Lisa TURNER, individually and as parent and next friend of N.T., a minor, Plaintiff, v. CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER, d/b/a Cincinnati Children's Hospital Medical Center, et al., Defendants Case No.: 1:13CV230 United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Western Division Filed March 31, 2015 Counsel George Demetrios Jonson, Montgomery, Rennie & Johnson, Cincinnati, OH, for Plaintiff. Allison Knerr, Jon David Brittingham, Jason R. Goldschmidt, Dinsmore and Shohl, LLP, Cincinnati, OH, Peter J. Hoffman, Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, LLC, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendants. Barrett, Michael R., United States District Judge OPINION AND ORDER *1 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Lisa Turner’s Motion to Compel Discovery. (Doc. 20). Defendants Cincinnati Children’s Hospital Medical Center (“Cincinnati Children’s”) and Dr. Timothy Crombleholme (“Crombleholme”) (collectively, “Defendants”) have filed a response in opposition (Doc. 22), and Plaintiff has filed a reply (Doc. 24). Subsequently, upon request of the Court, Plaintiff and Defendants filed their respective supplemental memorandum (Docs. 40, 41). On December 15, 2014, the Court held a hearing on the motion. (Doc. 43). This matter is now ripe for review. I. SUMMARY OF BACKGROUND This case involves claims for malpractice and negligent credentialing, and in particular, the case raises the question of whether Dr. Crombleholme had the adequate skill to effectively perform Plaintiff’s Selective Laser Photocoagulation of Communication Vessels (“SLPCV”). The SLPCV is an in-utero laser procedure used to treat a common complication of twin pregnancies. Dr. Crombleholme was the lead investigator for a publicly-funded National Institute of Health (“NIH”) study about the efficacy of SLPCV. In that study, SLPCV was performed on approximately 40 patients from 18 institutions across the country. The patients consented to involvement in the study. According to the study protocol, “[p]articipation in this trial may cause a loss of privacy but the mother’s records and those of her babies will be handled as confidentially as possible” with “the only identifier being the subject’s trial number [and] with each twin designated with the same number with an R for recipient twins and a D for donor twins.” (Doc. 40-1, PageId 922). “Neither the mother’s name nor the names of her babies will be used in any publication about this study.” (Id.). Dr. Crombleholme performed SLPCV on the study participants. The study was stopped early, however, because the Trial Oversight Committee (“TOC”) and Data Safety Monitoring Board (“DSMB”) detected a statistical trend in adverse outcomes for SLPCV participants. The results of the study, including data from de-identified participants, were eventually published in the American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology in October 2007. Plaintiff now seeks production of the SLPCV video recordings of third-party patients from the NIH study, the raw survival data from the NIH study, and the DSMB/TOC communications. Plaintiff also seeks discovery as to Dr. Crombleholme’s hospital privileges at Cincinnati Children’s Hospital. Defendants have opposed production of those materials. Defendants have provided to the Court for in camera inspection a subset of approximately thirty-two documents for which confidentiality and/or privilege is asserted. Moreover, several third parties, including Duke University, the University of Texas’s medical branch, and New York University, have submitted NIH study materials to the Court for in camera review pursuant to subpoenas, which are subject to Defendants' objections to production.[1] II. LEGAL STANDARD *2 Plaintiff’s request to compel responses to requests for production of documents is governed by Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 37, a party may file a motion to compel discovery when a party fails to provide a proper response to the request for the production of documents under Rule 34. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B). Under Rule 34, the request must be for documents, electronically stored information, or other items that are within the scope of Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or in other words, are non-privileged matters relevant to a party’s claim or defense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). III. ANALYSIS The two overarching issues raised by Plaintiff’s motion to compel are: (1) whether the SLPCV videos, raw survival data, and TOC/DSMB communications from the NIH study at issue are discoverable; and (2) whether Plaintiff is entitled to discover the list of privileges granted to Dr. Crombleholme at Children’s Hospital. A. NIH Study Documents The parties raise four issues relating to the discoverability of the documents from the NIH study. Each issue is discussed below. 1. Confidential Medical Information Defendants argue that the documents and other information from the NIH study contain confidential patient information and are therefore protected from disclosure under HIPPA and/or Ohio Rev. Code § 2317.02. The raw data and the SLPCV video from the NIH study sought by Plaintiff have been de-identified in accordance with study protocol.