Eddie Kleppinger, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Texas Department of Transportation, et al., Defendants CIVIL ACTION NO. L–10–124 United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Laredo Division Signed March 12, 2012 Counsel Eddie Kleppinger, Jr., Laredo, TX, pro se. Walter Clyde Brocato, Mary Sanchez, Amy Michelle Kovar, Matthew Tyler Bohuslav, Elsa Ulloa, Office of the Attorney General of Texas, Bonnie Cox Lockhart, Attorney General of Texas, Austin, TX, for Defendants. Hacker, J. Scott, United States Magistrate Judge MEMORANDUM AND ORDER *1 Pending before the Court are Plaintiff's motions to compel discovery against five of the individual Defendants. (See Dkt. Nos. 82, 84, 85, 86, and 87). Also pending before the Court is “Plaintiff's Request for Hearing of Plaintiff's Opposed Motions to Compel Discovery of Individual Defendants and for Sanctions” (Dkt. No. 89). Specifically, Plaintiff seeks to compel interrogatory responses from Defendants Yolanda Arriaga, Leonel Garza, Marco Salgado Frausto, Doris Howdeshell, and Brenda Harper (collectively, “the individual Defendants”). (Id.). Plaintiff also requests that sanctions be issued against the individual Defendants. (Id.). Each individual Defendant filed his or her own response on February 2, 2012. (See Dkt. Nos. 94, 95, 96, 97, and 98). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motions to compel are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Moreover, Plaintiff's request for a hearing (Dkt. No. 89) is DENIED. I. LEGAL STANDARD A party may obtain discovery of any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). “Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Id. Relevancy has been defined, for purposes of discovery, as encompassing “any matter that could bear on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978). Thus, “relevancy is broadly construed, and a request for discovery should be considered relevant if there is any possibility that the information sought may be relevant to the claim or defense of any party.” Merrill v. Waffle House, Inc., 227 F.R.D. 467, 470 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (quoting Sheldon v. Vermonty, 204 F.R.D. 679, 689 (D. Kan. 2001)) (internal quotations omitted). However, “[c]ourts have also recognized that ‘the legal tenet that relevancy in the discovery context is broader than in the context of admissibility should not be misapplied as to allow fishing expeditions in discovery.’ ” Millennium Mktg. Grp., LLC v. United States, 2008 WL 4461999, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2008) (citing Sal Ciolino & Assoc. v. First Extended Servs., 2006 WL 1581248, at *2 (E.D. La. May 17, 2006)). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure direct the Court to limit the frequency or extent of discovery when the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i). The Court must also limit discovery when the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). “Rule 26 vests the trial judge with broad discretion to tailor discovery narrowly and to dictate the sequence of discovery.” Crawford–El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 599 (1998). *2 “The burden is on the ‘party who opposes its opponent's request for production to show specifically how ... each [request] is not relevant or how each [request] is overly broad, burdensome or oppressive.’ ” SEC v. Brady, 238 F.R.D. 429, 436 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (citing Merrill, 227 F.R.D. at 477) (quoting McLeod, Alexander, Powel and Apffel, P.C. v. Quarles, 894 F.2d 1482, 1485 (5th Cir. 1990)) (internal quotations omitted). Unless it is clear that the information sought can have no possible bearing on the claim or defense of a party, the request for discovery should be allowed. Id. at 437. In some cases, however, if the request for discovery is overly broad on its face or when relevancy is not readily apparent, the party seeking discovery has the burden to show the relevancy of the request. Tara Woods Ltd. P'ship v. Fannie Mae, 265 F.R.D. 561, 567 (D. Colo. 2010) (citing Hammond v. Lowe's Home Ctrs. Inc., 216 F.R.D. 666, 670 (D. Kan. 2003)); see Scottsdale Ins. v. Am. Re–Ins. Co., 2007 WL 405870, at *4 (D. Neb. Feb. 2, 2007) (“A party resisting facially overbroad or unduly burdensome discovery need not provide specific detailed support.”). Nonetheless, despite the overly broad nature of a discovery request, a party typically has a duty to respond to it to the extent the request is not objectionable and can be narrowed to an appropriate scope. See Moses v. Halstead, 236 F.R.D. 667, 672–73 (D. Kan. 2006). Conversely, if inadequate guidance exists to determine the proper scope of an overly broad or burdensome request for discovery, this rule does not apply, and the Court will not compel further response from the party opposing the request. Id.; see also Scottsdale Ins., 2007 WL 405870, at *4 (citing Cotracom Commodity Trading Co. v. Seaboard Corp., 189 F.R.D. 655, 665 (D. Kan. 1999)). Finally, “[d]iscovery in employment discrimination cases depends heavily upon the particular circumstances of the case.” Owens v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 221 F.R.D. 649, 652 (D. Kan. 2004) (citation omitted). II. INTERROGATORIES AT ISSUE A. Interrogatories “Concerning the Allegations in the Complaint or the Answer” Specifically, Plaintiff requests that each of the individual Defendants: (1) “[i]dentify all persons who may have knowledge of facts concerning the allegations in the Complaint or the Answer;” (2) “[s]et forth in detail which allegations in the instant Complaint Defendant was aware of prior to receiving” Plaintiff's original complaint, and “[i]dentify all other TXDOT employees you informed or communicated with concerning those allegations;” and (3) “[i]dentify all persons or entities, not previously identified, with whom Defendant has communicated ... concerning the allegations in the Complaint or the Answer ... and describe those communications.” The use of the term “concerning” in conjunction with the broad description “the allegations in the Complaint [or the Answer]” renders the discovery requests at issue facially overbroad. See Moses, 236 F.R.D. at 672–73 (sustaining overbreadth objection when the term “concerning” modified an “enormous amount of information, i.e., all issues raised in the pleadings”); see also Scottsdale, Ins., 2007 WL 405870, at *4 (same). This is especially true when the Court considers that Plaintiff's complaint is seventy pages long and consists of 210 paragraphs. (See Dkt. No. 40). Similarly, there are 210 responsive paragraphs in Defendants' amended answer to Plaintiff's second amended complaint. (See Dkt. No. 99). As such, Plaintiff's motions to compel are DENIED as to Interrogatory Nos. 1 (directed to each of the individual Defendants), 7 (directed to each of the individual Defendants), and 8 (directed to each of the individual Defendants). B. Identification of Trial Witnesses *3 Plaintiff requests that the individual Defendants identify all persons the individual Defendants intend to call as a witness at trial and give a summary of their anticipated testimony. (See Dkt. No. 70, ¶ 28). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, parties must produce as part of their initial disclosures “each individual likely to have discoverable information—along with the subjects of that information—that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses .... ” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i). Rule 26 further requires that identification of trial witnesses be made at least 30 days before trial, unless the Court orders otherwise. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(3)(A)(i). In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas–Laredo Division, each District Judge sets a deadline by which the parties must file their Joint Pretrial Order. See S.D. Tex. L. R. App. B. When filing their Joint Pretrial Order, the parties must identify their trial witnesses along with a brief statement of the nature of their testimony, among other things. Id. However, the Federal Rules and the Local Rules do not specifically address whether a party can be compelled to disclose its trial witnesses during the discovery phase between the initial disclosures and the filing of the Joint Pretrial Order. Case law addressing the issues suggests that, generally, a party cannot compel the opposing party to identify their trial witnesses during discovery. See D'Onofrio v. SFX Sports Grp., Inc., 247 F.R.D. 43 (D.D.C. 2008) (quoting 8 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2013 (2d ed. 1994)). However, a party wishing to obtain the identity of trial witnesses through discovery “must show a particular need for that deviation” from the general rule. Id. (quoting Brock v. R.J. Auto Parts and Serv., Inc., 864 F.2d 677, 679 (10th Cir. 1998)). Here, it appears that Plaintiff's interrogatory is premature. The deadline for the Joint Pretrial Order and a trial date have yet to be set by the District Court. Understandably, the individual Defendants have not yet identified their trial witnesses. (See Dkt. No. 81, p. 4). More importantly, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a particularized need for the identity of the individual Defendants' trial witnesses at this time. As such, Plaintiff's motions to compel are DENIED as to Interrogatory No. 3 (directed to each of the individual Defendants). Nonetheless, the individual Defendants are reminded of their obligation under Rule 26(e) to supplement their initial disclosures with the name of every person who may have discoverable information. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(e)(1). C. Discipline of Other Employees In this set of interrogatories, Plaintiff requests that some of the individual Defendants (1) identify all current and former employees of TXDOT that have been disciplined for alleged misuse of the TXDOT e-mail or computer systems; (2) identify all current and former employees of TXDOT that have been disciplined for actual or potential violations of TXDOT's confidentiality policies; (3) describe the alleged violation in detail; (4) describe all disciplinary action taken against that person; and (5) state how the individual Defendant learned of the alleged misuse and of the disciplinary actions taken. However, the information Plaintiff seeks through these interrogatories is unreasonably duplicative of discovery requests directed to Defendant TXDOT. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(c)(i) (“On motion or on its own, the court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery ... if it determines that the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative ....”). Consistent with this Court's Order issued on March 4, 2012, Defendant TXDOT will provide Plaintiff with non-privileged information and documents regarding the discipline of other employees in the Travel Services Division from October 1, 2006 to September 20, 2011, for the same type of conduct that Plaintiff allegedly committed. As such, Plaintiff's motions to compel are DENIED as to Interrogatory Nos. 16 (directed to Defendant Arriaga), 17 (directed to Defendants Howdeshell, Harper, Frausto, and Arriaga) and 18 (directed to Defendants Howdeshell, Harper, and Frausto). D. Previous Discrimination Complaints *4 Plaintiff requests that each of the individual Defendants identify all persons who have made any employment discrimination complaints of which the individual Defendant is aware, including the type of complaint made, the date it was made, and to whom it was made. Plaintiff further requests that the individual Defendants “describe Defendant's response and any action taken by the Defendant or its employees in response to the complaint and identify all persons involved with the response, the actions each person took and in the final resolution, disposition and determination of the complaint including the date of the final action.” However, the information Plaintiff seeks through these interrogatories is unreasonably duplicative of discovery requests directed to Defendant TXDOT. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(c)(i). Moreover, the information sought in these interrogatories should be contained in the documents Defendant TXDOT has been ordered to produce consistent with this Court's Order issued on March 4, 2012. Specifically, Defendant TXDOT will produce non-privileged information and documents of other employment discrimination complaints filed against Defendant by Travel Counselors in the Travel Services Division from October 1, 2006 to September 20, 2011, based on the fact that they are white (race and/or color), male, and/or born in the United States. (See Dkt. No. 122, p. 14). As such, Plaintiff's motions to compel are DENIED as to Interrogatory No. 4 (directed to each of the individual Defendants) and Interrogatory No. 5 (directed to each of the individual Defendants). E. Disciplinary Actions Taken Against Plaintiff In Interrogatory No. 6, Plaintiff requests that some of the individual Defendants “[d]escribe fully and in detail all formal or informal corrective or disciplinary actions [the individual Defendant] took or authorized others to take with regard to the Plaintiff.” Plaintiff further requests that the individual Defendants “[i]nclude the details that precipitated [the individual Defendant's] action, how the Plaintiff[']s acts or omissions violated any applicable policy, rule or standard, how [the individual Defendant] learned of the alleged act or omission, any investigation of the facts by [the individual Defendant], and explain why [the individual Defendant's] corrective or disciplinary actions were supported by TxDOT policy.” In Interrogatory Nos. 18 and 19, related interrogatories, Plaintiff requests that some of the individual Defendants “[d]escribe in detail Defendant's knowledge concerning the Plaintiff's misuse of the TxDOT e-mail system and alleged breach of TxDOT confidentiality policy.” As drafted, Interrogatory No. 6 is overly broad. Specifically, the Court acknowledges that any corrective or disciplinary actions taken against Plaintiff are not necessarily relevant or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Nonetheless, the following disciplinary actions are discoverable: (1) disciplinary actions that formed the basis for Plaintiff's termination and (2) any other disciplinary actions Defendants will use to defend this lawsuit. (See Dkt. No. 122, p. 30–31). 1. Defendant Garza Defendant Garza responded that he “took no disciplinary action against Plaintiff.” (See Dkt. No., 84, p. 12; Dkt. No. 96, p. 8). Plaintiff argues that Defendant Garza's response is “evasive and incomplete” because Plaintiff “seeks not only formal or informal disciplinary actions but also seeks disclosure of any similar ‘corrective’ actions the Defendant took.” (See Dkt. No. 84, p. 12 (emphasis in original)). In essence, Plaintiff implies that corrective action is distinct from disciplinary action. *5 However, the terms “corrective action” and “disciplinary action” are often used interchangeably. See, e.g., Taylor v. Peerless Indus., Inc., 322 Fed.Appx. 355, 366–367 (5th Cir. 2009) (in Title VII racial discrimination case, defendant's “progressive disciplinary policy” stated “specific corrective action will depend on the severity and conditions of the problem,” and the “type of disciplinary action taken, may vary depending on the situation and will be determined within the sole discretion of [defendant]”); Padgett v. Litton Sys., Inc., 662 F. Supp. 106, 108 (S.D. Miss. 1987) (defendant's policy concerning the taking of any necessary disciplinary action against its employees states, “Each supervisor is responsible for the disciplining of their assigned personnel ... Prompt correction action is taken in all cases and consists of a written warning, disciplinary layoff, or immediate discharge, as the facts of the situation require.”); Jimerson v. Garrett Aviation Servs., LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128440, at *17–18 n. 32 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2010) (court stated plaintiff failed to show that defendant “skipped a step” in its disciplinary procedures when it fired plaintiff because defendant's decision was within the company's Corrective Action policy). Therefore, Defendant Garza's response that he took no disciplinary action against Plaintiff is sufficient, as long as Defendant Garza is using the terms interchangeably. As such, Plaintiff's motion to compel is DENIED regarding Interrogatory No. 6 (directed to Defendant Garza).[1] 2. Defendant Frausto Defendant Frausto, Plaintiff's supervisor at the Laredo Travel Information Center, responded that he “had some coaching sessions with the Plaintiff” because of (1) Plaintiff's failure to report incidents to Defendant Frausto “about the purchasing;” (2) “some budget issues;” and (3) “his unprofessional behavior towards the purchasers.” (See Dkt. No. 97, pp. 5–6). Defendant Frausto further stated that he reported to his supervisor, Ms. Harper, “that Plaintiff had been forwarding TXDOT e-mails to his home computer. (Id. at p. 6). Finally, Defendant Frausto asserted that he prepared Plaintiff's close-out evaluation, which was provided to Plaintiff on the day of his termination. (Id.). In responding to the interrogatory, Defendant Frausto describes the corrective actions he took with regard to Plaintiff, and seems to answer the first part of Interrogatory No. 6. However, Defendant Frausto fails to respond to the remainder of the interrogatory. Instead, Defendant Frausto provides vague reasons for Plaintiff's discipline such as non-reporting of purchasing incidents, “budget issues” and “unprofessional behavior,” without providing any details. Defendant Frausto attempts to justify his response by stating that, “the interrogatory is overly broad and unduly burdensome” “to the extent [it] requires an analysis of TXDOT's rule and regulations.” (Id. at p. 6). However, in performing his job, Defendant was required to apply TXDOT policy. (See Dkt. No. 40, ¶73; Dkt. No. 99, ¶73 (applicant for Supervisor II position at the Laredo Travel Information Center was evaluated on his or her qualifications regarding “extensive knowledge of office management practices and procedures,” including being “responsible for enforcing established policies and procedures”)). Moreover, if Defendant had “coaching sessions” with Plaintiff regarding multiple incidents that arguably warranted discipline, presumably Defendant Frausto reviewed TXDOT policies, and Plaintiff's alleged violations of those policies, with Plaintiff during those “coaching sessions.” *6 Notably, Defendant Frausto mentions that Plaintiff's close-out evaluation was provided to Plaintiff, but Defendant does not specify that the evaluation is a document responsive to the interrogatory. If Defendant Frausto's intention was to refer to Plaintiff's close-out evaluation or other documents in response to Interrogatory No. 6, Defendant must clearly state that intention. See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 33(d). As such, Plaintiff's motions to compel are GRANTED as to Interrogatory No. 6 (directed to Defendant Frausto). Defendant Frausto is ORDERED to respond to Interrogatory No. 6 and include (1) how Defendant Frausto believed Plaintiff violated TXDOT's policies; (2) how Defendant Frausto learned of Plaintiff's alleged policy violations; (3) any investigation of the facts conducted by Defendant Frausto, and (4) how Defendant Frausto's disciplinary actions were supported by TXDOT policies. As discussed above, Defendant Frausto need only include the following disciplinary actions in responding to Interrogatory No. 6: (1) disciplinary actions that formed the basis for Plaintiff's termination; and/or (2) any other disciplinary actions Defendants will use to defend this lawsuit. 3. Defendant Harper Defendant Harper, Section Director of the Travel Services Section, has provided a detailed response in answering Interrogatory No. 6. (See Dkt. No. 95, p. 10). However, Defendant Harper failed to specify how the disciplinary actions (i.e., change of Plaintiff's computer password, Plaintiff being placed on paid administrative leave, Plaintiff's termination) she took against Plaintiff were supported by TXDOT policy. As such, Plaintiff's motions to compel are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as to Interrogatory No. 6 (directed to Defendant Harper). Defendant Harper is ORDERED to state how the disciplinary actions she took against Plaintiff were supported by TXDOT policy. 