Edward SANTANA on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. RCSH OPERATIONS, LLC d/b/a Ruth's Chris Steakhouse, a Florida corporation, Defendant CASE NO. 10-61376-CIV-SELTZER United States District Court, S.D. Florida Signed January 22, 2013 Counsel Edward Santana, pro se. Celeste Laborde McNulty, Jones Walker Waechter Poitevent Carrere & Denegre LLP, New Orleans, LA, Laurie Michele Riley, Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrere & Denegre, LLP, Miami, FL, for Defendant. Seltzer, Barry S., United States Magistrate Judge ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS TO QUASH NON-PARTY SUBPOENAS *1 THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motions to Quash Subpoenas to Non-Parties (DE 207 and DE 214) and the Court being sufficiently advised, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motions are DENIED for the reasons set forth below. Defendant obtained a final judgment in its favor, and against Plaintiff (DE 164). On August 31, 2012, the Court awarded Defendant (hereinafter the “Judgment Creditor”) a judgment for costs against Plaintiff (hereinafter the “Judgment Debtor”) in the amount of $13,559.49, with interest to accrue at the statutorily prescribed non-exempt rate (DE 196). To attempt to locate the Judgment Debtor's assets so that it may collect on the cost judgment, the Judgment Creditor served subpoenas duces tecum on non-parties American Honda Finance Corporation d/b/a Acura Financial Services (“Acura”), Verizon Wireless (“Verizon”), and Bank of America. The Judgment Debtor now moves to quash these three subpoenas. ACURA AND VERIZON SUBPOENAS The Judgment Debtor argues that the Court should quash the subpoenas duces tecum directed to Acura and Verizon for the following reasons: (1) the subpoenas are procedurally defective under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 45(b)(2)(A) and (B) in that they were issued out of this District and are seeking documents from companies located in California and New Jersey, which are more than 100 miles from the place designated for production (Miami, Florida); (2) the production of the documents sought by the subpoenas would place an undue burden on Acura and Verizon; (3) the document requests are overbroad; (4) the documents sought by the subpoenas are not relevant; and (5) the subpoenas are “an invasion of the Plaintiff's privacy, especially the cell phone statement/records....” The Judgment Creditor argues that the Judgment Debtor lacks standing to move to quash subpoenas directed to non-parties Acura and Verizon. Generally, a party does not have standing to challenge a subpoena directed to a non-party, unless that party has a personal right or privilege with respect to the subject matter of the materials sought. Armor Screen Corp. v. Storm Catcher, Inc., No. 07-81091-Civ, 2008 WL 5049277, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2008) (Vitunac, M.J.) (citing Brown v. Braddick, 595 F.2d 961, 967 (5th Cir. 1079)); Stevenson v. Stanley Bostich, Inc., 201 F.R.D. 551, 555 n.3 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (collecting cases); Stewart v. Mitchell Transport, No. 01-2546-JWL, 2002 WL 1558210, *at 1 (D. Kan. July 8, 2002). Beyond his assertion that the subpoenas violate his privacy, the Judgment Debtor has not identified any privilege or personal right to the documents being sought through the Acura and Verizon subpoenas. And the Judgment Debtor has not cited any statute, case law, or other authority supporting his assertion that he has a privacy interest in the subpoenaed documents. The Court, therefore, concludes that the Judgment Debtor has failed to establish his standing to challenge the subpoenas directed to these non-parties.[1]Accordingly, the Plaintiff/Judgment Debtor's Motion to Quash Subpoenas to Non-Parties (DE 207) is DENIED. See Universitas Educ., LLC v. Nova Group, Inc., No. 11 Civ, 1590(LTS)(HBP), 2013 WL 57892, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2013) (denying motions to quash subpoenas, stating: “Here, [the movant] has made no attempt to establish any proprietary or other confidentiality-related interest it may have in the requested documents beyond a conclusionary assertion that the subpoenas seek documents that are ‘private, confidential, and commercially sensitive.’ This bald statement, by itself, is insufficient to confer [the movant] with standing....”). BANK OF AMERICA SUBPOENA *2 The Judgment Debtor separately moves to quash the subpoena duces tecum directed to Bank of America. He proffers the following grounds: (1) the document requests are overbroad; (2) the documents sought are not relevant; (3) the documents sought are privileged; and (4) the subpoenas are “an invasion of the Plaintiff's privacy.” Preliminarily, the Court notes that the Judgment Debtor does have standing to challenge the subpoena directed to Bank of America. Although not artfully stated, the Judgment Debtor is alleging a privacy interest in the financial documents being sought by the subpoena.