Natividad M. EDWARDS, Plaintiff v. NEW OPPORTUNITIES, INC., et al., Defendants CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:05-cv-1238 (JCH) United States District Court, D. Connecticut Signed July 01, 2008 Counsel Natividad M. Edwards, Waterbury, CT, pro se. Giovanna T. Weller, Kelly D. Neyra, Carmody & Torrance, Waterbury, CT, Paul S. Tagatac, Michelson Kane Royster & Barger, Hartford, CT, for Defendant New Opportunities Inc. Paul S. Tagatac, Michelson Kane Royster & Barger, Hartford, CT, for Defendants Catherine Awwad, Darlene Tynan. Giovanna T. Weller, Kelly D. Neyra, Carmody & Torrance, Waterbury, CT, for Defendants Toni Hirst, Kathleen Maness, Ivory Anders, Barbara Place, Lynn Musto, Tracy Giorgio, Shanae McIntyre. Norman Zolot, Woodbridge, CT, for Defendant Mary Carr. Hall, Janet C., United States District Judge RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT *1 This is a pro se action brought by plaintiff Natividad Edwards against her former employer, New Opportunities, Inc. (“NOI”), and a number of her former co-workers. Edwards is of Mexican descent, and she believes that NOI took various adverse actions against her because of her national origin, and because she ultimately filed charges with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (“CHRO”). Edwards has accordingly brought various claims against NOI pursuant to Title VII, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-3(a), and the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (“CFEPA”), see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-60(a). Edwards also brings several claims against her co-workers under CFEPA and Connecticut common law. All of the defendants have moved for summary judgment. See Doc. Nos.172, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 180, 182, 183, 183. For the reasons that follow, the court GRANTS the motion filed by NOI. With all federal claims dismissed, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims against the individual defendants, and those claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to refiling in state court. I. STANDARD OF REVIEW In a motion for summary judgment, the burden is on the moving party to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986); White v. ABCO Engineering Corp., 221 F.3d 293, 300 (2d Cir. 2000). Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial,” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and present such evidence as would allow a jury to find in his favor in order to defeat the motion. Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2000). Generally, when assessing the record, the trial court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgement is sought. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Graham, 230 F.3d at 38. “This remedy that precludes a trial is properly granted only when no rational finder of fact could find in favor of the non-moving party.” Carlton v. Mystic Transp., Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2000). “When reasonable persons, applying the proper legal standards, could differ in their responses to the question” raised on the basis of the evidence presented, the question must be left to the jury. Sologub v. City of New York, 202 F.3d 175, 178 (2d Cir. 2000). Notwithstanding this general rule for summary judgment motions, however, the court must also account for compliance with Local Rule 56. Specifically, under D. Conn. Civ. R. 56(a), a party opposing summary judgment must file a Local Rule 56(a)(2) statement in which the party indicates whether it admits or denies the facts as set forth in a movant’s Local Rule 56(a)(1) statement. Additionally, when a party files a Local Rule 56(a)(2) statement, “each denial ... must be followed by a specific citation to (1) the affidavit of a witness competent to testify as to the facts at trial and/or (2) evidence that would be admissible at trial.” D. Conn. Civ. R. 56(a)(3). This specific citation obligation “requires counsel and pro se parties to cite to specific paragraphs when citing affidavits or responses to discovery requests, and to cite to specific pages when citing to deposition or other transcripts or to documents longer than a single page in length.” Id. A party’s failure to comply with the specific citation obligation “may result in the court deeming certain facts that are supported by the evidence admitted in accordance with [Local] Rule 56(a)(1).” Id. *2 The court recognizes that the plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this action.[1] However, this court previously warned the plaintiff about the need to comply with Local Rule 56. See Doc. No. 157. Additionally, at the time that each defendant moved for summary judgment, that defendant filed a Notice to Pro Se Litigant, explaining to the plaintiff her various obligations under Local Rule 56. See Doc. Nos. 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 180, 182, 183, 186, 189. All defendants filed a consolidated 56(a)(1) Statement, see Doc. No. 181, and defendant Carr filed a supplemental 56(a)(1) Statement of her own, see Doc. No. 186. Notwithstanding the numerous warnings given, Edwards did not file any Rule 56(a)(2) statement that specifically responded to Carr’s supplemental 56(a)(2) statement. All of the facts in Carr’s statement will therefore be deemed admitted. Additionally, while Edwards did file two different versions of a 56(a)(2) Statement designed to be responsive to the defendants' consolidated 56(a)(1) Statement, see Doc. No. 194, Paper Exhs. at I-XI; Doc No. 197, these submissions were incomplete. In both versions of Edwards’s 56(a)(2) statement, every paragraph does only one of three things: (1) fails to provide any citation at all; or (2) provides a “See Exhibit” citation that does not indicate which exhibit (of the many Edwards has submitted) is being referenced; or (3) provides a citation to an “Answer” she filed during the prior CHRO proceedings; or (4) agrees with the defendants' version of the facts. To the extent Edwards takes actions (1) and (2), she fails to meet the “specific citation” requirement of the local rules. To the extent Edwards takes action (3), she fails to cite to admissible evidence, as her CHRO “Answer” is an entirely unsworn document that constitutes inadmissible hearsay. Accordingly, the court will deem the entirety of both 56(a)(1) statements to be admitted. II. BACKGROUND Taking the Rule 56(a)(1) statements as true, but construing the admissible evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,[2] the court understands the facts to be as follows. *3 NOI is a non-profit community agency located in Waterbury, Connecticut. Joint Defendants' 56(a)(1) Stat. at ¶ 1. NOI administers the “One Stop System” (“One Stop”), a program that provides a single location where individuals can access job training, education, and employment services. Id. at ¶¶ 5-7. Before July 1, 2003, One Stop had been administered by the City of Waterbury. Id. at ¶ 9. On that date, however, the city transferred One Stop to NOI, which began administering the program from an office located on Thomaston Avenue. Id. at ¶¶ 10-11. Prior to the change-over, Edwards had worked for One Stop as a Bilingual Receptionist (and as a Greeter); when the program was transferred to NOI, she accepted a job working for NOI as a Receptionist. Id. at ¶¶ 13, 20. At NOI, Edwards’s immediate supervisor was defendant Kathleen Maness, the Director of the One Stop program. Id. at ¶¶ 15, 23. Maness’s supervisor was defendant Toni Hirst. Maness Aff. at ¶ 29. Edward’s co-workers at NOI included defendants Ivory Anders, Barbara Place, Lynn Musto, Tracy Giorgio, and Shanae McIntyre, as well as several other individuals who are not defendants. Three other defendants, Catherine Awwad, Darlene Tynan, and Mary Carr, were also plaintiff’s “co-workers,” although they were not NOI employees. Awwad and Tynan worked for a related agency called the Northwest Regional Workforce Investment Board (“NRWIB”), which shared office space with NOI. Edwards Dep. at 446-447. Carr was a “Senior Aide” who had been placed at NOI, on a part-time basis, through the John Driscoll United Labor Agency (“JDULA”). Defendants' 56(a)(1) Stat. at ¶¶ 27, 30. This meant that Carr was part of a program run by JDULA, in which JDULA provided training and jobs to individuals 55 and over. Id. at ¶ 29. Edwards is of Mexican descent, and she speaks English with a noticeable accent. On a daily basis, all of the defendants would engage in such behaviors as making “demeaning finger gestures” and “mimicking the Plaintiff[’s] Mexican accent over the intercom and from behind cubicles.” Plaintiff’s Disputed Issues of Material Fact at 10; see also id. at 10-11 (stating that the defendants' mockery was not sporadic, but was instead chronic and repeated); id. at 20 (stating that Edwards was “ridiculed and made the butt of [jokes] by the Defendants mimicking her accent on a daily basis”). In addition, on several occasions, Maness referred to Edwards as a “fucking bitch” in front of some of Edwards’s co-workers. Id. Edwards believes that this signaled to Maness’s subordinates that it was acceptable for them to treat Edwards with little respect. In particular, Edwards contends that her co-workers would do things like mock the fact that Edwards wanted to work in corporate America “when she cannot even speak English,” put dirt in her coffee, and put a picture of Edwards’s son in the garbage. Id. Edwards’s co-workers did more than simply give her a hard time to her face. Indeed, during the first year or so that Edwards worked at NOI, co-workers frequently complained to Maness about Edwards’s job performance. In particular, co-workers told Maness that Edwards was sometimes difficult to understand because of her accent, that she forwarded messages to the wrong people, that she improperly paged people over the office intercom, and that she occasionally tapped into their phone lines to listen to their conversations. See Joint Defendants' 56(a)(1) Stat. at ¶ 24; Maness Aff. at ¶ 12. Maness also received complaints that Edwards was difficult to work with. Maness Aff. at ¶ 13. Maness is African-American. *4 On January 23, 2004, Edwards got into a loud argument with African-American co-worker Mary Carr. Joint Defendants' 56(a)(1) Stat. at ¶ 27. The confrontation began because Carr believed that Edwards had failed to give her a personal message the previous day. Id. at ¶ 31; Carr’s 56(a)(1) Stat. at ¶ 3. Carr called Edwards a “mother fucker” and commanded Edwards to give her messages in the future. Carr 56(a)(1) at ¶ 3. Carr also pushed Edwards with her fingers to further express her anger. Id. at ¶ 4. Edwards was on the phone with a client at the time this was happening, and as the client recounted the incident, Edwards responded by calling Carr a “crazy woman” and then threatened to call the police. Plaintiff’s Exh. XVI, Graham Aff. Carr retorted by taunting Edwards and daring her to follow through on her threat. Id. Carr also loudly told Edwards: “Oh no, you don't want to go there – you don't know who you're messing with.” Id. Carr further threatened Edwards by saying that she would “straighten [her] out,” Carr’s 56(a)(1) Stat. at ¶ 5, that she would “mess [her] up,” and that Edwards was “going to be sorry.” Plaintiff’s Exh. XVI, Graham Aff. Anders soon became aware of the loud argument between Carr and Edwards, and she went to get Maness. Joint Defendants' 56(a)(1) Stat. at ¶ 32. Maness came to the reception desk, and she asked both Carr and Edwards to accompany her to her office. Id. at ¶ 33; Carr’s 56(a)(1) Stat. at ¶ 11. Carr and Edwards complied, and after Maness listened to each tell their story, she concluded that both were equally responsible for the altercation. Joint Defendants' 56(a)(1) Stat. at ¶ 34. Maness also concluded that this was an isolated event, and she asked both women to