UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. AMMON BUNDY, JON RITZHEIMER, JOSEPH O'SHAUGHNESSY, RYAN PAYNE, RYAN BUNDY, BRIAN CAVALIER, SHAWNA COX, PETER SANTILLI, JASON PATRICK, DUANE LEO EHMER, DYLAN ANDERSON, SEAN ANDERSON, DAVID LEE FRY, JEFF WAYNE BANTA, SANDRA LYNN ANDERSON, KENNETH MEDENBACH, BLAINE COOPER, WESLEY KJAR, COREY LEQUIEU, NEIL WAMPLER, JASON CHARLES BLOMGREN, DARRYL WILLIAM THORN, GEOFFREY STANEK, TRAVIS COX, ERIC LEE FLORES, and JAKE RYAN, Defendants 3:16-cr-00051-BR United States District Court, D. Oregon Filed September 14, 2016 Counsel Ethan D. Knight, Geoffrey A. Barrow, Craig J. Gabriel, Michelle Holman Kerin, Scott E. Bradford, United States Attorney's Office District of Oregon, Portland, OR, for Plaintiff. Terri Wood, Law Office of Terri Wood, PC, Rosalind M. Lee, Rosalind Manson Lee, LLC, Kelly R. Beckley, Beckley & Bons, P.C., Marc P. Friedman, Marc P. Friedman, Attorney at Law, Eugene, OR, Amy M. Baggio, Baggio Law, Anthony C. Schwartz, The Schwartz Law Firm, Lisa Hay, Richard Edward Neel Federico, Office of the Federal Public Defender District of Oregon, Lisa J. Ludwig, Ludwig Runstein LLC, Andrew M. Kohlmetz, Raivio, Kohlmetz & Steen, PC, Michele Lynne Kohler, Michele L. Kohler, PC, Krista M. Shipsey, Law Office of Krista Shipsey, James F. Halley, James F. Halley, P.C., Robert W. Rainwater, Rainwater Law Group, Paul A. Hood, Paul Hood, Attorney at Law, LLC, Ernest Warren, Jr., Warren & Sugarman, Jesse A. Merrithew, Levi Merrithew Horst LLP, Heather M. Murray, Benjamin T. Andersen, Portland, OR, Jay A. Nelson, Law Office of Jay A. Nelson, McMinnville, OR, for Defendants. Ryan Bundy, pro se. Brown, Anna J., United States District Judge ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SUPPRESS FACEBOOK EVIDENCE *1 This matter comes before the Court on the reopened Motion (#741) to Suppress Evidence (Facebook Accounts) filed by Defendant David Lee Fry on behalf of all Defendants. For the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES Defendants' Motion, and, pursuant to the Court's supervisory authority over the government, the Court ADMONISHES the government for its lack of diligence in failing to ensure that nonresponsive information from the seized Facebook accounts was sealed or destroyed in a timely manner pursuant to the Warrant issued April 8, 2016, following completion of the segregation of such data on June 21, 2016. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On June 20, 2016, Fry filed on behalf of all Defendants a Motion (#741) to Suppress Evidence (Facebook Accounts). The Court initially heard oral argument on Defendants' Motion on July 18, 2016, and received into evidence for purposes of this Motion Defendants' Exhibits D-H in addition to the materials filed with the Motion.[1] On July 20, 2016, the Court issued an Order (#915) denying Defendants' Motion. On August 16, 2016, however, Defendants filed a Motion (#1040) to Reopen their Motion (#741) to Suppress on the basis that the United States Attorney's Office (USAO) had inadvertently produced to Defendants (as part of discovery) information from 11 Facebook accounts that was not responsive to the Warrant and, therefore, that should have been segregated and sealed pursuant to the search procedures laid out in the Warrant. On August 19, 2016, the government filed a Response (#1077) to Defendants' Motion to Reopen Motion to Suppress Facebook Evidence. On August 23, 2016, the Court heard oral argument and held an evidentiary hearing on the Motion to Reopen during Pretrial Conference proceedings. During those proceedings the Court concluded the government's previous responses concerning the Facebook suppression issues contained either incomplete or inaccurate information and that the factual record was not sufficiently developed to (1) explain how the inadvertent disclosure of nonresponsive evidence occurred or (2) assure the Court that the government properly followed the search procedures laid out in the Warrant. Accordingly, by Order (#1097) issued August 23, 2016, the Court withdrew that portion of its Order (#915) that denied Defendants' Motion (#741) to Suppress; reopened Defendants' Motion; struck the government's Response (#827) to Defendants' Motion to Suppress, the government's Response (#1077) to Defendants' Motion to Reopen the Motion to Suppress, and the Declaration (#1079) of Geoffrey A. Barrow; and directed the government to file the following no later than Noon, August 29, 2016: (a) a new, complete factual record, including declarations by individuals with personal knowledge, that fully identifies all representatives of the government who had possession of or access to the materials Facebook produced at anytime in response to the Search Warrant issued April 8, 2016, from the time(s) Facebook made the productions until the present, and (b) a new memorandum with its position on the Motion to Suppress in light of the factual record. *2 On August 29, 2016, the government filed its Amended Response (#1129) to Defendants' Motion to Suppress together with the Declarations of Peter L. Summers (#1130); Claudia I. Bonilla (#1131); Matthew D. Hiemstra (#1132); Richard A. Baltzersen, Jr. (#1133); J. Matthew Yeager (#1134); Michelle Holman Kerin (#1135); Douglas Paul Angel (#1136); and Rena R. Rallis (#1137). On September 1, 2016, Defendants filed a Reply (#1170) to the government's Response. The Court heard a second oral argument on September 6, 2016, at which time the Court concluded the government's record was incomplete as to when and by whom information nonresponsive to the Warrant was either destroyed or sealed. Accordingly, the Court directed the government to complete the record. On September 7, 2016, the government filed a Sur-Reply (#1215) to Defendants' Motion to Suppress together with the Amended Declarations of Peter L. Summers (#1216); Richard A. Baltzersen, Jr. (#1217); Claudia I. Bonilla (#1218); J. Matthew Yeager (#1219); Matthew D. Hiemstra (#1220); and Travis J. Welter (#1221). The Court heard a third oral argument on September 9, 2016, and took the matter under advisement on that date. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Based on its assessment of the record, the Court finds the following facts beyond a preponderance of the evidence: On April 8, 2016, Magistrate Judge Paul Papak of the United States District Court for the District of Oregon issued a search-and-seizure Warrant for Facebook accounts that were associated with Defendants. The Warrant authorized the government to search Defendants' Facebook accounts for information that constitutes evidence of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 372 in connection with Defendants' activities at the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge (MNWR) in January and February 2016. The accounts to be searched were stored at premises owned, maintained, controlled, or operated by Facebook (a company headquartered in Menlo Park, California) in the Northern District of California. In particular, the Warrant permitted the search and seizure of information pertaining to: a. Records, including photographs, comments, videos, and other postings, of or about individuals illegally occupying the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge (MNWR), the planning and preparation of that occupation, and requests for support or assistance and the recruitment of others in furtherance of the occupation of the MNWR. b. Records, including photographs and videos or the sharing of any photographs and videos, of individuals in possession of firearms or with others in possession of firearms, while at the MNWR or in Harney County, Oregon. c. Records of communications, including private messages, with other coconspirators. d. Evidence indicating how and when the Facebook account was accessed or used, to determine the chronological and geographic context of account access, use, and events relating to the crime under investigation and to the Facebook account owner. e. Records relating to who created, used, or communicated with the user ID, including records about their identities and whereabouts. f. Evidence indicating the Facebook account owner's or user's state of mind as it relates to the crimes under investigation. g. The identity of the person(s) who communicated with the user ID about matters relating to the armed occupation of MNWR, including records that help reveal their whereabouts. The Warrant limited the search to information during the period November 1, 2015, through Defendant-specific dates in late-January 2016 to mid-February 2016. *3 The Warrant also laid out a specific search procedure for the government to follow: 4. During its review of the information received from Facebook under this warrant, law enforcement will segregate the information into two groups: (i) information that is responsive to the warrant and that the government may therefore seize; and (ii) information that is not responsive to the warrant. This review will be performed within a reasonable amount of time not to exceed 180 days from the date of execution of the warrant. If the government needs additional time to conduct this review, it may seek an extension of the time period from the Court. 5. Information that is responsive to the warrant will be copied onto a separate storage device or medium. Responsive information may be used by law enforcement in the same manner as any other seized evidence. Information that is not responsive to the warrant will be sealed and stored on a secure medium or in a secure location. Nonresponsive information will not be reviewed again without further order of the Court (e.g., subsequent search warrant or order to unseal by the district court). 6. The government will retain a complete copy of the information received from Facebook for a number of reasons, including proving the authenticity of evidence to be used at trial, responding to questions regarding the corruption of data, establishing the chain of custody of data, refuting claims of fabricating, tampering, or destroying data, and addressing potential exculpatory evidence claims where, for example, a defendant claims that the government avoided its obligations by destroying data or returning it to a third party. At the outset of this litigation the USAO established a “filter team” separate from the prosecution team to be available to remove privileged material from the information otherwise available to the government before the prosecution team and its agents reviewed such information. The USAO filter team was led by Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) Michelle Holman Kerin. On May 2, 2016, as part of the separate prosecution team, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agent (SA) Peter L. Summers downloaded Facebook's initial response to the Warrant from a “law-enforcement portal” provided by Facebook. This first response to the Warrant contained text and pictures from all 23 Facebook accounts to be searched under the Warrant, but it did not include videos due to the size of the video files. SA Summers entered the downloaded information and provided a copy of the information to the USAO. On May 4, 2016, SA Summers received a second response from Facebook in the form of five