RECKITT BENCKISER, INC., Plaintiff, v. WATSON LABORATORIES, INC.-FLORIDA, Defendant CASE NO. 09-60609-CIV-DIMITROULEAS/SNOW United States District Court, S.D. Florida Signed August 25, 2011 Counsel John D. Carlin, Aaron J. Rugh, Chandrika Vira, Colleen Tracy, Dominick A. Conde, Jason M. Dorsky, Lawrence F. Scinto, Tara Byrne, Thomas Gabriel, Timothy J. Kelly, Fitzpatrick Cella Harper & Scinto, New York, NY, Luca Roberto Bronzi, Luca Bronzi, PA, North Miami Beach, FL, for Plaintiff. Shawn Logan Birken, Law Offices of Shawn L. Birken, Fort Lauderdale, FL, Andrew Ellsworth, Bingham McCutchen LLP, San Francisco, CA, Bruce Jefferson Boggs, Jr., Matthew L. Fedowitz, Susan Baker Manning, Bingham McCutchen LLP, Washington, DC, Janet T. Munn, Rasco Klock Perez Nieto, P.L., Coral Gables, FL, for Defendant. Snow, Lurana S., United States Magistrate Judge REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION *1 THIS CAUSE is before the Court on the defendant's Bill of Costs (DE 351), which the undersigned deems to be a motion to tax costs, and was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Lurana S. Snow, for report and recommendation. The issues have been briefed and an evidentiary hearing was held on August 25, 2011. The matter is ripe for consideration. I. BACKGROUND This is a patent infringement action filed by the plaintiff on April 24, 2009. It was tried to the Court commencing on January 24, 2011. The Court found for the defendant and final judgment was entered on February 9, 2011. The defendant's Bill of Costs was timely filed. The plaintiff appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of this Court. Mandate issued on August 15, 2011. The defendant seeks to tax costs in the total amount of $350,947.32, including $1,072.75 for fees of the Clerk; $565.75 for service of summonses and subpoenas; $57,424.74 for transcripts, and $291,884.08 for exemplification and copies. In support of the Bill of Costs, the defendant has attached the sworn declaration of Susan Baker Manning, Esq. and copies of invoices deemed to be pertinent. The plaintiff objects to several categories of costs: (1) fees for certificates of good standing and pro hac vice applications for out-of-district counsel; (2) fees for depositions where (a) the defendant has submitted to the Court bills to the client rather than invoices from the court reporter, (b) the invoices are submitted, but do not break down the services provided to identify which were necessary and which were for the convenience of counsel, and (c) identified costs incurred for the convenience of counsel in transcribed and videotaped depositions, and (3) fees for exemplification and copying, including (a) charges by an outside vendor for processing and production of electronic documents to the plaintiff, (b) charges for copies made of documents during the preparation of pleadings for filing, of documents during deposition preparation, of trial exhibits and expert witness exhibits. and of documents copied during trial. II. RECOMMENDATIONS OF LAW Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d) and 28 U.S.C. § 1920, the Court shall award costs to the prevailing party in a lawsuit. Rule 54(d) creates a presumption in favor of awarding costs, which the opposing party must overcome. Manor Healthcare Corp. v. Lomelo, 929 F.2d 633, 639 (11th Cir. 1991). Taxable costs are identified in 28 U.S.C. § 1920: (1) Fees of the clerk and marshal; (2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case; (3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses; (4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case; (5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title; (6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation services under section 1828 of this title. *2 The decision to award costs is discretionary with the Court, but the Court may tax only items specifically enumerated in § 1920, absent alternative contractual or statutory authority. Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 445 (1987). A. Pro Hac Vice Applications The plaintiff objects to claimed costs for obtaining certificates of good standing and the fees of the Clerk for pro hac vice applications for out-of-district counsel, totaling $1,072.75. The plaintiff contends that the defendant has not shown that these costs were necessary, pointing out that the defendant also retained Florida counsel. The parties agree that § 1920(1) does not explicitly cover such fees and that there is a split of authority on whether they are taxable. The plaintiff relies on Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 2010 WL 3212065 at *3 (S.D. Fla. July 7, 2010) and Covington v. Arizona Beverage Co., 2011 WL 810592 at *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 25, 