MICHELLE MEEKER, Plaintiff, v. LIFE CARE CENTERS OF AMERICA, INC., d/b/a Heritage Park Care Center, and COLORADO MEDICAL INVESTORS, LLC, d/b/a Heritage Park Care Center, Defendants Civil Action No. 14-cv-02101-WYD-NYW United States District Court, D. Colorado Filed August 26, 2016 Counsel Deirdre Elizabeth Ostrowski, Christina M. Habas, Keating Wagner Polidori & Free, P.C., Kimberly Jo Jones, Paula Dee Greisen, King & Greisen, LLP, Denver, CO, for Plaintiff. Gail Lynne Benson, Ian Ray Mitchell, Thomas Pollart & Miller, LLC, Greenwood Village, CO, for Defendant Wang, Nina Y., United States Magistrate Judge ORDER ON MOTION FOR SANCTIONS *1 This matter comes before the court on the following motions: (1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions for LCCA Defendants’ Failure to Comply with this Court’s Order on Discovery Motions [Doc. 204] Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 (“Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions”) [#262, filed on Mar. 18, 2016]; and (2) Defendants Life Care Centers of America, Inc. and Colorado Medical Investors, LLC’s Brief in Opposition to Further Production of Emails (“Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration”) [#276, filed Apr. 29, 2016]. These motions were referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the Order of Reference dated July 29, 2014 [#6], the Reassignment dated February 10, 2015 [#58], and the Memoranda dated April 8, 2016 [#266] and April 29, 2016 [#277]. The court has considered the Parties’ arguments reflected in the briefing, including Plaintiff’s Supplement filed on July 1, 2016 [#304][1] and the LCCA Defendants’ Response thereto [#313], the Amended Status Report dated July 8, 2016 [#307]. The court also heard oral argument on May 12, 2016 [#285]. Being fully apprised of the premises, I hereby GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions and DENY Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration for the following reasons. BACKGROUND The background of this case and the discovery disputes involving Plaintiff Michelle Meeker (“Plaintiff” or “Ms. Meeker”) and Defendants Life Care Centers of America, Inc. (“LCCA”) and Colorado Medical Investors (“CMI”) (collectively, “LCCA Defendants”) have been well-documented in this court’s Orders and Recommendations. See, e.g., [#123; #158; #204; #268]. Nevertheless, given the nature of the discovery conduct at issue and the sanctions Plaintiff seeks, this court is compelled to recount the most salient facts again. This case arises out of an “active shooter” training drill, in which Ms. Meeker unwittingly played the role of a hostage while employed at LCCA’s Heritage Park Care Center (“HPCC”) in Carbondale, Colorado. [#172]. Plaintiff alleges that the LCCA Defendants intentionally failed to disclose to her, or any other employee, that the gunman in the facility on October 16, 2013 was actually a police officer and that the hostage situation was merely a drill. [Id. at 2]. As a result, Plaintiff asserts the following claims against the only remaining defendants, the LCCA Defendants: (1) a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) excessive force in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) false imprisonment in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (4) a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process violation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (5) a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process violation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (6) a state law claim for civil assault; (7) a state law claim for civil battery; (8) a state law claim for civil false arrest/imprisonment; (9) a state law claim for outrageous conduct; and (10) willful and wonton breach of contract. [#172]. A Protective Order was entered by the Honorable Boyd N. Boland on December 31, 2014, to facilitate efficient and fair discovery. [#45]. *2 January 2015 Representation by LCCA Defendants. In November 2014, Plaintiff requested in an interrogatory that the LCCA Defendants identify other “safety, security or emergency drills” apart from the October 2013 drill at issue in this case. [#173-1 at 6]. Ms. Meeker also sought documents reflecting any information “described or identified” in the LCCA Defendants’ responses to interrogatories, as well as communications between the LCCA Defendants regarding the drill at HPCC or other drills. [Id. at 5-6]. In January 2015, in response to these discovery requests, the LCCA Defendants affirmatively and unequivocally stated, “the only hostage drill that has ever taken place at any LCCA facility was that occurring at the Carbondale, Colorado facility on October 16, 2013.” [#173-7 at 3]. Yvonne Bates-King certified these discovery requests under oath, [id. at 14], and counsel of record signed them under Rule 26(g) [id. at 13]. When asked to produce documents transmitted in any fashion by any LCCA facility to the LCCA corporate office about any drills or other training for safety or security from October 1, 2009 to the present, the LCCA Defendants objected, and affirmatively represented that “responsive documents pertaining to the hostage drill at the Carbondale, Colorado facility have already been provided.” [Id. at 11]. When the LCCA Defendants propounded Second Supplemental Responses to Plaintiff’s First Set of Discovery Requests on April 10, 2015, Defendants included a supplemental objection from Robert Baker, the former Executive Director of HPCC, but the statement that the HPCC drill was the only one of its kind remained. [#313-2 at 4]. Representation that “there was nothing to compel” and July 20, 2015 Order. On March 9, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel LCCA Defendants’ Disclosures and Discovery Responses Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a) (“First Motion to Compel”). [#73]. As part of that motion, Plaintiff sought discovery regarding other “emergency preparedness” or “disaster drills,” conducted at the LCCA Defendants’ facilities and communications related to those drills. [Id. at 9-10]. Plaintiff argued that such information was relevant to the LCCA Defendants’ knowledge of the impact of such drills, that “bears on Plaintiff’s intentional tort claims, among other things.” [Id. at 10]. Plaintiff also sought to compel additional information in response to Interrogatory No. 4, which requested identification of all documents prepared, consulted, or referred to as part of the planning and execution of, or review of the October 16, 2013 drill. [Id. at 12]. In response to this First Motion to