LUMA PICTURES INC., Plaintiff, v. JONATHAN BETUEL, Defendant. AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIMS No. CV 16-2625-GW (PLAx) United States District Court, C.D. California, Western Division Filed December 21, 2016 Abrams, Paul L., United States Magistrate Judge ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS *1 This action involves a copyright dispute regarding the ownership of certain scripts and other works (collectively “Scripts”) written by defendant and counterclaimant Jonathan Betuel (“Betuel” or “defendant”). On December 5, 2016, plaintiff and counterdefendant Luma Pictures Inc. (“Luma” or “plaintiff”) filed a Motion to Compel Further Discovery (“Motion” or “Mot.”), along with a Joint Stipulation (alternatively “JS”) seeking to compel Betuel to provide further responses to certain discovery, and a declaration of Luma's counsel, Jill Glennon (“Glennon Decl.”). (ECF Nos. 54, 55). On December 20, 2016, the parties filed their Supplemental Briefs (alternatively “Supp'l Mem.”). (ECF Nos. 62, 63). Having considered the pleadings filed in connection with the Motion, the Court has concluded that oral argument will not be of material assistance in determining the Motion. Accordingly, the hearing scheduled for January 3, 2017, is ordered off calendar. See Local Rule 7-15. I. BACKGROUND By way of background, Luma was formed by Betuel and Payam Shohadai in 2002, as an artist-run visual effects studio. (JS at 1). Betuel, also a minority shareholder of Luma, was employed by Luma until he was terminated in August 2015. (Id.). Shohadai contributed his experience producing visual effects for motion pictures and the capital to start up the company; Betuel contributed his industry contacts and experience as a writer, producer, and director of motion pictures, “including the cult classic, The Last Starfighter – the first motion picture to use computer generated imagery.” (Id. (citing Compl. ¶¶ 1, 16, 17)). Betuel was given a salaried position as head of sales, and Shohadai assumed the position of president and chief executive officer. (Id. (citing Compl. ¶ 18)). Betuel and Shohadai agreed that part of Betuel's job “would involve the use of Mr. Betuel's experience (including as a writer) to help Luma collaborate with its clients ....” (JS at 1-2 (citing Compl. ¶ 18)). Shohadai and Betuel, from the outset, “discussed their goals for Luma, including its eventual expansion from its roots as a provider of visual effects for motion pictures generated by third parties, to a full service studio, providing visual effects for content originated in house.” (JS at 2 (citing Compl. ¶ 19)). To further this objective, Betuel “devoted substantial time and energy at Luma working to create original content worth[y] of production,” including a number of scripts and written works that were “written and/or promoted by Betuel during the period of his employment.” (Id. (citing Compl. ¶¶ 19-20)). Luma understood Betuel's work to write and promote the Scripts to be “in furtherance of Luma's objective to expand its business into content generation.” (Id. (citing Compl. ¶ 25)). However, Luma “eventually grew tired with the proportion of time Betuel spent writing The Scripts, which were never placed into production,” and in August 2015 made the decision to terminate Betuel's employment. (Id.(citing Compl. ¶ 26)). It demanded the return of all Luma property, including the Scripts. (Id. (citing Compl. ¶ 26)). Betuel denied Luma owned the Scripts, and this action followed. (Id.). *2 On August 31, 2016, Luma served its first set of written interrogatories (“ROGs”) and requests for production of documents (“RPDs”) (collectively “Subject Discovery”) on Betuel. (Glennon Decl. ¶ 2). Betuel served written objections and interrogatory responses to the Subject Discovery on October 5, 2016, but did not provide any responsive documents “until the morning of his deposition on October 14, 2016, when he produced 94 pages of emails.”[1] (Glennon Decl. ¶ 4). Luma contends the production was “deficient on its face,” as it omitted attachments that were referenced in the emails, and “was devoid of any drafts, outlines, notes or final versions of The Scripts.” (JS at 3 (citing Glennon Decl. ¶ 4)). During his deposition, Betuel testified that in searching for documents responsive to the RPDs, he had found files “dating back to 2010, including emails and their attachments, scans and PDF files.” (JS at 3 (citing Glennon Decl. Ex. 3)). He “confirmed he wrote and/or promoted The Scripts during the years he was employed at Luma,” and also testified that he searched for the Scripts “on his computer and believes he provided them to his counsel via [D]ropbox.” (Id. (citing Glennon Decl. Ex. 3)). Pursuant to Ms. Glennon's October 27, 2016, meet and confer letter to Drew Sherman (Betuel's counsel), on November 8, 2016, counsel met in person to discuss the issues raised in the letter, which included Betuel's withholding of documents he had agreed to produce, such as documents