disks that contained the same text and pictures that Facebook produced on May 2, 2016, but also included the videos that were not included in the May 2, 2016, response. Due to the size of the responses from Facebook, on May 6, 2016, the prosecution team enlisted the assistance of SA Matthew Hiemstra with the FBI Domestic Terrorism Operations Unit (DTOU) in Virginia to conduct an initial, software-based search of the information provided by Facebook to flag information that contained any reference to a certain set of search terms. *4 Separately through correspondence with counsel for Ammon Bundy sometime before May 13, 2016, AUSA Kerin determined two Facebook accounts covered by the Warrant and associated with Ammon Bundy and the “Bundy Ranch” could contain privileged material. Accordingly, on May 13, 2016, AUSA Kerin received the disks containing the information from Facebook's first and second responses to the Warrant including the two Bundy Facebook accounts. Also on May 13, 2016, SA Claudia Bonilla (with the prosecution team) received from Facebook a third response in the form of two disks that contained data through February 11, 2016. On May 16, 2016, the government provided each Defendant with a complete, unsegregated copy of that Defendant's Facebook account. Also on May 16, 2016, AUSA Kerin provided to Ammon Bundy's counsel complete copies of the portions of the two Facebook accounts associated with Ammon Bundy and Bundy Ranch seized pursuant to the Warrant. That same day SA Bonilla provided SA Hiemstra with a copy of the Warrant Affidavit and the Warrant search procedures as well as a list of search terms to be employed. On May 19, 2016, SA Summers received from Facebook a fourth response to the Warrant through the law-enforcement portal that consisted of a single, comprehensive collection of all information provided by Facebook pursuant to the Warrant. SA Summers downloaded this response, which was 10.7 gigabytes in size, to an external hard drive. On May 19, 2016, SA Summers provided to SA Hiemstra a link to the Facebook law-enforcement portal through which SA Hiemstra could access the fourth response from Facebook. Sometime between May 16, 2016, and May 19, 2016, SA Hiemstra initiated the software-based review of the information provided by Facebook, which was a search separate and distinct from the search directed by AUSA Kerin for privileged information. SA Hiemstra and members of the DTOU uploaded the information provided by Facebook to a software program called “Palantir Mint,” which analyzed the information and flagged those portions of the Facebook accounts in which the search terms appeared. The Palantir Mint software then generated a “Mint report” that identified the flagged portions of the Facebook accounts. Neither SA Hiemstra nor any member of his team personally made judgments regarding which material was responsive to the Warrant and which information was nonresponsive. Between May 17, 2016, and May 26, 2016, the Mint reports were sent to FBI personnel in Portland, Oregon, where government agents with the prosecution team used the Mint reports to help segregate information that was responsive to the Warrant from information that was nonresponsive. The review conducted by FBI personnel in Portland, Oregon, took place between May 17, 2016, and June 21, 2016. In order to conduct this review various agents were assigned subsets of the 23 Facebook accounts obtained through the Warrant. Although agents conducted the review of the 21 Facebook accounts not associated with Ammon Bundy or the Bundy Ranch simultaneously with the USAO filter team's review of the Ammon Bundy and Bundy Ranch accounts for privileged material, the FBI agents did not review the Ammon Bundy or Bundy Ranch accounts until after the USAO filter team had removed the privileged materials in those accounts. The prosecution team's review for responsive and nonresponsive material included the following: SA J. Matthew Yeager reviewed the accounts associated with Peter Santilli and “Guerilla Media” on May 17, 2016; Jason Patrick and Darryl Thorn on May 26, 2016; and Travis Cox and David Fry on June 3, 2016. *5 SA Summers reviewed the accounts associated with Jon Ritzheimer and Joseph O'Shaughnessy on May 26, 2016, and Duane Ehmer on June 15, 2016. FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force Officer (TFO) Jeremy Chedester reviewed the account associated with Geoffrey Stanek on June 1, 2016. SA Adam Krametbauer reviewed the accounts associated with Ryan Bundy and Ryan Payne on June 1, 2016. SA Kevin Strauss reviewed the accounts associated with Blaine Cooper on May 31, 2016; Corey Lequieu on June 8, 2016; Sandra Anderson on June 9, 2016; Wesley Kjar on June 10, 2016; and Jason Blomgren on June 13, 2016. SA Wade Mutchler reviewed the accounts associated with Shawna Cox and Sean Anderson on June 1, 2016. TFO Daniel Diamond reviewed the account associated with Eric Flores on June 2, 2016. The agents provided to the USAO prosecution team the information from those accounts that they determined was responsive to the Warrant, but the agents did not provide to the USAO prosecution team any information that was determined to be nonresponsive to the Warrant. Meanwhile on May 25, 2016, SA Summers provided to AUSA Kerin for the USAO filter team five disks that contained the entirety of Facebook's fourth response (including information that was not responsive to the Warrant). AUSA Kerin provided those disks to Automated Litigation Support (ALS) Specialist Doug Angel, who copied the information onto his computer hard drive and separated the information into folders for