Martin Voe, an individual proceeding under a pseudonym, Plaintiff, v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Oregon, and Successors, a Corporation Sole, an Oregon Corporation, D/b/a Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon; and Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon, an Oregon Corporation, Defendants Case No. 3:14–cv–01016–SB United States District Court, D. Oregon Signed March 10, 2015 Beckerman, Stacie F., United States Magistrate Judge ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL SOCIAL MEDIA DISCOVERY *1 Defendant Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Oregon, and successors, a corporation sole, dba Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon (“Archdiocese”), has moved to compel Plaintiff Martin Voe to produce twenty-nine categories of information from Plaintiff's social media account(s). (ECF No. 23.) At oral argument, Plaintiff's counsel informed the Court that Plaintiff maintains only one social media account, on Facebook.com (“Facebook”), and that Plaintiff has already produced all of his Facebook communications that discuss Father Maurice Grammond (“Fr. Grammond”), the alleged sexual abuse, and the damages Plaintiff attributes to that abuse. For the reasons discussed herein, Defendant's Motion to Compel is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. I. DISCUSSION Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 26(b)(1) provides that “any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party” is discoverable, and that “[r]elevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). District courts have discretion to limit the scope of discovery if: (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information sought; or (iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C). Discovery of social media content “requires the application of basic discovery principles in a novel context.” E.E.O.C. v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, 270 F.R.D. 430, 434 (S.D. Ind. 2010). Courts have generally been circumspect about compelling discovery of social media accounts in their entirety, recognizing that the Rules do not grant “a generalized right to rummage at will through information that [the responding party] has limited from public view [.]” Tompkins v. Detroit Metro. Airport, 278 F.R.D. 387, 388 (E.D. Mich. 2012); Mackelprang v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Agency of Nevada, Inc., No. 2:06–cv–00788–JCM–GWF, 2007 WL 119149, at *7 (D. Nev. Jan. 9, 2007) (“Ordering ... release of all of the private mail messages on Plaintiff's Myspace.com internet account would allow Defendants to cast too wide a net for any information that might be relevant and discoverable.”). The Archdiocese's original request for “[a]ll social networking postings by Plaintiff Martin Voe or between Plaintiff and any other person from the period 2004 to the present, including photographs, written posts, social media contacts (e.g., ‘Friends'), and indications of interest in people, places, things, or issues,” (Def.'s Mot. to Compel, at 6), is overbroad. However, prior to filing its motion to compel, the Archdiocese narrowed its request to a list of twenty-nine more specific subcategories. (See Def's Supplemental Br. in Supp. of its Mot. to Compel, at 2–5.) *2 The relevance of social media communications is determined by the “substance of the communication” rather than “the simple fact that a claimant has had social communications.” Simply Storage Mgmt., 270 F.R.D. at 435. This Court has determined that the substance identified by the Archdiocese in several of the twenty-nine subcategories is relevant to Plaintiff's claims for liability and damages, and the Archdiocese's defenses, in this case to date (and as further narrowed by the Court, in certain sub-categories): 1. Events alleged in Plaintiff's complaint; 2. Individuals identified specifically or generally in Plaintiff's complaint; 3. Any of the following: a. “emotional injury, pain and suffering, ... emotional trauma, and permanent psychological damages” that Plaintiff has experienced without regard for whether Plaintiff presently attributes that issue to Plaintiff's alleged abuse (see Am. Compl. ¶ 12); b. Plaintiff's alleged “dissociative amnesia, anxiety disorder(s), avoidance, denial, depression, other dissociative disorder(s), mood disorder(s), post-traumatic stress disorder, traumatic amnesia, self-blame, and/or substance abuse disorder(s)” (see Am. Compl. ¶ 14); 12. Any physical trauma; 13. Any mental health or substance abuse treatment; 14. Plaintiff's use and abuse of any controlled substances; 15. Plaintiff's participation in any twelve-step, Alcoholics Anonymous, or similar programs designed to aid a person in combating addiction or substance abuse issues; 16. Plaintiff's sobriety; 21. Plaintiff's childhood (up to age eighteen); 26. Claims for compensation asserted by Plaintiff against third parties, for any of the damages alleged in this case; and 29. All communications with the following individuals: R.C., M.C., D.R., E.L., C.V., L.M., J.M., R.M., E.F. (individuals known to Plaintiff who have asserted sexual abuse claims against Fr. Grammond, and individuals Plaintiff has identified as having communicated with him regarding his allegations), relating to Plaintiff's allegations, or relating to any of the subcategories identified above. Accordingly, this Court orders Plaintiff to produce any Facebook communications (including Plaintiff's profile, Plaintiff's status updates, comments on Plaintiff's wall or Plaintiff's comments on other walls, and messages sent to/from Plaintiff; but excluding any photographs), from the period January 1, 2004, to the present, relevant to the subcategories set forth above. To the extent a relevant communication is to/from one of Plaintiff's Facebook “friends,” or other third party, Plaintiff must disclose the identity of that person, if the person's true identity does not appear in the communication (but the Court denies the Archdiocese's request to compel Plaintiff to disclose all of the “identities of Plaintiff's contacts on social media” in subcategory twenty-eight).