4. Defendant Howdeshell Defendant Howdeshell, Division Director of the Travel Services Division, has provided a response that answers most of Interrogatory No. 6. (See Dkt. No. 98, pp. 9–10). However, Defendant Howdeshell fails to explain whether she conducted an investigation of the facts that formed the basis of the disciplinary action she took against Plaintiff (i.e., termination) and to reveal the facts that investigation revealed, if any. As such, Plaintiff's motions to compel are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as to Interrogatory No. 6 (directed to Defendant Howdeshell). Defendant Howdeshell is ORDERED to explain whether she conducted an investigation of the facts that formed the basis of the disciplinary action she took against Plaintiff (i.e., termination) and to reveal the facts that investigation revealed, if any. Furthermore, given the similarities between the information Plaintiff is entitled to under Interrogatory No. 6 and the information sought in Interrogatory Nos. 18 and 19, Plaintiff's motions to compel are DENIED as to Interrogatory No. 18 (directed to Defendant Arriaga) and Interrogatory No. 19 (directed to Defendants Frausto, Harper, and Howdeshell). F. Plaintiff's Complaints of Discrimination, Harassment, Retaliation or a Hostile Work Environment Plaintiff requests that each of the individual Defendants “[i]dentify and describe each time Plaintiff made complaints of discrimination, harassment, retaliation or a hostile work environment to the [individual] Defendant and describe all actions, if any, taken by the [individual] Defendant in response to each of Plaintiff's complaints.” Generally, the Court is of the opinion that Plaintiff is entitled to information concerning the specific complaints he made to the individual Defendants regarding allegations of discrimination, harassment, retaliation, or a hostile work environment against Plaintiff. 1. Defendant Garza *7 Defendant Garza's response only refers to one complaint made by Plaintiff regarding a conversation between Naomi Flores and “an employee of a contract vendor” and the use of an “inappropriate word to describe [Plaintiff]” by the contract vendor's employee. (See Dkt. No. 96, p. 10). Thus, it is unclear whether Defendant Garza has identified and described to the best of his knowledge each of Plaintiff's complaints of discrimination, harassment, retaliation or a hostile work environment that Plaintiff directly reported to him. Furthermore, Defendant Garza states that a Civil Rights Investigation was initiated after Plaintiff expressed concerns about Plaintiff's employment. (See Dkt. No. 96, p. 11). However, Defendant has not specified that the Civil Rights Investigation file, or any other document, is a responsive document that would provide Plaintiff with the information he is seeking. FED. R. CIV. PROC. 33(d)(2). As such, Plaintiff's motions to compel are GRANTED as to Interrogatory No. 9 (directed to Defendant Garza). Defendant Garza is ORDERED to clarify whether the sole complaint he described in response to the interrogatory is the only complaint Plaintiff made to Defendant Garza regarding Plaintiff's allegations of discrimination, harassment, retaliation, or a hostile work environment. For any other complaints identified by Defendant Garza, Defendant Garza is further ORDERED to provide some detail of the actions he took in response to each of Plaintiff's complaints made directly to Defendant Garza regarding Plaintiff's allegations of discrimination, harassment, retaliation, or a hostile work environment. 2. Defendant Frausto Defendant Frausto responded that he “is not aware of any such complaints made by Plaintiff.” (See Dkt. No. 97, p. 8). Specifically, Defendant Frausto states that he “has no information that is responsive to this interrogatory.” (Id). Plaintiff argues that Defendant Frausto's response is “untrue, evasive, non-responsive and incomplete.” (See Dkt. No. 85, p. 14). It is clear to the Court that Defendant Frausto is asserting that Plaintiff did not make any complaints directly to Defendant Frausto. Thus, Defendant Frausto's response is sufficient. If Plaintiff believes Defendant Frausto's response is untrue and incomplete, Plaintiff can raise the issue of Defendant Frausto's credibility during deposition or at trial. As such, Plaintiff's motions to compel are DENIED as to Interrogatory No. 9 (directed to Defendant Frausto). 3. Defendant Harper Defendant Harper's response is sufficient. Specifically, Defendant Harper describes two instances where Plaintiff “made complaints of discrimination, harassment, retaliation or a hostile work environment” to Defendant Harper. (See Dkt. No. 87, p. 15). Furthermore, Defendant Harper describes the actions she took in response to Plaintiff's complaints. (Id.). As such, Plaintiff's motions to compel are DENIED as to Interrogatory No. 9 (directed to Defendant Harper). 4. Defendant Howdeshell Defendant Howdeshell's response is sufficient. Specifically, Defendant Howdeshell describes two instances where Plaintiff “made complaints of discrimination, harassment, retaliation or a hostile work environment” to Defendant Howdeshell. (See Dkt. No. 86, pp. 14–15). Furthermore, Defendant Howdeshell describes the actions she took in response to Plaintiff's complaints. (Id). As such, Plaintiff's motions to compel are DENIED as to Interrogatory No. 9 (directed to Defendant Howdeshell). 5. Defendant Arriaga Defendant Arriaga initially responded to the interrogatory by stating “none.” (See Dkt. No. 82, p. 14). Subsequently, Defendant Arriaga clarified that Plaintiff never made any complaints to Defendant Arriaga. (See Dkt. No. 94, p. 10). This response is reasonable in light of the fact that Defendant Arriaga “is employed in the Human Resources Office and is solely responsible for the interviewing and hiring process.” (Id.). As such, Plaintiff's motions to compel are DENIED as to Interrogatory No. 9 (directed to Defendant Arriaga). G. Disciplinary Actions Taken Against Defendant Garza *8 Plaintiff asks Defendant Garza to “[i]dentify and describe fully any formal or informal disciplinary actions taken against [Defendant Garza] by TxDOT including and since 2001.” However, Plaintiff has not shown how all disciplinary actions taken by TXDOT against Defendant Garza are relevant to Plaintiff's lawsuit. Nonetheless, consistent with this Court's March 4, 2012 Order, “evidence of other acts of discrimination or retaliation similar to the discrimination or retaliation charged have been admitted to show, for example, motive or intent. By the same token, only discrimination or retaliation of the same character and type as that is alleged is probative.” (See Dkt. No. 122, p. 9). Thus, disciplinary action taken by TXDOT against Defendant Garza relating to allegations of discrimination, harassment, retaliation or a hostile work environment may be relevant to show Defendant Garza's motive or intent. As limited in the Court's March 4, 2012 Order, Defendant Garza is ORDERED to provide Plaintiff with information of any disciplinary actions taken against Defendant Garza by Defendant TXDOT in response to claims of discrimination, harassment, retaliation or a hostile work environment filed by Travel Counselors in the Travel Services Division from October 1, 2006, to September 20, 2011, based on the fact that they are white (race and/or color), male, and/or born in the United States. (See Dkt. No. 122, p. 14). As such, Plaintiff's motions to compel are DENIED IN PART AND GRANTED IN PART as to Interrogatory No. 10 (directed to Defendant Garza). H. Communications Regarding Plaintiff's Application and Qualifications for the Supervisor Position in Laredo Plaintiff asks some of the individual Defendants to “[i]dentify and describe fully and in detail all communications in which you were a party concerning, both, Plaintiff's application or qualification for the Supervisor job posting in Laredo, TX.” Plaintiff further requests that the individual Defendants “[i]nclude in [their] description any action [the individual Defendant] took” as a result of the communications. 1. Defendant Arriaga Defendant Arriaga responds by detailing communications she had with both Defendant Harper and Plaintiff. (See Dkt. No. 94, pp. 10–11). Defendant Arriaga also directs Plaintiff to the Job Requisition packet for the Laredo Supervisor job posting. (Id.). Plaintiff argues that Defendant's answer is “evasive and incomplete.” (See Dkt. No. 82, p. 15). To the extent Plaintiff believes Defendant Arriaga purposefully omitted key communications regarding Plaintiff's application or qualifications for the Supervisor position, Plaintiff can raise the issue of Defendant Arriaga's credibility during deposition or at trial. Assuming the Job Requisition packet contains all of Defendant Arriaga's documented communications regarding Plaintiff's application or qualifications for the Supervisor position, Defendant Arriaga's answer to this interrogatory appears to be sufficient. Thus, Defendant Arriaga is ORDERED to clarify whether all documented communications responsive to this interrogatory are included in the Job Requisition packet. Defendant Arriaga is further ORDERED to produce documented communications not contained in the Job Requisition packet, if any. Finally, specific details of relevant oral communications are better suited for Defendant Arriaga's deposition.[2] As such, Plaintiff's motions to compel are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as to Interrogatory No. 10 (directed to Defendant Arriaga). 