referenced in the emails, all contested scripts, and documents reflecting metadata; Betuel's objections and withholding of documents based on the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine, or citing confidentiality protection, without producing a privilege log or seeking a protective order; objections that the requests seek information “for an improper purpose” without identifying that purpose; and objections that certain terms are “vague” and “ambiguous,” or that the requests are not “reasonably tailored to any timeframe.” (Glennon Decl. Ex. 1). Mr. Sherman stood by defendant's objections and refused to supplement Betuel's responses. (Glennon Decl. ¶ 5). Mr. Sherman also later stated that there were no responsive documents “because Betuel did not save separate versions of The Scripts,” and instead “saved subsequent additions to the same file, effectively overwriting/destroying prior versions.” (Glennon Decl. ¶ 5 Ex. 2). Seven days after serving defendant with plaintiff's portion of the Joint Stipulation, defendant produced 571 additional pages of documents, which included three of the scripts Betuel identified during his deposition, as well as emails referencing attachments but only one actual attachment. (Supp'l Glennon Decl. ¶¶ 4-5). Betuel contends that this Motion is unnecessary because plaintiff “could have simply propounded amended discovery requests ... specifically defining the information sought from Betuel,” especially with respect to the parties' disagreement about the definition of the term “authored.” (JS at 4). Betuel states that he refused to supplement his responses “because Plaintiff would not agree to propound amended discovery requests.” (Id.). He notes that he “does not want to supplement” his responses “when there is a clear disagreement as to the interpretation of the actual requests,” and if plaintiff had “simply amended its initial discovery requests to clear up any confusion, Betuel would have happily complied.” (Id.). He contends that Luma “is attempting to force Betuel to respond to requests in a manner inconsistent with Betuel's understanding of those requests, but consistentwith Plaintiff's interpretation.”[2] (JS at 4-5 (emphasis in original)). With respect to the document production, Betuel contends that he has already produced responsive documents, but that plaintiff “does not approve of Betuel's use of the uniformly accepted PDF format of the documents,” and wants the documents in “ ‘native’ format.” (JS at 5). He argues that Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “only requires that the parties produce documents as they are kept in the usual course of business or in the form ordinarily maintained unless otherwise stipulated,” and that he produced them “in a reasonably available format.” (Id.). Betuel argues that plaintiff's contention that “Betuel did not include a privilege log and that any confidentiality objection is ‘improper,’ ” “is a red herring,” because “all Plaintiff wants to see are the scripts in order to know when they were created [and] [c]onfidential documents will not assist Plaintiff in deciphering such information.” (Id.). Finally, Betuel submits that “[i]n a case like this, where Plaintiff is a big company and Betuel is a single person, Plaintiff's meritless initiation of this Joint Stipulation is indicative of gamesmanship.” (Id.). *3 In its Supplemental Brief, defendant argues that plaintiff's motion is filled with “fabrications” and “misquotes,” that plaintiff is seeking to broaden the scope of discovery even though it sought to limit it in its previous motion for protective order, and that defendant has answered the interrogatories and responded to the document requests as presented. Luma requests a ruling on Betuel's objections, and an order compelling further responses. (JS at 6). It also requests the Court impose monetary sanctions on Betuel “for his evasive and incomplete discovery responses, which necessitated the filing of this Motion.” (Id.). Betuel also requests attorneys' fees and sanctions. (JS at 55; Supp'l Mem. at 5). II. DISCUSSION A. LEGAL STANDARD The Court will examine the issues in this Motion using the same legal standards set forth in its Order re: Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order (ECF No. 61, at 4-5). B. THE ROGS The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that interrogatories must be responded to “separately and fully.