[1] In compelling Plaintiff to produce these Facebook communications, the Court notes that it is not unduly burdensome for Plaintiff to request a download of his Facebook data on the site, and that “[t]he content of social networking sites is not protected from discovery merely because a party deems the content ‘private.’ ” Keller v. Nat'l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co., No. CV 12–72–M–DLC–JCL, 2013 WL 27731, at *4 (D. Mont. Jan. 2, 2013) (citing Simply Storage Mgmt., 270 F.R.D. at 434). *3 The more difficult question posed is whether the subcategories of information the Archdiocese seeks relating more generally to Plaintiff's emotional health are relevant to Plaintiff's claim for noneconomic damages. (See Def's Supplemental Br. in Supp. of its Mot. to Compel, at 2–5 (subcategories 4–11, 17).) This Court agrees with the several other courts that have held that sweeping requests for any communications in which a party expresses certain emotions or interests are generally too broad, and have little probative value. See, e.g., Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants' Motion to Compel, Roe v. The Archdiocese of Portland, Case No. 3:13–cv–1930–MO (D. Or. Feb. 13, 2015) (holding that social media pictures or posts that merely show a plaintiff has had moments of happiness in his life have little or no probative value in rebutting the plaintiff's claims of emotional injury). One court recognized that “[t]o be sure, anything that a person says or does might in some theoretical sense be reflective of her emotional state[, b]ut that is hardly justification for requiring the production of every thought she may have reduced to writing, or, indeed, the deposition of everyone she may have talked to.” Rozell v. Ross–Holst, No. 05 Civ. 2936(JGK)JCF, 2006 WL 163143, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2006). “The fact that an individual may express some degree of joy, happiness, or sociability on certain occasions sheds little light on the issue of whether he or she is actually suffering emotional distress.” Giacchetto v. Paatchogue–Medford Union Free Sch. Dist. 293 F.R.D. 112, 115 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). “If the Court were to allow broad discovery of Plaintiff's social networking postings as part of the emotional distress inquiry, then there would be no principled reason to prevent discovery into every other personal communication the Plaintiff had or sent since alleged incident.” Id.; see also Tompkins, 278 F.R.D. at 388 (holding that the Rules do not allow a requesting party “to engage in the proverbial fishing expedition, in the hope that there might be something of relevance in [the producing party's] Facebook account”); Holter v. Wells Fargo & Co., 281 F.R.D. 340, 344 (D. Minn. 2011) (“While everything that is posted on a social media website is arguably reflective of a person's emotional state [the court] would not allow depositions of every friend and acquaintance to inquire about every conversation and interaction with plaintiff.”). Accordingly, the Court denies the motion to compel discovery relating to those subcategories (four through eleven and seventeen), with leave to renew if the Archdiocese can make a prima facie showing that Plaintiff has posted Facebook communications inconsistent with any specific claim of injury he has suffered. See Tompkins, 278 F.R.D. at 388–89. That leaves several subcategories of information relating to damages the Archdiocese predicts Plaintiff may claim, because similarly-situated sexual abuse victims have asserted such claims in other cases against the Archdiocese. (See Def's Supplemental Br. in Supp. of its Mot. to Compel, at 2–5 (subcategories 18–20, 22–24, 27) (e.g., claims that the sexual abuse resulted in criminal proclivities, impacted spiritual beliefs, or resulted in a lack of intimacy).) At this time, those discovery requests are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, because Plaintiff has not made those allegations. However, if Plaintiff does allege the types of damages identified in the requests, the Court will revisit the Archdiocese's motion as to those categories of discovery (and will allow the re-opening of fact discovery for that limited purpose, if necessary). Finally, the Court also orders Plaintiff to (1) download his entire Facebook profile and provide the profile to his counsel, to preserve the account for additional review, if necessary, and (2) inform counsel for the Archdiocese if he has deleted any Facebook content, or instructed others to do so, since September 9, 2014, when the Archdiocese served the original discovery requests. II. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated herein, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Compel (ECF No. 23) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff shall produce the discovery ordered herein on or before March 23, 2015. If any such discovery is relevant to the Archdiocese's pending motion for summary judgment, the Archdiocese may file supplemental briefing on or before April 1, 2015. Footnotes [1] The Court also denies the Archdiocese's request to compel social media communications relating to “Plaintiff's interaction with or relationships with individuals he knew while a minor,” (Def.'s Supplemental Br. in Supp. of its Mot. to Compel, at 4), as overbroad, because Plaintiff has already identified individuals with whom he has communicated regarding his claims, and this Court has compelled Plaintiff to produce those Facebook communications.