2011), holding that the pro hac vice fees are an expense of counsel, not the client. Both decisions rely on United States District Judge Kenneth Marra's opinion in Exhibit Icons, LLC v. XP Companies, LLC, 2009 WL 3877667 at *1 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 18, 2009), holding that “Plaintiff ought not to bear a cost resulting from Defendants choosing an out of state attorney to defend themselves when competent in-state attorneys were available.” The defendant cites decisions in other circuits which have taxed to the losing party the fees associated with pro hac vice motions, particularly Craftsmen Limousine, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 579 F.3d 894, 898 (8th Cir. 2009) and Davis v. Puritan-Benefit Corp., 923 F. Supp. 179, 181 (D. Kan. 1996). The defendant acknowledges that the Eleventh Circuit has not issued a published opinion directly on point, but has, in an unpublished decision, affirmed a district court's refusal to tax pro hac vice costs. Eagle Ins. v. Johnson, 162 F.3d 98 (11th Cir. 1998), affirming Eagle Ins. v. Johnson, 982 F. Supp. 1456 (M.D. Ala. 1997). The undersigned finds to be persuasive the cases from trial courts within this Circuit holding that fees associated with pro hac vice applications are not recoverable, particularly where, as here, the defendant is a Florida corporation and was represented by competent counsel from within this district as well as by out-of-district counsel. The Court should decline to tax the $535.00 claimed by the defendant for these costs. B. Deposition Transcripts The plaintiff objects to the taxation of costs charged by court reporters associated with three groups of depositions on the ground that the costs were incurred for the convenience of counsel and were not “necessarily obtained for use in the case,” as required by § 1920(2), or that the documentation provided by the defendant does not provide sufficient information on the nature of the costs incurred. The first group of court reporters' charges to which the plaintiff objects relate to the depositions of Janet Vaughn, Babi Suri, Mark David Nuttal, Donald Keyser, Keith Gallicano, Amit Antarkar (first deposition) and Thomas Dowling. The plaintiff notes that in support of these charges, the defendant has provided bills to the client rather than invoices from the court reporters, totaling $21,284.90. (DE 351-8 at 2-4, 7) Additionally, the plaintiff objects to the costs associated with the deposition of an unnamed deponent in an invoice in the amount of $3,779.37 from Veritext Corporate Services, Inc. for services rendered on December 30, 2010. (DE 351-12 at 2) The plaintiff computes the total charges for these depositions to be $21,651.77. *3 The plaintiff argues that it is impossible to ascertain which costs associated with these depositions were incurred for the convenience of counsel. The plaintiff notes that courts have held that some costs related to depositions are not taxable because they were incurred for the convenience of counsel. Klayman v. Freedom's Watch, Inc., 2008 WL 4194881 at *5-6 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 12, 1998) (expedited shipping, ASCII disks, e-transcripts, word index, condensed copy, CD-rom, real time hookup, additional DVDs and storage charges not recoverable); RGF Environmental Group v. Activ Tek Environmental Corp., 2010 WL 3269982 at *3 (S.D. Fla. July 21, 2010) (deposition exhibits, delivery charges, expedited fees, postage costs, condensed transcripts, ASCII disks and copies of transcripts not recoverable); Woods v. Deangelo Marine Exhaust Inc., 2010 WL 4116571 at *8 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 27, 2010) (court reporter charges related to the delivery of transcripts, handling of exhibits and CD copies not recoverable). The defendant responds that the court reporter's charges pertaining to this group of depositions are sufficiently identified in the client billings as “Depositions and Transcripts,” and are further identified by the name of the vendor providing the service, the date of the deposition and the name of the deponent. The defendant does not address the charge of $3,779.37 for services rendered by Veritext on December 30, 2010. The defendant argues that all depositions for which they seek reimbursement were necessarily obtained for use the in the case, since eight of the eleven deponents were listed as potential trial witnesses by at least one of the parties. The undersigned notes that the defendant has supplied actual invoices for court reporter's services pertaining to four depositions, which are discussed below: Gilbert Banker, Martyn Davies, Gordon Amidon and Amit Antarkar (second deposition). (DE 351-11 at 7, 8, 10; DE 351-13 at 3) These invoices list charges