2. Defendant Harper *9 Defendant Harper responds by detailing communications she had with both Defendant Arriaga and Plaintiff. (See Dkt. No. 95, p. 14). Defendant Harper also directs Plaintiff to the Job Requisition packet for the Laredo Supervisor job posting. (Id.). Plaintiff argues that Defendant's answer is “evasive and incomplete.” (See Dkt. No. 87, p. 17). To the extent Plaintiff believes Defendant Harper purposefully omitted key communications regarding Plaintiff's application or qualifications for the Supervisor position, Plaintiff can raise the issue of Defendant Harper's credibility during deposition or at trial. Assuming the Job Requisition packet contains all of Defendant Harper's documented communications regarding Plaintiff's application or qualifications for the Supervisor position, Defendant Harper's answer to this interrogatory appears to be sufficient. Thus, Defendant Harper is ORDERED to clarify whether all documented communications responsive to this interrogatory are included in the Job Requisition packet. Defendant Harper is further ORDERED to produce documented communications not contained in the Job Requisition packet, if any. Finally, specific details of relevant oral communications are better suited for Defendant Harper's deposition. As such, Plaintiff's motions to compel are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as to Interrogatory No. 10 (directed to Defendant Harper). I. Purchasing Policy Violations by Defendant Frausto Plaintiff asks Defendant Frausto to “[d]escribe the purchasing policies required under Texas state law and TxDOT purchasing policies for expenditure of funds, provision of services, and/or the purchase of good and services at TxDOT.” Plaintiff further asks Defendant Frausto to include “any deviations from those rules and policies by [Defendant Frausto] that resulted in goods or services being provided or purchased without prior authorization, if any.” Plaintiff requests that Defendant Frausto “[e]xplain and identify any authorization or exemptions allowing deviation from any policies, rules or procedures required by state law or TxDOT policies. Finally, Plaintiff asks that Defendant Frausto “[i]nclude the duties and responsibilities of persons authorized under TxDOT policy to either request, approve, or receive goods or services.” Defendant Frausto responds that “[t]he purchasing policies for TXDOT are posted online for all employees and these were available to the Plaintiff while he was employed at TXDOT.” (See Dkt. No. 97, p. 8). Plaintiff argues that the “interrogatory requests information concerning matters of material interest which are relevant to the issues in this suit.” (See Dkt. No. 85, p. 15). Presumably, Plaintiff is referring to allegations made in his second amended complaint of violations of purchasing policy involving Defendant Frausto. Specifically, Plaintiff describes an incident occurring on or about October 29, 2010, when Defendant Frausto called Plaintiff into Defendant Frausto's office to discuss errors Plaintiff allegedly made over the course of the month. (See Dkt. No. 40, ¶ 85). According to Plaintiff, “[o]ne of the matters that Defendant [Frausto] couched as being an error occurred when [Plaintiff] sent an e-mail to Purchasing requesting advice on how to handle an after-the-fact purchase made by Defendant [Frausto].” (Id.). Plaintiff also discusses an incident on December 7, 2010, where Defendant Frausto took written disciplinary action against Plaintiff for, among other alleged violations, (1) not entering in an invoice from a vendor that provided services to the Laredo Travel Information Center, (2) not providing the “contract parameters” for a vendor, and (3) not entering a vendor report that another employee was responsible for that was due in October 2010. (Id. at ¶ 86). Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Frausto's “allegations were without merit and made solely for the purpose of laying a foundation for, ultimately, terminating [Plaintiff].” (Id. at ¶ 85). *10 Here, Plaintiff has not indicated how any deviations by Defendant Frausto from TXDOT's purchasing policies resulting in “goods or services being provided or purchased without prior authorization” are relevant or likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Nonetheless, the Court believes those deviations by Defendant Frausto in which Plaintiff was involved are relevant to the issues raised in Plaintiff's complaint. As such, Defendant Frausto is ORDERED to describe deviations, if any, by Defendant Frausto, from Texas state law and TXDOT's purchasing policies that resulted in goods or services being provided or purchased without prior authorization if those deviations involved Plaintiff. Defendant Frausto is further ORDERED to describe his duties and responsibilities to either request, approve, or receive goods or services relating to any deviations specifically identified by Defendant Frausto, and to identify and explain any authorizations or exemptions allowing such deviations. Moreover, although Defendant Frausto states that TXDOT's purchasing policies are posted on-line for all employees, it does not appear that such records are readily available to Plaintiff since he is no longer employed at TXDOT. Furthermore, Defendant Frausto has failed to indicate whether Plaintiff has had an opportunity to examine or make copies of the online document reflecting TXDOT's purchasing policies. Thus, to the extent Defendant Frausto has not already done so, Defendant Frausto is ORDERED to provide Plaintiff an opportunity to examine and/or make copies of the TXDOT purchasing policies. As such, Plaintiff's motions to compel are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as to Interrogatory No. 10 (directed to Defendant Frausto). J. The Individual Defendants' Denial that They Acted Under “Color of Law” Plaintiff requests that each of the individual Defendants “[d]escribe fully and in detail any supporting evidence of [the individual Defendants'] contentions in Paragraphs 156 and 170 of Defendants' Answer to Plaintiff's Second Amended Original Complaint that at all times relevant to the instant suit you were not acting under color of law.” The Court begins by noting that Plaintiff's interrogatory is ambiguous as drafted. Nonetheless, the Court will attempt to clarify this interrogatory. In setting forth his § 1983 claim, paragraphs 156 and 170 of Plaintiff's Second Amended Original Complaint (Dkt. No. 40) both state: At all times relevant hereto, all individual Defendants to this claim were acting under the color of state law in their capacity as supervisors, directors, and executives of the Texas Department of Transportation and their acts or omissions were conducted within the scope of their official duties or employment. (Dkt. No. 40, ¶¶ 156, 170). In Defendants' Amended Answer (Dkt. No. 99), Defendants state: Defendants lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of Plaintiff's allegation that certain acts or omissions occurred. However, to the extent that such acts or omissions did occur, Defendants admit that the acts or omissions by the individual Defendants were conducted within the course and scope of their employment. Defendants deny the rest of the allegations contained in Paragraph [156/170]. Furthermore, Defendants specifically deny that there was any misuse of power by any Defendant or that any acts beyond the bounds of lawful authority occurred. (Dkt. No. 99, ¶¶ 156, 170). To prevail on a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a litigant must prove that he was deprived, by one acting under color of law, of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the United States Constitution and laws. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Mathis v. Register, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126341, at *6 (W.D. La. Oct. 14, 2011) (citing Banuelos v. McFarland, 41 F.3d 232, 234 (5th Cir. 1995)). The acting “under color of law” requirement means that defendants must have “committed the complained-of acts in the course of their performance of duties, and have misused power that they possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because they were ‘clothed’ with the authority of state law.” Mathis at *7 (citing United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 325 (1941)); see Dahlstrom v. Moore, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6289 at *6 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 29, 2008) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988)). Put simply, only “state actors”—officials acting under the purported authority of state law—may be sued pursuant to § 1983. Mathis at *7. *11 Here, it appears that the individual Defendants deny that they were “acting under color of law” to the extent that they deny “any misuse of power by any Defendant or that any acts beyond the bounds of lawful authority occurred.” Thus, Plaintiff seems to be asking for evidence that would support the individual Defendants' assertions that they did not misuse their power or that they did not act beyond the bounds of lawful authority. No matter how the Court attempts to clarify this interrogatory, Plaintiff is improperly seeking proof of a negative. See, e.g., United Oil Co., Inc. v. Parts Assoc., Inc., 227 F.R.D. 404, 408 (D. Md. 2005) (interrogatory asking for the basis for any contention that answering party did not cause or contribute to injuries and damages alleged in complaint was overbroad and demanded proof of a negative, and thus did not have to be answered); Jacobs v. Scribner, 2009 WL 3241540, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2009) (stating that defendant could not provide any more details to respond to interrogatory inquiring about the details of plaintiff's injury when defendant denied that plaintiff was injured, and defendant could not be required to prove a negative); Copus v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 2008 WL 2794807, at *4 (N.D. Tex. July 18, 2008) (stating that defendant need not prove the negative in answering interrogatory). This interrogatory is ambiguous and does not provide Defendant with reasonable notice of what Plaintiff is seeking. As such, Plaintiff's motions to compel are DENIED as to Interrogatory No. 12 (for each of the individual Defendants). K. The Individual Defendants' Actions and Decisions Plaintiff asks that each individual Defendant answer the following interrogatory: “In regard to Plaintiff's claims in the instant suit, at all times relevant, have your