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3) (“Rule 33”). All grounds for objection to an interrogatory must be stated “with specificity.” Rule 33(b)(4). The responding party must exercise reason and common sense to attribute ordinary definitions to terms and phrases used in the interrogatories. Thomas v. Cate, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1030-31 (E.D. Cal. 2010); Advanced Visual Image Design, LLC v. Exist, Inc., 2015 WL 4934178, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2015) (citation omitted). The party objecting to discovery as vague or ambiguous has the burden to show such vagueness or ambiguity. Thomas, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 1030 (citations omitted). “If necessary to clarify its answers, the responding party may include any reasonable definition of the term or phrase at issue.” Novatel Wireless, Inc. v. Franklin Wireless Corp., 2014 WL 11878457, at *2 (S.D. Cal. June 2, 2014) (citing McCoo v. Denny's Inc., 192 F.R.D. 675, 694 (D. Kan. 2000)). At issue in the Motion are ROG numbers 1-4 as follows: ROG No. 1: List the titles of all WORKS authored by YOU, solely or jointly, during the period beginning with YOUR employment by PLAINTIFF in 2002 and ending with the termination of that employment in 2015. ROG No. 2: Provide the name and contact information for all PERSONS YOU met with for the purpose of selling, developing, producing and/or directing motion pictures based upon the WORKS identified in YOUR response to Interrogatory No. 1. ROG No. 3: For each PERSON identified in response to Interrogatory No. 2 identify the date and location of the meeting. ROG No. 4: Identify the location or locations where YOU wrote the WORKS identified in response to Interrogatory No. 1. In response to ROG numbers 1, 2, and 4, defendant objected to the term “YOU” as overbroad and vague. (JS at 9, 15, 22-23). Defendant objected to the term “authored by YOU ... during the period beginning with YOUR employment by PLAINTIFF in 2002 and ending with the termination of that employment in 2015” in ROG number 1 as vague, arguing that it “infers that any work listed or acknowledged in this response thereto was authored by Defendant during the course of Defendant's employment.” (JS at 9). He also objected to the term “authored” in ROG number 1 as vague “as to whether the term refers to finished works, notes on a work, etc.” (id.), and to the term “wrote” in ROG number 4 for the following reasons: (1) it was “not defined in the definitions section, and could be interpreted as hand writing (with a pen/pencil on paper), typinc [sic], etc.”; (2) “ ‘wrote’ is an action verb with ‘works’ as the subject, leading to more vagueness as to whether this request refers to actually putting words into sequential order on a work that is now complete”; and (3) ROG number 1 “uses the phrase ‘WORKS authored by YOU’ and now this interrogatory refers to where Defendant ‘wrote’ the works, creating more ambiguity.” (JS at 22 (emphases added)). *4 In response to ROG number 1, “[s]ubject to his objections,” defendant provided two titles: “Shark Tide” and “Shaman.” (JS at 9).[3] Luma argues that during his deposition, however, Betuel testified that he wrote and/or promoted approximately eleven works during the period he was employed by Luma, and that an additional two works were identified in the documents he produced. (JS at 10-11 (citations omitted)). At the meet and confer, Betuel's counsel “explained” that in responding to ROG number 1, he considered that the term “ ‘authored’ does not encompass scripts or other works that were in progress before Betuel was employed by Luma or works that were incomplete as of the date of his termination,” and that the term “ ‘WORKS’ ... does not include drafts or partial versions of scripts written by Betuel during his employment.” (JS at 11). Luma's counsel responded that the terms “authored” and “WORKS” both as defined and as “logically construed in the context of a copyright dispute, clearly contemplate all versions of scripts and other works, including rough drafts and portions of scripts that were written during the period of Betuel's employment.” (Id.). Mr. Sherman argued “that the use of the past tense verb, ‘authored’, limits the request to completed WORKS,” despite Luma's instructions plainly stating that “the use of the present tense shall also be read to include the past tense and vice versa.” (Id.). Luma notes that its definition of WORKS was not limited to “completed” works, and Mr. Sherman's interpretation actually conflicts with Luma's other instructions, one of which provides that the term DOCUMENTS includes “preliminary, intermediate or final drafts.” (JS at 12). Luma also contends -- and later provided Mr. Sherman with its authority -- that as defined by the Copyright Act, “works” extends to unfinished works. (Id.). Finally, Luma submits that the term “YOU” is also “plainly evident,” and Betuel has not shown that “more tools beyond mere reason and common sense are necessary to attribute ordinary definitions to terms and phrases.” (JS at 13 (citing Thomas, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 1030)). In his argument herein, Mr. Sherman now also objects that “with Plaintiff's new desire to make the interrogatories relate to 11 (but not limited to 11) different scripts, Interrogatory number 1 now contains at least 11 discrete subparts.” (JS at 14 (citations omitted)). In his Supplemental Brief, defendant, among other things, argues that it provided appropriate responses by “accord[ing] the plain and ordinary meaning to terms