for numerous services which cannot be taxed because they were incurred for the convenience of counsel. Where the defendant has provided only the client billing records, it is impossible to ascertain which court reporter charges are taxable to the plaintiff, and the claimed charges must be rejected in their entirety. See, Scelta v. Delicatessen Support Services, Inc., 203 F.Supp.2d 1328, 1340-41 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (failure to describe the nature or purpose of copies results in a denial of all copying charges). The plaintiff next objects to specific charges associated with the depositions of Gilbert Banker, Martyn Davies, Gordon Amidon and Amit Antarkar (second deposition). (DE 351-11 at 7, 8, 10; DE 351-13 at 3) The plaintiff argues that as to each of these depositions, the defendant is entitled to recover only the court reporter's attendance fee and the cost of one copy of the deposition transcript. The remaining costs, relating to ASCII disks, real time hookup, exhibits, color copies, shipping and handling, CDs and DVDs, should be disallowed. The defendant's reply memorandum does not address these objections. The undersigned agrees with the plaintiff that, as to each of these depositions, the defendant is entitled to recover only the court reporter's attendance fees and the cost of one transcript. Therefore, the costs related to these four depositions must be reduced by $7275.25. The final group of depositions to which the plaintiff objects consists of those depositions which were videotaped. Regarding the depositions of Keyser and Nuttal (DE 351-8 at 4), the plaintiff points out that these charges are listed in summary fashion on client invoices, so it is impossible to ascertain which charges were incurred for the convenience of counsel. The plaintiff argues that the entire cost of these two depositions should be disallowed. With regard to the depositions of Davies and Amidon (DE 351-11 at 9 and DE 351-12 at 1),[1] the plaintiff contends that the Court should disallow charges for digitized and synced video and shipping costs as costs incurred for the convenience of counsel. The defendant contends that the videotaped depositions were necessary for use at trial and the bills provide sufficient information for the Court to ascertain the cost of each video. *4 The undersigned agrees with the plaintiff that the charges for the videotaped depositions of Keyser and Nuttal totaling $3,412.50, must be disallowed since it is impossible to ascertain from the client billing records supplied if any portion of the charges were incurred for the convenience of counsel. Regarding the depositions of Davies and Amidon, the charges for shipping and for digitized and synced video, totaling $1594.30, were incurred for the convenience of counsel and should not be taxed. Accordingly, the defendant's claimed costs for depositions necessarily obtained for use in the case under § 1920(2) should be reduced by $33,933.82 in costs incurred for the convenience of counsel. Thus, the total of taxable costs for depositions is $23,490.92. C. Copying Charges The plaintiff objects to several categories of costs claimed by the defendant under § 1920(4), which permits taxation of fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case. Specifically, the plaintiff challenges the defendant's claims for the costs of electronic discovery production, copies of pleadings, copies of documents in preparation for depositions, copies of trial and witness exhibits and copies made during trial. 1. E-Discovery Production Charges The plaintiff objects to the defendant's claim of $219,486.89 to an outside vendor for the costs of electronically produced discovery on the ground that this service was performed for the convenience of counsel and pursuant to the parties' mutual agreement.[2] The plaintiff cites Klayman, 2008 WL 4194881 at *7, holding that costs for creating a litigation database, trial evidence presentation, and copies were not taxable where prevailing party failed to demonstrate that such services were necessary due to the extreme complexity of the case and the need to organize millions of documents. The plaintiff also relies on Roehrs v. Conesys, Inc., 2008 WL 755187 at *3 (N.D. Tex. March 21, 2008) (costs for electronic conversion of documents were incurred for the convenience of counsel and not compensable); Twee Jonge Gezellen (PTY) Ltd. v. Owens-Illinois, 2008 WL 905996 at *8 (N.D. Ohio March 31, 2008) (costs associated with electronic scanning, computerized litigation support, rough disks and bates labeling generally not taxable, unless done solely for purposes of complying with the Court's requirement of electronic filing), and Fells v. Virginia Department of Transportation, 605 F.Supp. 740, 