apologize to each other. Id. at ¶¶ 34-35. Maness did not take disciplinary action against either Carr or Edwards. Id. at ¶ 34. Edwards was unsatisfied with Maness’s resolution of the Carr incident, and so she contacted the JDULA’s director, John O'Connor, to complain about the situation. Id. at ¶ 38. Maness soon found out that Edwards had contacted O'Connor, and she gave Edwards a verbal warning for insubordination. Joint Defendants' 56(a)(1) Stat. at ¶ 39. Maness explained to Edwards that if she was unhappy with the way the Carr incident had been handled, the proper recourse would have been to avail herself of the grievance procedures outlined in NOI’s employee handbook. Id. Edwards later admitted, in a letter she sent to Maness, that she had been wrong to contact O'Connor. Id. at ¶ 41. The Carr/Edwards incident appears to have signaled to NOI’s managers that all was not right at the workplace on Thomaston Avenue. Thus, on March 25, 2004, NOI provided mandatory training to its employees on communication in the workplace. Id. at ¶ 144. Awwad also attended this meeting, even though she was not an NOI employee. Id. at ¶ 145.[3] March 25, 2004 was an eventful day for a second reason. That day, Maness heard Edwards make a comment over the intercom about Weight Watchers. Id. at ¶ 42. Maness believed that this comment was maliciously directed towards Tynan. Id. Accordingly, on the 26th, Maness told Edwards that her behavior had been unacceptable, and she verbally warned Edwards that continuing this behavior would result in strong disciplinary action. Maness Aff. at ¶ 24 & id. at Exh. 5. This was not the end of the matter. Awwad subsequently informed Maness that Tynan had been very upset after hearing Edward’s comments, and she requested a meeting. Joint Defendants' 56(a)(1) Stat. at ¶ 44; Maness Aff. at ¶ 25. Maness agreed, and so on March 30, 2004, Maness asked Edwards to join her in a meeting. Joint Defendants' 56(a)(1) Stat. at ¶¶ 44-45. Once Edwards arrived at Maness’s office, she discovered that Tynan was going to be present. Id. at ¶ 48. Edwards abruptly left, informing everyone that she refused to meet without her lawyer present. Id. *5 Shortly thereafter, Edwards scheduled a meeting with Hirst, NOI’s Director of Research, Planning, and Development. Id. at ¶ 49. That meeting took place on March 31, 2004, with Maness present, and during the meeting Hirst referred Edwards to an Employee Assistance Program (“EAP”) from which Edwards could obtain counseling services. Id. at ¶ 51. Both Maness and Hirst explained that they were referring Edwards so that she could improve her interactions with co-workers. Id. at ¶ 56. Edwards scheduled an EAP appointment for April 1, 2004, but she left shortly after her session began. Id. at ¶ 59. Hirst later approached Edwards about her early departure, and Edwards told Hirst that she was going to reschedule. Id. at ¶ 62. After Edwards never followed through on that promise, see id. at ¶ 59, Hirst gave Edwards a written warning for insubordination. Id. at ¶ 62. The warning was dated April 19, 2004. Id. Meanwhile, on April 6, 2004 – several weeks before Edwards received the warning from Hirst – Edwards received her annual performance evaluation. Id. at ¶ 64. The evaluation was not positive, and Edwards was rated as less than “Good” in five out of six categories. Id. The evaluation particularly criticized Edwards for being argumentative, and for not having a good attitude towards her fellow employees. Id. at ¶ 65. Edwards was given a 30-day probationary period in which she was required to improve her performance. Id. at ¶ 66. Several weeks later, on April 26, 2004, Edwards drafted a lengthy, somewhat rambling letter to Maness, in which she expressed her displeasure with the disciplinary actions that had been taken against her. Id. at ¶ 67. Edwards asked that all verbal warnings be removed from her personnel file. Id. Edwards also maintained that she had been subjected to a “hostile, discriminative, intolerant, health-threatening, bullying[,] and ... harassing environment,” although Edwards did not expressly state her belief that she had been subjected to discrimination based on her national origin or ethnicity.[4] Maness Aff. Exh. 7. The letter did suggest that Manes had been unfairly siding with Carr, or was otherwise “protecting” Carr. Id. Also, in many places the letter expressed frustration with the fact that people in the office pretended to have difficulty understanding Edwards when she spoke English. See id. The letter especially called out Tynan and Awwad for bullying Edwards and making fun of her accent. Id. The letter also expressed displeasure with the fact that Maness had called Edwards a “fucking bitch” on two separate occasions. Id. The letter never accused Maness or Hirst of engaging in accent mockery or similar behavior. Id. In response to the letter, NOI’s CEO, James Gatling, agreed to convene a meeting in his office.[5] Gatling, Hirst, Mannes, Joe Caizzo, Kimberly Kenneson, and Shelly Donahue were present at the meeting, as was Edwards.