each of the 23 accounts on the disks. Angel was not informed of the FBI's two-step, substantive segregation of nonresponsive information required by the Warrant. Pursuant to the USAO filter team's instructions, Angel reviewed the Ammon Bundy and Bundy Ranch accounts, removed information that was privileged, and copied that information to a disk to provide to Ammon Bundy's counsel. Angel copied the nonprivileged information from the Ammon Bundy and Bundy Ranch accounts to a network folder accessible by the USAO prosecution team. The USAO prosecution team, however, did not have access to the privileged information that Angel segregated from the accounts. AUSA Kerin instructed Angel to return the nonprivileged information in the 23 Facebook accounts to ALS Specialist Rena Rallis who was working with the prosecution team. Angel intended to copy all 23 accounts (minus the privileged information removed from the Ammon Bundy and Bundy Ranch accounts) to a thumb drive, but inadvertently only copied 11 accounts (none of which belong to any of the Defendants involved in the trial that began on September 7, 2016) to that thumb drive. At some point in June Angel then returned the disks he had in his possession to AUSA Kerin and deleted any remaining information from his hard drive. On June 21, 2016, SA Yeager and SA Bonilla reviewed the Ammon Bundy and Bundy Ranch Facebook accounts (minus the privileged information removed by Angel) to segregate information responsive to the Warrant from information that was nonresponsive to the Warrant. On June 24, 2016, the government provided the information responsive to the Warrant from 21 Facebook accounts (omitting the accounts of Ammon Bundy and the Bundy Ranch) to all of the Defendants in Discovery Volume 39. In Discovery Volume 39, however, Rallis inadvertently also included the 11 complete Facebook accounts that Angel had provided to her. *6 On July 1, 2016, the government provided the information responsive to the Warrant from the Ammon Bundy and Bundy Ranch accounts to all Defendants in Discovery Volume 41. At the initial July 18, 2016, oral argument on Defendants' Motion (#741), AUSA Craig Gabriel informed the Court: The warrant has been executed. The raw materials are in a secure location at the FBI. They will not be accessed unless there is follow-on search warrant or order from this Court. And I will say, your Honor, that each account holder was provided with his or her raw data from the account. So, for example, the - the voluminous exhibit that Mr. Per - excuse me, Per Olson provided to the Court, he has that, his client has that. No other defendant has that because that's his account. And the Government's lawyers have not seen that. The search was undertaken by the FBI, and so that raw data is in two places. It's with each individual account holder, and it's in a sealed, secure location at the FBI. Tr. of Proceedings (#1051) at 53. On August 3, 2016, however, Per Olson, counsel for Defendant Fry, emailed AUSA Gabriel and informed him that Discovery Volume 39 contained the 11 unsegregated Facebook accounts. AUSA Gabriel instructed Rallis to search the USAO network for those files and to delete them immediately. Rallis did so promptly and believed that all such information had been deleted at that point. Sometime in the week of August 23, 2016, however, Rallis discovered to her horror that she still possessed in her office the thumb drive that Angel originally gave to her. Rallis gave that thumb drive to FBI Agent Ronnie Walker. On August 4, 2016, SA Travis J. Welter met with AUSA Gabriel and AUSA Geoffrey Barrow. At that meeting AUSAs Gabriel and Barrow instructed Welter to seal and to return to the Portland FBI office all Facebook data that remained at the USAO and to destroy all remaining copies of Facebook data that were not sealed and stored in evidence.[2] On August 4 or August 5, 2016, SA Welter collected and destroyed the remaining working copies of unsegregated Facebook information from the FBI search teams in Portland, Oregon. On August 5, 2016, the government notified the Court of its inadvertent disclosure of the 11 unsegregated Facebook accounts to Defendants. In that letter the government indicated: The FBI properly executed the warrant pursuant to the warrant's procedures; however, a miscommunication within the U.S. Attorneys' Office unfortunately caused the raw data for the above accounts (that was initially sent only to each individual account holder) to be produced to all defense counsel in Volume 39 on June 24, 2016. *7 None of the prosecution team's attorneys or staff accessed the raw data at any time, with the exception of confirming the inadvertent disclosure. On August 4, 2016, the U.S. Attorney's Office removed all raw Facebook data from its discovery database and computer system. The raw data will not be accessed again absent an order by the Court. On August 8, 2016, a member of SA Hiemstra's DTOU team received an email from a Plantir Mint system operator confirming that all information responsive to the Warrant had been deleted from DTOU computer systems. On August 23, 2016, SA Welter deleted unsegregated Facebook information that remained on the hard drive of a computer used by SA Bonilla, who left the Portland FBI office on June 30, 2016. On August 29, 2016, SA Chad Lapp destroyed disks that were in SA Yeager's office at the Bend, Oregon, FBI office. Those disks contained unsegregated Facebook information and had not been accessed since the May 17-June 21, 2016, review was completed. The five disks that were provided to AUSA Kerin for use by the USAO filter team have remained sealed