[2] Numerous courts have held that parties have a personal interest in their financial records sufficient to confer standing to challenge a subpoena directed to a third-party. See, e.g., Keybank Nat'l Ass'n v. Perkins Rowe, L.L.C., No. 09-497 JJB-SR, 2011 WL 90108, at *3 (M.D. La. Jan. 11, 2011); Schmulovich v. 1161 Rt 9 LLC, No. 07-597 (FLW), 2007 WL 23652598, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 15, 2007); Arias-Zeballos v. Tan, No. 06 Civ. 1268 (GEL)(KN), 2007 WL 210112, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2007). And in Florida, an individual has a constitutional right to privacy in his financial information. See Fla. Const. art. 1, § 23; see also Ochoa v. Empresas ICA, S.A.B de C.V., No. 11-23898-CIV, 2012 WL 3260324, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2012) (Simonton, M.J.) (“Florida protects an individual's expectation of privacy in financial records.”); Winfield v. Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, Dep't Bus. Regulation, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla. 1985) (“[W]e find that the law in the state of Florida recognizes an individual's legitimate expectation of privacy in financial institution records.”). Furthermore, Florida Statute § 655.059(2)(b) requires that a financial institution keep confidential a non-public account, except upon authorization from the account holder. “Florida's constitutional and statutory protection of personal financial and banking records, however, is not absolute.” Ochoa, 2012 WL 3260324, at *6; see also Fla. Stat. Fla. Stat. § 655.059(2)(b) (permitting disclosure of such non-payment in accordance with 15 U.S.C. § 6802, which provides for disclosure “to respond to judicial process); Fla. Stat. § 655.059(1)(e)(providing that although “the books and records of a financial institution are confidential,” such books and records “shall be made available for inspection and examination ... pursuant to a subpoena”). “A party's finances, if relevant to the disputed issues of the underlying action, are not excepted from discovery....” Ochoa, 2012 WL 3260324, at *6 (quoting Friedman v. Heart Institute of Port St. Lucie, Inc., 863 So. 2d 189, 194-95 (Fla. 2003)). Here, the Judgment Debtor's banking records are clearly relevant. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a)(2) permits a party to conduct discovery in aid of execution on a judgment. See 1st Technology, LLC v. Rational Enters. LTDA, No. 2:06-cv-01110-RLH-GWF, 2007 WL 5596692, at *4 (D. Nev. Nov. 13, 2007) (“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize discovery to allow a judgment creditor to identify assets that can be used to satisfy a judgment.”) (quoting Scioto Constr. Inc. v. Morris, No. 4-99-V-83, 2007 WL 108906, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 9, 2007)). “The scope of post-judgment discovery is broad[;] the judgment creditor must be given the freedom to make a broad inquiry to discovery hidden or concealed assets of the judgment debtor.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, “[p]ost-judgment discovery can be used to gain information relating to the existence or transfer of the judgment debtor's assets.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Judgment Creditor contends that the Bank of America is believed to have records concerning funds or accounts currently or formerly held by the Judgment Debtor. Such documents, therefore, are relevant to the location of the Judgment Debtor's assets and to any transfer of assets to third-parties that may be used to satisfy the judgment. *3 Finally, the Court has carefully reviewed the subpoena directed to the Bank of America and finds that the document request is not overly broad. Accordingly, the Plaintiff/ Judgment Debtor's Motion to Quash Subpoena[ ] to Non-Parties (DE 214) is DENIED. DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 22nd day of January 2013. Footnotes [1] The Judgment Debtor has not even addressed the standing issue raised in Defendant's opposition memoranda (DE 213 and DE 216); he chose not to file a reply thereto, and the time for doing so has passed. [2] The Judgment Debtor also alleges that the documents sought from the Bank of America are privileged. Yet, he fails to identify the privilege that he claims shields his bank records from disclosure. The Court, therefore, will not address the Judgment Debtor's privilege argument further.