in discovery requests,” that its responses were “neither incorrect nor incomplete,” and that the information sought is beyond the scope of relevant discovery. The Court finds that defendant's strained reading of ROG number 1, and his objections to it, are without merit. His interpretation of the terms “YOU,” “WORKS,” “authored,” and “wrote,” as well as his contention that the time frame suggested -- “during the period beginning with YOUR employment by PLAINTIFF in 2002 and ending with the termination of that employment in 2015” (emphasis added) -- “infers that any work listed or acknowledge in this response thereto was authored by Defendant during the course ofDefendant's employment,” are unreasonable and not well taken. This is especially true given plaintiff's counsel's reasoned explanations of the intended meanings of these terms as defined in the Subject Discovery, and as further elucidated by her during the meet and confer, in follow-up correspondence, and in the Joint Stipulation itself. The terms used were more than clear enough for defendant to have made a good faith effort to provide responses (or produce documents) that he could have identified as falling within the normal day-to-day meaning of the requests or interrogatories, or as later explained by plaintiff. Indeed, while defendant concedes that had plaintiff propounded amended discovery requests and specifically defined the information it was looking for this Motion would have been unnecessary (JS at 4), the very purpose of the Rule 37 meet and confer is to resolve these sorts of issues without Court intervention. Defendant's objections are overruled. *5 Likewise, defendant's objection that interrogatory number 1 contains an impermissible number of subparts simply because the list defendant would have to provide consists of 11 or more different titles is also without merit and is overruled. Defendant's responses to ROG numbers 2, 3, and 4 all hinge on his response to ROG number 1. For the same reasons discussed above, defendant's objections to ROG numbers 2, 3, and 4 are also overruled. Plaintiff's Motion to compel further responses to ROG numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4 is granted. No later than January 6, 2017, defendant shall provide full and complete responses to each of these interrogatories, consistent with Luma's interpretation and explanation of the terms used in each ROG as explained and detailed by Luma in its portion of Section IV of the Joint Stipulation. C. RPDs The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that when responding to requests for production, for each item or category the responses “must either state that inspection and related activities will be permitted as requested or state with specificity the grounds for objecting to the request, including the reasons.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B) (“Rule 34”). The objection must specifically state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of the objection. Rule 34(b)(2)(C). An objection to part of a request must specify the part and permit inspection of the rest. Id. As discussed previously, the responding party must exercise reason and common sense to attribute ordinary definitions to terms and phrases used in the requests. Thomas, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 1030-31. The party objecting to discovery as vague or ambiguous has the burden to show such vagueness or ambiguity. Id. at 1030 (citations omitted). “If necessary to clarify its answers, the responding party may include any reasonable definition of the term or phrase at issue.” Novatel Wireless, Inc., 2014 WL 11878457, at *2(citing McCoo, 192 F.R.D. at 694). At issue in the Motion are RPD numbers 6-10, 14, and 28-30 as follows: RPD No. 6: All DOCUMENTS reflecting COMMUNICATIONS between YOU and SHOHADAI CONCERNING WORKS YOU created during the period beginning with YOUR employment by PLAINTIFF in 2002 and ending with the termination of YOUR employment in 2015. RPD No. 7: All DOCUMENTS reflecting COMMUNICATIONS between YOU and any other PERSON CONCERNING the sale of, development, production and/or direction of WORKS YOU created during the period beginning with YOUR employment by PLAINTIFF in 2002 and ending with the termination of YOUR employment in 2015. RPD No. 8: All DOCUMENTS reflecting WORKS YOU created during the period beginning with YOUR employment by PLAINTIFF in 2002 and ending with the termination of YOUR employment in 2015. RPD No. 9: All DOCUMENTS reflecting agreements between YOU and any other PERSON CONCERNING the sale of, development, production and/or direction of WORKS YOU created during the period beginning with YOUR employment by PLAINTIFF in 2002 and ending with the termination of YOUR employment in 2015. RPD No. 10: All DOCUMENTS reflecting calendar entries for meetings between YOU and any other PERSON CONCERNING the sale of, development, production and/or direction of WORKS YOU created during the period beginning with YOUR employment