Compel, the LCCA Defendants argued that the information regarding other drills was facially irrelevant, overbroad and unduly burdensome. [#102 at 10-12]. The LCCA Defendants also asserted that they: have disclosed all known correspondence between Heritage Park Care Center and Life Care Centers of America’s [sic] regarding Plaintiff and the safety drill. None is being hidden or otherwise surreptitiously withheld. If additional correspondence is found, it will be disclosed pursuant to the rules. But at this time there is nothing for the Court to “compel” because the documents Plaintiff is requesting are not known to exist. [Id. at 13 (emphasis added) ]. In an Order dated July 20, 2015, this court accepted the LCCA Defendants’ representation as a good faith averment, specifically relying upon the LCCA Defendants’ contention that no responsive materials have been withheld. [#141 at 10-11]. The court also considered Plaintiff’s request for information related to similar drills and observed that other instances of the same type can be relevant to a party’s claims or defenses under Rule 26(b)(1). [#141 at 9]. But it nonetheless found Plaintiff’s discovery requests, including Interrogatory No. 5 and Requests for Production Nos. 5, 8, and 9 overly broad on their face, and declined to redraft them for Plaintiff. [#141 at 10]. The court specifically held that “[t]o the extent that Ms. Meeker properly reframes these discovery requests and the Life Care Defendants’ responses are still perceived inadequate, Plaintiff may seek court intervention after an appropriate meet and confer.” [Id.]. Plaintiff redrafted the discovery and served it on August 6, 2015. [#290 at 2]. September 3, 2015 Informal Discovery Dispute Conference. The July 20 Order marked the beginning of a series of motions and orders from this court, culminating in the instant Motion for Sanctions. On September 3, 2015, the court held an informal discovery conference relating to the unannounced emergency drills at the LCCA facilities. [#157]. Counsel for the LCCA Defendants represented during that conference they were unaware of the number of unannounced drills at the LCCA facilities from 2010 to present. [Id. at 2]. During the September 3 discovery conference, the court ordered the LCCA Defendants to take reasonable steps to determine the number of unannounced drills that would be subject to discovery. *3 October 1, 2015 Informal Discovery Dispute Conference. The court held another informal discovery dispute conference on October 1, 2015 regarding the documents. [#166 at 1]. During that Informal Discovery Conference, Defendants agreed to the production of documents for hostage and active shooter drills, but not the bomb threats and intruder drills. [#166]. The court also ordered documents related to those types of drills, such as internal emails within the LCCA Defendants, to be produced. [Id.]. This court ordered then ordered that such documents would be produced on or before October 8, 2015. [Id. at 2]. Assurance about “previously conduct email search” and October 6, 2015 Motion for Protective Order. The LCCA Defendants assured the court that “Life Care Defendants have previously conducted an email search as it relates to the October 16, 2013 drill conducted at Heritage Park Care Center, which is the basis of Plaintiff’s complaint. Only a couple emails were identified that could even remotely be considered relevant to this case.” [#167 at 7 (emphasis added) ]. But what became clear on October 6, 2015, when the LCCA Defendants moved for a Protective Order, was that the LCCA Defendants had failed to undertake sufficient measures to determine what scope of responsive electronic mail existed beyond the October 2013 incident, but rather simply contended that the search was overly burdensome. [#167 at 6-7]. At that time, the LCCA Defendants argued that “it could take anywhere from six months to one year to perform a search of all LCCA emails with regard to approximately 200 drills performed at over 100 facilities for a five year time period.” [Id. at 6]. However, an October 6, 2015 Affidavit from Brad Thompson, the Director of Information Technology for LCCA, provided no details of any attempts to do test searches on already-identified potential witnesses, such as individuals who had been identified on the Parties’ initial disclosures. [#285-5]. Instead, Mr. Thompson’s statements were general in nature, and used descriptions like “incredibly time consuming and burdensome,” without any concrete examples of attempts by LCCA to run searches to demonstrate that the burden of such searches outweighed the value of any data that could be ascertained. [Id.]. And as discussed later in this Order, Mr. Thompson did not even receive information that enabled him to “research” as to how to perform email searches until months later on February 2, 2016. [#323 at 49:5-18]. The Motion for Protective Order did not mention or attempt to explain why the LCCA Defendants had affirmatively asserted in response to Interrogatory No. 5 that the October 2013 hostage drill at the HPCC was one of a kind. [#167]. Even as Plaintiff agreed to limit the email searches to those employees who were members of the relevant safety committee and the management employees of those facilities, counsel for the LCCA Defendants continued to insist that it would take over a year to complete such searches. [#173-3 at 1]. Indeed, in their reply in support of the motion for a protective order, the LCCA Defendants argued that because of the court’s July 20, 2015 Order, they “did not anticipate the potential for extensive electronic discovery as to the LCCA facilities other than Heritage Park Care Center until it was recently ordered to produce underlying documents related to the 202 drills identified by Plaintiff.” [#183 at 3]. The LCCA Defendants continued to insist that “a complete search was conducted at [every] facility and all responsive documents were provided.” [Id.]. At the time of the filing of the Reply, it was clear that the LCCA Defendants had undertaken no reasonable search to ascertain whether responsive email existed, but instead argued that the “Life Care Defendants are required to go on a months-long fishing expedition to identify whether any responsive emails existed.” [Id. at 5]. *4 December 4, 2015 Order. This court disagreed with the LCCA Defendants. In an Order dated December 4, 2015, the court ordered the LCCA Defendants to conduct email searches using search terms identified in discovery produced by the LCCA Defendants. [#204 at 12]. The court instructed that these email searches should be limited to Jessica Varley, Cathy Ortiz, and the members of the safety committee and three management employees of each facility. [Id.]