Sylee Castle v. A. Lugo and C. Wood Case No. 2:18-cv-08827-JVS (JDE) United States District Court, C.D. California Filed July 13, 2020 Counsel Sylee Castle, Lancaster, CA, pro se. Audra C. Call, Colin A. Shaff, CAAG - Office of Attorney General California Department of Justice, Los Angeles, CA, for A. Lugo and C. Wood Early, John D., United States Magistrate Judge Proceedings: (In Chambers) Order re Plaintiff's Motion to Compel (Dkt. 88) I. INTRODUCTION *1 On June 29, 2020, Plaintiff Sylee Castle, a prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Motion to Compel Production of Documents and for Sanctions against Defendant Lugo. Dkt. 88 (“Motion”). On June 18, 2020, Defendant Lugo filed his Opposition to the Motion, seeking recovery of expenses of at least $1,430 incurred in opposing the Motion under Rule 37(a)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. 90 (“Opposition” or “Opp.”). Per the Court's prior order (Dkt. 89), the Motion is now fully briefed. The Court finds the Motion appropriate for decision without oral argument and rules as follows. II. RELEVANT LAW “Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Rule”) 26(b)(1). “Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Id. “Generally, the purpose of discovery is to remove surprise from trial preparation so the parties can obtain evidence necessary to evaluate and resolve their dispute.” Duran v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 258 F.R.D. 375, 378 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citations omitted). Although relevance for discovery purposes is defined “very broadly,” Garneau v. City of Seattle, 147 F.3d 802, 812 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 506-07 (1947)), it is not without boundaries. See, e.g., Rivera v. NIBCO, 364 F.3d 1057, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004) (“District courts need not condone the use of discovery to engage in fishing expeditions.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674, 679-80 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (citing Hickman, 329 U.S. at 507); Rule 26(b)(2). District courts have broad discretion in determining relevancy for discovery purposes. Mfg. Automation & Software Sys., Inc. v. Hughes, 2017 WL 5641120, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2017) (citing Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2005)). Discovery requests that seek irrelevant information are inherently unduly burdensome. Wheel Grp. Holdings, LLC v. Cub Elecparts, Inc., 2018 WL 6264980, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2018). Under Rule 34(a)(1), a party may serve on any other party requests, within the scope of Rule 26(b), to produce or permit inspection of, among other things, “(A) any designated documents or electronically stored information.” Such requests “must describe with reasonable particularity each item or category of items to be inspected ... [and] must specify a reasonable time, place, and manner for the inspection ....” Rule 34(b)(1)(A), (B). The party responding to a request for production must, “[f]or each item or category, ... either state that inspection ... will be permitted as requested or state with specificity the grounds for objecting to the request, including the reasons.” Rule 34(b)(2)(B). “An objection must state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection. An objection to part of a request must specify the part and permit inspection of the rest.” Rule 34(b)(2)(C). *2 A propounding party may move for an order compelling production of documents in response to a request for production if the responding party fails to produce documents as requested under Rule 34. See Rule 37(a)(3)(B)(i), (iv). An evasive or incomplete answer or response is treated as a failure to answer or respond. Rule 37(a)(4). “Upon a motion to compel discovery, the movant has the initial burden of demonstrating relevance. In turn, the party opposing discovery has the burden of showing that discovery should not be allowed, and also has the burden of clarifying, explaining and supporting its objections with competent evidence.” United States v. McGraw–Hill Cos., 2014 WL 1647385, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2014) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). III. DISCUSSION The instant Motion represents Plaintiff's fifth motion to compel the production of documents filed in fewer than three months in this action. See Dkt. 68, 73, 80, 84. Of the prior motions, two were denied in their entirety and two were granted in part and denied in part. See Dkt. 74, 75, 83, 87. In one prior motion, Plaintiff sought to compel Defendant to: Identify and produce a complete copy of the California State Prison—Los Angeles County LOP/loss of privilege report from January 16, 2014 to December 31, 2019. Dkt. 73 at 15 (CM/ECF pagination). The Court found: Plaintiff has not met his initial burden to show: (1) the discovery sought is appropriate under Rule 26(b)(1); and (2) Lugo failed to properly respond. As to the first failure, Plaintiff has not shown how records relating to nearly six years' of inmate loss of privilege reports, not limited by the nature of the lost privilege, nature of the legal issues, identity of the inmate, identity of the testifying guards, or identity of hearing officer, has any relevance to this case, involving allegations regarding a single loss of privileges hearing, or that any arguable, minimal relevance is not wholly disproportionate to the needs of the case, taking into account