[6] Joint Defendants' 56(a)(1) Stat. at ¶ 68. Edwards was given a full opportunity to make her case with regard to all the issues she complained about in her letter. Id. at ¶ 71; see also Edwards Dep. at 157. Edwards spent the meeting venting her disapproval over the way that Maness had handled the incident with Carr. Hirst Aff. at ¶ 31. She also requested that the verbal warnings be removed from her file. Id. at ¶ 32. There is no evidence that Edwards ever discussed any of the other bullying incidents at the meeting, or otherwise suggested at the meeting that she had been subjected to a harassing work environment, even though Gatling specifically gave her the opportunity to discuss the issue. See Edwards Dep. at 149-57. Indeed, at the end of the meeting, when Gatling asked Edwards what she wanted him to do, her sole response was that she wanted the warnings removed from her personnel file. Id. at 155-57. *6 On May 19, 2004, Hirst sent Edwards a letter in which she told Edwards that NOI was not going to rescind any of the reprimands (although it would permit Edwards to place a responsive memo in the file). Id. at ¶ 72. Hirst also told Edwards that NOI had “thoroughly investigated” her concerns, and had concluded that the work environment was not “hostile, discriminative, intolerant, threatening, bullying, or harassing in any manner.” Hirst Aff. Exh. 4. Two days later, Edwards filed a CHRO Complaint in which she alleged that NOI had discriminated against her on the basis of her national origin. Joint Defendants' 56(a)(1) Stat. at ¶ 92. NOI did not actually receive notice of the CHRO Complaint until June 7, 2004. Id. at ¶ 93. Moreover, even after NOI did receive notice, the only individuals who ever learned about the filing were Hirst, Maness, and Gatling. Id. at ¶ 95. In the interim, things started to improve for Edwards at work. Indeed, on May 28, 2004, Maness informed Edwards that her work performance and relationships with staff had improved, and that she was therefore being taken off probation. Id. at ¶¶ 73-74. Still, Edwards continued to have workplace issues that created a certain amount of conflict. In May or June of 2004, NOI set up a new voicemail system. Each employee was required to change their default password (“0000”) to a more personal password. Id. at ¶¶ 80-81. Notwithstanding this instruction, Edwards did not change the password for NOI’s general mailbox. Id. at ¶ 89. This proved problematic, because over the course of several months, several employees/affiliates began receiving racially charged voicemails. At least one of the inappropriate voicemails originated from Edwards’s extension. Id. at ¶¶ 80, 82. Edwards denied responsibility for the messages, and was not disciplined for them. She was, however, reminded to change her voicemail password. Id. at ¶ 83. She did not do so, and this led to further problems. In September 2004, someone deleted the outgoing message on NOI’s main phone line. The replacement message was changed to say: “if you need help come to us and we will f* * * you up.” Id. ¶ 87 (alterations in original). Edwards was again reminded to change the default password, and when she failed to do so again, Maness told Edwards that she would no longer be responsible for retrieving messages from the voice mail system. Id. at ¶¶ 88-90. No one accused Edwards of having been the individual who altered the outgoing message. Id. at ¶ 91. Edwards was also involved in a workplace incident regarding a Snow White sign. On August 17, 2004, a nine foot tall Snow White sign was observed on the lawn in front of the Thomaston Avenue building. Id. at ¶ 103. The sign said “Happy Birthday Auntie Nettie.” Id. Edwards believed that the sign was placed there by her co-workers as part of an effort at harassment: Edwards’s nickname is “Nattie,” and some of her co-workers had previously mocked her short stature by referring to her as “Dopey,” one of the dwarves from the Snow White movie. Id.at ¶ 104. Unbeknownst to Edwards, the sign was actually placed in front of the building by nieces and nephews of Annette Lombardi, an employee of the Connecticut Department of Social Services who worked in the same office building. Lombardi was celebrating her 50th birthday that day, and her nieces and nephews call her “Auntie Nettie.” See id. at ¶¶ 105-107. Despite these few hiccups, things somewhat improved for Edwards in late 2004 and early 2005. Indeed, on May 13, 2005, Edwards received her annual performance review, and this time the review was largely positive. Id. at ¶ 76. Nonetheless, less than two months later, on June 27, 2005, Edwards submitted her letter of resignation. June 29th was her last day at NOI. *7 Edwards filed her federal lawsuit on July 14, 2005. Following a number of Rulings by this court, see Doc. Nos. 66, 73, 120, the issues and defendants have been narrowed considerably. Accordingly, the following claims in plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint are currently in the case: (1) a hostile work environment claim against defendant NOI, asserted both under Title VII and CFEPA; (2) a constructive discharge claim against defendant NOI, asserted under Title VII and CFEPA; (3) a retaliation claim against defendant NOI, asserted under Title VII and CFEPA; (4) an aiding and abetting claim asserted against the individual defendants[7] under CFEPA; and (5) a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against the individual defendants. All the defendants have moved for summary judgment on all claims. III. CLAIMS AGAINST NOI The three claims asserted against NOI, for hostile work environment, constructive discharge, and retaliation, are brought pursuant to both federal and state law. Because federal and state law on these issues is essentially the same, see Brittell v. Dept. of Corr., 247 Conn. 148, 165 (1998), there is no need to analyze the federal and state claims separately. A. Hostile Work Environment Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an individual, on the basis of national origin, with respect to that individual’s “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). This means that employees are protected not only from economic discrimination, but also from harassment that is sufficiently severe or pervasive that it alters the terms and conditions of employment. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). To have a successful claim based on a hostile work environment, an employee’s treatment must be sufficiently degrading such that reasonable people would find the conduct to be hostile or abusive. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). Additionally, the employee must show that she subjectively perceived the behavior as harassing. Id. at 21-22. Finally, when a plaintiff sues her employer, she must show that “a specific basis exists for imputing the objectionable conduct to the employer.” Fairbrother v. Morrison, 412 F.3d 39, 48-49 (2d Cir. 2005). 