. The LCCA Defendants were ordered to complete these searches no later than December 24, 2015. [Id.]. The court reserved a ruling on Plaintiff’s request for sanctions, but specifically advised the LCCA Defendants that failure to comply with the court’s Order or engage in discovery in a good faith manner may lead to sanctions. [Id.]. The LCCA Defendants then filed a motion to stay a portion of the court’s Order that compelled them to produce certain financial information, but they did not seek a stay of the portion of the Order requiring them to search for and produce responsive electronic mail regarding emergency or hostage drills. [#210]. In granting the LCCA Defendants’ Motion to Stay with respect to the financial documents, this court was clear that all other portions of the court order remained in effect. [#214 at 2]. The LCCA Defendants also objected to the court’s December 4 Order [#206]. The objection, like the Motion to Stay, only addressed the production of financial information, and the LCCA Defendants did not object to the court’s order to search for and produce documents pertaining to the disaster drills. [Id.]. On December 23, 2015, the LCCA Defendants filed a Status Report, indicating that they had identified 84[2] drills that involved or referred to “hostage situations, active shooters, weapons, intruders, code gray and code black.” [#216 at 1; #216-1]. That same day, the LCCA Defendants moved for an extension of time to comply with the December 4 Order, seeking an additional 60 days. [#218]. On February 1, 2016, the presiding judge, the Honorable Wiley Y. Daniel, overruled the LCCA Defendants’ objection and affirmed this court’s December 4 Order. [#234]. On February 10, 2016, this court granted the LCCA Defendants’ Motion for Extension of Time to comply with the December 4 Order and permitted the LCCA Defendants up to and including February 23, 2016 to comply. [#248]. At that time, the court indicated that “[n]o further extension will be granted absent extraordinary circumstances.” [Id.]. On February 23, 2016, the LCCA Defendants again moved for an extension—this time, for six months. [#258]. In an Order dated April 11, 2016, this court addressed the LCCA Defendants’ Motion for Extension of Time, ordering the LCCA Defendants to produce all non-privileged documents from completed searches no later than April 25, 2016. [#268]. The court then set an evidentiary hearing for May 12, 2016 on the issue of further document production. [Id. at 16]. April 2016 Admission. On April 29, 2016, the LCCA Defendants filed the instant Motion for Reconsideration, again arguing that the court should reconsider its December 4 Order compelling the LCCA Defendants to produce additional electronic mail. [#276]. In the Motion for Reconsideration, the LCCA Defendants reported that they had completed email searches for 10 disaster drills, and “[o]ut of the approximate 200 emails that were identified as responsive by counsel for Life Care Defendants, the emails have shown the following facts: (1) emergency disaster drills are planned and conducted at LCCA facilities; [and] (2) some of the drills involve active shooter, intruder or hostage drills ...” [Id. at 2 -3 (emphasis added) ]. The LCCA Defendants did not attempt to reconcile these new statements with their statement that the October 2013 drill at the Carbondale, Colorado HPCC facility was “the only hostage drill that has ever taken place at any LCCA facility was that occurring at the Carbondale, Colorado facility on October 16, 2013.” [#173-7 at 3 (emphasis added) ]. Instead, the LCCA Defendants offered to enter a stipulation, because on April 29, 2016, 18 months after Plaintiff began seeking information about similar drills to which she was allegedly an unwitting and unwilling participant and 14 months after the LCCA Defendants swore, under oath, that the only hostage drill that had ever taken place at any LCCA facility was that occurring in October 2013 at the Carbondale facility, the LCCA Defendants finally admitted: *5 Life Care Defendants are not disputing that LCCA facilities routinely plan and conduct emergency disaster drills, some of which are conducted unannounced and on issues such as bomb threats, intruders, gunman, active shooters, and hostage scenarios. [#276 at 3 (emphasis added) ]. May 12, 2016 Evidentiary Hearing. The LCCA Defendants also did not explain the basis for the inconsistency in their representations about the disaster drills during the May 12, 2016 evidentiary hearing. The court makes the following findings of facts and conclusions of law drawn from the May 12 evidentiary hearing, which appear to be undisputed: (1) Plaintiff made her first demand on LCCA regarding the claims in this case through counsel in a letter dated December 4, 2013. [#285-1]. In that letter, counsel for Plaintiff identified potential state law claims of outrageous conduct, civil battery, false imprisonment, and civil conspiracy, and possible federal constitutional violations and provided details regarding Plaintiff’s legal theories. [Id.]. The letter contained a specific preservation demand that “LCCA preserve all documents related to Ms. Meeker’s employment, the ‘drill’ on October 16, 2013 at Heritage Park Care Center and any and all issues raised, directly or indirectly, in this letter.” [Id. at 11]. (2) Plaintiff’s counsel sent a second letter dated January 6, 2014, requesting that LCCA preserve electronically stored information (“ESI”), including electronic mail. [#285-2]. In that same letter, Plaintiff’s counsel requested that LCCA to preserve certain categories of ESI. [Id. at 3-4]. Those categories included communications related to the incident at issue, and any “de-briefing” meetings occurring after the incident [id. at 3] and communications between HPCC and LCCA corporate [id. at 4]. These early letters do not appear to request that the LCCA Defendants search for or preserve information regarding other hostage-taking drills occurring at other LCCA facilities. [#285-1; #285-2]. (3) LCCA’s Information Technology Department never put a litigation hold in place. [Testimony of Bradley Thompson, Director of Information Technology, #323 at 18:15-20:23]. (4) LCCA’s electronic mail system includes archives and active systems. [#285-5 at ¶ 3; #285-6]. (5) If an employee is currently employed with LCCA, it is likely that she or he has an active email account. To search whether 655 employees had active email accounts, it would take