743-44 (E.D. Va. 2009) (even if the costs of electronic scanning of documents are deemed taxable, costs of creating searchable electronic documents is not an enumerated cost under § 1920). In its Memorandum of Law in Support of Bill of Costs (DE 351-2), the defendant describes the reason for contracting with the outside vendor to produce discovery documents: *5 Watson's most significant copying charges related to discovery work—specifically, production of documents to Reckitt at its request. Watson employed Encore Discovery Solutions to produce electronic images in TIFF format of Watson's documents that were responsive to Reckitt's document requests. The cost of processing and copying electronic files in the format requested by Reckitt was $71,927.06. Reckitt also insisted that Watson produce its extremely large Excel spreadsheets in TIFF format, despite the fact that it would be expensive to do so and the documents would be more easy to read in their native format. Watson incurred an additional charge of $134,648.69 to process and produce the Excel files in TIFF format. Manning Decl. Ex. A; Ex. B at 49-50. Watson believed it was necessary to make these particular copies because they were requested by Reckitt (in fact, Reckitt moved to compel Watson to re-produce the native Excel files in TIFF format). In addition, pursuant to Reckitt's requests, Watson processed and produced documents from Watson India Pvt, Ltd. at a cost of $12,911.14. Manning Decl. Ex. A; Ex. B at 51-53. Accordingly, because Reckitt specifically requested that Watson produce its documents in the format provided, Watson reasonably believed that it was necessary to incur $219,486.89 in fees to produce electronic copies of its documents to Reckitt during discovery. Id. at 5 (footnotes omitted). The defendant relies on cases which have held that the electronic scanning of documents is the modern-day equivalent of exemplification of copies and papers, and thus compensable under § 1920(4). Brown v. McGraw Hill Companies, 526 F.Supp.2d 950, 959 (N.D. Iowa 2007), citing BDT Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc., 405 F.3d 415, 420 (6th Cir. 2005). The defendant also cites Fast Memory Erase, LLC v. Spansion, Inc., 2010 WL 5093945 at *5 (N.D. Tex. 2010), holding that a prevailing party may “recover the costs of converting paper documents into electronic files where the parties agreed that responsive documents would be produced in an electronic format,” and citing cases which have reached the same result: Rundus v. City of Dallas, 2009 WL 3614519 at * 3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2009); Neutrino Development Corp. v. Sonosite, Inc., 2007 WL 998636 at *4 (S.D. Tex. March 30, 2007). The undersigned finds these cases to be persuasive. The parties agreed on the format for discovery, involving the production of documents in electronic format in lieu of photocopies. Photocopies of documents produced in discovery clearly are taxable under § 1920(4), DeSisto College, Inc. v. Town of Howey-In-The-Hills, 718 F. Supp. 906, 913 (M.D. Fla. 1989), and the alternative manner of producing discovery copies was freely chosen by both parties (and insisted upon by the plaintiff). The cases cited by the plaintiff which rejected claims for electronic costs involved, for the most part, costs incurred by a party in connection with internal case management and/or the creation of searchable electronic documents, as distinguished from the scanning of paper documents for production in discovery. Moreover, the fact that this Court rejected the defendant's request for payment of these costs earlier in the litigation does not, as the plaintiff suggests, preclude recovery of the costs after entry of judgment for the defendant. Prior to judgment each party bears its own costs, but the prevailing party can recoup many of those costs after judgment has been entered in its favor. A prior ruling by a court that a party is responsible for any cost during the litigation does not prevent the party from seeking to recover that cost post-judgment. In the instant case, the cost of producing discovery documents is not distinguishable from other costs taxable to the plaintiff. Finally, the undersigned finds that the management fee charged by Encore Discovery Solutions is an integral part of the process of document production, and 3% of the charges of Encore attributable o document production are taxable as costs. Therefore, the defendant is entitled to costs of electronic discovery production in the amount of $221,644.70.