[2] There is no indication that any identifying information of any of the patients in the study is contained in those documents. See Medina v. Medina Gen. Hosp., 2011-Ohio-3990, ¶ 16 (Ohio App. Aug. 11, 2011) (holding that information subject to disclosure did not violate HIPPA where the identities of non-party patients could not reasonably be determined); see also Roth v. Sunrise Senior Living Mgmt., No. 2:12-cv-4567, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30706, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 2012) (citing relevant caselaw indicating that redacted, de-identified medical records comply with HIPPA). With respect to the TOC/DSMB communications, the Court has determined that the records contain in some parts the initials of the patients, which could be used to identify a patient.[3]That identifying information shall be redacted. Other information, including the subject numbers of the patients, do not reasonably identify a patient and shall not be redacted.[4] Subject to that limitation, Plaintiff is not prevented from obtaining the TOC/DSMB communications. Medina, 2011-Ohio-3990, ¶ 16; see also Roth, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30706, at *4. As for Ohio Rev. Code § 2317.02(B)(1), it contains a testimonial privilege that precludes a physician from testifying concerning “a communication made to the physician ... by the patient in that relation or the physician’s ... advice to a patient....” See Medina, 2011-Ohio-3990, ¶ 14. A “communication” means “acquiring, recording, or transmitting any information, in any manner, concerning any facts, opinions, or statements necessary to enable a physician ... to diagnose, treat, prescribe, or act for a patient” and it may include “any medical ... or hospital communication such as a record, chart, letter, memorandum, laboratory test and results, x-ray, photograph, financial statement, diagnosis, or prognosis.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2317.02(B)(5)(a). It does not protect against disclosure of medical “information,” including hospital procedures or its employees or contractor’s practices, even if the information is extracted from confidential records. Medina, 2011-Ohio-3990, ¶ 14. The purpose of the privilege “ ‘is to encourage patients to make a full disclosure of their symptoms and conditions to their physicians without fear that such matters will later become public.’ ” Ward v. Summa Health Sys., 128 Ohio St. 3d 212, 217 (2010) (quoting State v. Antill, 176 Ohio St. 61, 64-65 (1964)). The burden of showing that the privilege applies rests upon the party seeking to exclude the documents or testimony. Medina, 2011-Ohio-3990, ¶ 9 (citing Lemley v. Kaiser, 6 Ohio St. 3d 258, 263-64 (1983)). *3 Here, Defendants have not met their burden of showing that the raw survival data, TOC/DSMB communications, and SLPCV videos are protected by Ohio Rev. Code § 2317.02(B)(1). In seeking the raw survival data, Plaintiff is not seeking the disclosure of non-party confidential medical records themselves but instead requests non-privileged data derived or extracted from medical records and that is de-identified. Simply because the information may have some relation to a medical procedure does not mean the information itself is privileged. See Medina, 2011-Ohio-3990, ¶ 14(holding that information as to the number of times a defendant charted an event and the intervals of that charting was not privileged under Ohio Rev. Code § 2317.02, as discovery is not precluded simply because non-privileged information is extracted from confidential records). Similarly, the TOC/DSMB communications are not medical records, do not constitute advice from a physician to a patient, and do not reflect communications from a patient to the physician. Instead, the records sought consist of information and outcomes charted for the purposes of the study, communications between the TOC and DSMB or another third party in regards to the NIH study. Defendants have not met their burden of showing otherwise. Finally, Defendants also have not met their burden of showing the SLPCV videos are subject to Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.02. The SLPCV videos do not constitute advice from a physician to a patient. Further, the SLPCV videos are de-identified and were created for the research purposes of the publicly-funded NIH study and with the patient’s understanding that a loss of privacy may occur. Given those circumstances, the Court finds that the SLPCV videos do not fall within the scope of Ohio Rev. Code § 2317.02. Those documents thus are not protected from disclosure on this basis.[5] 2. Ohio’s peer review privilege Defendants claim that the requested documents and other information from the NIH study are protected by Ohio’s peer review statute. Plaintiff disagrees.[6] The Ohio statute governing “peer review committees” provides, in pertinent part: Proceedings and records within the scope of a peer review committee of a health care entity shall be held in confidence and shall not be subject to discovery or introduction in evidence in any civil action against a health care entity or health care provider, including both individuals who provide health care and entities that provide health care, arising out of matters that are the subject of evaluation and review by the peer review committee.... Information, documents, or records otherwise available from original sources are not to be construed as being unavailable for discovery or for use in any civil action merely because they were produced or presented during proceedings of a peer review committee, but the information, documents, or records are available only from the original sources and cannot be obtained from the peer review committee’s proceedings or records. Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.252. As used in the statute, a “health care entity” means “an entity, whether acting on its own behalf or on behalf of or in affiliation with other care entities, that conducts as a part of its regular business activities professional credentialing or quality review activities involving the competence of, professional conduct of, or quality of care provided by health care providers, including both individuals who provide health care and entities that provide health care.” Ohio Rev. Code. § 2305.25(A)(1). A “peer review committee” is defined as a: utilization review committee, quality assessment committee, performance improvement committee, tissue committee, credentialing committee, or other committee that does either of the following: (a) Conducts professional credentialing or quality review activities involving the competence of, professional conduct of, or quality of care provided by health care providers, including both individuals who provide health care and entities that provide health care; [or] (b) Conducts any other attendant hearing process initiated as a result of a peer review committee’s recommendations or actions. *4 Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.25(E)(1). The statute further sets out specific types of committees that constitute “peer review committees,” which include: (a) A peer review committee of a hospital or long-term care facility or a peer review committee of a nonprofit health corporation that is a member of the hospital or long-term care facility or of which the hospital or facility is a member; (b) A peer review committee of a community mental health center; (c) A board or committee of a hospital, a long-term care facility, or other health care entity when reviewing professional qualifications or activities of health care providers, including both individuals who provide health care and entities that provide health care; (d) A peer review committee, professional standards review committee, or arbitration committee of a state or local society composed of members who are in active practice as physicians, dentists, optometrists, psychologists, or pharmacists; (e) A peer review committee of a health insuring corporation that has at least a two-thirds majority of member physicians in active practice and that conducts professional credentialing and quality review activities involving the competence or professional conduct of health care providers that adversely affects or could adversely affect the health or welfare of any patient; (f) A peer review committee of a health insuring corporation that has at least a two-thirds majority of member physicians in active practice and that conducts professional credentialing and quality review activities involving the competence or professional conduct of a health care facility that has contracted with the health insuring corporation to provide health care services to enrollees, which conduct adversely affects, or could adversely affect, the health or welfare of any patient; (g) A peer review committee of a sickness and accident insurer that has at least a two-thirds majority of physicians in active practice and that conducts professional credentialing and quality review activities involving the competence or professional conduct of health care providers that adversely affects or could adversely affect the health or welfare of any patient; (h) A peer review committee of a sickness and accident insurer that has at least a two-thirds majority of physicians in active practice and that conducts professional credentialing and quality review activities involving the competence or professional conduct of a health care facility that has contracted with the insurer to provide health care services to insureds, which conduct adversely affects, or could adversely affect, the health or welfare of any patient; (i) A peer review committee of any insurer authorized under Title XXXIX of the Revised Code to do the business of medical professional liability insurance in this state that conducts professional quality review activities involving the competence or professional conduct of health care providers that adversely affects or could affect the health or welfare of any patient; (j) A peer review committee of the bureau of workers' compensation or the industrial commission that is responsible for reviewing the professional qualifications and the performance of providers conducting medical examinations or file reviews for the bureau or the commission; *5 (k) Any other peer review committee of a health care entity. Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.25(E)(2)(a)-(k). Privileges are to be strictly construed. Giusti v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr., 178 Ohio App. 3d 53, 60 (9th Dist. App. 2008) (citing Svoboda v. Clear Channel Communs. Inc., 156 Ohio App. 3d 307 (6th Dist. App. 2004); Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 428 (1947)). The burden of proving that the statutory privilege applies to documents requested in discovery is on the defendant. Bansal v. Mount Carmel Health Sys., 2009-Ohio-6845, ¶ 14 (10th Dist. App. Dec. 24, 2009). Not only must the defendant show that it is a peer review committee of a health care entity that is subject to the statute, but it also must show that the requested documentation is entitled to the peer-review privilege. Id., ¶¶ 14-15. “Simply labeling a document ‘peer review,’ ‘confidential,’ or ‘privileged’ does not invoke the statutory privilege.” Id., ¶ 14. The defendant “must provide evidence as to the specific documents requested, not generalities regarding the types of documents usually contained in a peer review committee’s records.” Id., ¶ 15. Indeed, Ohio courts have held that “ ‘[t]he peer-review privilege is not a generalized cloak of secrecy over the entire peer-review process.’ ” Bailey v. Manor Care of Mayfield Hts., 2013-Ohio-4927, ¶ 23 (8th Dist. App. Nov. 7, 2013) (quoting Giusti v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr., 178 Ohio App. 3d 53 (9th Dist. App. 2008)). Documents that may be provided to a peer review committee, but were not originally prepared exclusively for the committee are not protected by the privilege; the privilege attaches only to the files for the committee rather than to all files in a facility. Bansal, 2009-Ohio-6845, ¶ 17; Selby v. Fort Hamilton Hosp., 2008-Ohio-2413, ¶¶ 12-28 (12th Dist. App. May 19, 2008). In attempting to satisfy its burden, a party may (1) submit the documents in question for an in camera inspection; or (2) present affidavits or deposition testimony containing the information necessary for the trial court to determine whether the privilege attaches. Bansal, 2009-Ohio-6845, ¶ 14. The central questions here are whether Defendants have met their burden of showing that the Institutional Review Board (“IRB”), DSMB or TOC are peer review committees and that the documents at issue were within the exclusive purview of the peer review committees. The IRB, DSMB, and TOC are not one of the peer-review committees specifically identified in the Ohio statute. They may, however, fall under the statute’s “catch-all” category of “[a]ny other peer review committee of a health care entity.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.25(E)(2)(k). The Code of Federal Regulations generally sets forth the functions and responsibilities of an IRB and DSMB. 5 C.F.R. § 5501.109; 45 C.F.R. § 46.107. The NIH study documents further define the roles of the IRB and the DSMB, as well as the TOC, as they relate to the NIH study at issue here. (See Doc. 42, PageID 1243-1254). The parties also presented testimony of Dr. Thomas Inge, Dr. Candida Fratazzi, and Dr. Michael Mont concerning whether the IRB, DSMB, and TOC constitute peer review committees. *6 Dr. Inge agreed that IRBs and DSMBs are not hospital peer review committees. (Doc. 35, PageId 666). He explained that some communications of the IRB with the DSMB are confidential while others are public. (Id., PageId 681-83). Dr. Inge further opined that the function of DSMBs is not to review the competency of physicians in their provision of care. (Id., PageId 668). He explains, however, that DSMBs are a form of expert peer review because they perform peer review functions and may come across quality of care information in evaluating a broad list of study-related events and processes to ensure that performance of studies is adequate to answer scientifically valid questions and to ensure the safety of the participants. (Id., PageId 666, 668-69). He was unable to provide specific information, however, as to whether the DSMB for the NIH study at issue here actually came across any quality of care information or how detailed they get in their review of adverse events. (Id., PageId 669, 685). He also was unfamiliar with the role of and information obtained or reviewed by a TOC. (Id., PageId 676). Dr. Fratazzi largely agreed with Dr. Inge. (See, e.g., Doc. 36, PageId 795-96, 798, 801-02, 813-15). She explained that DSMBs are required to protect the confidentiality of the trial data and the result of their monitoring, but she also admitted that none of the peer review committees specifically identified in the Ohio statute are DSMBs. (Id., PageId 801-02, 813-15). She further testified that DSMBs review some adverse events of special concern, but that not all special adverse events get reviewed in detail. (Id., PageID 798). Dr. Mont disagreed with Dr. Inge and Dr. Fratazzi, testifying that a DSMB is not a peer review committee as its purpose is not to monitor the quality of care of practitioners. (Doc. 41, PageID 1035-36). While he agreed that in some cases quality of care may incidentally be raised, it is not something that generally is commented upon or in the purview of a DSMB. (Id., PageID 1036-37). Dr. Mont also distinguished the performance improvement goals and powers of a DSMB from the performance improvement goals and powers of a peer review committee. (Doc. 41, PageID 1049, 1051). He further explained the different “safety” goals of a DSMB and a peer review committee. (Id., PageId 1051-53). Generally stated, Dr. Mont testified that the DSMB is looking at patient safety in terms of the efficacy of a study, experimental drug, or agent whereas a peer review committee is trying to guarantee the safety of patients from the practitioners themselves. (Id.). Upon review, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that Defendants have not met their burden of showing that the IRB, DSMB, and TOC constitute peer review committees.