LCCA about 30 minutes total. [Testimony of Bradley Thompson, Director of Information Technology, #323 at 41:19-42:18]. No searches for responsive documents have ever been undertaken in the active electronic mail system. [Testimony of Bradley Thompson, Director Information Technology, #323 at 32:6-9, 35:3-18]. This includes individuals who were specifically involved with the HPCC drill, including Jessica Varley, Nancy Becker, and Neil Jensen. (6) Within the same general timeframe as the October 2013 drill, there were a number of other emergency drills that, based on their names, appear to have been similar to the one conducted at HPCC. [#285-7]. For instance, from LCCA’s own account, another “hostage-taking; person armed” drill occurred at Hallmark Manor, Washington within six weeks of the HPCC event. [Id. at 3]. There was also drills at LCC of LaGrange, Indiana on December 19, 2013 [id. at 11], and Heritage Health Care, Arizona on March 30, 2012. [Id. at 4]. *6 (6) As of October 6, 2015, Mr. Thompson had not received any names or information about any potential electronic mail search on other drills similar to one that occurred at HPCC, and had performed no searches. [Testimony of Mr. Thompson, #323 at 28:12-21; #170]. In fact, Mr. Thompson testified during the evidentiary hearing that when he provided an estimate in his affidavit of the burden of searching for the relevant documents pertaining to the emergency drills, he did not know the variables that would be involved in performing the searches. [Testimony of Mr. Thompson, #323 at 29:14-25]. (7) February 2, 2016 was the first date that Mr. Thompson, as LCCA’s Director of Information Technology, took steps to identify emails relevant to Ms. Meeker’s claims. [Testimony of Mr. Thompson, #323 at 49:5-18]. This was also the first date that Mr. Thompson received the information to begin the research into how to structure the searches. [Id. (“February 2nd was the first drill batches that I received to start searching, to start doing the research to start searching.”) ]. In late May 2016, the LCCA Defendants produced a number of emails regarding the October 2013 drill at the HPCC facility. [#304-2]. These emails included communications that reflected that HPCC staff had received procedures entitled “Person with a Weapon” and a guideline for developing an “Active Shooter procedure.”[3] [Id. at 2-3]. They include correspondence with individuals identified by Plaintiff as “key individuals,” including the then-Executive Director of HPCC, Robert Baker. [Id. at 4]. The subject lines of some of the emails refer to a “Litigation Hold,” but the scope of the litigation hold is not described. See e.g., [id.]. The emails also suggest some type of internal review related to the “Michelle Meeker matter.” [#304-2 at 12-13]. The LCCA Defendants clarified in their Response that these emails pertained to the demand letter from Plaintiff’s counsel to LCCA. [#313 at 3-4]. Based on the Amended Status Report, the LCCA Defendants had produced emails for 32 out of 82 drills by July 8, 2016. [#307]. The LCCA Defendants indicate that as of July 11, 2016, they had produced documents for 45 out of 82 drills. [#309]. APPLICABLE LAW I. Discovery Obligations Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure In federal civil litigation, discovery is the process by which the Parties seek information to evaluate the merits of their respective claims and defenses. “The discovery procedures established under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seek to further the interests of justice by minimizing surprise at trial and ensuring wide-ranging discovery of information.” Witt v. GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 307 F.R.D. 554, 554-55 (D. Colo. 2014). “Wide-ranging,” however, is not boundless. Rather, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that the parties and the court cooperate so that discovery is proportional to the needs of the case. Rule 26(b)(1) provides that “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).[4] It should come as no surprise that parties to a civil action often have differing opinions, in the first instance, as to what discovery is permitted. *7 Thus, the responsibility of both the parties and the court is to approach discovery as a vehicle by which to reach a “just, speedy, and inexpensive” resolution of the case, so that it does not become a roadblock to such end. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Because discovery is, in large part, a process that is managed and executed by the parties themselves, see Witt, 307 F.R.D. at 554-55, civil litigants, and their respective counsel are bound under the Rules by a number of obligations to other parties and the court. As an initial matter, to ensure that discovery is not rendered futile, “litigants have a duty to preserve documents that may be relevant to pending or imminent litigation.” Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614, 620 (D. Colo. 2007). That obligation may arise, depending on the facts presented, prior to the filing of a complaint, when a party “knew, or should have known” that the material may be relevant to future litigation. Oto Software Inc. v. Highwall Tech., LLC, No. 08-cv-01897-PAB-CBS, 2010 WL 3842434, at *7 (D. Colo. Aug. 6, 2010). Under Rule 26(a)(1), parties must make affirmative mandatory disclosures of certain information, including any witness or document upon which it intends to rely to support its claims or defenses. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1). During formal discovery, Rule 33 governs interrogatories and their responses. Specifically, Rule 33(b)(3) provides that “[e]ach interrogatory must, to the extent it is not objected to, be answered separately and fully in writing under oath.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3). Objections must be stated with specificity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4). When the party to whom the interrogatory is directed is a private or public corporation, the answer to the interrogatory must be furnished by an officer or agent of such corporation and include “information available to the party,” rather than simply the individual. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(1)(B). The attorney who makes the objections and the officer or agent supplying the answer must sign the interrogatory response. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(5). Rule 34 controls requests for production of documents and things. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34. Requests made under Rule 34 must (1) describe with reasonable particularity each item or category of items to be inspected or produced; (2) may specify the form or forms that ESI must be produced; and (3) designate a reasonable time, place, or manner for inspection or production. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(1). Rule 34 obligates a party to respond within 30 days after being served.[5] Prior to December 1, 2015, parties were required to produce responsive, non-privileged documents, ESI, and any tangible things that are within the responding party’s possession, custody or control, but the precise timing of such production was not required to be reflected in the response. Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B) (effective Dec. 1, 2015) with Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B) (effective Dec. 1, 2007). In either case, the Rule requires the court to produce documents in a reasonable amount of time, or by a date set by court order. Parties must undertake a reasonable inquiry prior to responding to discovery. Rule 26(g) requires the discovery responses to be signed by at least one counsel of record, and by signing, the attorney certifies: that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief after a reasonable inquiry: (A) with respect to a disclosure, it is complete and correct as of the time it is made; and (B) with respect to a discovery request, response, or objection, it is: (i) consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law, or for establishing new law; (ii) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; and (iii) neither unreasonable nor unduly burdensome or expensive, considering the needs of the case, prior discovery in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g) (emphasis added). As discussed in detail below, trial counsel must exercise “some degree of oversight to ensure that a client is acting competently, diligently and ethically to fulfill its discovery obligations to the court,” and accordingly, counsel must make careful inquiry to determine the existence of documents and to ensure their production. Sun River Energy, Inc. v. Nelson, 800 F.3d 1219, 1229 (10th Cir. 2015). And even after disclosure and responses to discovery have been made, a party has a continuing obligation to supplement or correct its discovery responses throughout the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e). Such supplementation is required: *8 (1) in a timely manner if the party learns that in some material respect the disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect, and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing; or (2) as ordered by the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1)-(2). Counsel’s obligations under Rule 26(g) extend to supplementation. II. Court Intervention and Sanctions A party that believes that it has not received information or documents to discovery requests that it has propounded may move for an order compelling further responses to interrogatories or production of documents after a complete meet and confer and an informal discovery conference.[6] Fed. R. Civ. P. 37. Rule 37(b)(2), the basis of Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions, provides that if a party fails to comply with an order of the court compelling discovery, the court may issue further just orders that include: (i) directing that the matters embraced in the order or other designated facts be taken as established for purposes of the action, as the prevailing party claims; (ii) prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses, or from introducing designated matters in evidence; (iii) striking pleadings in whole or in part; (iv) staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed; (v) dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part; (vi) rendering a default judgment against the disobedient party; or (vii) treating as contempt of court the failure to obey any order except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2). “Instead of or in addition to the orders above, the court must order the disobedient party, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C). Whether or not to sanction a party for violating a discovery order rests in the court’s sound discretion, based on a fact-based inquiry. See Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds, 965 F.2d 916, 920 (10th Cir. 1992). Rule 37(b)(2) contains a general and specific standard that limit the court’s discretion in awarding sanctions. See Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guiee, 456 U.S. 694, 706 (1982); Ehrenhaus, 965 F.2d at 920. The sanction must be just, and it must be specifically related to the particular claim that was at issue in the order to provide discovery. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 706. In this case, Plaintiff seeks attorney fees and costs associated with Plaintiff’s efforts to secure the emails pertaining to the emergency drills, and a number of non-monetary sanctions, including: Requiring LCCA Defendants to allow an independent, third party expert of Plaintiff’s choosing to conduct the email search for discoverable emails pursuant to the Court’s December 4, 2015 order, at LCCA Defendants’ expense; *9 Requiring LCCA Defendants to produce all discoverable emails on a rolling basis within a reasonable time after the emails are identified by the third party expert; Requiring that LCCA Defendants’ review of and production of such emails be overseen by the third party expert, who will make periodic reports to this Court as to LCCA Defendants’ bad faith in the review and production of such emails; Requiring that the third party expert make an initial report to the Court as to LCCA Defendants’ bad faith in its representations to this Court to date regarding the existence of and burdens attendant to searching for discoverable emails, as well as any bad faith to date with regard to LCCA Defendants’ minimal efforts to conduct the email search; Imposing a per-day monetary penalty for each day that passes from the date of the Court’s order on this motion for sanction until the date that LCCA Defendants have complied completely with all of the Court’s orders related to this discovery; An admission that LCCA Defendants were asked for HPCC emails but that they refused to provide this evidence for over 1-1/2 years until the Court compelled them to do so, and that they then lied about the existence of the emails for the purpose of withholding evidence from Plaintiff; An admission that LCCA Defendants repeatedly withheld relevant evidence during this litigation about their conduct