by PLAINTIFF in 2002 and ending with the termination of YOUR employment in 2015. *6 RPD No. 14: All DOCUMENTS reflecting COMMUNICATIONS between YOU and SHOHADAI CONCERNING the expansion of PLAINTIFF'S business to include origination of scripts, treatments, story lines and/or outlines for motion pictures, whether for television or film. RPD No. 28: All DOCUMENTS including METADATA, reflecting the dates YOU wrote the WORKS authored by YOU during the period beginning with YOUR employment by PLAINTIFF and ending with the termination of YOUR employment. RPD No. 29: All DOCUMENTS including METADATA, reflecting the times YOU wrote the WORKS authored by YOU during the period beginning with YOUR employment by PLAINTIFF and ending with the termination of YOUR employment. RPD No. 30: All DOCUMENTS, including METADATA, reflecting the location YOU wrote the WORKS authored by YOU during the period beginning with YOUR employment by PLAINTIFF and ending with the termination of YOUR employment. Defendant responded to these RPDs with many of the same objections discussed above, as well as several additional objections. With respect to RPD numbers 6, 7, 14, and 30, he responded: “Subject to and without waiving any of the foregoing objections ... no responsive documents could be found after a diligent search and reasonable inquiry.” With respect to RPD numbers 8, 9, 10, 28, and 29, he responded: “Subject to and without waiving any of the foregoing objections Defendant is producing contemporaneously with these responses non-privileged, non-confidential, responsive documents, which are within the scope of the litigation, not duplicative, in its possession, custody, and/or control.” To the extent defendant objects to these RPDs as vague and ambiguous with respect to the same terms that were included in the ROGS, defendant's objections are overruled for the reasons set forth above. For each of these RPDs, defendant also objects to the term “reflecting” as vague and ambiguous “since the term ‘reflecting’ is not, itself, defined, yet the term is included in the definition of the defined terms ‘CONCERNING’ and ‘RELATING TO,’ which are defined in all capitals, but the term here is used in lower case.” (JS at 25). It is not the term “reflecting” as used in the RPDS that is vague and ambiguous, but rather defendant's objection thereto. Defendant is again straining to create an ambiguity where there is none, and the term is easily understood in the context of the entire request and in its ordinary usage. This objection is overruled. Defendant also objects to RPD numbers 7, 9, and 10 on the ground that each of these requests “seeks confidential information protected by attorney-client privilege and attorney work product doctrines as the request could mean to include communications between Defendant and attorneys.” (See, e.g., JS at 27). He also indicated in his response to RPD numbers 8, 9, 10, 28, and 29, that he would produce “non-privileged, non-confidential, responsive documents, which are within the scope of the litigation, not duplicative, in [his] possession, custody, and/or control.” (See, e.g., JS at 30). To the extent defendant has withheld responsive documents that he contends are protected by the attorney-client privilege or any other privilege or protection, defendant was required to provide plaintiff with a sufficiently detailed privilege log to enable plaintiff to evaluate the applicability of the privilege or other protection. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5); Clarke v. Am. Comm. Nat'l Bank, 974 F.2d 127, 129 (9th Cir. 1992); see The Rutter Group, Cal. Practice Guide, Fed. Civ. Proc. Before Trial, Form 11:A (Privilege Log). Failure to provide sufficient information may constitute a waiver of the privilege. See Eureka Fin. Corp. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 136 F.R.D. 179, 182-83 (E.D. Cal. 1991) (a “blanket objection” to each document on the ground of attorney-client privilege with no further description is clearly insufficient); Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. West, 748 F.2d 540, 542 (10th Cir. 1984) (attorney-client privilege waived when defendant did not make a timely and sufficient showing that the documents were protected by privilege). Further, to the extent defendant contends any responsive documents contain “confidential” information, this objection is overruled. If defendant is concerned about producing “confidential” information, he may, of course, submit a stipulated protective order if good cause can be shown for the entry of such an order. *7 In response to RPD numbers 8, 9, 10, 28, and 29, Betuel objects to each of these requests as duplicative, and/or as seeking documents that are not within the scope of the litigation and “for purposes other than to determine whether or not Defendant created works while working at Luma or using Luma's equipment” (see, e.g.. JS at 30), and/or simply responds that he will produce documents “which are within the scope of the