1. Whether the Conduct Was Hostile NOI begins by claiming that the conduct of Edwards’s co-workers[8] was not sufficiently severe and pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment. NOI Mem. at 14. In NOI’s view, any accent mimicry and related misbehavior only occurred sporadically, and constituted only trivial harassment, such that the terms and conditions of Edwards’s employment were not affected. Id. at 14-15. Whether or not a work environment is hostile is something that can only be determined by examining the totality of the circumstances. Ferris v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 277 F.3d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 2001). Relevant factors include “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. Because a plaintiff need only show that the relevant conduct was sufficiently severe orsufficiently pervasive, even relatively minor conduct can create a hostile work environment when it occurs with sufficient frequency. SeeTerry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 149 (2d Cir. 2003). According to Edwards’s affidavit, each of the individual defendants ridiculed and mocked the plaintiff’s accent on a daily basis. Although a few instances of accent mimicry might not be enough to constitute a hostile work environment, cf. Usherenko v. Bertucci’s Corp., No. 05-cv-756, 2006 WL 3791389, at *7 (D. Conn. Dec. 21, 2006), the mockery in this case was so frequent that it can easily be described as “pervasive” – particularly when combined with the other indignities that Edwards’s co-workers inflicted on her. Under the totality of the circumstances, a jury could conclude that Edwards had been subjected to a hostile work environment.[9] *8 Relatedly, NOI suggests that Edwards did not subjectively find the accent mockery to be offensive. NOI points out that two of Edwards’s male co-workers also engaged in daily accent mimicry, and yet Edwards did not find their comments hurtful. See NOI Mem. at 17 (citing Edwards Dep. at 188, 190). As Edwards explained at her deposition, however, she did not find these comments offensive because she perceived her male co-workers to be joking around when they engaged in these actions. Edwards Dep. at 190. By contrast, Edwards perceived the defendants to be acting maliciously when engaging in similar behavior. Id. If this testimony is credited, a jury could certainly find that Edwards subjectively perceived the individual defendants' actions to be hostile. 2. Whether the Conduct Constituted National Origin Discrimination As its next argument, NOI takes the surprising position that accent mockery cannot constitute national origin discrimination. This argument lacks merit. Admittedly, the Second Circuit has not yet squarely held that hostility based on an individual’s accent is evidence of national origin discrimination. Cf. Ghose v. Century 21, Inc., 12 Fed. Appx. 52, 54 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding that a plaintiff had introduced insufficient evidence that he was actually mistreated because of his accent). However, as the Ninth Circuit has recognized, an individual’s accent is so closely tied to her national origin that the two characteristics will often be inextricably intertwined. Raad v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 323 F.3d 1185, 1195 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Ang v. Procter & Gamble Co., 932 F.2d 540, 549 (6th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that discrimination based on speaking manner can constitute national origin discrimination); Carino v. Univ. of Okla., 750 F.2d 815, 819 (10th Cir. 1984) (same). The EEOC agrees. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (“The Commission defines national origin discrimination broadly as including ... the denial of equal opportunity ... because an individual has the ... linguistic characteristics of a national origin group.”). NOI also argues that Edwards’s supervisors did not create a hostile work environment based on Edwards’s national origin. NOI contends that when Maness and Hirst took various disciplinary actions against Edwards, and removed some of her job duties, they did so for legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons. See NOI Mem. at 20-26. NOI misses the point. Based on the evidence properly before the court, there can be no dispute that Maness and Hirst took these actions for legitimate reasons. However, Edwards has still introduced evidence that Maness and Hirst engaged in repeated mockery of Edwards’s accent.[10] Just as pervasive accent mockery constitutes a hostile work environment when engaged in by co-workers, it is also a hostile work environment when engaged in by supervisors. 3. Whether NOI is Liable for the Discrimination *9 Finally, NOI argues that any discriminatory conduct by the individual defendants cannot be imputed to NOI as a matter of law. Because this argument involves some complexity, the court will separate out co-worker harassment from supervisor harassment. See Fairbrother, 412 F.3d at 52. An employer will be liable for co-worker harassment when the plaintiff can show either that the employer failed to provide a reasonable avenue for complaint, or that the employer knew (or should have known) about the harassment and failed to take appropriate action.[11] Id.at 2; see also Richardson v. N.Y. State Dept. of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 441(2d Cir. 1999). Here, Edwards fails to muster evidence in support of either prong of the test.