with respect to the HPCC drill as well as about their conduct related to hostage-type drills at LCCA facilities nationwide; An Order directing LCCA Defendants to produce LCCA’s owner, Forrest Preston, its President, Beecher Hunter, and its corporate employee Bret Alexander, in Denver, Colorado on dates to be determined by Plaintiff’s counsel, for their depositions, at LCCA Defendants’ expense, as a means to cure the prejudice caused to Plaintiff by LCCA Defendants’ non-production of these emails and false representations that they did not exist during the discovery period in this case, and leave of Court to allow Plaintiff to add these witnesses to the Pretrial Order as potential trial witnesses; An Order precluding LCCA Defendants from adding these emails and/or any other late discovery to the Final Pretrial Order as potential trial exhibits. [#262 at 8-9; #304 at 7-8]. III. Motion for Reconsideration While not framed as such, Defendants Life Care Centers of America, Inc. and Colorado Medical Investors, LLC’s Brief in Opposition to Further Production of Emails, is at its core a request to this court to reconsider its December 4 Order directing the LCCA Defendants to search for and produce emails regarding other hostage-taking drills based on burden to the LCCA Defendants. [#276]. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly provide for a motion for reconsideration. Because the LCCA Defendants seek reconsideration of a non-final order, their motion falls within the plenary power of the court to revisit and amend interlocutory orders when justice so requires. Zeller v. Ventures Trust 2013-I-NH, No. 15-cv-01077-PAB-NYW, 2015 WL 4743191, at *1 (D. Colo. Aug. 11, 2015); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (“[A]ny order ... that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.”). Courts in this district have applied different standards on motions for reconsideration of non-final orders. United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Boulder Plaza Residential, LLC, No. 06-cv-00037-PAB-CBS, 2010 WL 420046, at *3 (D. Colo. Feb. 1, 2010) (listing cases applying Rule 59(e) standard, Rule 60(b) standard, and “law of the case” standard). Nonetheless, the prevailing approach demonstrates that courts consider whether new evidence or legal authority has emerged or whether the prior ruling was clearly in error. See James v. Dunbar, No. 09-cv-02479-PAB, 2010 WL 3834335, at *1 (D. Colo. Sep. 27, 2010). ANALYSIS I. Motion for Reconsideration *10 The court first considers the LCCA Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration, in which the LCCA Defendants request that they be relieved of its duty to comply with the December 4 Order and produce the responsive emails. Rule 26(b)(2)(B) provides that while “[a] party need not provide discovery of ESI from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of burden or cost[ ], [o]n motion to compel discovery or for a protective order, the party from whom discovery is sought must show that the information is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B). A party seeking a protective order on the basis of burden (or otherwise) cannot rely upon general, conclusory statements. Rather, it must make “particular and specific demonstrations of fact to support its claims of burden.” Cartel Asset Mgmt. v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 01-cv-01644-REB-CBS, 2010 WL 502721, at *10 (D. Colo. Feb. 8, 2010) (citing Exum v. U.S. Olympic Committee, 209 F.R.D. 201, 206 (D. Colo. 2002)). The Motion for Reconsideration raises no new legal authority, nor does it demonstrate that the prior ruling was clearly in error. Nor does the court consider the LCCA Defendants’ arguments regarding the burden that producing all of the documents pertaining to the drills to be a sound basis for reconsideration of the court’s prior Order. Indeed, the LCCA Defendants’ present dilemma regarding the purported burden of producing this discovery was a function of their own discovery strategy and tactics involving avoidance and delay. The LCCA Defendants were required to undertake a reasonable inquiry into the specific burden associated with production of electronic mail related to other hostage-taking drills before filing their Motion for Protective Order. However, they chose not to do so. [#204 at 9]. Perhaps had the LCCA Defendants engaged in the same type of analysis of the amount of data that would be potentially responsive to Plaintiff’s discovery request pertaining to the drills and the time and money it would take to gather and produce that data prior to asserting their objections to discovery or moving for a protective order, the court may have reached a different conclusion. But this court declines to re-visit the issue months after the fact. The Rules require LCCA Defendants and their counsel to engage in a reasonable inquiry prior to propounding discovery responses and prior to making arguments in court filings. Accordingly, Defendants Life Care Centers of America, Inc. and Colorado Medical Investors, LLC’s Brief in Opposition to Further Production of Emails is DENIED. II. Motion for Sanctions A. The LCCA Defendants’ Actions Were Not Substantially Justified As early as November 2014, the LCCA Defendants were on notice that Plaintiff was seeking information and documents regarding other emergency drills similar to the one that occurred at the HPCC in October 2013. In response to Plaintiff’s Interrogatory No. 5, the LCCA Defendants unequivocally stated that “the only hostage drill that has ever taken place at any LCCA facility was that occurring at the Carbondale, Colorado facility on October 16, 2013.” [#173-7]. The LCCA Defendants also affirmatively represented that “responsive documents pertaining to the hostage drill at the Carbondale, Colorado facility have already been provided.” [Id. at 11]. Indeed, the LCCA Defendants assured this court that “at this time there is nothing for the Court to ‘compel’.” [#102 at 13]. The court accepted these representations as true, and relied upon these statements in its July 20, 2015 Order when it declined to further compel the LCCA Defendants to produce documents about the October 2013 drill. [#141 at 10-11]. The Advisory Committee Notes to the 1983 Amendments to Rule 2(g) makes clear that both the party and its counsel have obligations under that Rule to make a “reasonable inquiry into the factual basis of [its] response, request, or objection.