litigation, [and] not duplicative.” Plaintiff contends that the 94 pages of emails thus far produced by defendant do not include any documents responsive to these RPDs, do not include any of the scripts Betuel worked on during his employment even though he testified that he had located scripts on his computer and produced them to counsel, do not include the attachments referenced in the produced emails, and do not include any metadata. (See, e.g., JS at 31, 44-45). Plaintiff notes that Betuel testified that he “does not know what metadata is and did not ask anyone how to find and produce it when responding to Luma's requests for production of documents,” and contends that Betuel should be ordered to produce the requested documents “that are electronically stored with their metadata intact -- either in native format or in a usable form of Mr. Betuel's choice.”[4] (See, e.g., JS at 46 (citation omitted)). Metadata is discoverable “so long as the relevance threshold set forth in Rule 26(b)(1) is met.” United States ex rel. Carter v. Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., 305 F.R.D. 225, 228 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2015) (citation omitted). Plaintiff argues that the documents sought in RPD numbers 28, 29, and 30, including the metadata, are relevant because a key issue in this litigation is the “time, date and location where Mr. Betuel wrote the scripts.” (JS at 45, 49, 53). Defendant has not in any way refuted this assertion or claimed that the requests should be limited for any other reason. In fact, in light of the primary issue in this litigation -- whether Luma or Betuel owns the copyrights for the Scripts, i.e., whether the Scripts are “works made for hire” as provided in the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201 -- it is clear that the requested documents, including their metadata, are relevant to the parties' claims or defenses and proportional to the needs of the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).[5] Thus, Betuel's objection that these requests seek documents that are not within the scope of discovery, and/or his self-determined restriction to limit his production accordingly, is overruled. *8 With respect to defendant's “objection” that the requests seek documents that are duplicative of other requests, if defendant has indeed previously produced a document and its associated metadata, then it need not be produced more than once. However, to the extent any documents have been produced without the requested metadata, defendants' objection is overruled. Plaintiff's Motion to compel further responses to RPD numbers 6-10, 14, and 28-30 is granted. Defendant shall conduct a diligent search for all responsive documents, consistent with Luma's interpretation and explanation of the terms used in each RPD as explained by Luma in its portion of Section IV of the Joint Stipulation. No later than January 6, 2017, based on that search, defendant shall provide amended responses to the RPDs, without objection, and produce all documents responsive to the RPDs, either in their native format[6] or in a usable format of Mr. Betuel's choice. All email attachments shall be produced in such a way that plaintiff can determine which email any given document was attached to. Defendant's counsel shall ensure that the production includes the requested metadata for the documents produced in response to RPDs 28, 29, and 30, even if that means retaining a specialist to search for and produce the requested documents with their metadata intact. Along with the amended responses and document production, to the extent defendant withholds responsive documents that he contends are protected by the attorney-client privilege or any other privilege or protection, he must provide plaintiff with a sufficiently detailed privilege log to enable plaintiff to evaluate the applicability of the privilege or other protection. See The Rutter Group, Cal. Practice Guide, Fed. Civ. Proc. Before Trial, Form 11:A (Privilege Log). Along with the responsive documents and privilege log, defendant shall provide plaintiff with a declaration, signed under penalty of perjury, detailing the procedures and efforts he made to locate responsive documents and the results of that search, and declaring that after this search he has now produced all documents responsive to these requests. D. SANCTIONS Plaintiff requests sanctions pursuant to Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 37”) in the amount of $ 8,310 against defendant and his counsel, reflecting the legal fees incurred in connection with the Motion. (JS at 6-8; Supp'l Mem. at 5; Supp'l Glennon Decl. at ¶¶ 6-7). Defendant requests attorneys' fees “for its forced involvement in this motion and any sanctions the Court deems just.” (JS at 55; Supp'l Mem. at 5). Pursuant to Rule 37, when the Court grants a discovery motion, it has the authority to require the party whose conduct necessitated the motion -- in this case defendant -- to pay the moving