in AUSA Kerin's office since Angel returned them to her sometime in June 2016. The seal on the disks includes instructions not to access them without further order of the Court. It now appears that all other media with unsegregated Facebook information and/or Facebook information that was deemed nonresponsive to the Warrant have either been destroyed or are sealed with instructions not to access without further order of the Court. DISCUSSION I. Overbreadth of the Search Warrant In their original Motion (#741) to Suppress Defendants contend the Warrant was overbroad because there was not sufficient probable cause to justify a Warrant to search all Facebook functions, including the private-messaging function. “Probable cause is established if an affidavit presents a fair probability' that evidence of criminal activity will be found in the place to be searched.” United States v. Flores, 802 F.3d 1028, 1043 (9th Cir. 2015)(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). Probable cause in a search-warrant affidavit must be based on the material supplied by the affiant as well as “reasonable inferences” drawn from the material. Gates, 462 U.S. at 240. See also United States v. Schesso, 730 F.3d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 2013). When determining whether the warrant was supported by probable cause, the court gives “great deference” to the probable-cause determination of the issuing judge. United States v. Grant, 682 F.3d 827, 832 (9th Cir. 2012). See also Flores, 802 F.3d at 1043. The court considers three factors when analyzing the overbreadth of a warrant: (1) whether probable cause existed to seize all items of a category described in the warrant; (2) whether the warrant set forth objective standards by which executing officers could differentiate items subject to seizure from those which were not; and (3) whether the government could have described the items more particularly in light of the information available. Flores, 802 F.3d at 1044 (quoting United States v. Le Shi, 525 F.3d 709, 731-32 (9th Cir. 2008)). Defendants assert the Warrant was overbroad because Facebook functions are obviously severable, and the search-warrant application only provided probable cause to search Defendants' public postings and not other features that included the private-messaging function. According to Defendants, therefore, the Warrant was overbroad because it permitted a comprehensive initial seizure of all functions of Defendants' Facebook accounts subject to the two-step review and filtering process provided within the Warrant. *8 The government, on the other hand, contends the Warrant was not overbroad as demonstrated by the fact that the Ninth Circuit approved a similar warrant in Flores, including the use of the two-step search process by which the government initially seizes the entirety of a Facebook account, conducts an initial review of the materials seized to identify the material that is responsive to the search warrant, and then separates and seals material that is not responsive to the warrant. Because the Warrant in this case closely mirrors the warrant in Flores, the government contends this Warrant similarly was not overbroad, and, in any event, suppression would be inappropriate even if the Warrant was overbroad because the law-enforcement officers acted in good-faith reliance on the Magistrate Judge's issuance of the Warrant. See Flores, 802 F.3d at 1028. In Flores the government obtained a search warrant that permitted the government to search the Facebook account associated with Flores's name and email address and to seize only evidence relevant to the two offenses listed in the warrant. 802 F.3d at 1044. The warrant authorized Facebook to provide agents with the entire contents of Flores's Facebook account. Id. at 1046. Agents then segregated information that was responsive to the search warrant from information that was nonresponsive and sealed the nonresponsive information so it could not be accessed absent a new warrant. Id. Ultimately the agents determined 100 of the 11,000 pages of data initially seized were responsive to the search warrant. Id. Applying the factors from Le Shi, the Ninth Circuit specifically concluded the warrant in Flores was not overbroad because it allowed the government to search only the Facebook account associated with the defendant, authorized the government to seize permanently only the information that was relevant to the alleged violations on which the warrant application was based, and established sufficient “ ‘Objective standards' for segregating responsive material from the rest of Flores's account.” Id. at 1044 (quoting Le Shi, 525 F.3d at 731-32). Although the Ninth Circuit expressed some concern over the lack of any temporal limit on the warrant (i.e., the warrant permitted seizure of relevant information created at any time during the existence of the Facebook account), the court ultimately concluded the warrant was not overbroad because “the warrant here specified a crime and a suspect, the seized data was not used for any broader investigative purposes, and Facebook, rather than government agents, segregated Flores's account to protect third parties' rights.” Id. at 1045-46. Moreover, any concern about a lack of any temporal limit was moot because the only information the government sought to introduce originated on the day of the defendant's arrest. Id. Here the government is correct that the Magistrate Judge issued a Warrant similar to the warrant that the Ninth Circuit largely approved in Flores. The Warrant in this case similarly specified a crime and the suspects, provided