[3] 2. Other Copying Charges *6 The plaintiff also objects to the taxation of costs for copies of pleadings, copies of documents in preparation for depositions, copies of trial and witness exhibits and copies made during trial, on the grounds that the copies were not sufficiently described and/or were made for the convenience of counsel. The plaintiff argues that the entire claimed amount of $65,655.79 should be denied, but also lodges specific objections to the various categories of copies. In Scelta v. Delicatessen Support Services, Inc., 203 F. Supp.2d 1328, 1340 (M.D. Fla. May 13, 2002), the Court noted that under 28U.S.C. § 1920(4) photocopying is compensable if it was necessarily obtained for use in the case. “In making this determination, ‘the court should consider whether the prevailing party could have reasonably believed that it was necessary to copy the papers in issue.’ ” Id. at 1340, quoting E.E.O.C. v. W&O, Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 62 (11th Cir. 2000). The court further noted that the burden of establishing entitlement to copying costs lies with the prevailing party, citing Desisto, 718 F.Supp. at 914 (holding that the prevailing party must itemize photocopying costs to distinguish compensable copies from those made for the convenience of counsel). The Scelta court held that billing records which merely list “copies” or “photocopies” without any description of the nature or purpose of the photocopying was insufficient. The court acknowledged that an accounting for each photocopy was implausible, the prevailing party must make some attempt to differentiate recoverable copying costs from non-recoverable general photocopying expenses. Scelta, 203 F. Supp.2d at 1340, citing Fulton Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n of Atlanta v. American Ins. Co., 143 F.R.D. 292, 300 (N.D. Ga. 1991). Since the court had no basis for determining which copying costs were compensable, the claim was rejected in its entirety. Scelta, 203 F. Supp.2d at 1340-1341; see also, Aranda v. Jewish Community Services of South Florida, Inc., 2007 WL 707384 (S.D. Fla. March 5, 2007). “The party seeking to recover photocopy costs must come forward with evidence showing the nature of documents copied and how they were used or intended to be used in the case.” Corsair Asset Management, Inc. v. Mosdovitz, 142 F.R.D. 347, 352 (N.D. Ga. 1992), citing Fulton, 143 F.R.D. at 300. “Simply making unsubstantiated claims that such documents were necessary is insufficient to permit recovery.” Id. The first category to which the plaintiff objects is $6,708.16 in copy charges for the preparation of filing the defendant's Answer and Affirmative Defense, as well as briefing on the Motion to Dismiss, Motion for Scheduling Conference, Motion to Stay, and Motion for Protective Order and Claim Construction. (DE 351-5 at 2, 6; DE 351-6 at 5; DE 351-7 at 1-2, 6-7; DE 351-8 at 5; DE 351-12 at 6) These charges are listed in client billings and identified only as “copy charges” or “photocopy charges.” Only one of the items (DE 351-12) breaks down the total charge by number of copies and the rate of $.25 per page. Presumably, all of these billings represent charges for in-house copying by the law firms involved. Since there is no way for the Court to discern whether the copies were necessarily obtained for use in the case or for the convenience of counsel, or whether the charges include non-compensable items such as color copies, the charges in this category must be denied in their entirety.[4] *7 The next category as to which an objection is lodged is $20,265.22 in copy charges in preparation for depositions. (DE 351-8 at 1-3; DE 351-13 at 4) Of these charges, $19,810.36 are listed in client billings and are identified only as “copy charges,” and must be denied based on the lack of description of the nature and purpose of the copies. The remaining charge of $454.86 is listed in an invoice (DE 351-13 at 4) for the conversion of single-sided documents to double-sided documents in color, plus the cost of binders and sales tax. As to this charge, clearly the documents already existed in single-sided format and the charge was incurred for the convenience of counsel. Woods, 2010 WL 4416751 at *12; Durden v. Citicorp Trust Bank, FSB, 2010 WL 2105921 at * 4 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 26, 2010); M.D. Mark, Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 2008 WL 162990 at *6 (D. Colo. January 15, 2008). This category of copy charges also must be denied in its entirety. Next, the plaintiff objects to $24,962.27[5] in copy charges for trial exhibits and expert witness exhibits, consisting of $13,816.40 to Alternative Legal Copy Service, Inc. and $11,145.87 to Capture Discovery, Inc. (DE 351-10 at 9-10; DE 351-11 at 1-6; DE 351-12 at 10; DE 351-13 at 1-2) In this Circuit, as a general rule, “exhibit costs are not taxable because there is no statutory authorization.” E.E.O.C. v. W&O, Inc., 213 F.3d at 623. Moreover, the