party's reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees, unless the moving party filed the motion before attempting in good faith to obtain the discovery without court action, the opposing party's response or objection was substantially justified, or “other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). *9 Here, instead of attempting to provide responses and produce documents in accordance with the logical meaning of plaintiff's RPDs and ROGs, defendant did everything he could to read ambiguity into them. Counsel's statements that he “does not want to supplement” the responses “when there is a clear disagreement as to the interpretation of the actual requests,” and if plaintiff had “simply amended its initial discovery requests to clear up any confusion, Betuel would have happily complied,” provide evidence that counsel did not demonstrate the requisite good faith effort to eliminate the necessity for a discovery motion or as many of the disputes as possible. (Id.). As discussed above, the terms used were more than clear enough for defendant to have made a good faith effort to provide responses or produce documents that he could have identified as falling within the normal day-to-day meaning of the requests or interrogatories. Defendant is right in one respect. This “is an unnecessary motion to compel.” (JS at 4). But it is unnecessary because of defendant's strained interpretations of the terms used in the Subject Discovery requests, and his unwillingness to reasonably resolve the discovery dispute without Court intervention. But for the unreasonable positions taken by defendant's counsel, this dispute could have, and should have been, resolved without Court intervention. Plaintiff's request for sanctions is granted, and defendant's request for sanctions is denied. Plaintiff's counsel submitted a declaration under penalty of perjury attesting that reasonable attorneys' fees in the amount of $ 8,310 were incurred in preparing this Motion. (Supp'l Brief, Supp'l Glennon Dec. at ¶¶ 6-7). This amount included 27.7 hours of counsel's time at the rate of $ 300 per hour. The Court finds the amount of time spent on this relatively straight-forward Motion to be excessive, and instead finds $ 3,000 to be the reasonable expenses incurred in bringing this Motion. III. CONCLUSION Accordingly, the Court grants plaintiff's Motion to Compel further responses to the Subject Discovery. No later than January 6, 2017, defendant shall provide amended responses and all documents, as well as any privilege log and declaration, in accordance with this Order. Defendant and defendant's counsel, jointly and severally, shall also pay to plaintiff the sum of $ 3,000 on or before that same date. It is so ordered. [1] Plaintiff states that “[a]ll 94 pages of the documents produced by Defendant were included in a single PDF file that did not include metadata for any of the documents produced.” (JS at 50). [2] The Court observes that plaintiff is under no obligation to amend its discovery requests simply because defendant wants hisunderstanding and interpretation of the terms to control. Plaintiff has provided Betuel with its interpretation of the requests that it drafted, and Betuel must provide full and complete responses accordingly. This should have been accomplished without Court intervention. [3] In its Supplemental Brief, Luma indicates that Betuel has now produced three scripts identified in his deposition: “Shaman,” “The Conservationist” and “The Next Starfighter.” [4] With respect to the production of metadata, “[t]he Ninth Circuit has not provided significant guidance on the application of Rule 34(b)(2)(E) to the production of metadata.” Johnson v. RLI Insur. Co., 2015 WL 5125639, at *4 (D. Alaska Aug. 31, 2015). This does not mean, however, “that a responding party is free to convert electronically stored information from the form in which it is ordinarily maintained to a different form that makes it more difficult or burdensome for the requesting party to use the information efficiently in the litigation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b), advisory committee note, 2006 amendment. [5] In its Supplemental Brief, defendant argues that it need not produce metadata as it provided documents as kept in the ordinary course of business. Defendant misconstrues the document request, and/or the nature of metadata. While defendant is entitled to produce responsive documents as kept in the usual course of business (or, for electronically stored information, in the form in which it is ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably usable form), it must also search for and produce all metadata associated with the requested documents, as plaintiff has a right to obtain that relevant information as well as the documents themselves. [6] As previously discussed, documents must be produced in a form in which they were ordinarily maintained, or in “a reasonably usable form.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(E).