[12] Turning to the first prong, the undisputed evidence shows that NOI provided a reasonable avenue for complaint. See Joint Defendants' 56(a)(1) Stat. at ¶¶ 140-41 (explaining NOI’s internal grievance procedure, which allowed an employee to first go to her supervisor when she had a workplace issue, and then provided for escalation if the employee was unsatisfied with the supervisor’s resolution of the issue); Hirst Aff. Exh. 2 (same). Nor can Edwards succeed on the second prong. After she complained to Maness about harassing conduct, NOI responded by quickly convening a meeting with the CEO in an attempt to resolve the issue. At that meeting, Edwards was given the opportunity to request that NOI take action to prevent the harassment. While she failed to avail herself of that opportunity, choosing instead to request that the discipline against her be rescinded, NOI certainly cannot be faulted for that decision. In these circumstances, Edwards has failed to demonstrate that NOI took an unreasonable response to her allegations of co-worker harassment – particularly in light of the fact that NOI had so recently provided training to its employees on workplace communication. The allegations of supervisor harassment are more complicated. An employer is always liable for a supervisor’s harassment when the harassment “culminates in a tangible employment action, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment.” Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-08 (1998). When there is no tangible employment action, the employer will be presumptively liable, but it may invoke a two-pronged affirmative defense. That is, the employer can escape liability if it shows “(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any ... harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. *10 There is no indication that Edwards’s supervisors subjected her to anything resembling a “tangible employment action” on the basis of her national origin,[13] and Edwards does not so suggest.[14] The real question is therefore whether or not NOI is entitled to summary judgment on its affirmative defense. Turning to the first prong, an employer will generally demonstrate reasonable care when it has promulgated an anti-harassment policy that was in effect during the period of the plaintiff’s employment. Ferraro v. Kellwood Co., 440 F.3d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 128 (2d Cir. 2003). To show that it took reasonable care, an employer need not prove that it was actually successful in reducing harassment. Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc., 239 F.3d 243, 245 (2d Cir. 2001). NOI had a policy, in effect during the relevant time and provided to all employees, that prohibited national origin harassment. Joint Defendants' 56(a)(1) Stat. at ¶ 138; see also Hirst Aff. Exh. 2 at 3. Under the policy, employees were encouraged to report any harassment immediately, and NOI promised to promptly undertake an investigation once a complaint was made. Hirst Aff. Exh. 2 at 4. The policy further stated that any harassment was to be reported to the employee’s immediate supervisor in the first instance. Id. The supervisor was then required to immediately report the allegation to a member of management and to human resources. Id. If a supervisor was the harasser, the policy allowed the employee to instead report the harassment to either a member of management, or to human resources. Id. In all situations, NOI promised not to retaliate against an individual who made a good faith complaint. Id. NOI further promised to maintain as much confidentiality as possible during the investigation. Id. Edwards has not identified anything unreasonable about this policy, and the policy is similar to others that the Second Circuit has deemed reasonable as a matter of law. See, e.g., Ferraro, 440 F.3d at 102-103; Leopold, 239 F.3d at 245. As there is no dispute that Edwards neglected to utilize NOI’s grievance procedure to complain about any harassment by Maness or Hirst, see Joint Defendants' 56(a)(1) Stat. at ¶ 143, NOI has established the first prong of its affirmative defense. For the second prong of its affirmative defense, NOI argues that it was unreasonable for Edwards to ignore the complaint procedures available her. NOI Mem. in Opp. at 26-27. Because NOI has made this argument, the “burden of production shifts to the employee to come forward with one or more reasons why the employee did not make use of the procedures. The employer may rely upon the absence or inadequacy of such a justification in carrying its ultimate burden of persuasion.” Leopold, 239 F.3d at 246. In her papers, Edwards does not offer any justification for her failure to use the complaint procedure. NOI has therefore established the second prong of its affirmative defense. With both prongs met, NOI is entitled to summary judgment on Edwards’s hostile work environment claims. B. Constructive Discharge *11 Edwards’s next set of claims seek to impose liability on NOI for what she claims was her constructive discharge in June 2005. An employee is constructively discharged when an employer “intentionally creates a work atmosphere so intolerable that [the employee] is forced to quit involuntarily.” Terry, 336 F.3d at 152. To a large extent, the inquiry is objective: the factfinder must determine if “working conditions [became] so intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee’s position would have felt compelled to resign.” Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 141 (2004). However, the plaintiff must also show that the defendant intended to create the intolerable workplace conditions, Petrosino v. Bell Atl., 385 F.3d 210, 229-30 (2d Cir. 2004); Whidbee v. Gazarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 74 (2d Cir. 2000), a requirement that at the very least must be met with evidence of the employer’s “deliberateness.” Petrosino, 385 F.3d at 229-30. In her Memorandum, Edwards does not clearly specify the actions by her co-workers and supervisors that amounted to a constructive discharge. However, to the extent that Edwards believes her hostile work environment contributed to a constructive discharge, NOI is not liable for the hostile work environment, as discussed in the previous section. To the extent that Edwards bases her argument on the official discipline taken against her (i.e. the warnings given her by Hirst and Maness, her placement on probation, and Maness’s decision to eliminate Edwards’s responsibility for answer voicemails), her constructive discharge claim fails because a reasonable person in her position would not have felt compelled to resign in response to these actions. See Stetson v. NYNEX Serv. Co., 990 F.2d 355, 360 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that constructive discharge cannot be established simply through evidence that an employee was dissatisfied with his work assignments); Martin v. Citibank, N.A., 762 F.2d 212, 221 (2d Cir. 1985) (constructive discharge not proven where supervisor gave various verbal warnings to plaintiffs, and made unjustified complaints about the employee’s attitude); see also Suders, 542 U.S. at 146 (explaining that conditions amounting to a constructive discharge must be much more aggravated than the conditions required to establish a hostile work environment). Indeed, much off the discipline was later “undone” in May 2004, when Edwards was taken of probation, and in May 2005, when Edwards was given an excellent performance review. Cf. Petrosino, 385 F.3d at 230 (finding that no constructive discharge had been shown, despite the fact that the employee had endured hostile conduct for a considerable time, in part because the conduct had not been ratcheted up shortly before the employee’s resignation). NOI is entitled to summary judgment on the constructive discharge claims asserted under federal and state law. C. Retaliation In her final two claims against NOI, Edwards argues that she was retaliated against for filing a complaint with the CHRO. To state a claim for retaliation, Edwards must establish (1) that she participated in protected activity that the defendant was aware of, (2) that she was subjected to an adverse employment action, and (3) that there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 115 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam). *12 Edwards’s retaliation claim fails on the third element. The undisputed evidence shows that NOI did not receive notice of the CHRO filing until June 7, 2004, and that the only people at NOI who knew about the complaint were Gatling, Hirst, and Maness. Although Hirst and Maness may have engaged in some mocking of Edwards after her CHRO complaint was filed, they did the same thing beforehand. Edwards has not identified anything that these individuals did differently after the complaint was filed.[15] See Schiano v. Quality Payroll Sys., 445 F.3d 597, 609 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that a court deciding a retaliation claim must examine the retaliation suffered for filing a complaint, rather than on the hostilities originally suffered from being a member of a protected group). Edwards has therefore not introduced sufficient evidence of a causal connection to survive summary judgment on her retaliation claims. IV. OTHER CLAIMS Now that the court has dismissed all claims (both federal and state) against NOI, the only remaining claims are the state law claims against the individual defendants. Jurisdiction over these claims exists solely by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1367. However, when all federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial, it is appropriate for the district court to leave the state law claims to the state courts. Giordano v. City of New York, 274 F.3d 740, 754 (2d Cir. 2001). Indeed, it is more than appropriate: “[i]n general, where the federal claims are dismissed before trial, the state claims should be dismissed as well.” Marcus v. AT & T Corp., 138 F.3d 46, 57 (2d Cir. 1998).[16] V. CONCLUSION NOI’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 177] is GRANTED, and judgment will enter for NOI on all of the plaintiff’s claims against that defendant. The outstanding state law claims against the individual defendants are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to refiling in state court. The remaining Motions for Summary Judgment [Doc. Nos. 172, 174, 175, 176, 178, 180, 182, 183, 186] are therefore DENIED AS MOOT. The Clerk is ordered to close the case. SO ORDERED. Footnotes [1] Earlier in this case, plaintiff was represented by appointed counsel. Plaintiff elected to proceed pro se before any of the Motions for Summary Judgment were filed. See Doc. Nos. 138, 142. [2] Somewhat confusingly, the plaintiff has filed a document entitled “Disputed Issues of Material Fact.” See Doc. No. 204. Despite its name, the document does not appear to be a Rule 56(a)(2) statement of disputed issues of material fact. Instead, the document has the look and feel of a legal memorandum: it has a fact section, an argument section, and it cites to various legal authorities that are claimed to support the plaintiff’s position. Further adding to the confusion, this document is signed by the plaintiff and notarized. The court is mindful of its obligation to read pro se submissions liberally. See, e.g., Diaz v. United States, 517 F.3d 608, 613 (2d Cir. 2008). Accordingly, because this submission is notarized, and contains within it various factual statements, the court will construe the submission as both a memorandum in support and as an affidavit filed by the plaintiff. Although the court construes the submission as an affidavit, that does not mean that the court will treat every statement in the submission as supported by evidence. Instead, the court will construe the submission as evidence only of those factual claims for which the plaintiff would have personal knowledge of the facts she recites. The submission is not evidence of any other factual claims, and it certainly is not evidence to the extent it makes conclusory statements or legal arguments. Additionally, the court notes that the Local Rules further