Stacy A. HAWKINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William RICHTER, et al., Defendants, Google LLC, formerly known as Google Inc., Defendant-Appellee No. 17-1968 United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit FILED July 06, 2018 ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN Counsel Stacy A. Hawkins, Saginaw, MI, pro se. Bradley Robert Love, Jeff M. Barron, Barnes & Thornburg, Indianapolis, IN, L. Rachel Lerman, Barnes & Thornburg, Los Angeles, CA, For Defendant-Appellee. Panel members: Moore, Karen N., Gibbons, Julia S., McKeague, David W. Panel ORDER *1 Stacy A. Hawkins, a Michigan resident proceeding pro se, appeals the district court's dismissal of his civil complaint. This case has been referred to a panel of the court that, upon examination, unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a). In 2016, Hawkins sued William Richter, Nevin Steinbrink, Nicholas Wilson, Michael Herbolsheimer, Steinbrink Engineering, Fashion Square Dental (FSD), and Google LLC, alleging that they hacked his company-related email and social media accounts in violation of the Stored Communications Act (SCA), 18 U.S.C. § 2701, et seq. Hawkins raised ten claims in his complaint: 1) declaratory relief regarding the email and social media hacking; 2) violation of the SCA, 18 U.S.C. § 2701; 3) violation of Michigan's Unauthorized Access to Computers Act (UACA), Michigan Compiled Laws § 752.791, et seq.; 4) breach of fiduciary duty by Google; 5) breach of fiduciary duty by Steinbrink; 6) breach of fiduciary duty by Steinbrink Engineering; 7) breach of fiduciary duty by Richter; 8) declaratory relief regarding the operating agreement; 9) breach of contract by Richter, Steinbrink, Wilson, Herbolsheimer, and Steinbrink Engineering; and 10) conversion by Richter, FSD, Steinbrink, Wilson, Herbolsheimer, and Steinbrink Engineering. Hawkins requested over $18,000,000 in damages, declaratory relief, attorney's fees, and any other relief the court deemed proper. In September 2016, Google filed a motion to dismiss all claims against it pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) as well as 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), arguing that Hawkins lacked standing and had no cause of action under the SCA or UACA because the email and social media accounts were controlled by a Michigan limited liability company called Click Care, LLC. In January 2017, the remaining defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing primarily that Hawkins failed to state a claim and lacked standing. A magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation that the defendants' motions to dismiss be granted. The magistrate judge found that Hawkins lacked standing to bring his sole federal claim and that the court, therefore, lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the complaint and must dismiss it. The district court adopted the report and recommendation and dismissed Hawkins's complaint. In his timely appeal, Hawkins argues that the district court misapplied the law regarding standing because the SCA creates a federal cause of action when: 1) an individual's password-protected social media profile gets hacked, 2) an individual's password-protected company-issued email account gets hacked, and 3) the internet service provider provides access to the individual's company-issued email account to third parties. In November 2017, Stacy voluntarily dismissed Richter, Steinbrink, Wilson, Herbolsheimer, Steinbrink Engineering, and FSD pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b), leaving Google as the only appellee. Google argues on appeal that Hawkins: 1) lacks standing under the SCA, 2) fails to state a claim under the SCA, and 3) fails to plead any state-law claims. Moreover, Google has filed a motion to strike portions of Hawkins's reply brief. *2 We review de novo a district court's dismissal of a complaint for lack of standing as well as a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Stocker v. United States, 705 F.3d 225, 229 (6th Cir. 2013); McGlone v. Bell, 681 F.3d 718, 728 (6th Cir. 2012). When ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of standing or a facial challenge to its subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the district court must accept all material allegations of the complaint as true. Carrier Corp. v. Outokumpu Oyj, 673 F.3d 430, 440 (6th Cir. 2012); Courtney v. Smith, 297 F.3d 455, 459 (6th Cir. 2002). To establish standing Hawkins must allege that: 1) he has “suffered an injury in fact that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”; 2) his injury is “fairly traceable to the challenged action” by Google; and 3) “it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” McGlone, 681 F.3d at 729 (quoting Wuliger v. Mfrs. Life Ins., 567 F.3d 787, 793 (6th Cir. 2009) ). To adequately allege jurisdiction, the complaint “must contain non-conclusory facts which, if true, establish that the district court had jurisdiction over the dispute.” Carrier Corp., 673 F.3d at 440 (citing O'Bryan v. Holy See, 556 F.3d 361, 375-76 (6th Cir. 2009) ). The district court properly dismissed Hawkins's complaint for lack of standing and subject-matter jurisdiction. The SCA governs how a service provider “may divulge the contents of certain electronic communications or disclose other subscriber or customer records and information.” Long v. Insight Commc'ns of Cent. Ohio, LLC, 804 F.3d 791, 794 (6th Cir. 2015). The subscriber or customer in this case, as Hawkins concedes, was Click Care. Hawkins concedes that he acted as an administrator of the Click Care email accounts and that both Hawkins and the defendants, except FSD and Google, “maintained an ownership interest in Click Care” at the time of the filing of this complaint. Hawkins concedes that the Click Care email accounts were created and paid for using the company bank account. Hawkins cannot allege that he has suffered an injury because “Michigan law treats limited liability companies separately from their members.” Tooling, Mfg. & Techs. Ass'n v. Hartford Fire Ins., 693 F.3d 665, 672 n.6 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Mich. Comp. Laws § 450.4504(2) ). Thus, the claims asserted in Hawkins's complaint belong to Click Care and not him. Click Care is not a plaintiff in this case, and Hawkins cannot represent Click Care pro se because a corporation must be represented in federal court by an attorney. United States v. 9.19 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Marquette Cty., 416 F.2d 1244, 1245 (6th Cir. 1969). Once the district court determined that Hawkins did not have standing for his SCA claim, which was the only cognizable federal claim in the complaint, the court was required to dismiss the entire complaint because there remained no independent basis upon which to assert federal subject-matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331; see Accord Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1255 (6th Cir. 1996). The district court, therefore, properly dismissed Hawkins's state-law claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). And because Hawkins has neither pointed us to authority to suggest that the UACA allows a civil cause of action nor adequately alleged that a fiduciary relationship exists between him and Google, he has failed to plead state-law claims that could support diversity jurisdiction now that Hawkins has voluntarily dismissed the other parties. *3 Finally, we deny Google's motion to strike portions of Hawkins's reply brief. We recognize that pro se pleadings are to be held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); see Bridge v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 681 F.3d 355, 358 (6th Cir. 2012). The portions of Hawkins's reply brief that Google wishes the court to strike do not alter the foregoing analysis. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court's judgment and DENY Google's motion as moot.