[7] The purposes and powers of a peer review committee differ from the purposes and powers of the IRB, DSMB, and TOC. Although peer review committees and an IRB, DSMB or TOC are concerned with “safety” in a general sense, the Court agrees with Dr. Mont that the focus of the safety concerns is vastly different. Moreover, the overall goal of health care entities is to ensure patient safety, but that does not make all of its functions peer review activities that are subject to Ohio’s statutory privilege. Further, while the evidence shows that there are some instances where an IRB, DSMB or TOC may come across quality of care information, that alone does not transform every function of an IRB, DSMB, or TOC into a peer-review activity absent more. In this case, no specific information has been presented to show that the IRB, DSMB or TOC conducted the type of review and investigation of a provider’s competence, professional conduct, or quality of care that is contemplated by Ohio’s statute. *7 Further, after an in camera review of relevant documentation submitted by third parties in response to subpoenas as well as some of the documentation at issue that was provided by Defendants, the Court finds that Defendants have not met their burden of proving those documents are privileged. Specifically, Defendants have not shown that the documentation requested by Plaintiff was only within the purview of a peer review committee. Raw survival data is an important part of a research study and would be necessary to obtain to determine scientific significance, even in the absence of a peer review committee. Likewise, the SLPCV videos are documentation of the research itself. No evidence has been presented to demonstrate that they were created by and/or prepared exclusively for the use of a peer review committee. As for the DSMB/TOC communications, Defendants similarly have not satisfied their burden of identifying any specific documents that involved the type of quality review of the competence of, professional conduct of, or quality of care provided by a health care provider that would make it subject to the statutory privilege. The “confidential” status of the information does not make it non-discoverable. Not only is there a lack of clarity as to the confidentiality of such information where, as here, the study has been completed, but an entity cannot trigger the statutory privilege merely by labeling information “confidential.” Here, the Court has determined that the statutory privilege is not applicable to the raw survival data, the SLPCV videos, and the TOC/DSMB communications requested by Plaintiff. Accordingly, the raw survival data, the SLPCV videos, and the TOC/DSMB communications must be produced to Plaintiff by Defendants, consistent with this Opinion and Order and subject to the “Confidential” designation in the protective order (Doc. 31). 3. Relevance, Undue Burden, and Possession Relevance for discovery purposes is extremely broad. Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., 135 F.3d 389, 402 (6th Cir. 1998). “The scope of examination permitted under Rule 26(b) is broader than that permitted at trial. The test is whether the line of interrogation is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Mellon v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 424 F.2d 499, 500-01 (6th Cir. 1970); see also Fed. R. Civ. 26(b)(1). District courts nevertheless “have discretion to limit the scope of discovery where the information sought is overly broad or would prove unduly burdensome to produce.” Surles v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 474 F.3d 288, 305 (6th Cir. 2007)(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)). To determine the proper scope of discovery, the court must balance a party’s “right to discovery with the need to prevent ‘fishing expeditions.’ ” Conti v. Am. Axle & Mfg. Inc., 326 Fed.Appx. 900, 907 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bush v. Dictaphone Corp., 161 F.3d 363, 367 (6th Cir. 1998)). A court may limit discovery otherwise permitted if it determines that “the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive” or “the burden or expensive of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i) and (iii). Although Defendants claim that the information is not relevant to any of the claims or defenses in the case, the Court disagrees. As stated above, relevance for discovery purposes is extremely broad. The information sought by Plaintiff relates to a NIH study in which Dr. Crombleholme was the principal investigator and was performing the exact procedure at issue in this case. While it is possible that not all of the information will be admissible for all of Plaintiff’s claims, the Court finds that the discovery sought is reasonably calculated to lead to evidence that may be admissible at trial in relation to at least one of Plaintiff’s claims. At this stage, that is sufficient to permit the discovery. *8 Any argument that Dr. Crombleholme lacks possession, custody or control of the information sought is not well taken. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(a) provides that a party may request production of documents or information in the possession, custody, or control of the party upon whom the request is served. A party has “possession, custody or control” when it has actual possession, custody or control or when it was the legal right to obtain the documents on demand. Craig v. Bridges Bros. Trucking LLC, No. 2:12-cv-954, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105470 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 1, 2014) (citing In re Bankers Trust Co., 61 F.3d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 1995)). Here, the Court is persuaded that as the principal investigator of the NIH study, Dr. Crombleholme has the legal right to obtain the documents and information sought by Plaintiff in relation to the NIH study and that it would not be unduly burdensome for him to do so.