require a nonmoving party to submit a statement of “Disputed Issues of Material Fact.” D. Conn. Civ. R. 56(a)(2). This requirement is in addition to a party’s obligation to submit responses to a moving party’s Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement. Importantly, this list of disputed issues is also subject to the specific citation requirement. See id. To the extent that Edwards fails to provide specific citations as required by the local rules, the court will not search blindly through the record to find support for her claims in the “Disputed Issues of Material Fact.” [3] It is not clear from the record whether Carr and/or Tynan attended the meeting. [4] The letter did include allegations that Spanish-speaking clients had not been receiving favorable treatment from NOI, as compared with clients who were native English speakers. Maness Aff. Exh. 7. [5] Gatling, along with Hirst, Awwad, and O'Connor, appear to have been copied on Edwards’s letter to Maness. Maness Aff. Exh. 7. [6] Caizzo and Kenneson were NWRIB employees. Donahue was an NOI employee. [7] The individual defendants currently in the case are Awwad, Anders, Carr, Georgio, Hirst, Maness, McIntyre, Musto, Place, and Tynan. [8] The court will use the term to “co-workers” to refer to all individual defendants other than Maness and Hirst. [9] NOI suggests that because Edwards filed her CHRO complaint on May 21, 2004, she can only maintain her action based on conduct that occurred within 180 or 300 days of the filing of her CHRO complaint. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-82(f) (setting a 180 day limitations period for CFEPA claims); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (setting a 300 day limitations period for Title VII claims when a plaintiff files initially with a state agency like the CHRO). NOI is incorrect as a matter of law. See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117 (2002) (“It does not matter, for purposes of [Title VII], that some of the component acts of the hostile work environment fall outside the [300 day] period. Provided that an act contributing to the claim occurs within the filing period, the entire time period of the hostile environment may be considered by a court for the purposes of determining liability.”). [10] In its Memorandum, NOI contends that Maness and Hirst never made a single remark to Edwards about her national origin. See NOI Mem. at 23 (citing Edwards Dep. at 149-160). The cited pages of Edwards’s deposition contain no such statement. By contrast, Edwards’s affidavit states that all of the defendants engaged in daily accent mockery. As Maness and Hirst are two of the defendants, the court understands this reference to include Maness and Hirst. [11] Because Carr, Awwad, and Tynan were not employees of NOI, one could argue that NOI had no duty to remedy any harassment by those individuals, as compared to its duty viz a viz Edwards’s other co-workers. Because it does not affect the outcome, the court will treat Carr, Awwad, and Tynan as ordinary co-workers for purposes of determining NOI’s liability. SeeQuinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 766 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the company’s duty to protect an employee from harassment by non-employees is no greater than the company’s duty to protect that employee from harassment by ordinary co-workers). [12] This is not to say definitively that no such evidence exists in the record. However, Edwards has an obligation under the Local Rules to cite the court to specific evidence in support of her claims, particularly on issues for which she bears the burden of proof. Edwards has nowhere pointed the court to evidence that would establish liability for co-worker harassment. [13] As discussed above, the undisputed evidence shows that any discipline imposed on Edwards (e.g. the warnings, placing her on probation, removing some minor job duties) was undertaken for nondiscriminatory reasons. [14] Edwards does claim that she was “constructively discharged” from her position in 2005. However, constructive discharge can only constitute a tangible employment action when it involves a supervisor’s “official action.” Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 148-49 (2004). There is no indication that any harassment by Maness or Hirst constituted “official” action. Instead, the harassment that Maness and Hirst engaged in was essentially limited to making offensive comments to Edwards, divorced from any corporate or supervisory purpose. Indeed, this kind of harassment is identical to the kind of harassment that could be engaged in by any individual, whether or not a co-worker. [15] The closest Edwards comes to providing evidence that there was retaliation against her is the evidence that Maness removed her voicemail duties in September 2004. However, the undisputed evidence shows that Maness removed these duties because Edwards had repeatedly failed to change the default password; these circumstances do not give rise to an inference that action was taken against Edwards because of her CHRO complaint. Even if the circumstances were otherwise, removing Edwards’s responsibility for checking voicemail would not constitute an adverse employment action. In Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006), the Supreme Court held that employment actions are only actionably adverse when they are “harmful to the point that they could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id. at 57. Removing Edwards’s responsibility for checking voicemail is so trivial that no reasonable jury could conclude it was sufficiently adverse to be actionable. [16] To be clear, the court has not declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims against NOI. Instead, because those claims were essentially coterminous with the federal claims against NOI, the court exercised its discretion to decide those claims on the merits.