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g) advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment. “The duty to make a ‘reasonable inquiry’ is satisfied if the investigation undertaken by the attorney and the conclusions drawn therefrom are reasonable under the circumstances. It is an objective standard similar to the one imposed by Rule 11.” Id. At a minimum, the LCCA Defendants were on notice, at the very inception of this lawsuit, that they were under an obligation to gather relevant information from key individuals having knowledge of the October 2013 drill at HPCC: Robert Baker, Jessica Varley, and Melanie Holmes (all of whom were originally named as Defendants in this case). [#1]. Jessica Varley testified that she believed that she emailed Robert Baker, the former Executive Director of HPCC, her notes on the hostage drill. [#173-9 at 193:12-194:18]. *11 And yet, the LCCA Defendants did not ask its Director of Information Technology, Mr. Thompson, to undertake any searches in LCCA’s active email accounts to ascertain whether there were any documents related to the October 2013 drill or to other hostage-taking drills. In fact, the LCCA Defendants did not provide Mr. Thompson with the parameters so he could build a search on the archive systems until February 2, 2016—fourteen months after first receiving discovery requests that sought information about the HPCC drill in question in November 2014 [#173-1 at 6]; twelve months after affirmatively stating that the drill at HPCC was the only one of its kind in January 2015 [#173-7 at 3]; eleven months after they had asserted in response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel that they had disclosed all known correspondence about the HPCC drill and there was nothing more to compel in March 2015 [#102 at 13]; four months after it assured the court it had “previously conducted an email search as it relates to the October 16, 2013 drill conducted at Heritage Park Care Center” in October 2015 [#167 at 7]; four months after the court originally ordered them to produce documents about hostage and active shooter drills in October 2015 [#166]; two months after the court denied the LCCA Defendants’ subsequent Motion for Protective Order by Order dated December 4, 2015 [#204]; one month after the LCCA Defendants filed a Status Report with the court seeking an additional sixty days to complete its production [#216]; and one day after the Honorable Wiley Y. Daniel overruled their objection on an entirely different issue (the production of financial documents related to variable interest entities) [#234]. Whether the LCCA Defendants’ misstatements were intentional or a result of negligence, one thing is clear: there is no basis to conclude that the LCCA Defendants’ engaged in reasonable searches for responsive documents and information about either the October 2013 drill or other similar drills before propounding their discovery responses and assuring to the court multiple times that there were no other responsive documents or information, or that it would be overly burdensome to look for such information. This simply cannot be what the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure intended the discovery process to be, for either the parties or the court. In addition, despite their assurances that they would supplement discovery responses in accordance with Rule 26(e), the LCCA Defendants failed to proactively amend their response to Interrogatory No. 5 once they discovered that it was incorrect. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e) (requiring a party who has responded to an interrogatory to supplement or correct its response “in a timely manner if the party learns that in some material respect the disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect, and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing”). Instead, after being cornered into admitting that there were other comparable drills, in April 2016, the LCCA Defendants offered to enter a stipulation with Plaintiff in which they would “not dispute” that the LCCA facilities “routinely plan and conduct emergency disaster drills, some of which are conducted unannounced and on issues such as bomb threats, intruders, gunman, active shooters and hostage scenarios.” [#276 at 3]. There is, and can be, no dispute that this court ordered the LCCA Defendants to produce emails related to the other hostage-taking drills on October 1, 2015 [#166] and then again on December 4, 2015. [#204]. The LCCA Defendants did not object to that portion of this court’s order, nor did they move to stay its execution. [#206, #210]. In granting the motion to stay on the issue of financial documents, this court explicitly stated that all other portions of the order remained in effect. [#214 at 2]. In addition, the LCCA Defendants were obligated to produce documents related to the October 2013 HPCC drill. Through a number of extensions, the LCCA Defendants were able to secure through April 25, 2016 to produce the documents. In its December 4 Order, the court “specifically advised that failure to comply with this court’s order or engage in discovery in a good faith manner may lead to sanctions, including but not limited to default judgment.” [#204 at 12]. And yet, to date, the LCCA Defendants have not fully complied with either the court’s orders, but rather continue to attempt to find ways to avoid their discovery obligations. Accordingly, based on the record before it, this court finds that the LCCA Defendants violated their obligations under Rule 26(g), Rule 33, and Rule 34 and violated two court orders compelling document production. Moreover, the court finds that the LCCA Defendants’ multiple failures to comply with their discovery obligations under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were not substantially justified. The court therefore finds that sanctions against the LCCA Defendants, and LCCA Defendants’ counsel, jointly and severally, are appropriate. B. Proper Sanctions The court now turns to determining the proper sanctions for the LCCA Defendants and their counsel’s discovery conduct. While it is within the sound discretion of the court to issue sanctions for violations of Rule 37(b)(2), any sanctions must be in the interests of justice and proportional to the specific violation of the Rules. Olcott v. Delaware Flood Co., 76 F.3d 1538, 1557 (10th Cir. 1996). In exercising its discretion, this court notes the asymmetry of information regarding the October 2013 drill at issue as well as any other similar drills that favored the LCCA Defendants; but for the persistence of Plaintiff and her counsel, this court would have assumed that a reasonable search had been undertaken and accepted the LCCA