[8] B. Credentialing Privileges Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to obtain the documentation that lists the privileges granted to Dr. Crombleholme by Children’s Hospital of Cincinnati. Defendant disagrees, arguing that the information is subject to the peer review privilege but may be obtained through questioning of Dr. Crombleholme in his deposition. The same Ohio statute that governs the peer review issue discussed above is relevant here. As previously discussed, the Ohio peer review statute protects information within the purview of a peer review committee of a health care entity. While that information cannot be obtained from the peer review committee’s proceedings or records, it may be obtained from the files of the hospital itself. Here, Defendant has not met its burden of showing that the documentation that lists the privileges granted to Dr. Crombleholme was within the exclusive purview of the peer review committee. The privileges granted to Dr. Crombleholme governed his ability to practice at Children’s Hospital, and Defendants have not shown that such documentation was not otherwise available from the hospital itself outside the files of the peer review committee. As such, Defendants must produce to Plaintiff the documentation maintained by the hospital itself containing the list of privileges granted to Dr. Crombleholme at Children’s Hospital. It need not produce, however, any such record maintained in the peer review committee’s file. IV. CONCLUSION Consistent with the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Discovery (Doc. 20) is GRANTED subject to the limitations previously identified. Following entry of this Opinion and Order, the Court will provide the subpoenaed documents directly to Plaintiff. The Court also will provide Defendants with a Court-redacted copy of the sub-set of thirty-two documents reviewed in camera. Defendants thereafter shall produce to Plaintiff, consistent with the Court’s redactions, all of the following records that are in the possession of Defendants: (1) the de-identified raw survival data, (2) the de-identified SLPCV videos, (3) the TOC/DSMB communications, and (4) the list of privileges granted to Dr. Crombleholme at Cincinnati Children’s Hospital as maintained in the files of the hospital itself rather than in the file of the peer review committee. All productions of documents shall be subject to the parties' Stipulated Protective Order (Doc. 31). *9 IT IS SO ORDERED. Footnotes [1] Third-party William Beaumont Hospital has filed a motion to quash the subpoena issued to it. (Doc. 23). [2] Defendants represent, that it is not in possession of any raw survival data from the NIH study. (Doc. 39). Plaintiff contends that all of that data is held in an electronic data management program called Clinitrial to which Dr. Crombleholme has access as the principal investigator. (Doc. 40, PageId 896). The issue of “possession” is addressed infra. [3] There also is a stray non-patient Social Security number and a non-patient date of birth contained within the subset of documents reviewed. Those identifiers also shall be redacted. [4] In the event the parties determine that the raw data sought by Plaintiff likewise contains the initials of the patients, or other Social Security numbers or dates of birth, that information should be redacted consistently with this Opinion and Order. [5] While the Court need not reach the issue here, it is noted several courts have determined that the state privilege laws that prevent disclosure of de-identified medical information are preempted by HIPPA, which permits the disclosure of de-identified medical information. See Roth v. Sunrise Senior Living Mgmt., No. 2:11-cv-4567, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30706, at *5-6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 2012); In re Zyprexa Products Liability Litig., 254 F.R.D. 50 (E.D. N.Y. 2008); see also Northwestern Mem'l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 926 (7th Cir. 2004) (discussing the relationship between HIPPA and state privilege laws). [6] Although Plaintiff disputes that Ohio law even applies in this case, she argues that even if Ohio law applies, the peer review privilege still is not applicable. [7] The central cases cited by the parties are Looney v. Moore, 18 F. Supp. 3d 1338, 1338-39 (S.D. Ala. 2014), KD v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D. Delaware 2010), and Konrady v. Oesterling, 149 F.R.D. 592, 593 (D. Minn. 1993). While they are considered, they are non-binding and are given little weight as they do not construe or apply Ohio’s peer review statute. [8] The Court places weight on Plaintiff’s argument on this matter set forth in its supplemental memorandum in support of the motion to compel. (Doc. 40, PageId 897-99). It is noted, however, that several institutions have already produced to the Court relevant documents in response to subpoenas issued by Plaintiff. After an in camera review, the Court has determined that such information is not protected by the statutory privilege and may be produced to Plaintiff with redactions of personal identifying information and subject to the Stipulated Protective Order.