actions and decisions been based upon the rules, policies and customs of TxDOT and did you perform your duties and make your decisions consistent with TxDOT rules, policies and customs?” Plaintiff's interrogatory is patently overbroad for multiple reasons. First, he makes reference to “Plaintiff's claims in the instant suit.” Such a reference is indistinguishable from Plaintiff's overbroad interrogatories that use the term “concerning” in conjunction with the broad description “the allegations in the Complaint” as discussed in Section A. above. Second, the phrase “at all times relevant” does not narrow the possible realm of information Plaintiff is seeking. Third, Plaintiff inquires about all of the individual Defendants “actions and decisions” and whether all of those “actions and decisions” were based upon and consistent with “the rules, policies and customs of TxDOT.” Plaintiff fails to specify what actions and what decisions Plaintiff is inquiring about with regard to each individual Defendant. Thus, while the Court has spent considerable time attempting to narrow the scope of many of Plaintiff's discovery requests, this interrogatory is a prime example of a discovery request that is simply too broad for the Court to expend considerable time and resources to narrow for Plaintiff. As such, Plaintiff's motions to compel are DENIED as to Interrogatory No. 13 (for each of the individual Defendants). L. Communications of Plaintiff's Complaints of Discrimination, Harassment, Retaliation or a Hostile Work Environment Plaintiff asks that each of the individual Defendants “[i]dentify and describe all communications between [the individual Defendant] and Plaintiff or any attorney representing Plaintiff concerning his complaints of discrimination, harassment, retaliation, hostile work environment or any other work-related matter of which he complained. Plaintiff further requests that the individual Defendant “[i]nclude any communications related to the resolution of his concerns.” As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff's interrogatory is overly broad as drafted in that Plaintiff fails to show how “any other work-related matter of which [Plaintiff] complained” would be relevant or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (emphasis added). The Court further notes that, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking specific details related to oral communications concerning Plaintiff's complaints of discrimination, harassment, retaliation, or a hostile work environment, such questions are more properly raised at the deposition of each individual Defendant. (See cases cited supra note 2). 1. Defendant Frausto *12 Defendant Frausto responded as follows: “None. Defendant did not have any communications with the Plaintiff or any attorney representing the Plaintiff concerning these matters.” (See Dkt. No. 97, pp. 10–11). Defendant Frausto's response is clear and unequivocal. Nonetheless, Plaintiff argues that “Defendant [Frausto's] answer is untrue.” (See Dkt. No. 85, p. 19). However, if Plaintiff believes Defendant Frausto's response is untrue, Plaintiff can raise the issue of Defendant Frausto's credibility during deposition or at trial. As such, Plaintiff's motions to compel are DENIED as to Interrogatory No. 14 (directed to Defendant Frausto). 2. Defendant Garza Defendant Garza initially responded to the interrogatory by stating “none.” (See Dkt. No. 96, p. 14). Subsequently, Defendant Garza clarified that “Defendant Garza has had no such communications.” (Id.). Defendant Garza's response is clear and unequivocal. Nonetheless, Plaintiff argues that “Defendant [Garza's] answer is evasive, incomplete, and untrue.” (See Dkt. No. 84, p. 20). However, if Plaintiff believes Defendant Garza's response is incomplete or untrue, Plaintiff can raise the issue of Defendant Garza's credibility during deposition or at trial. As such, Plaintiff's motions to compel are DENIED as to Interrogatory No. 14 (directed to Defendant Garza). 3. Defendant Howdeshell In addition to responding to Plaintiff's interrogatory, Defendant Howdeshell refers Plaintiff to the Civil Rights Investigation file from 2008. (See Dkt. No. 98, p. 16). Assuming the Civil Rights Investigation file contains all documented communications between Plaintiff and Defendant Howdeshell concerning Plaintiff's complaints of discrimination, harassment, retaliation, or hostile work environment, Defendant Howdeshell's answer to this interrogatory appears to be sufficient. Thus, Defendant Howdeshell is ORDERED to clarify whether all documented communications responsive to this interrogatory are included in the Civil Rights Investigation file. Defendant Howdeshell is further ORDERED to produce documented communications not contained in the Civil Rights Investigation file, if any. Finally, specific details of relevant oral communications are better suited for Defendant Howdeshell's deposition. As such, Plaintiff's motions to compel are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as to Interrogatory No. 14 (directed to Defendant Howdeshell). 4. Defendant Arriaga Defendant Arriaga responded that “[t]he only conversation [she] had with Plaintiff was the phone conversation [she] had with the Plaintiff about his work history, which is described in response to Interrogatory No. 10.” (See Dkt. No. 94, p. 13). In other words, Defendant Arriaga claims that she did not participate in any communications with Plaintiff responsive to this interrogatory. Defendant Arriaga's response is clear and unequivocal. However, Plaintiff argues that Defendant Arriaga's response “is evasive, non-responsive and incomplete.” (See Dkt. No. 82, p. 19). If Plaintiff believes Defendant Arriaga's response is incomplete, Plaintiff can raise the issue of Defendant Arriaga's credibility during deposition or at trial. As such, Plaintiff's motions to compel are DENIED as to Interrogatory No. 14 (directed to Defendant Arriaga). 5. Defendant Harper In addition to responding to Plaintiff's interrogatory, Defendant Harper refers Plaintiff to the Civil Rights Investigation file from 2008. (See Dkt. No. 95, p. 17). Assuming the Civil Rights Investigation file contains all documented communications between Plaintiff and Defendant Harper concerning Plaintiff's complaints of discrimination, harassment, retaliation, or hostile work environment, Defendant Harper's answer to this interrogatory appears to be sufficient. Thus, Defendant Harper is ORDERED to clarify whether all documented communications responsive to this interrogatory are included in the Civil Rights Investigation file. Defendant Harper is further ORDERED to produce documented communications not contained in the Civil Rights Investigation file, if any. Finally, specific details of relevant oral communications are better suited for Defendant Harper's deposition. As such, Plaintiff's motions to compel are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as to Interrogatory No. 14 (directed to Defendant Harper). M. Prevention of Retaliation Against Plaintiff by Defendant Arriaga *13 Plaintiff requests that Defendant Arriaga describe “what actions or steps, if any, Defendant [Arriaga] took to prevent retaliation against Plaintiff ... after his complaints commenced to Defendant [Arriaga] ....” Defendant Arriaga responded that she “was not aware of any such complaints by Plaintiff.” (See Dkt. No. 94, p. 13). Defendant Arriaga later clarified that she did not take any action because she was not aware of any such complaints by Plaintiff. (Id.). Defendant Arriaga's response is clear, unequivocal, and sufficient. As such, Plaintiff's motions to compel are DENIED as to Interrogatory No. 15 (directed to Defendant Arriaga). N. Training Regarding the Prevention of Employment Discrimination, Harassment and/or Retaliation Plaintiff requests that some of the individual Defendants “[d]escribe in detail all training provided to the Defendant and to employees under the Supervision of the Defendant regarding the prevention of employment discrimination/harassment, and/or retaliation, and complaint procedures, including the course name and topic, and the date and place of each such session.” Plaintiff further requests that the individual Defendants “[i]dentify each person who conducted each training session, and the persons who attended, the date each person successfully completed the course, and state whether attendance was mandatory.” This interrogatory is overly broad as drafted in that it seeks details of training provided not just to the individual Defendants, but to those employees under the individual Defendants' supervision. Plaintiff has failed to show how the training of each employee under the supervision of a particular Defendant is relevant to his claims of discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment when he is only accusing the individual Defendants of such acts. Plaintiff has also failed to establish how the identity of all persons in attendance at any given training and the date each person successfully completed the course is relevant or likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Nonetheless, the training provided to the individual Defendants who Plaintiff alleges discriminated and retaliated against him is relevant or likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. As such, Plaintiff's motions to compel are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as to Interrogatory No. 15 (directed to Defendants Howdeshell, Frausto, Garza, and Harper). To the extent they have not already done so, each of the individual Defendants is ORDERED to provide Plaintiff with information of any training in which they participated related to the prevention of employment discrimination, harassment, or retaliation, during the time of Plaintiff's employment. Specifically, the individual Defendants should set forth: (1) the course name of the training; (2) the date of the training; (3) a brief description of the topics discussed at the training; and (4) whether the training was optional or mandatory. O. Discipline of Other Employees Plaintiff requests that most of the individual Defendants “[d]escribe fully and in detail all formal or informal corrective or disciplinary actions [the individual Defendant] took or authorized others to take regarding current and former employees or staff members of the TxDOT Travel Information Center at Laredo, TX.” This request is overly broad as drafted in that Plaintiff requests information of all disciplinary actions taken by the individual Defendants against any current or former employees of the Laredo Travel Information Center. Plaintiff is not entitled to such expansive information. Consistent with this Court's Order issued on March 4, 2012, Plaintiff is only entitled to information related to the discipline of other employees for (1) alleged misuse of Defendant TXDOT's electronic mail or computer information systems resources, and (2) actual or potential violations of Defendant TXDOT's confidentiality policies, from October 1, 2006, to September 20, 2011. (See Dkt. No. 122). Moreover, Plaintiff has limited this interrogatory to employees of the Travel Information Center in Laredo, TX. As such, Plaintiff's motions to compel are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as to Interrogatory No. 11 (directed to Defendants Frausto, Howdeshell, Garza, and Harper). To the extent they have not already done so, Defendants are ORDERED to provide details of all disciplinary actions consistent with the limitations set forth above. If Defendants have not taken any disciplinary actions consistent with the limitations set forth above, they must clearly inform Plaintiff of that fact. P. Prevention of Retaliation *14 Plaintiff requests some of the Defendants “[d]escribe fully and in detail ... what action or steps, if any, Defendant took to prevent retaliation against Plaintiff ... after his complaints commenced to Defendant on or about February 2008 to present.” Each of the requested individual Defendants objects on the basis that this interrogatory is overly broad and unduly burdensome. (See Dkt. No. 96, pp. 15–16; Dkt. No. 95 pp. 18–19; Dkt. No. 98, pp. 17–18). Each individual Defendant further responds that he or she denies ever retaliating against Plaintiff. (Id.). In addition, the individual Defendants state that the investigator conducting the Civil Rights Investigation “informs all witnesses that it is unlawful and a violation of TxDOT policy to retaliate against anyone who opposes a discriminatory practice, makes or files a complaint or participates in an investigation.” (Id.). Finally, the individual Defendants “refer[ ] Plaintiff to the EEO Policy in Chapter 1, Section 1 of the Human Resources Manual.” (Id.). Here, Plaintiff's interrogatory is not overly broad or unduly burdensome and is likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. See e.g., Thompson v. United Transp. Union, 2000 WL 1375293, at *1 (D. Kan. Sept. 15, 2000) (after limiting the temporal and geographic scope, ordering defendant to “state all actions it took to prevent or correct sexual harassment and/or discrimination” at a specified location). Furthermore, the fact that the individual Defendants deny ever retaliating against Plaintiff does not necessarily mean that Plaintiff was not retaliated against. Nonetheless, the question is not asking for instances of retaliation, but the specific actions that the individual Defendants, not the Civil Rights Investigator, took to prevent retaliation against Plaintiff. Reference to the Human Resources Manual is insufficient to answer this interrogatory. As such, Defendant's objections are OVERRULED, and Plaintiff's motion to compel is GRANTED as to Interrogatory No. 16 (directed to Defendants Garza, Harper, and Howdeshell). Defendants Garza, Harper, and Howdeshell are ORDERED to respond to this interrogatory by describing any specific actions each of them took to prevent retaliation against Plaintiff from February 2008 to the time of Plaintiff's termination. To the extent that the individual Defendants did not take any specific actions, they must so clearly state. However, the individual Defendants need not specifically describe any actions taken by others to prevent retaliation against Plaintiff unless such actions were taken together with actions taken by the responding individual Defendant. Q. Complaints Made to Defendant Garza In Interrogatory No. 17, Plaintiff requests that Defendant Garza “[d]escribe in detail all questions posed to you by the TxDOT Office of Civil Rights in the investigation of any complaints by employees at the Texas Travel Information Center–Laredo, including but not limited to, complaints by Ofelia Noriega and Eddie Kleppinger, Jr.” Similarly, in Interrogatory No. 18, Plaintiff requests that Defendant Garza “[i]dentify all communications and complaints by any employees or former employees at the Texas Travel Information Center-Laredo, regarding any discontentment with any workplace activity.” Here, in responding to Interrogatory No. 17, Defendant Garza responds that he “cannot remember all of the questions that were posed to Defendant by the TxDOT Office of Civil Rights.” (See Dkt. 96, p. 16). The Court notes that Defendant Garza's response is insufficient. Nonetheless, Plaintiff has failed to show why he would be entitled to information regarding (1) any complaints investigated by the Office of Civil Rights, and/or (2) any complaints regarding discontentment with any workplace activity, even if limited to the Laredo Travel Information Center. Importantly, Plaintiff is only entitled to non-privileged information and documents of other employment discrimination complaints filed against Defendant by Travel Counselors in the Travel Services Division from October 1, 2006 to September 20, 2011, based on the fact that they are white (race and/or color), male, and/or born in the United States. (See Dkt. No. 122, p. 14). Moreover, Plaintiff has limited these interrogatories to the Laredo Travel Information Center. *15 Thus, Plaintiff's motions to compel are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as to Interrogatory No. 17 (directed to Defendant Garza). Defendant Garza is ORDERED to produce any documents that reflect questions posed by the Office of Civil Rights in their investigation of any complaints consistent with the limitations discussed above. To the extent those questions were oral questions, and no hard-copy document reflecting the oral questions exists, details of such questions are more properly raised at Defendant Garza's deposition. Due to its facial overbreadth, Plaintiff's motions to compel are DENIED as to Interrogatory No. 18 (directed to Defendant Garza). R. Complaints Made to Defendant Garza Plaintiff requests that Defendant Garza “[d]escribe in detail Defendant's knowledge concerning the Plaintiff's use of the TxDOT computer and e-mail systems.” Plaintiff further requests that Defendant Garza “[i]nclude any inspections, investigations or reports of which you are aware concerning Plaintiff's use of the equipment and include if you ever received copies of any e-mails from the Plaintiff in response to, or as an attachment to any evaluations or other workplace activities.” Finally, Plaintiff asks that Defendant Garza “identify all dates on which you received” “copies of e-mails from the Plaintiff.” As drafted, this interrogatory is another example that is too ambiguous and broad for the Court to attempt to narrow. For example, in the first part of this interrogatory, Plaintiff seeks information regarding his use of Defendant TXDOT's computer and e-mail systems without identifying any specific acts associated with such use. Further, it is unclear what Plaintiff is seeking in the second part of this interrogatory. However, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking e-mails between Defendant Garza and Plaintiff in the latter part of this interrogatory, the Court has already ordered Defendant TXDOT to produce any readily accessible ESI including, but not limited to e-mails, that is relevant to this lawsuit or that is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (See Dkt. No. 122, p. 29). Thus, any e-mails that are relevant, or that are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, between Defendant Garza and Plaintiff should be encompassed by this production. In addition, if Defendant Garza is aware of any “inspections investigations or reports” concerning Plaintiff's “use of the equipment,” which may have included copies of Plaintiff's work-related emails, then Defendant Garza is ORDERED to answer Interrogatory 19, accordingly. As such, Plaintiff's motion to compel is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as to Interrogatory No. 19 (directed to Defendant Garza). S. Procedures to Make an Employment Discrimination Complaint Plaintiff asks that some of the individual Defendants “[d]escribe the procedures required by TxDOT for an employee to make a complaint of sex, sexual, gender, race, or national original discrimination; harassment; a hostile work environment; reprisals; or retaliation.” Each of the individual Defendants responded that “[t]he procedures are set forth in the TxDOT Human Resources Manual which has been produced to Plaintiff.” (See Dkt. No. 96, p. 18; Dkt. No. 95, p. 23; Dkt. No. 98, p. 22). According to Plaintiff, however, he is seeking the individual Defendant's description of their “knowledge and understanding ... concerning TxDOT's EEO policies by requesting the Defendant ‘to tell’ ... the ‘procedures required’ to make a complaint.” Plaintiff's motion to compel is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as to Interrogatory No. 20 (directed to Defendants Garza, Harper, and Howdeshell). The individual Defendants are ORDERED to clarify whether the “procedures required by TxDOT for an employee to make a complaint” of employment discrimination and/or retaliation are fully described in the Human Resources Manual. The individual Defendants are further ORDERED to specify the section or chapter in which responsive information is located in the manual. To the extent that the Human Resources Manual does not fully describe the procedures required to make an employment discrimination/retaliation complaint, the individual Defendants are ORDERED to supplement their response to this interrogatory with those procedures that are not specifically set forth in the manual. T. Plaintiff's Employment Applications *16 Plaintiff asks that Defendant Arriaga “[i]dentify each and every employment application submitted by Plaintiff, to Defendant TxDOT, in which you participated in any manner, including but not limited to, receiving, processing, evaluating, scoring, verifying, reviewing, or in any other manner participated, included making any decisions, judgments, or determinations concerning the Plaintiff[']s application and explain your participation, actions, findings or determination.” The Court notes that Plaintiff's interrogatory is overly broad as drafted. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks information regarding “each and every” employment application submitted by Plaintiff to Defendant TxDOT. Although the Court is not aware of how many employment applications Plaintiff has submitted, it is not clear that “each of every” application would be relevant to this lawsuit or would be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Nonetheless, it is clear from Plaintiff's complaint that Defendant Arriaga was indeed involved in the processing of Plaintiff's application for Travel Counselor Supervisor in Laredo submitted June 2009. (See Dkt. No. 40, p. 23). In response, Defendant Arriaga referred Plaintiff to the Job requisition packet for the Laredo Supervisor job posting. (Id. at p. 8). Moreover, in addition to providing other details regarding Defendant Arriaga's involvement in processing Plaintiff's application, Defendant Arriaga stated that her “final determination was that Plaintiff did not meet the minimum job requirements.” (See Dkt. No. 94, p. 7). Here, the Court is of the opinion that Defendant Arriaga should elaborate on her “final determination.” As such, Plaintiff's motions to compel are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as to Interrogatory No. 6 (directed to Defendant Arriaga). Defendant Arriaga is ORDERED to provide Plaintiff with specific and detailed reasons on why she ultimately determined that “Plaintiff did not meet the minimum job requirements.” U. Experience Credit Granted on Plaintiff's Application for Employment For “each job application submitted” by Plaintiff to Defendant TXDOT, Plaintiff asks that Defendant Arriaga “identify and explain the applicable dates for which experience credit was granted and identify the amount of total experience credit granted to the Plaintiff in each of the following categories [:] business management; public management; facilities management; tourism management; public contact; managerial or supervisory experience; and lead worker experience.” Again, Plaintiff's interrogatory is overly broad as drafted in that it seeks information regarding “each job application” submitted by Plaintiff to Defendant TxDOT. Thus, the Court will focus on the application for the Travel Counselor Supervisor position in Laredo submitted June 2009, which Defendant Arriaga clearly processed. (See Dkt. No. 40, p. 23). Defendant Arriaga responds that “the complete job applications with the job tasks and scoring are contained in the [Job Requisition] packet for this job,” and “[t]his packet was provided to Plaintiff.” (See Dkt. No. 94, p. 11). However, according to Plaintiff, “the information provided to the Plaintiff in the [Job Requisition packet] does not include scoring of his application as alleged in the Defendant's response.” (See Dkt. No. 82, p. 17). Here, it is unclear to the Court whether the “scoring” that Defendant Arriaga claims has already been provided to Plaintiff would include the “experience credit” granted in the specific categories Plaintiff seeks. If it does, Plaintiff claims not to have been provided with such information. As such, Defendant Arriaga is ORDERED to provide Plaintiff with the part of the Job Requisition packet that would identify the amount of “experience credit” granted to Plaintiff for the Supervisor position in Laredo. If that is not located in the Job Requisition packet, Defendant Arriaga is ORDERED to provide Plaintiff with the amount of total “experience credit” granted to Plaintiff in the categories listed above. To the extent she has not already done so, Defendant Arriaga is further ORDERED to explain how she arrived at the “experience credit” amounts. As such, Plaintiff's motions to compel are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as to Interrogatory No. 11 (directed to Defendant Arriaga). V. Plaintiff's Policy Violations *17 Plaintiff requests that Defendant Arriaga “[e]xplain in detail [her] knowledge of any alleged violation of any TxDOT rule, policy, or procedure by the Plaintiff and identify the source of [her] knowledge.” Defendant Arriaga responds by stating that “Plaintiff did not submit an accurate work history,” and he “violated the procedures for applications for a job.” (See Dkt. No. 94, p. 15). Defendant Arriaga further refers Plaintiff to her response to Interrogatory No. 10, in which she provides details of the communications she exchanged with Plaintiff regarding this alleged violation. (Id.). Here, Plaintiff's interrogatory request is overly broad as drafted in that it seeks detail of any violation of TxDOT's rules, policies, or procedures. Consistent with this Court's Order issued on March 4, 2012, the following policy violations by Plaintiff are discoverable in this interrogatory: (1) policy violations that formed the basis for Plaintiff's termination; and/or (2) policy violations Defendant Arriaga will illicit against Plaintiff in defending this lawsuit. (See Dkt. No. 122, p. 30–31). Assuming this is the only policy violation in which Defendant Arriaga was directly involved, Defendant Arriaga has answered the interrogatory sufficiently. Nonetheless, it is unclear whether the one policy violation described by Defendant Arriaga is the only policy violation in which she was directly involved that would fall within the parameters previously issued by the Court. Thus, Defendant Arriaga is ORDERED to clarify whether this is the only policy violation in which she was directly involved that (1) formed the basis for Plaintiff's termination; and/or (2) Defendant Arriaga asserted against Plaintiff in defending this lawsuit. To the extent there are other policy violations, Defendant Arriaga is ORDERED to respond to this interrogatory. As such, Plaintiff's motions to compel are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as to Interrogatory No. 19 (directed to Defendant Arriaga). W. Information Related to Defendant Frausto In multiple interrogatories, Plaintiff seeks expansive information from Defendant Frausto. Notably, Defendant Frausto was the person selected for the Supervisor position in Laredo for which Plaintiff applied and was not interviewed. The Court further notes that the relevant information sought by Plaintiff would likely be contained in Defendant Frausto's personnel file and will address the issue in that context. In Title VII litigation “courts have customarily allowed a wide discovery of personnel files.” Coughlin v. Lee, 946. F.2d 1152, 1159 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing cases). Specifically, a plaintiff is entitled to discover personnel files of other employees who have been promoted or hired over him since the qualifications and job performance of other employees in comparison with plaintiff's qualifications and performance are at the heart of the issue. See Weakhee v. Norton, 621 F.2d 1080, 1082 (10th Cir. 1980) (court held that plaintiff was entitled to personnel files of other employees who had been promoted over him); Gatewood v. Stone Container Corp., 170 F.R.D. 455, 458 (S.D. Iowa 1996) (plaintiff could obtain discovery of personnel files of four co-employees who were promoted, even though they were selected for promotion by different managers since positions in question and criteria for promotion appeared analogous). Thus, it is clear to the Court that Plaintiff is entitled to Defendant Frausto's personnel file. Defendant Frausto is ORDERED to produce his personnel file, with the exception of any confidential documents that may be in the file. However, Plaintiff's requests for specific information is addressed in more detail below. 1. Interrogatory No. 16 a. Defendant Frausto's Employment History *18 Plaintiff requests that Defendant Frausto “provide the name, address and telephone number of each previous employer, describe [his] work days and work hours and the duties [he] performed, [and] provide the name of [his] immediate supervisor.” Most of the information sought in this interrogatory should be provided in Defendant Frausto's resume, which should, in turn, be in his personnel file. To the extent any information sought is not in Defendant Frausto's resume, it is irrelevant to this lawsuit. The sole reason Defendant Frausto's personnel file and resume are potentially relevant is because of Plaintiff's allegations that Defendants “were well on their course of retaliation ... and discrimination of Plaintiff” when Plaintiff was not “approved” for the “interview phase” and Defendant Frausto was. (See Dkt. No. 40, pp. 23–24). In his complaint, Plaintiff makes the following allegations: Defendant Arriaga gave credit to Defendant [Frausto] for the bachelor's degree that he claimed to have received from the Instituto Techologico De Leon in Mexico. She also credited him with having the requisite number of years of work experience and in the requisite fields and positions that were required in addition to a bachelor's degree. (See Dkt. No. 40, p. 22). While not explicitly stated, it is apparent that Plaintiff believes he was as qualified or more qualified than Defendant Frausto for the Supervisor position. Accordingly, any information that was not available to Defendant TXDOT when it reviewed Defendant Frausto's application for employment and ultimately selected Defendant Frausto, is not relevant to the lawsuit. Thus, access to Defendant Frausto's personnel file should be sufficient. b. Family Relationships Plaintiff further requests that Defendant Frausto “[i]dentify everyone in the ownership, management or supervisory chain of command, from your immediate supervisor up through the owners, partners or investors were related to you through family or marriage.” Notably, Plaintiff has failed to show how any of these relationships would be relevant or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in the instant lawsuit. Even assuming Plaintiff was seeking this information regarding Defendant Frausto's employment with Defendant TXDOT, it is irrelevant. See Johnson v. Maestri Murrell Prop. Mgmt., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97524, at *16–17 (M.D. La. Aug. 29, 2011) (in Title VII race discrimination case, stating nepotism is a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for selection of candidate over plaintiff); Shahin v. Del., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128201, at *5 (D. Del. Nov. 30, 2010) (finding that “any information regarding relatives, friends or neighbors of hired individuals in an attempt to show that individuals were hired based upon their relationships with others irrelevant to the issues of national origin or age discrimination”). Consequently, lack of relevance is even more apparent when the Court considers that Plaintiff is seeking this information for Defendant Frausto's previous employers and not TXDOT, the employer Plaintiff is currently alleging discriminated against him. 2. Interrogatory No. 20: Defendant Frausto's Education Plaintiff requests that Defendant Frausto “[d]escribe in detail [his] education.” Plaintiff further requests “detailed information concerning each and all diplomas or degrees you have acquired, the date each diploma or degree was awarded and the institution granting the award.” Moreover, Plaintiff asks that Defendant Frausto “provide the name, address and date that any person or entity has evaluated or determined that any foreign diploma or degree that you hold, if any, is equivalent to the corresponding United States degree or diploma, and include if the person or entity making the determination is certified or authorized to make such an evaluation or determination by the National Association of Foreign Student Affairs (NAFSA) or the Association of International Educators.” *19 In response, Defendant Frausto stated that his “high school diploma (June 1983) and [his] Bachelor's of Business Administration (August 1988) both were earned at the Instituto Technologico of Leon, Mexico.” (See Dkt. No. 97, pp. 14–15). Defendant Frausto has properly responded to the first part of the interrogatory, but has failed to address the second part seeking information about his foreign education. To the extent that Defendant Frausto has personal knowledge that “any person or entity has evaluated” his foreign degree, and he is aware of the results of that evaluation, Defendant Frausto is ORDERED to respond to the second part of this interrogatory. However, if Defendant Frausto does not have personal knowledge of such an evaluation, his duty to provide responses to interrogatories is limited to obtaining information through reasonable efforts. See Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6018, at *2 (W.D. Texas Jan. 21, 2011) (citing Schartz v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 512, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19123, 1996 WL 741384, at *3 (D. Kan. Dec. 18, 1996)). In answering interrogatories, Defendant Frausto must provide information within his control. See Smith v. JP Morgan Chase, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2234, at *5 (W.D. La. Jan. 5, 2011) (citation omitted); Haggie v. Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corp., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35665, at *9 (N.D. Miss. May 14, 2007) (duty to respond to interrogatories limited to obtaining information from person and entities of which party has actual control). Therefore, Defendant Frausto must at least make a good faith effort to determine if information responsive to this interrogatory exists within documents under its control (i.e., his personnel file). See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tedford, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108282, at *16–17 (N.D. Miss. May 12, 2008). Thus, Defendant Frausto is ORDERED to address the second part of this interrogatory by clearly stating whether he has personal knowledge of any such evaluations of his foreign degrees. If Defendant Frausto does not have personal knowledge of such evaluations, he is ORDERED to make a good faith effort to determine if responsive information exists within his personnel file at TXDOT. However, Defendant Frausto is not required to investigate whether “any person or entity” has evaluated his foreign degree because “any person or entity” would likely not be within his control. 3. Interrogatory No. 21: Defendant Frausto's English Language Background Plaintiff requests that Defendant Frausto “[d]escribe in detail any courses, trainings or education [he has] received encompassing English as a primary or secondary language, describe the course syllabus.” Plaintiff further requests that Defendant Frausto “include in his description all course work that related to English language writing, the English lexicon, prepared or extemporaneous English speech, expressive or creative English language writing, linguistics, linguistic anthropology, or forensic stylistics.” Defendant objects to this interrogatory because it is harassing, irrelevant, and is not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. (See Dkt. No. 97, p. 15). Defendant Frausto further responds that this interrogatory “seeks to embarrass and harass Defendant [Frausto] simply because he is from Mexico.” (Id.). Notably, the Court believes that this interrogatory is harassing as drafted. Nonetheless, a limited part of this interrogatory is potentially relevant. Specifically, to the extent a basic level of English proficiency is required and measured by Defendant TXDOT in evaluating an applicant for a Supervisor position, Defendant Frausto is ORDERED to generally set forth how he meets that standard. *20 In sum, Plaintiff's motions to compel are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as to Interrogatory Nos. 16, 20, and 21 (directed to Defendant Frausto). X. Communications between Defendants Plaintiff requests that each of the individual Defendants “[i]dentify and describe all communications between you and any other Defendant in this suit concerning Plaintiffs employment, employment applications, qualifications, performance, conduct, duties, termination, or the allegations in the Complaint or the Answer.” This request is overbroad in that it basically seeks all communications regarding Plaintiff. Consistent with this Court's March 4, 2012 Order, Defendants will produce any readily accessible ESI including, but not limited to e-mails, that are relevant to this lawsuit or that are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (See Dkt. No. 122, pp. 28–29). Moreover, questions regarding any details of oral communications that took place between the Defendants are better addressed at each individual Defendants' deposition. As such, Plaintiff's motions to compel are DENIED as to Interrogatory No. 2 (directed to each of the individual Defendants). III. PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS In his motion, Plaintiff requests sanctions in the form of an award of the reasonable expenses he incurred in bringing his motions to compel. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(A) provides for an award of expenses, including attorney's fees, only where a motion to compel has been granted in its entirety, which is not the case with the present motion. Since Plaintiff's motions will be granted in part and denied in part as set forth above, the reasonable costs and expenses incurred in connection with the motion will instead by apportioned between the parties under Federal Rule 37. Thus, each party will bear its own costs and expenses regarding this motion. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(C). IV. CONCLUSION Accordingly, Plaintiff's motions to compel discovery against five of the individual Defendants (Dkt. Nos. 82, 84, 85, 86, and 87) are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. “Plaintiff's Request for Hearing of Plaintiff's Opposed Motions to Compel Discovery of Individual Defendants and for Sanctions” (Dkt. No. 89) is DENIED. The individual Defendants are hereby ORDERED to respond to the interrogatories consistent with this Order. IT IS SO ORDERED. Footnotes [1] The Court notes, however, that if Defendant Garza is not supplying information on the basis that it was corrective versus disciplinary, than the Court reiterates that the following information is discoverable: (1) disciplinary (or corrective) actions that formed the basis for Plaintiff's termination and (2) any other disciplinary (or corrective) actions Defendants will use to defend this lawsuit. [2] See, e.g., PIC Grp., Inc., v. Landcoast Insulation, Inc., 2010 WL 4791710, at *5 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 18, 2010) (declining to compel further response to interrogatory asking for oral communications because it was “unreasonably and unduly burdensome and the least efficient way to obtain the information,” and Plaintiff could inquire as to oral communications in depositions); United States v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL–CIO, 2006 WL 2014093, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 18, 2006) (“The court agrees that information about communications between defendants concerning the subject matter of the action is best explored through depositions rather than interrogatories ....”); Pirollo v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 2000 WL 1052138, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 25, 2000) (finding that interrogatory requesting details of any meetings/communications in which plaintiff's position was discussed would be more efficiently elicited by depositions of appropriate decision makers); Sussman v. Paradigm Partners, Inc., 1993 WL 385752, at *2 (“Depositions are surely a more efficient means than interrogatories of eliciting information about oral conversations.”).