for a two-step search-and-seizure process to ensure nonresponsive information was separated and sealed, and only authorized the seizure of information within the listed accounts associated with Defendants. Moreover, unlike the warrant in Flores, the Warrant issued in this case also contained a temporal limitation for information from November 1, 2015, through the date of the relevant Defendant's arrest (each arrest date occurring between late-January and mid-February 2016). The Warrant in this case, therefore, was, in fact, narrower than the one approved by the Ninth Circuit in Flores. Moreover, the Court disagrees with Defendants' contention that the Warrant Affidavit did not provide probable cause to search nonpublic features such as the private-messaging function. To the contrary, the Affidavit provided: *9 [I]nformation stored in connection with a Facebook account may provide crucial evidence of the “who, what, when, where, and how” of the criminal conduct under investigation, thus enabling the United States to establish and prove each element or alternatively, to exclude the innocent from further suspicion. In my training and experience, a Facebook user's “Neoprint,” IP log, stored electronic communications, and other data retained by Facebook, can indicate who has used or controlled the Facebook account. This “user attribution” evidence is analogous to the search for “indicia of occupancy” while executing a search warrant at a residence. For example, profile contact information, private messaging logs, status updates, and tagged photos (and the data associated with the foregoing, such as date and time) may be evidence of who used or controlled the Facebook account at a relevant time. Further, Facebook account activity can show how and when the account was accessed or used. These assertions were sufficient for the Magistrate Judge to find there was a fair probability that evidence of the relevant crime could be found in the private features of Defendants' Facebook accounts. In addition, in light of the evidence of public postings presented in the Warrant Affidavit as well as the information that various alleged members of the conspiracy were Facebook friends, the Magistrate Judge could reasonably infer there was a fair probability that evidence of the alleged crime could also be found in many of the private functions of Defendants' Facebook accounts. Accordingly, on this record the Court concludes Flores is controlling, and, therefore, the Warrant in this case was not overbroad on its face. II. Execution of the Search Warrant In light of the recently developed evidene, Defendants contend the government improperly executed the Warrant (1) when the government did not set up a search team separate from the primary investigation team to conduct an initial review of the materials produced by Facebook; (2) when the government included search terms in their initial review that were outside of the scope of the Warrant; (3) when the government provided unsegregated Facebook information to the USAO filter team; (4) when the government provided 11 unsegregated Facebook accounts to all Defendants in Discovery Volume 39; and (5) when the government failed to seal or to destroy unsegregated Facebook data in a timely manner after the agents segregated responsive and nonresponsive information. In particular, Defendants contend the government's failure to destroy or to seal nonresponsive Facebook information in a timely manner constitutes “flagrant disregard” for the search procedures set out in the Warrant and, as a consequence, necessitates complete suppression of all information obtained pursuant to the Warrant. “Ordinarily, only evidence that is obtained in violation of a warrant is suppressed.” United States v. Chen, 979 F.2d 714, 717 (9th Cir. 1992). See also United States v. Sears, 411 F.3d 1124, 1131 (9th Cir. 2005). “However, ‘in cases where there is ‘flagrant disregard’ for the terms of the warrant, the district court may suppress all of the evidence, including evidence that was not tainted by the violation.' ” Sears, 411 F.3d at 1131 (quoting Chen, 979 F.2d at 717). “Wholesale suppression is an ‘extraordinary remedy’ that is appropriate ‘only when the officers transform the search into an impermissible general search by ignoring the terms of the warrant and engaging in indiscriminate fishing.’ ” Sears, 411 F.3d at 1131 (quoting Chen, 979 F.2d at 717). As noted, the Warrant required the following search procedure: 4. During its review of the information received from Facebook under this warrant, law enforcement will segregate the information into two groups: (i) information that is responsive to the warrant and that the government may therefore seize; and (ii) information that is not responsive to the warrant. This review will be performed within a reasonable amount of time not to exceed 180 days from the date of execution of the warrant. If the government needs additional time to conduct this review, it may seek an extension of the time period from the Court. *10 5. Information that is responsive to the warrant will be copied onto a separate storage device or medium. Responsive information may be used by law enforcement in the same manner as any other seized evidence. Information that is not responsive to the warrant will be sealed and stored on a secure medium or in a secure location. Nonresponsive information will not be reviewed again without further order of the Court (e.g., subsequent search warrant or order to unseal by the district court). 6. The government will retain a complete copy of the information received from Facebook for a number of reasons, including proving the authenticity of evidence to be used at trial, responding to questions regarding the corruption of data, establishing the chain of custody of data, refuting claims of fabricating, tampering, or destroying data, and addressing potential exculpatory evidence claims where, for example, a defendant claims that the government avoided its obligations by destroying data or returning it to a third party. A. Use of a Separate Search Team Although the Court finds the use of a search team separate from the primary investigation team for the purposes of conducting substantive review of the Facebook data would have been an added layer of protection for ensuring the investigation team did not benefit from exposure to information that was nonresponsive to the Warrant (and, in this case, could have prevented many of the errors that plagued execution of the Warrant), there is not any such requirement in the Warrant nor does Flores mandate such an additional safeguard. Accordingly, the government's failure to employ a separate search team to segregate responsive information from nonresponsive information does not by itself constitute a violation of the Warrant. Nevertheless, the Court points out the errors that occurred in the execution of this Warrant highlight the utility of such a separate search team to conduct the initial review under similar warrants. B. Use of Search Terms During the initial review of the information provided by Facebook, the government used many different search terms to locate information responsive to the Warrant and to identify nonresponsive information. Although these search terms were diverse and related to several different topics, the Court finds each of the search terms are relevant in some way to the alleged occupation of the MNWR that constitutes the conspiracy charge on which the Warrant was predicated. Accordingly, the Court concludes the search terms did not impermissibly exceed the scope of the Warrant. C. Use of the USAO Privilege Filter Team As noted, the Warrant did not expressly provide for the use of a privilege filter team. Although the privilege filter team was not contemplated in the Warrant and, therefore, existed separately from the searches authorized by the Warrant, the Court concludes the terms of the search procedures laid out in the Warrant were sufficiently broad to permit the use of the privilege filter team separate from the prosecution team for the purpose of screening for privileged information at the request of Ammon Bundy's counsel. Moreover, the use of that privilege filter team narrowed rather than expanded the scope of the search because it removed privileged material from the information that investigating agents would otherwise search for responsiveness to the Warrant. Accordingly, regardless whether the Warrant procedures are sufficiently broad to permit the use of a privilege filter team expressly, the privilege filter process is not the type of “flagrant disregard” for a search-warrant procedure that would justify wholesale suppression. See Sears, 411 F.3d at 1131. *11 The Court, nonetheless, notes it would have been prudent for the government to alert and to seek guidance from the issuing Magistrate Judge when it became clear that some Facebook materials should be submitted to a privilege filtering process in addition to the process of separating responsive data from nonresponsive data. If the government had done so, the Magistrate Judge could have clarified the Warrant procedures to address expressly the use of a privilege filter team, and the government could have avoided the risks inherent in conducting the simultaneous screenings without such direction. D. Inadvertent Disclosure of Unsegregated Facebook Information in Discovery Volume 39 The Court concludes the inadvertent disclosure of the 11 unsegregated Facebook accounts to all Defendants in Discovery Volume 39 does not justify wholesale suppression of all evidence obtained pursuant to the Warrant. This inadvertent disclosure was a result of mistakes on the part of Angel and Rallis arising from confusion caused by the simultaneous employment of the privilege filter team along with the separate segregation of responsive and nonresponsive information. Moreover, it is clear that the prosecution team never accessed the unsegregated records inadvertently disclosed to other Defendants who are not the subject of the current trial. The Court fully credits the testimony of both Angel and Rallis and appreciates the candor and accountability that both demonstrated in their Declarations and during the August 23, 2016, evidentiary hearing. Ultimately the inadvertent errors that Rallis and Angel made are of the type that otherwise careful government agents can understandably make, especially during the course of highly complex litigation such as this matter involving voluminous discovery. Such errors, as Defendants now agree, do not constitute “flagrant disregard” of the terms of the Warrant. E. Failure to Destroy or to Seal Nonresponsive Facebook Data in a Timely Manner The Court, nevertheless, is troubled by the failures of the various agents, collectively and individually, to destroy or to seal information in their possession that was determined to be nonresponsive to the Warrant. It is clear that the segregation of responsive and nonresponsive information was accomplished by June 21, 2016, when the Ammon Bundy and Bundy Ranch accounts were reviewed by SA Yeager and SA Bonilla. It was not until more than six weeks later on August 4, 2016, and then only at Defendants' collective insistence, that there was any concerted effort by the government to destroy or to seal nonresponsive information that remained in the possession of government agents. The government contends this delay did not violate the terms of the Warrant because the Warrant allowed the government up to 180 days to complete the search, which the government points out will not elapse until early October. The Court disagrees. The Court notes the Warrant required the government to complete its review “within a reasonable amount of time not to exceed 180 days from the date of execution of the warrant.” The 180-day limitation, therefore, was the outer limit of the time that the government had to complete the search. Even with that 180-day limit, the government was required to perform the search in a “reasonable amount of time.” In light of the complexity of the search and the volume of information that the government was required to review, the Court concludes it was reasonable for the government to take until June 21, 2016, to finish the review. On the other hand, it appears to have taken most of the month of August for the government successfully to locate and to destroy or to seal the nonresponsive information still in its possession. While it is not per se unreasonable to take that much time to complete the “seal or destroy” process, the Court finds the six-week delay between the government's completion of the review under the Warrant and the beginning of the government's concerted effort to locate and to destroy or to seal nonresponsive information was unreasonable, especially when it appears the initiation of that effort was prompted by defense counsel rather than the government. *12 Nevertheless, there is not any evidence in the record from which the Court could conclude that the government agents' unreasonable delay expanded the scope of the search or otherwise exposed the government to more information than that which they were entitled to under the Warrant. The agents' actions, therefore, did not “ ‘transform the search into an impermissible general search by ignoring the terms of the warrant and engaging in indiscriminate fishing.’ ” See Sears, 411 F.3d at 1131 (quoting Chen, 979 F.2d at 717). Accordingly, the Court concludes even though the government's efforts to complete this final step of the Warrant procedures were late and seemingly nonchalant, the “extraordinary remedy” of wholesale suppression is not warranted in the circumstances. See id. Nonetheless, Defendants contend the Court should exercise its inherent supervisory authority over government agents by suppressing all of the Facebook evidence on this ground. Although the Court is frustrated by the government agents' delay in sealing and/or destroying the information that was nonresponsive to the Warrant, the Court concludes suppression of evidence that was otherwise properly obtained pursuant to the Warrant is not an appropriate remedy for the government's timing error. Whether pursuant to the Fourth Amendment or to the Court's supervisory authority, wholesale suppression is an extraordinary remedy only to be applied to flagrant abuses of government authority. Although the government's delay in sealing and/or destroying nonresponsive Facebook information was unreasonable, it was not sufficiently egregious to justify the suppression of a significant amount of evidence that was otherwise lawfully obtained under the totality of the circumstances. The Court, nevertheless, admonishes the government for its obvious lack of diligence, attention to detail, and failure to destroy or to seal information pursuant to the Warrant that the government identified as nonresponsive to the Warrant in a timely manner. This should not have happened in any case, and, in any event, is particularly unacceptable in the context of this high-profile, complex prosecution with seemingly extraordinary resources being expended at every turn. In the future the Court expects the government to provide high-level leadership to ensure issues such as these are identified and resolved proactively and well before, as in this case, three rounds of evidentiary presentations and arguments that could have been avoided. The Court trusts the USAO and the investigators on whom it relies will take appropriate actions to address the oversights in this case to ensure they are not repeated in the future. CONCLUSION For these reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants' Motion, and, pursuant to the Court's supervisory authority over the government, the Court ADMONISHES the government for its lack of diligence in failing to ensure that nonresponsive information from the seized Facebook accounts was sealed or destroyed in a timely manner pursuant to the Warrant issued April 8, 2016, following completion of the segregation of such data on June 21, 2016. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED this 14th day of September, 2016. Footnotes [1] The Court directs the Clerk to return Exhibits D-H to counsel for Defendant Fry to maintain through any appeal of this matter. [2] In light of the necessary separation between the prosecutors and the investigative team conducting the review of the Facebook materials, the Court concludes AUSA Gabriel did not intentionally mislead the Court at the July 18, 2016, oral argument. The more reasonable inference is that AUSA Gabriel represented the nonresponsive materials had been destroyed and/or sealed either because he was misinformed or because he erroneously (but in good faith) believed the nonresponsive information had been sealed and/or destroyed at the time that it was segregated from the responsive information.