section 3295 is a procedural rather than substantive matter, see Oakes v. Halvorsen Marine Ltd., 179 F.R.D. 281, 285 (C.D. Cal. 1998), UAC is not required to make a Section 3295 showing. Moreover, Section 3295 does not bar disclosure of financial information here because such would conflict with Rule 26(b), which permits the discovery of financial information related to punitive damages. Oakes, 179 F.R.D. at 286. In considering whether privacy laws would bar the disclosure of the Corporate Defendants' financial and net worth information, the Court concludes they would not. In California, the right to privacy primarily derives from the California Constitution's declaration that individuals have an inalienable right to privacy. Cal. Const. art. I, § 1. However, courts in the Ninth Circuit have held that, although the right to privacy under California law “extend[s] to financial privacy in litigation,” any such right “is subject to balancing the needs of the litigation with the sensitivity of the information/records sought.” See, e.g., Davis v. Leal, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1110 (E.D. Cal. 1999). Thus, the right to privacy is not an “absolute bar to discovery” and “may be subject to invasion.” EEOC v. Cal. Psychiatric Transitions, 258 F.R.D. 391, at 395 (E.D. Cal. 2009). Courts frequently have found that a party's need for the information may outweigh whatever privacy rights, if any, another party may have. See, e.g., Cook v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 132 F.R.D. 548, 552 (E.D. Cal. 1990) (citing with approval Moskowitz v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 313, 316 (1982)). Here, evidence of the Corporate Defendants' financial condition is critical to UAC's claims for punitive damages. “[W]hile a party does have an interest in nondisclosure and confidentiality of its financial records, this interest can be adequately protected by a protective order.” CEH, Inc. v. FV “Seafarer,” 153 F.R.D. 491, 499 (D.R.I. 1994). Such a protective order is in effect here (ECF No. 70), thereby accommodating UAC's need for the information while protecting the privacy of the Corporate Defendants. c. Relevance to the Corporate Defendants' Affiliations *6 Third, UAC argues that the information sought through RFP-2 is relevant to the determination of the degree to which the Corporate Defendants do business with each other and/or effectively operate as agents and affiliates of each other, and to the identification of third parties with which they conducted business relating to the film festival at issue. (Mot. 6.) The Court agrees. Finding the third parties who have done work with the Corporate Defendants, and identifying the nature of their relationship, would lead to a better understanding of the scope of the film festival and, more importantly, the nature and extent of profits related thereto. * * * In sum, the Court concludes that the scope of discovery sought by UAC through RFP-2 is proper. 2. The Corporate Defendants Have Waived Objections. UAC contends that, in failing to serve responses to RFP-2, the Corporate Defendants have waived all objections thereto, including on the basis of any right or privilege. (Mot. 7.) The Court agrees. “It is well established that a failure to object to discovery requests within the time required constitutes a waiver of any objection,” including any claims of privilege. Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 1981)). Here, the Corporate Defendants failed to respond to RFP-2 within the thirty days allowed by Rule 34. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(A). Worse, they did not respond at all. On this basis, the Court concludes that the Corporate Defendants have waived all objections to RFP-2. 3. An Award of $4,108.00 in Attorneys' Fees is Warranted. a. UAC Is Entitled to Reimbursement of the Attorneys' Fees It Has Expended in Bringing This Motion. Rule 37(a)(5) requires that a Court granting a motion to compel award attorneys' fees to the moving party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). It states in relevant part: If the motion is granted—or if the disclosure or requested discovery is provided after the motion was filed—the court must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant's reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees. Id. However, the Court must not order such payment if the movant files before attempting in good faith to obtain the discovery without court action, the opposing party's response or objection was substantially justified, or “other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Id. UAC argues that none of the circumstances mitigating an award of attorneys' fees is present here. (Mot. 7.) The Court agrees. First, UAC has demonstrated unambiguously that it attempted to obtain the Corporate Defendants' compliance with UAC's RFP-2 before filing its Motion, albeit without avail. When the Corporate Defendants failed to respond to UAC's discovery, UAC sent a meet-and-confer letter requesting their responses. (Bost Decl. ¶ 3, Exh. B.) When the Corporate Defendants failed to respond, UAC initiated this Court's informal discovery dispute resolution procedures by requesting the Corporate Defendants' portion of the IDC Request. (Id. ¶ 4, Exh. C.) In their portion of the IDC Request, the Corporate Defendants stated that they could not comply with UAC's discovery because they “[could not] afford to expend legal fees.” (Id., Exh. C.) UAC was prepared to go forward with the discovery conference with the Court, but the Court instead instructed the parties to file a motion. (ECF No. 163.) Thus, UAC has demonstrated that it made “good faith” efforts to resolve this dispute informally and without court action. *7 Second, Corporate Defendants utterly have failed to meet their burden to show that their position is substantially justified or that other circumstances exist that would make an award of expenses unjust. See Bronzed Sugar, LLC v. Sugared + Bronzed, LLC, No. 8:17-cv-01698-AG-KESx, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222720, at *8 (C.D. Cal. July 10, 2018) (“The party against whom an award of attorney's fees is sought [under Rule 37(a)(5)(A)] bears the burden of showing that its failure to comply with a discovery order was ‘substantially justified’ or that ‘other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.’ ” (citations omitted)). Corporate Defendants have failed to justify their position other than with a conclusory and unsupported statement by their counsel in the IDC Request that they lack the ability to afford to respond. However, Corporate Defendants have not even attempted to make a showing of a financial inability to incur the relatively minor cost of responding to RFP-2, especially given that producing the financial documents would be as simple as locating and copying them. In any event, Corporate Defendants have failed to meet and confer adequately regarding their responses, failed to participate in the preparation of a joint stipulation, and failed to respond timely to the Motion. Sanctions are warranted. See C.D. Cal. L.R. 37-4 (warning that failure to comply with discovery procedures “may result in the imposition of sanctions”); see, e.g., Herrera v. PNC Bank N.A., No. EDCV 18-144-JFW (KKx), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 227150, at *9 (C.D. Cal. July 26, 2018) (awarding Rule 37 sanctions where responding party “failed to meet and confer, participate in the preparation of a joint stipulation, or timely oppose the Motion to Compel”). On this basis, the Court concludes that UAC is entitled to an award of the attorneys' fees it expended in bringing this motion. b. An Award of $4,108.00 in Attorneys' Fees is Reasonable. UAC seeks $4,108.00 as a reasonable fee incurred for the preparation of the Motion and Reply. (Bost Decl. ¶¶ 8-9; Reply 2 n.1.) It identifies two attorneys who together billed as follows: Attorney Paul A. Bost, Special Counsel Jill M. Pietrini, Partner TOTAL Work Product Preparation of Motion Preparation of Reply Review of Motion Review of Reply $4,108.00[4] Hours 6.0 0.4 0.6 0.2 Rate $555.00 $695.00 In Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), the Supreme Court adopted the lodestar method for calculating attorneys' fee awards. “A court determines the lodestar by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on a particular motion by a reasonable hourly rate.” Id. at 433. “Although the district court's calculating of an award need not be done with precision, some indication of how it arrived at its figures and the amount of the award is necessary.” Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1211 (9th Cir. 1986). A party seeking attorneys' fees must provide “satisfactory evidence” that the requested rates are in line with those “prevailing in the community for similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Dish Network L.L.C. v. Jadoo TV, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-9768-FMO (KSx), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221869, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2019) (quoting Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008)). “[D]etermining an appropriate ‘market rate’ for the services of a lawyer is inherently difficult.” Blum v. Stetson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984). The forum in which the district court sits generally is recognized as the “relevant community.” Shirrod v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 809 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2015); Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1205 (9th Cir. 2013). A declaration regarding the prevailing rate in the relevant community is sufficient to establish a reasonable hourly rate. Widrig v. Apfel, 140 F.3d 1207, 1209 (9th Cir. 1998). “The party opposing the fee application has a burden of rebuttal that requires submission of evidence to the district court challenging the accuracy and reasonableness of the ... facts asserted by the prevailing party in its submitted affidavits.” Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1397-98 (9th Cir. 1992). Still, the Court has a duty to “independently review [a] fee request even absent ... objections.” Gates, 987 F.2d at 1401. “When a fee applicant fails to meet its burden of establishing the reasonableness of the requested rates, however, the court may exercise its discretion to determine reasonable hourly rates based on its experience and knowledge of prevailing rates in the community.” Bademyan v. Receivable Mgmt. Servs. Corp., No. CV 08-00519 MMM (RZx), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21923, at *15 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2009); see Ingram v. Oroudjian, 647 F.3d 925, 928 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[J]udges are justified in relying on their own knowledge of customary rates and their experience concerning reasonable and proper fees.”). *8 Assessing the reasonableness of the attorney hourly rate UAC seeks here is difficult because of the dearth of information provided. Other than its counsel's declaration that the hourly rates of the two attorneys who worked on the Motion are “reasonable in light of [their] experience, [their] qualifications, and Sheppard Mullin's reputation” (Bost Decl. ¶¶ 8-9), and his attachment of their resumes (Bost Decl., Exhs. D, E), UAC provides no information regarding the prevailing market rate for similar work by similar attorneys. (See