the Rule 26(a)(1) proportionality factors. As to the second failure, Defendant Lugo answered RFP 19 fully and without equivocation. Dkt. 74 at 2. As a result, on April 27, 2020, the Court denied the prior motion. Id. In the instant Motion, Plaintiff seeks to compel a further response to RFP No. 38, which asks Defendant Lugo to: Identify and provide a complete copy of California State Prison – Los Angeles County LOP/Loss of Privilege Records from December 31, 2016 to December 31, 2019, which was authorized or implemented by Defendant Lugo. Motion at 21 (CM/ECF pagination). Plaintiff added argument why he believed RFP No. 38 sought relevant information, asserting the documents were relevant to a practice or custom” of deliberate indifference by Defendant Lugo to Plaintiff and others. Id. In response to RFP No. 38, Defendant Lugo responded as follows: Defendant objects to this Request on the following grounds: (1) it is vague, ambiguous, and overly broad as to the phrase “loss of privilege records,” requiring Defendant to guess as to the intended meaning; (2) it is overly broad as to time and scope and serves no purpose in this litigation other than to harass Defendants; (3) it lacks foundation and does not describe the material requested with reasonable particularity to determine what is sought and allow the opportunity for appropriate objections; (4) the documents requested would contain the information of other inmates, in violation of section 3370 of Title 15 in the California Code of Regulations, which protects inmate information from disclosure to other inmates and the public; and (5) the information sought is irrelevant to Plaintiff's own claims or defenses, and constitutes an improper fishing expedition on behalf of other inmates. See Kemp v. Ryan, 638 F.3d 1245, 1260 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he desire to engage in [an improper fishing] expedition cannot supply ‘good cause’ sufficient to justify discovery.”) *3 Without waiving and subject to these objections, Defendant produces the following records relating to loss of privileges authorized or implemented by Defendant Lugo, from December 31, 2016 to December 31, 2019, related to Plaintiff's individual claims or causes of action: [Records identified]. Motion at 13-14 (CM/ECF pagination). Plaintiff argues Defendant's response “used deception” by only producing Plaintiff's disciplinary hearing records when records of any disciplinary hearing involving Defendant Lugo were requested. See Motion at 5. Plaintiff argues that such records are relevant to show Defendant Lugo “had in motion a practice, custom, and or policy which was deliberate indifference to Plaintiff and other prisoners” at the prison relating to loss of privilege determinations from December 31, 2016 to December 31, 2019, and no such records other than those relating to Plaintiff were produced. Id. at 5-6. In his Opposition, Defendant Lugo reiterates several objections and notes the Court previously denied a motion to compel regarding RFP No. 18 that sought similar documents. See Opp. at 4-7. The Court finds that the documents sought by RFP No. 38, except as already provided by Defendant Lugo, are not proportional to the needs of the case under Rule 26(a)(1). The Court notes that RFP No. 38 has a slightly shorter time frame that RFP No. 18 and is narrowed to request documents only relating to Defendant Lugo. Nonetheless, RFP No. 38 seeks four years of inmate loss of privilege reports, not limited by the nature of the violation, the nature of the lost privilege, nature of the legal issues in the hearing, or identity of the inmate. Plaintiff's proffers that such documents could bear on Defendant Lugo's alleged intent at the instant hearing, which, according the operative Second Amended Complaint, took place in September 2017 (see Dkt. 22 at 8 (CM/ECF pagination)). Thus, most of the timeframe sought by RFP No. 38, December 31, 2016 to December 31, 2019, seeks documents after the relevant hearing, having little if any relevance to Defendant Lugo's state of mind as of September 2017. Further, as Defendant notes, disciplinary records of other inmates implicate the privacy rights of those inmates. Balancing those privacy rights against the minimal, arguable relevance of such documents, the scales tip against production. Documents relating to Plaintiff's disciplinary hearings overseen by Defendant Lugo are relevant, proportional to the needs of the case, and do not implicate the privacy rights of third parties. In agreeing to produce those records, Defendant Lugo has complied with his discovery obligations. As a result, the Motion is DENIED. As to the parties' cross-requests for “sanctions,” Plaintiff did not prevail and is not entitled to an award of expenses. As to Defendant, the Court considers that Plaintiff is a prisoner, proceeding pro se, who attempted to narrow RFP No. 18, previously found overly broad and disproportionate to the needs of the case, in propounding RFP No. 38. Although a close call, the Court finds that an award of expenses in these circumstances would be unjust. See Rule 37(a)(5)(B). The parties are advised that denial of a future motion to compel may result in an award of expenses against the party filing the motion, as could the granting of a future motion to compel result in an award of expenses against the party opposing the motion. IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER *4 For the foregoing reasons, the Motion (Dkt. 88) is DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED.