Federal Trade Commission, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Affiliate Strategies, Inc., et al., Defendants Case No. 09-4104-JAR United States District Court, D. Kansas Signed October 26, 2010 Counsel D. Brad Bailey, Office of United States Attorney, Topeka, KS, Gary L. Ivens, Janice L. Kopec, Michael E. Tankersley, William T. Maxson, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, DC, Sara C. Depaul, Federal Trade Commission, Cleveland, OH, Meghan E. Stoppel, Lawrence, KS, Shannon M. Harmon, Office of Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, David N. Kirkman, Department of Justice, Raleigh, NC, Philip Heimlich, Illinois Attorney General's Office, Springfield, IL, for Plaintiffs. Evan A. Schmutz, Stephen Quesenberry, Wm. Kelly Nash, Hill, Johnson & Schmutz, LC, Provo, UT, Micah R. Bruner, Bruner Law Offices, LLC, Sandy, UT, M. Courtney Koger, Kutak Rock LLP, Kansas City, MO, for Defendants. Sebelius, K. Gary, United States Magistrate Judge ORDER *1 This matter comes before the Court upon Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission's Motion to Compel Defendant Aria Financial Services LLC to Produce Documents (Doc. 235) and Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission's Motion to Compel Defendant Wealth Power Systems, LLC to Produce Documents (Doc. 257). The motions are fully briefed, and the Court is prepared to rule. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission's Motion to Compel Defendant Aria Financial Services LLC to Produce Documents (Doc. 235) is granted, and Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission's Motion to Compel Defendant Wealth Power Systems, LLC to Produce Documents (Doc. 257) is granted in part and denied in part. I. Procedural Requirement to Confer Before considering the merits of the motions to compel filed by Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission (“Plaintiff” or “FTC”), this Court must first determine whether the FTC has complied with the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this district's local rules regarding the movant's duty to confer with opposing counsel prior to filing a motion to compel. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1) provides that a motion to compel “must include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party failing to make disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain it without court action.” D. Kan. R. 37.2 expands on the movant's duty to confer, stating “[a] ‘reasonable effort to confer’ means more than mailing or faxing a letter to the opposing party. It requires that the parties in good faith converse, confer, compare views, consult and deliberate, or in good faith attempt to do so.” In this case, the parties have exchanged detailed correspondence aimed at attempting to resolve the instant discovery dispute without judicial intervention. The Court finds the FTC has satisfied the conference requirements embodied in Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1) and D. Kan. R. 37.2. II. Background On July 19, 2009, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint alleging Affiliate Strategies, Inc. (“Affiliate Strategies”), Landmark Publishing Group, L.L.C. (“Landmark Publishing”), Grant Writers Institute, L.L.C. (“GWI”), Apex Holdings International, L.L.C. (“Apex Holdings”), Brett Blackman (“Blackman”), Jordan Sevy (“Sevy”), and James Rulison (“Rulison”) (collectively referred to as the “Kansas Defendants”) violated the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”), the FTC's Telemarketing Sales Rule (“TSR”), and various state consumer protection statutes prohibiting unfair and deceptive trade practices.[1] On December 9, 2009, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, which named five new defendants, including Aria Financial Services, Inc. (“Aria”), Wealth Power Systems, LLC (“WPS”), and Justin Ely.[2] On June 21, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint.[3] In their Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs assert Defendants engaged in a plan, program, or campaign to deceptively market and sell grant related goods and services to consumers throughout the United States. The scheme purportedly worked as follows: the Kansas Defendants mass-mailed postcards and flyers containing the following language: “You are Guaranteed a $25,000 Grant from the U.S. Government.”[4] The flyers instructed consumers to call a telephone number to collect on the grant.[5] When consumers called the telephone number, they heard a voice recording guaranteeing a $25,000 grant if they purchased a grant guide.[6] At the end of the recording, the consumers were connected to a telemarketer who urged them to purchase the grant guide for $59 plus $10 in shipping and handling.[7] When a consumer purchased a grant guide, the Kansas Defendants placed his or her information on a lead list, which it sent to telemarketers, such as Aria and WPS, to market additional grant-related services and up-sell additional products and services. *2 On April 30, 2010, the FTC served its First Set of Requests for Production of Documents upon Aria and WPS.[8] On June 1, 2010, counsel for Aria and WPS filed an unopposed motion to extend the deadline in which to respond until June 11, 2010, which was granted by this Court.[9] On June 11, 2010, Aria and WPS served their respective responses to the discovery requests, objecting on a variety of grounds.[10] The FTC contends WPS produced only two documents in response to the requests and that Aria refused to produce any documents. On July 6, 2010, the FTC offered to narrow the discovery requests served on Aria by eliminating Request Nos. 15, 22–23, 32–35, 44–45, 63–68, and 70–75.[11] The FTC offered to narrow the discovery requests directed at WPS by eliminating Request Nos. 16, 23–24, 33–36, 45–46, 69–74, and 76–81.[12] The FTC also offered to limit the scope of the remaining requests to documents that “relate to the sale of grant guides, grant research services, and grant writing services, and any upsells or cross-sells to consumer leads generated by the sale of grant guides, grant research services, or grant writing services, including but not limited to tax-related services (as defined for you below) and non-grant related services sold on behalf of the ASI Defendants such as the Business Credit Infusion.”[13] On July 8, 2010, defense counsel accepted the FTC's proposal to narrow the documents request with respect to WPS only.[14] Defense counsel declined to accept the FTC's proposal with respect to Aria, however, because he contended Aria is not a proper party to the litigation.[15] Instead, defense counsel suggested sending to the FTC a copy of the goods and services offered by Aria to purportedly demonstrate Aria does not sell grant-related services and should be dropped from the case.[16] On July 9, 2010, the FTC rejected defense counsel's suggestion and provided defense counsel with correspondence between Justin Ely (purportedly on behalf of Aria) and Defendant Brett Blackman regarding the selling of grant related goods.[17] On July 10, 2010, the FTC moved for an order compelling Aria to produce all documents responsive to its requests for production, as narrowed. The FTC also contends WPS engaged in “wholesale document destruction” shortly after discovering it was subject to an FTC enforcement action and thus, has not produced all of its responsive documents. The FTC seeks an order compelling WPS to produce the purportedly destroyed documents as a prerequisite to filing a motion for sanctions for spoilation of evidence. III. Analysis A. Motion to Compel Defendant Aria Financial Services LLC to Produce Documents On July 12, 2010, two days after the FTC filed its instant motion, Aria accepted the FTC's proposal to limit its discovery requests and requested the FTC withdraw its motion to compel.[18] The FTC declined to withdraw its motion until it received responsive documents from Aria.[19] On July 23, 2010, Aria served supplemental responses to Plaintiff's document production requests.[20] Shortly thereafter, Aria produced approximately 170 pages of responsive documents.[21] *3 In its supplemental responses, Aria objects to Request Nos. 1, 46, 54, 57, and 59 on various grounds.[22] Aria also objects to certain definitions and general instructions and lodges a series of “General Objections.”[23] Aria then asserts it is producing non-privileged, responsive documents “[s]ubject to and without waiving any specific or general objections” in response to numerous requests.[24] Because Aria has qualified its responses in this manner, is not clear whether Aria is withholding any responsive documents based upon its objections. Accordingly, the Court will address the merits of Aria's objections. When a party files a motion to compel and asks the Court to overrule certain objections, the objecting party must specifically show in its response to the motion to compel how each request for production or interrogatory is objectionable.[25] By failing to address the objections in response to a motion to compel, a party fails to meet its burden to support its objections.[26] “Objections initially raised but not relied upon in response to the motion to compel will be deemed abandoned.”[27] When objections are not supported in response to a motion to compel, the Court is “left without any basis to determine whether the objections are valid and applicable in light of the particular circumstances of the case.”[28] Aria served its supplemental responses and objections prior to filing its response to the instant motion to compel. In its response to the instant motion, however, Aria does not specifically address or attempt to support any of its objections. Instead, Aria indicates it is “in the process of responding to the discovery requests as narrowed” and “is producing the documents responsive to Plaintiff's requests, as narrowed.”[29] Accordingly, the Court finds Aria has abandoned any objections raised in its supplemental responses.[30] Additionally, this District generally disapproves of general objections such as the ones lodged by Aria.[31] Aria has not attempted to apply any general objection to any specific request for production. Rather, Aria has simply stated its “General Objections” as hypothetical or contingent possibilities, hedging them with noncommittal language “to the extent” they might apply. For example, in its “General Objections,” Aria objects “to the extent [the requests] ... seek information that is unduly burdensome to locate or obtain.”[32] As the party asserting an undue burden objection, Aria has “ ‘the burden to show facts justifying [its] objection by demonstrating that the time or expense involved in responding to requested discovery is unduly burdensome.’ ”[33] This imposes an obligation on Aria“ ‘to provide sufficient detail in terms of time, money and procedure required to produce the requested documents.’ ”[34] Here, Aria has not demonstrated any requests are unduly burdensome by describing the time, expense, or procedure involved in responding.[35] *4 Aria also objects “to the extent” the requests seek the production of trade secrets or information protected by the attorney-client privilege, among other reasons. Aria, however, has not demonstrated the existence of any trade secrets or the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to any responsive documents. Because Aria has wholly failed to support any of its “General Objections,” they are overruled.[36] Similarly, Aria has not justified the objections lodged in response to specific requests for production. For example, Aria objects to Request Nos. 1, 46, 54, 57, and 59 as unduly burdensome. Aria, however, has not shown any request to be unduly burdensome by affidavit or any other explanation. Aria objects that the term “related to” in Request No. 59 is vague and ambiguous but has not elaborated or explained how.[37] Additionally, Aria objects that Request Nos. 1, 46, 54, 57, and 59 are irrelevant. The Court has reviewed the requests and finds them to be facially relevant. Thus, the burden shifts to Aria to demonstrate that the requested discovery either (1) does not come within the scope of relevance as defined under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), or (2) is of such marginal relevance that the potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary presumption in favor of broad discovery.[38] Aria has not done so here. Accordingly, the Court overrules all objections lodged in response to Request Nos. 1, 46, 54, 57, and 59. To the extent it has not done so, Aria shall produce all documents responsive to the FTC's requests for production, as narrowed, within seven (7) days of this Order. As discussed above, it is not clear whether Aria has withheld any responsive documents based upon its objections and/or whether Aria has completed its production. In its reply, the FTC asserts Aria's production is “grossly deficient.” For example, the FTC contends Aria's counsel admitted that Aria created at least one file for purposes of the document production in lieu of producing responsive documents. In e-mail correspondence, the FTC informed Aria's counsel that Aria failed to produce any accounting/financial records, except for a spreadsheet which was created on July 29, 2010.[39] In response, Aria's counsel stated, “Aria produced a spreadsheet summarizing the information contained in customer files. Aria placed each customer sold, the product purchased, and the amount of the purchase, along with any chargebacks or refunds, onto the spreadsheet to give you a quick picture of what the customer files would tell you.”[40] Aria's counsel's response implies that the information contained within the spreadsheet was produced as part of the customer files. The FTC, however, appears to contend the financial information contained within the spreadsheet was not produced as part of the customer files. The Court cannot ascertain this based upon the parties' briefs. As a result, Aria is ordered to provide the FTC with a supplemental response indicating whether the documents containing the information included on the spreadsheet were produced, and if so, identifying where in the production those documents are located (i.e. bates number). If Aria has not produced these documents, it is ordered to produce them within seven (7) days of this Order. *5 The FTC also asserts that four other documents produced by Aria were created for purposes of production on July 22, 2010.[41] The Court, however, cannot determine when these documents were created based upon the information presented to it. For example, one of the documents reflects it was “Modified” and “Created” on July 22, 2010 but “Printed” on June 15, 2009.[42] Another document reflects it was “Modified” and “Created” on July 22, 2010 but “Printed” on May 26, 2010.[43] As a result, the Court orders Aria to provide the FTC with a supplemental response indicating the date these documents were created. The FTC also indicates Aria has produced only 170 pages of documents, mainly consisting of customer files that generally contain little more than a receipt for charges and handwritten order forms. The FTC contends the production contained no sales scripts (Request Nos. 16–17), consumer complaints (Request Nos. 5–7), correspondence with consumers or vendors (Request Nos. 8–9), verification tapes (Request No. 3), sales manuals (Request No. 50), employee handbooks (Request No. 50), and financial or accounting records (Request Nos. 24–26, among others). In response to Request Nos. 3, 5, and 24, Aria indicates it is unaware of any responsive documents in its possession or control, and the Court has no reason to believe otherwise. Aria, however, indicates it would produce non-privileged, responsive documents subject to its specific and general objections for the other requests. Thus, Aria appears to possess responsive documents for the other requests. Indeed, it would be highly unusual if Aria does not possess any financial documents responsive to Request Nos. 25–26. Accordingly, IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission's Motion to Compel Defendant Aria Financial Services LLC to Produce Documents (Doc. 235) is granted. To the extent it has not done so, Aria shall produce all documents responsive to the FTC's requests for production, as narrowed, within seven (7) days of this Order. If no further responsive documents exist, Aria shall so indicate for each request. The FTC also argues that it recently discovered that WPS—a company purportedly related to Aria through common ownership and management—destroyed documents after learning of the FTC's lawsuit. The FTC, however, has not provided any evidence to the Court that Aria or its employees destroyed any documents. Thus, the FTC's motion to compel is not granted based upon Aria's alleged destruction of documents. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Aria shall provide the FTC with a supplemental response indicating whether the underlying documents containing the information included in attachment 6 to the FTC's reply (Doc. 261) were produced, and if so, identifying where in the production those documents are located (i.e. bates number). If Aria has not produced these documents, it shall do so within seven (7) days of this Order. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Aria shall provide the FTC with a supplemental response indicating the date the documents appended to the FTC's reply (Doc. 261) as attachments 3–5, 7 were created. B. Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission's Motion to Compel Defendant Wealth Power Systems, LLC to Produce Documents (Doc. 257) The FTC contends WPS engaged in “wholesale document destruction” shortly after discovering it was subject to an FTC enforcement action. As a result, the FTC argues WPS is “guilty” of spoilation of evidence, warranting the imposition of sanctions. In the instant motion, the FTC seeks an order compelling WPS to produce the purportedly destroyed documents as a prerequisite to filing a motion for sanctions. *6 Spoliation is the “ ‘destruction or significant alteration of evidence, or the failure to preserve property for another's use as evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation.’ ”[44] A litigant has a duty to preserve evidence that it knows or should know is relevant to imminent or ongoing litigation.[45] Mostly commonly, a party is deemed to have notice of pending litigation if the party has received a discovery request, a complaint has been filed, or any time a party receives notification that litigation is likely to be commenced.[46] Once a party reasonably anticipates litigation, it must suspend its routine document retention/destruction policy and put in place a litigation hold to ensure the preservation of relevant documents.[47] A litigant's duty to preserve evidence extends to electronically stored information.[48] Spoliation sanctions are proper when “(1) a party has a duty to preserve evidence because it knew, or should have known, that litigation was imminent, and (2) the adverse party was prejudiced by the destruction of the evidence.”[49]The moving party has the burden to demonstrate spoilation by a preponderance of the evidence.[50] Parties seeking redress for spoilation of evidence can seek sanctions pursuant to the Court's inherent authority to “manage [its] own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.”[51] A party can also pursue sanctions for spoilation pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37.[52] Before it can seek sanctions pursuant to Rule 37, the FTC contends it must first obtain an order compelling production of the destroyed documents.[53] The FTC cites Lewis v. ASAP Land Express, Inc. to support this procedure. In Lewis v. ASAP Land Express, Inc., plaintiff sought an order compelling the production of certain documents from defendant.[54] Defendant believed the documents had been destroyed by its landlord when defendant was evicted from its business premises.[55] Although it was unclear whether the documents in question had been destroyed, it was undisputed that defendant had failed to produce them.[56] The magistrate judge granted the motion to compel after determining the documents were relevant to the case and finding that defendant failed to support any objections.[57]The magistrate judge did not address whether spoilation had occurred in ruling on the motion to compel.[58] This Court will adopt a similar approach and focus its inquiry on whether WPS has produced all of the documents responsive to the FTC's First Set of Requests for Production of Documents. The FTC attaches the declaration of Bryant Voss, a former employee of ClickIncome and WPS, to support its claim that WPS has not produced all of its responsive documents by virtue of their destruction. Mr. Voss indicates he was employed as an administrative assistant to Cindi Paulsen, the general manager of WPS.[59] Mr. Voss states that on or about December 10, 2009, he overheard Ms. Paulsen tell several employees “to go through Grant Writers lead sheets and put them in piles to be shredded.”[60] Two of the office staff members purportedly told Mr. Voss they were directed to shred the lead sheets as a result of the FTC's investigation of Grant Writers Institute.[61] Mr. Voss also alleges he overheard Ms. Paulsen state that “Brian McAdam and Deric Gurley told Cliff Reed, who oversees the network administration, to purge the network databases of all electronic documents relating to, and any other reference to, Grant Writers Institute.”[62] *7 WPS concedes it destroyed paper copies of the lead sheets after learning about the existence of this lawsuit. In her declaration, Ms. Paulsen states, “After learning of the pending litigation, I instructed the sales staff to return all lead sheets with lead codes indicating that the leads were given to Wealth Power Systems by Justin Ely from Landmark Publishing.”[63] Similarly, Brian McAdam, the President and Chief Executive Officer of WPS, states, “After Wealth Power Systems learned of the pending litigation, I ensured that the salesmen's paper copies of lead sheets ... were destroyed to ensure that the leads were not called by Wealth Power Systems' sales staff.”[64] Deric Gurley, Vice President of WPS, also confirmed that the paper lead sheets were destroyed after WPS learned of this litigation.[65]Ms. Paulsen, Mr. McAdam, and Mr. Gurley all indicate the purpose in removing the paper sales sheets from the sales floor was to prevent those individuals listed in the lead sheets from being contacted by WPS sales staff.[66] They further indicate that WPS engaged in regular shredding of lead sheets and that the lead sheets at issue were destroyed pursuant to WPS' normal operating procedures.[67] WPS seeks to excuse its destruction of the paper lead sheets by claiming that it maintained electronic copies of the original lead sheets transmitted by Justin Ely. Mr. Gurley indicates WPS received leads from Justin Ely in a digital format.[68] The leads were then printed onto paper for the sales staff to call them.[69] WPS contends it maintains the original digital copy of every lead it has obtained from Justin Ely and that all lead sheets responsive to the FTC's requests were produced.[70] Production of the digital sheets is not necessarily sufficient, however. As WPS indicates, the hard copy lead sheets were used by WPS' sales team to contact potential customers. It is possible the sales team made handwritten notes or other annotations on the hard copy lead sheets when making calls and interacting with customers. Thus, it is not clear to the Court that the lead sheets maintained in digital form are identical to the hard copy sheets that were shredded. WPS also argues it was not obligated to produce documents in more than one form, citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(iii). Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(iii) states that a party need not produce the same electronically stored information in more than one form. As discussed above, it is likely the hard copy lead sheets contained information not included on the digital version of the sheets. As a result, the Court is not persuaded by WPS' argument. The lead sheets received from Mr. Ely are responsive to Request for Production Nos. 21–22, 55, 68, 75–76 and are facially relevant to the FTC's claims in this case. WPS has not raised or attempted to support any objection to producing the lead sheets in response to the FTC's motion to compel. As discussed above, “[o]bjections initially raised but not relied upon in response to the motion to compel will be deemed abandoned.”[71] Because WPS has not produced any hard copy lead sheets, the Court grants the FTC's motion to compel as to these documents. The Court does not express an opinion on whether the destruction of the lead sheets constitutes spoilation and what sanction, if any, should be imposed. Although WPS contends it has produced a digital copy of all responsive lead sheets, the FTC indicates it has been unable to identify any documents matching the description of an electronic lead file in WPS's production. As a result, WPS is ordered to provide the FTC with a supplemental response identifying where in the production the digital lead sheets were produced (i.e. bates number). If WPS has not produced these documents, it is ordered to produce them within seven (7) days of this Order. *8 The FTC also contends WPS destroyed electronic files relating to Grant Writers Institute. As discussed above, Mr. Voss alleges he overheard Ms. Paulsen state that “Brian McAdam and Deric Gurley told Cliff Reed, who oversees the network administration, to purge the network databases of all electronic documents relating to, and any other reference to, Grant Writers Institute.”[72] WPS denies it destroyed any electronic files and submits declarations from various employees that contradict Mr. Voss' declaration. Cliff Reid, the network administrator for WPS, states he was never instructed by Mr. McAdam or Mr. Gurley to purge any documents from the database and that “no documents relating in any way to Landmark Publishing or Grant Writers Institute have been removed, altered, or otherwise destroyed.”[73] Mr. McAdam states he never instructed Mr. Reid to purge, remove, or otherwise destroy any electronic documents ...” and that to his knowledge, there were no documents destroyed or otherwise purged from WPS' databases.[74] Mr. Gurley states he never instructed Mr. Reid to purge any documents from WPS' database and that no documents other than the hard copy lead sheets were ever ordered to be altered, removed, or destroyed.[75] WPS urges this Court to ignore Mr. Voss' declaration because it constitutes hearsay. The FTC contends Mr. Voss' statements are not hearsay because they are party admissions. Even considering Mr. Voss' declaration, the Court is not convinced WPS has failed to produce electronic documents responsive to the FTC's document requests.[76] Mr. Voss does not have any first hand knowledge that any electronic documents were destroyed. He did not participate in destroying any electronic documents or personally observe any electronic information being destroyed. He did not hear Mr. Gurley or Mr. McAdam order Mr. Reid to destroy any electronic documents. In contrast, WPS has submitted evidence from the employees who were allegedly involved in the incident—employees with first-hand knowledge—that contradicts Mr. Voss' allegations. The FTC urges the Court to ignore the declarations submitted by WPS because they are “classic examples of self-serving declarations.” The FTC's only proffered rationale for this argument is that the declarations were submitted by the current owners, managers, and employees of WPS and contain protestations of innocence. This is not a sufficient basis upon which to ignore the declarations. The declarations are detailed, based upon personal knowledge, and contain facts that would be admissible in evidence.[77] It is difficult for the Court to imagine what better evidence exists than the sworn statements of the individuals who were purportedly involved in the alleged destruction. Indeed, had WPS not submitted such declarations, the FTC would have likely argued WPS' failure to do so was evidence of its culpability. At this time, the Court has no reason to believe the declarations submitted by WPS are unreliable or untrustworthy such that Mr. Voss' declaration should be given greater weight. *9 In her declaration, Ms. Paulsen did not deny making the statement about the destruction of electronic documents purportedly overheard by Mr. Voss. This by itself, however, is not a sufficient basis upon which to conclude WPS has failed to produce responsive electronic documents. As a result, the FTC has not demonstrated that any documents beyond the hard copy lead sheets have been destroyed or otherwise withheld from production. Accordingly, IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission's Motion to Compel Defendant Wealth Power Systems, LLC to Produce Documents (Doc. 257) is hereby granted in part. WPS shall produce all hard copy lead sheets submitted by Justin Ely within seven (7) days of this Order. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that WPS shall provide the FTC with a supplemental response indicating where the electronic version of the lead sheets are located within WPS' production (i.e. bates stamp). If WPS has not produced these documents, it is ordered to produce them within seven (7) days of this Order. IT IS SO ORDERED. Footnotes [1] Compl. (Doc. 1). [2] Am. Compl. (Doc. 118). [3] Second Am. Compl. (Doc. 216). [4] Id. ¶¶ 37–38. [5] Id. ¶ 39. [6] Id. [7] Id. ¶ 40. [8] Docs. 173–174. The FTC sought 77 categories of documents from Aria and 84 categories of documents from WPS. Pl.'s Mot. to Compel (Doc. 235), Attach. 2; Pl. FTC's Mot. to Compel Def. Wealth Power Systems, LLC to Produce Docs. (Doc. 257), Attach. 2. [9] Docs. 195–196. [10] Pl.'s Mot. to Compel (Doc. 235), Attach. 2; Pl. FTC's Mot. to Compel Def. Wealth Power Systems, LLC to Produce Docs. (Doc. 257), Attach. 2. [11] Pl.'s Mot. to Compel (Doc. 235), Attach. 7. [12] Id. [13] Id. [14] Id., Attach. 8. [15] Id. [16] Id. [17] Id. [18] Pl. FTC's Reply to Aria's Opp'n to Mot. to Compel (Doc. 261), Attach. 1. [19] Id. [20] Id., Attach. 2. [21] Id., Attach. 1. [22] Pl. FTC's Reply to Aria's Opp'n to Mot. to Compel (Doc. 261), Attach. 2. [23] Id. [24] Id. [25] Sonnino v. Univ. of Kan. Hosp. Auth., 221 F.R.D. 661, 670–71 (D. Kan. 2004). [26] Id. at 671. [27] Cardenas v. Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc., 232 F.R.D. 377, 380 n.15 (D. Kan. 2005) (citing Sonnino, 220 F.R.D. at 641); Cotracom Commodity Trading Co. v. Seaboard Corp., 189 F.R.D. 655, 662 (D. Kan. 1999). [28] Sprint Commc'ns Co. Ltd. P'ship v. Big River Tel. Co., No. 08-2046-JWL, 2009 WL 1657472, at *2 (D. Kan. June 12, 2009) (citations omitted). [29] Mem. in Opp'n to Pl. FTC's Mot. to Compel (Doc. 253) at 4, 5. [30] See id. (holding that because defendant did not rely upon any objection in response to motion to compel, defendant's objections were abandoned). [31] See Cotracom Commodity Trading Co. v. Seaboard Corp., No. 97-2391-GTV, 1998 WL 231135, at *1 (D. Kan. May 6, 1998). [32] Pl. FTC's Reply to Aria's Opp'n to Mot. to Compel (Doc. 261), Attach. 2 at 3 ¶ 6. [33] G.D. v. Monarch Plastic Surgery, P.A., No. 06-2184-CM, 2007 WL 201150, at *2 (D. Kan. Jan. 22, 2007) (quoting Horizon Holdings, L.L.C. v. Genmar Holdings, Inc., 209 F.R.D. 208, 213 (D. Kan. 2002)). [34] G.D., 2007 WL 201150, at *2 (quoting Horizon Holdings, L.L.C., 209 F.R.D. at 213). [35] Sonnino v. Univ. of Kan. Hosp. Auth., 220 F.R.D. 633, 653 (D. Kan. 2004) (overruling undue burden objection where party asserting objection provided no detailed explanation, affidavit, or other proof showing that responding to discovery request would cause undue burden). [36] See Cotracom Commodity Trading Co., 1998 WL 231135, at *1 (overruling general objections because plaintiffs did “nothing of consequence to support any objection”). [37] See McBride v. Medicalodges, Inc., No. 06-2535-JWL, 2008 WL 1958350, at *1 (D. Kan. May 2, 2008) (stating that the party objecting to discovery as vague or ambiguous has the burden to show such vagueness or ambiguity). [38] Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lear Corp., 215 F.R.D. 637, 640 (D. Kan. 2004). [39] Pl. FTC's Reply to Aria's Opp'n to Mot. to Compel (Doc. 261), Attach. 8. [40] Id. [41] The documents are appended to the FTC's reply as attachments 3–5, 7. Id. [42] Id., Attach. 3. [43] Id., Attach. 7. [44] School-Link Techs., Inc. v. Applied Res., Inc., No. 05-2088-JWL, 2007 WL 677647, at *3 (D. Kan. Feb. 28, 2007) (quoting Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Zubulake V”)). [45] Workman v. AB Electrolux Corp., No. 03-4195-JAR, 2005 WL 1896246, at *5 (D. Kan. Aug. 8, 2005). [46] Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Topeka, No. 06-4004-RDR, 2007 WL 1246200, at *3 (D. Kan. Apr. 27, 2007) (internal citations omitted). [47] School-Link Techs., Inc., 2007 WL 677647, at *4 (citing Zubulake, 229 F.R.D. at 431). [48] In re Krause, 367 B.R. 740, 764 (D. Kan. 2007). [49] Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Grant, 505 F.3d 1013, 1032 (10th Cir. 2007). [50] In re Krause, 367 B.R. at 764. [51] Workman v. AB Electrolux Corp., No. 03-4195-JAR, 2005 WL 1896246, at *5 (D. Kan. Aug. 8, 2005) (citations omitted). [52] Turner v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colorado, 563 F.3d 1136, 1149 (10th Cir. 2009). [53] See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A) (stating that the court may impose sanctions when a party fails to obey a court order). [54] Lewis v. ASAP Land Express, Inc., No. 07-2226-EFM, 2009 WL 2580315, at *1 (D. Kan. Aug. 20, 2009). [55] Id. [56] Id. at *1–2. [57] Id. at *2. [58] Id. [59] Pl. FTC's Mot. to Compel Def. Wealth Power Systems, LLC to Produce Docs. (Doc. 257), Attach. 4 ¶ 9 (“Voss Decl.”); see also Mem. in Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. to Compel (Doc. 265), Attach. 3 ¶ 9 (“Gurley Decl.”) (confirming that Mr. Voss was employed by WPS). [60] Voss Decl. ¶ 11. [61] Id. ¶ 12. [62] Id. ¶ 10. [63] Mem. in Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. to Compel (Doc. 265), Attach. 4 ¶ 7 (“Paulsen Decl.”). [64] Id., Attach. 2 ¶ 15 (“McAdam Decl.”). [65] Gurley Decl. ¶¶ 13, 16. [66] Pauslen Decl. ¶ 8; McAdam Decl. ¶ 15; Gurley Decl. ¶ 13. [67] Pauslen Decl. ¶ 11; McAdam Decl. ¶ 16; Gurley Decl. ¶¶ 14–16. [68] Gurley Decl. ¶ 11. [69] Id. ¶ 12. [70] Id. ¶¶ 17–18. [71] Cardenas v. Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc., 232 F.R.D. 377, 380 n.15 (D. Kan. 2005) (citing Sonnino, 220 F.R.D. at 641); Cotracom Commodity Trading Co. v. Seaboard Corp., 189 F.R.D. 655, 662 (D. Kan. 1999). [72] Voss Decl. ¶ 10. [73] Mem. in Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. to Compel (Doc. 265), Attach. 1 ¶¶ 3, 8 (“Reid Decl.”). [74] McAdam Decl. ¶¶ 13–14. [75] Gurley Decl. ¶¶ 10, 18–19. [76] Cf. Lewis v. ASAP Land Express, Inc., No. 07-2226-EFM, 2009 WL 2580315, at *1 (D. Kan. Aug. 20, 2009) (granting motion to compel purportedly destroyed documents where there was no dispute the documents had not been produced). [77] See Garrett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 305 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir. 2002) (in resolving motions for summary judgment, courts will consider an affidavit if that information is “based on personal knowledge and set[s] forth facts that would be admissible in evidence.”).