Defendants’ multiple representations, through counsel as an officer of the court, that no further responsive documents existed. Indeed, this court noted in several instances with these Parties that it cannot compel the production of documents or information that does not exist. See Smith v. Pizza Hut, 09-cv-01632-CMA-BNB, 2013 WL 1751850, at *3 (D. Colo. Apr. 23, 2013) (Boland, J.). On the other hand, while this court recognizes that these additional searches have yielded additional documents and information regarding communications related to the HPCC drill and other drills, the probative value of such documents is yet to be determined. The prejudice to Plaintiff results from the undue delay of production, the close of discovery, and the expense attendant to seeking this production. Now that discovery has closed, Ms. Meeker is foreclosed from pursuing discovery regarding the late-produced documents, through either depositions or further written discovery. And the court expects that the human resources and costs associated with seeking this information is significant. *12 Weighing all the facts before me, this court finds that the following sanctions are appropriate and proportional to the specific violations of the Rules: (1) The LCCA Defendants and their counsel[7] are jointly and severally responsible for 50% of Plaintiffs’ reasonable attorney’s fees and costs associated with the briefing and argument arising from Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel [#73]; the LCCA Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order [#167], because there were other issues discussed in those motions; (2) The LCCA Defendants and their counsel are jointly and severally responsible 100% of Plaintiffs’ reasonable attorney’s fees and costs associated with the September 1, 2015 Informal Discovery Dispute Conference; October 1, 2015 Informal Discovery Dispute Conference; this instant Motion for Sanctions; the LCCA Defendants’ Brief in Opposition to Further Production of Emails; and the Evidentiary Hearing held on May 12, 2016, including the reasonable costs associated with Plaintiff’s retention of an expert; (3) All searches ordered by the court’s December 4, 2015 Order must be COMPLETED AND PRODUCED no later than ten (10) days from the date of this Order. No further extensions of this deadline will be granted;[8] (4) Plaintiff is GRANTED LEAVE to take a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition limited to one day of seven hours related to the other hostage-taking drills identified and information produced through the electronic mail searches. Plaintiff will serve that Rule 30(b)(6) notice no later than seven (7) days after the date of this Order, and the LCCA Defendants will produce the appropriate witness or witnesses for such deposition no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this Order. Plaintiff’s reasonable costs and fees, limited to the attendance of one counsel of record, associated with this further deposition will be borne by the LCCA Defendants; and (5) This court DECLINES to enter any sanction with respect to the preclusion of evidence or factual admissions at trial at this time, but such issue may be raised to Judge Daniel, at the appropriate time, in his discretion. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: (1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions for LCCA Defendants’ Failure to Comply with this Court’s Order on Discovery Motions [Doc. 204] Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 [#262] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART; and (2) Defendants Life Care Centers of America, Inc. and Colorado Medical Investors, LLC’s Brief in Opposition to Further Production of Emails [#276] is DENIED; (3) The Parties will MEET AND CONFER regarding the allowable fees and costs for the sanctions as set forth above, and to the extent that there is a dispute over what reasonable fees and costs are recoverable, Plaintiff will FILE a Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs no later than October 31, 2016. The Parties are specifically advised that the court may award or apportion the costs and fees associated with such Motion practice to the prevailing party; *13 (4) All searches contemplated by the December 4 Order WILL BE COMPLETED no later than ten (10) days from the date of this Order; and (5) Plaintiff is GRANTED LEAVE to take a single Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, limited to one day of seven hours, in accordance with the instructions set forth above. Footnotes [1] On July 20, 2016, this court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Supplement Motion for Sanctions [Doc. 262] for LCCA Defendants’ Failure to Comply With This Court’s Order on Discovery Motions [Doc. 204] [#303, filed July 1, 2016]. [#312]. [2] In the Amended Status Report, Plaintiff has revised this number to 82, based on an inadvertent counting error. [#307 at 2 n.1]. [3] The email references procedures and guidelines, but it is unclear whether the LCCA Defendants produced the procedures and guidelines. [#302-2 at 2]. [4] The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 26(b)(1), were amended effective December 1, 2015, during the pendency of this case and these disputes. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) and the Order of the Supreme Court dated April 29, 2015, the amendments govern all civil cases commenced after December 1, 2015 and “insofar as just and practicable, all proceedings then pending.” See http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv15(update)_1823.pdf. [5] Rule 34 was amended effective December 1, 2015, but the amendment as to the timing of when requests for production served prior to a Rule 26(f) conference are deemed served as reflected in the current Rule 34(b)(2)(A) is not applicable to the discovery dispute at issue. [6] The duty to meet and confer regarding a motion to compel is required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a), but the obligation that the Parties participate in an informal discovery dispute hearing arises from this court’s order and practice standards. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(v). [7] The court leaves any apportionment of the sanctions between the LCCA Defendants and their counsel to those entities. Any dispute with respect to the apportionment would likely be a separate action from this instant one. [8] The court notes that the LCCA Defendants’ unilateral actions in this case have afforded them more time than the six month extension they previously requested in February 2016. [#258].