invoices for these charges list separate charges for blowback, blowback/color, custom tabs, custom covers and spine, 3-ring binders in various sizes and, as to three of the invoices, TIFF conversion charges. The defendant has not described the specific nature and purpose of the copies, nor the reason for their costly presentation. Absent such evidence, these costs must be denied in their entirety. SeeCorsair, 142 F.R.D. at 352; Woods v. Deangelo Marine Exhaust Inc., 2010 WL 4116571 at *10-11. Finally, the plaintiff objects the taxation of the $13,720.14 cost to the defendant of renting two copy machines for use during trial. (DE 351-10 at 5-8) The plaintiff notes that there is nothing in the record to indicate what documents were copied on these machines and why they were necessary for use in the case. Additionally, there is no indication of why copying machines in the offices of local counsel were not utilized. It is hard to imagine a more obvious example of a cost incurred for the convenience of counsel, and this claim likewise must be denied. Id. Accordingly, this Court should deny the defendant's claim of $65,655.79 for fees for exemplification and copying documents (other than those produced in discovery), since the defendant has not presented evidence of the nature and purpose of the copies made, or otherwise demonstrated that they were necessary for use in the case and not made for the convenience of counsel. III. CONCLUSION This Court having considered carefully the pleadings, arguments of counsel, and the applicable case law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the defendant's Motion to Tax Costs (DE 351), be GRANTED, and the plaintiff be taxed costs in the total amount of $252,980.52 (representing the total claimed of $350,947.32, minus $535.02 in costs related to pro hac vice applications, minus $33,933.82 in deposition costs, plus $2157.81 in electronic discovery management fees, minus $65,655.79 in copying costs). The parties will have 14 days from the date of being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation within which to file written objections, if any, with The Honorable William P. Dimitrouleas, United States District Judge. Failure to file objections timely shall bar the parties from attacking on appeal factual findings contained herein. LoConte v. Dugger, 847 F.2d 745 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 958 (1988); RTC v. Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993). DONE AND SUBMITTED at Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 25th day of August, 2011. Footnotes [1] The plaintiff incorrectly states that the invoice for the Amidon deposition is attached at DE 351-6. [2] These items are listed in the defendant's Summary Chart (DE 351-4 at 6), and supported by invoices (DE 351-9 at 1-10 and DE 351-10 at 2-4). The totals of these invoices exceed the amount claimed by the defendant, with the claimed amounts indicated by brackets. The plaintiff's response contains no objection to the defendant's delineation of costs pertaining to document production, as distinguished from document collection, except for an objection to the 3% management fee charged by Encore Discovery Solutions. At the hearing, counsel for the plaintiff argued that hourly billings by technicians should not be included, but this objection was both untimely and too general to be considered. [3] The 3% management fee was listed on the Encore Discovery Solutions invoice of October 31, 2010 as $4,529.68. (DE 351-10 at 1) The defendant's computation of the management fee was reduced to $3,921.90, which is 3% of the $130,648.61 costs of producing discovery as reflected on the invoice. (DE 351-9 at 10). The defendant did not include the management fees reflected in the Encore invoices of June 30 and July 31, 2010. The 3% management fee for the $71,927.06 in fees for discovery production is $2,157.81. Since the defendant clearly seeks to tax this cost, the undersigned has added it to the defendant's total claim of $219,486.89. [4] In fact, the billing records contain no indication whatsoever of the purpose of the copies. At the hearing, counsel for the defendant stated that the determination of whether the copies were associated with the filing of pleadings, preparation for depositions, exhibits or trial was made by inference from other billing entries in the same time period. [5] The plaintiff lists the total for these copies as $25,262.27, but this appears to be a mathematical error, since the undersigned was not able to locate the additional $300.00 charge. Also, the plaintiff's stated overall total of copying charges (excluding those for discovery production) is $65,655.79, which is consistent with a charge of $24,962.27 for trial and expert exhibits.