generally Mot.; Bost Decl.; Reply.) Nevertheless, the Court exercises its discretion to rely on its own knowledge of reasonable and proper fees in the relevant community, the district in which it sits. Based on its experience regarding the prevailing rates in this district, the Court finds that the hourly rates sought by UAC—$555 for Paul A. Bost and $695 for Jill M. Pietrini—are consistent with the rates charged by comparable national law firms for partners and counsel of similar skill, reputation, and experience. See, e.g., Am. Rena Int'l Corp. v. Sis-Joyce Int'l Co., No. CV 12-6972 FMO (JEMx), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189271, at *126-27, (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2015) (finding reasonable an hourly rate range of $765.00 to $915.00 for partners and $300.00 to $535.00 for associates for attorneys performing work in Los Angeles on a trademark infringement action); McAllister v. St. Louis Rams, LLC, No. 2:17-mc-157-AB (KSx), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 227704, at *10 (C.D. Cal. July 2, 2018) (finding $610 to $975 was reasonable rate for attorneys at “large national law firms in Los Angeles, California”). “In addition to establishing a reasonable hourly rate, a prevailing party in a discovery dispute seeking attorneys' fees bears the burden of proving that the fees and costs taxed are reasonably necessary to achieve the result obtained.” McAllister, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 227704, at *8 (citations and quotation marks omitted). The prevailing party should make a “good-faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. The court has discretion in determining the number of hours that reasonably were expended by counsel. See Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001). The court reviews time records submitted by the applicant to determine whether the hours were reasonably incurred or if “any of the hours were unnecessary, duplicative or excessive,” or inadequately documented. True Health Chiropractic, Inc. v. McKesson Corp., No. 13-cv-02219-HSG (DMR), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70620, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2015). The hours expended by UAC in bringing this Motion are inadequately documented in that they are not supported by timesheets. (See generally Mot.; Bost Decl.; Reply.) Still, exercising its discretion, the Court notes that, based on its own experience, a total of 7.6 hours (6.8 by Mr. Bost and 0.8 by Ms. Pietrini) is a reasonable number of hours for the preparation of a Rule 37 motion to compel and reply thereon. See, e.g., Dish Network, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221869, at *17 (finding reasonable and awarding 16.1 hours for the preparation of a motion to compel); Natural-Immunogenics Corp. v. Newport Trial Grp., No. 15 CV-02034-JVS (JCGx), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225879, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2017) (finding reasonable 56.75 hours of attorney time (nine hours by two supervising partners and the balance by three associates) for preparing a motion to compel). * * * On this basis, the Court concludes that attorneys' fees for which UAC seeks reimbursement, in the amount of $4,108.00, are reasonable, and awards UAC this amount pursuant to Rule 37(a)(5)(A). V. CONCLUSION *9 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS UAC's Motion. Specifically, the Court orders as follows: 1. Each of the Corporate Defendants shall provide, at UAC's counsel's office unless the parties make other arrangements, and by no later than May 5, 2020, written responses, without objections, and documents responsive to UAC's RFP-2, withholding no document on the basis of objections (the “RFP-2 Response”). 2. The Corporate Defendants shall, jointly and severally, pay the sum of $4,108.00 in attorneys' fees and costs to UAC by no later than May 27, 2020. 3. In light of the imminent May 8, 2020 non-expert discovery cutoff date, to the extent UAC should seek to challenge the Corporate Defendants' RFP-2 Response and/or their compliance with this Order, the Court excuses their obligations, attendant to the filing of such a motion, to meet-and-confer pursuant to Local Rule 37 and this Magistrate Judge's Procedures. Should the May 8, 2020 non-expert discovery cutoff date be continued after the issuance of this Order, this paragraph will no longer apply. IT IS SO ORDERED. Footnotes [1] UAC brings this case against four corporate defendants—United Artist Studios LLC, United Artist Film Festival LLC, XLI Technologies Inc., and XLI41 L.L.C. (collectively, the “Corporate Defendants”)—and one individual defendant, James P. Schramm. The Motion is brought only against the Corporate Defendants. However, as needed for background, this Order refers to Mr. Schramm and the Corporate Defendants collectively as “Defendants.” [2] The Court takes judicial notice of the PI Order pursuant to Rule 201(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. A court may take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record. See Reyn's Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006); Gerritsen v. Warner Bros. Entm't Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (collecting cases). The counterclaims referenced in the PI Order subsequently were dismissed on November 27, 2019 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). (ECF No. 119.) [3] Pinpoint citations in this Order refer to the page numbers appearing in the ECF-generated headers. [4] Although UAC notes that Mr. Bost anticipates expending one hour in the preparation for and attendance of the hearing on the Motion (Bost Decl. ¶ 8), it does not include this amount in the total fees sought.