United States of America, ex rel. Melissa Simms Powell, Angela Hitchens, Joseph Plumley, Jr., Ed.D., and Glenn W. Dobson, Plaintiffs, v. American Intercontinental University, Inc., a Georgia Corporation, Career Education, Corp., a Delaware Corporation, and John Doe Nos. 1-100, Defendants CIVIL CASE NO. 1:08-CV-2277-RWS-LTW United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division Signed February 22, 2013 Counsel David M. Pernini, Joseph Duane Wargo, Abigail Stecker Romero, Lauren Annette Rucker, Michael Scott French, Wargo & French LLP, Sally B. Molloy, U.S. Attorney's Office, Atlanta, GA, Sarah F. Powers, Wargo & French, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiffs. Belinda I. Mathie, Mary Ellen Hennessy, Terance A. Gonsalves, Michael S. Weisman, Katten Muchin Rosenman, LLP, Chicago, IL, Brandon R. Williams, Derin Bronson Dickerson, William Roy Mitchelson, Jr., Cara Marie Peterman, Jason Popp, Leanne Marek Kantner, William H. Jordan, John Ludlow Latham, Alston & Bird, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants. Walker, Linda T., United States Magistrate Judge MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S ORDER *1 Pending before the Court are discovery-related issues raised by the parties during this Court's September 18, 2012 status conference and the parties' briefing in connection with Defendants' Motion for a Status Conference regarding discovery. See Docket Entries [182, 183, 185, 189, 191, 195, 199]. Also before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Strike the Declaration of Robert Shireman. Docket Entry [197]. For the reasons outlined below, the permissible scope of discovery is limited as described within the body of this Order. Additionally, the Defendants' Motion to Strike the Declaration of Robert Shireman is GRANTED as unopposed. Docket Entry [197]. DEFENDANTS' REQUEST TO LIMIT THE SCOPE OF DISCOVERY I. BACKGROUND On July 14, 2008, Relator Plaintiffs Melissa Simms Powell, Angela Hitchens, Joseph P. Plumley, Jr., Ed.D., and Glenn W. Dobson (“Plaintiffs”) filed the instant lawsuit on behalf of the United States of America pursuant to the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729, et seq. (“FCA”). Defendants are American Intercontinental University, Inc. (“AIU”), a for-profit higher education institution with two of its five campuses in Fulton County, Georgia, and its parent corporation, Career Education Corporation (“CEC”), who Plaintiffs believe exercises complete dominion and control over AIU and develops and oversees the implementation of all policies and procedures for AIU. (Compl. ¶¶ 11-14). Plaintiffs filed claims under the FCA to recover damages and civil penalties arising out of Defendants' alleged submission of false claims for funding to the United States Department of Education (“DOE”) and for making false statements that were material to the submitted false claims. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants made false statements concerning AIU's purported compliance with (a) the Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965's prohibition against incentive-based compensation for enrollment counselors; (b) Southern Association of Colleges and Schools' (“SACS”) accreditation standards; and (c) the student eligibility requirements of Title IV, specifically the proof of graduation requirement. Defendants answered the lawsuit on December 26, 2010, and discovery began on January 5, 2011. The parties began to have disputes during the discovery process starting at the end of February 2011. As a result, Defendants filed a Motion for Protective Order to define the scope of discovery and a Motion to Quash Subpoena issued to a third party and Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Compel Discovery. Docket Entries [86, 87, 106]. In June 2011, the lawsuit was referred to this Court for supervision of discovery. Docket Entry [112]. After holding a hearing on the parties' discovery motions and reviewing Defendants' supplemental briefing, this Court issued an Order defining the scope of discovery on January 20, 2012. Docket Entry [140]. In late February 2012, both parties requested that this Court have a status conference to discuss the length of the discovery period and a framework for producing the remaining electronic discovery documents necessitated by Plaintiffs' Requests for Production. Defendants argued that in light of the Court's January 20, 2012 Order, they were obligated to produce volumes of additional documentation responsive to Plaintiffs' Requests for Production. Defendants argued that due to the complexity of the issues in the case and the substantial volume of documents to be produced, an extension of the discovery period as well as document production deadlines was warranted. Defendants also argued for narrowed search terms and/or custodians. As a result of the parties' briefing, this Court was concerned that Defendants' methodology for conducting the electronic search was yielding too many unresponsive documents and ordered the parties to engage in a negotiating process to create a tighter search protocol and provided the parties with some suggestions for doing so. (Docket Entry [176], pp. 10-11). The parties notified the Court on June 29, 2012, that as a result of their negotiations, they had resolved the electronic discovery disputes. *2 On July 12, 2012, District Judge Story adjudicated Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and concluded that it does not have jurisdiction over some of Plaintiffs' claims. Specifically, the Court found that Plaintiffs' claims that Defendants made false statements concerning the proof of graduation requirements and the incentive compensation ban are barred by the first-to-file rule. Because the decision disposed of the claims pertaining to the proof of graduation requirement and the incentive compensation ban, Defendants again requested a status conference from this Court and asked that the Court narrow the scope of discovery in light of Judge Story's Order. Defendants argue that as a result of the elimination of these claims, discovery should not be had regarding Defendants' compliance with the proof of graduation requirements and incentive compensation ban. In support, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs remaining claim, that is the claim that Defendants made false statements concerning AIU's purported compliance with SACS' accreditation standards, do not relate to the proof of graduation requirement and the incentive compensation ban. Defendants further argue that even if Plaintiffs' Complaint could be interpreted to include a claim that AIU made false statements about its compliance with SACS accreditation standards in connection with the incentive compensation ban and proof of graduation requirement, the Court would not have jurisdiction over the claim under the first-to-file rule because it is factually related to the complaints previously filed. Defendants argue that even though they did not move to dismiss any such claim, the Court does not have jurisdiction to order discovery on these issues. Defendants also argue that the scope of discovery should be limited temporally and geographically, that the agreed upon search terms are no longer appropriate, and that the custodians should be limited. II. LEGAL ANALYSIS A. Discovery Regarding Compliance with the Incentive Compensation Ban and Proof of Graduation Requirement Defendants argue that because the District Court found in its July 2012 Order (Docket Entry [181] ) that it does not have jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims that Defendants made false statements concerning AIU's purported compliance with Title IV's prohibition against incentive-based compensation for enrollment counselors and the proof of graduation requirement, discovery should not be had on those topics. Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs' only remaining claim after the District Court's July 2012 Order, that is the claim that Defendants made false statements concerning AIU's purported compliance with the SACS accreditation standards (“the SACS fraud claim”), does not relate to the proof of graduation requirement and the incentive compensation ban. In response, Plaintiffs argue that Judge Story's Order specifically preserved Plaintiffs' claim regarding fraud on SACS and that Defendants' violations of federal regulations regarding the incentive compensation ban and the failure to require proof of graduation are discoverable in regard to the fraud on SACS. Discovery sought must be relevant to any party's claim or defense or must be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Mancuso v. Fla. Metro. Univ., No. 09-61984-CIV, 2011 WL 310726, at *3 n.3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 28, 2011); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The starting point for ascertaining whether or not discovery may be had on a topic is the complaint and the defenses. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), 2000 Advisory Committee Notes (“The Committee intends that the parties and the court focus on the actual claims and defenses involved in the action.”); United States v. R&F Props, of Lake Cnty., 433 F.3d 1349, 1359 (11th Cir. 2005) (defining the temporal scope of discovery in qui tam action under FCA by analyzing the time period of unlawful conduct alleged in the complaint). This does not mean, however, “that a fact must be alleged in a pleading for a party to be entitled to discovery of information concerning that fact. It means that the fact must be germane to a specific claim or defense asserted in the pleadings for information concerning it to be a proper subject of discovery.” 6 Moore's Federal Practice § 26.41 [a]. Nevertheless, the Court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed under the federal rules if it determines that “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). As stated, the starting point in this discussion is Plaintiffs' Complaint. Count II of the Complaint, which is the SACS fraud claim, remains in the case after the District Court dismissed the other claims. Plaintiffs contend in Count II of their Complaint that Defendants made a false record or statement in order to get a false and fraudulent claim for payment approved causing damage to the United States in contravention of the FCA, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2). In support, Plaintiffs plead that in 2005, SACS placed AIU on warning that its policies did not meet accreditation standards and identified corrective measures for how to improve its performance. (Compl. ¶ 34). In 2006 and 2007, SACS placed AIU on probation, identifying eighteen areas in which AIU needed to take corrective action, including compliance with the incentive compensation ban, increasing the percentage of faculty with terminal degrees, institution of procedures to determine students' academic qualifications, and ability to benefit from a college education prior to admission, and increasing the focus on service instead of sales. (Compl. ¶¶ 35-37). According to Plaintiffs, because Defendants feared that SACS would not remove AIU from probation in 2007, Defendants falsely represented to SACS that they would make required changes, use interest, desire and motivation (“IDM”) checklists as part of the admissions process, and retain the required level of faculty. (Compl. ¶ 40). Based on these allegations within the Complaint, this Court formerly concluded that the proper scope of discovery regarding the SACS fraud claim was (1) the requirement that the AIU admissions department consider academic qualifications and ability to benefit from a college education; (2) AIU's alleged sales focus when determining whether to admit students; (3) AIU's compliance with the incentive compensation ban; and (4) the requirement to maintain the requisite level of faculty members with terminal degrees. (Docket Entry [140], p. 11). 1. Discovery Regarding Defendants' Compliance With the Incentive Compensation Ban is Barred by the First-to-File Rule *3 It is true that this Court previously concluded that Plaintiffs' SACS fraud claim encompassed Defendants' alleged deception to the Government and SACS that it was complying with accreditation standards such as the incentive-compensation ban. Based on the findings in Judge Story's July 2012 Order, however, that portion of Plaintiffs' SACS fraud claim would now be barred by the first-to-file rule. The first-to-file rule, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5), “creates a jurisdictional limit on a court's authority to hear qui tam suits.” United States ex rel. Powell v. Am. Intercontinental Univ., Inc., No. 1:08-CV-2277-RWS, 2012 WL 2885356, at *4 (N.D. Ga. July 12, 2012). The first-to-file rule provides that when a person brings an action pursuant to the FCA, “no person other than the Government may intervene or bring a related action based on facts underlying the pending action.” Id. Thus, Section 3730(b)(5) “establishes a first-to-file bar, preventing successive plaintiffs from bringing related actions based on the same underlying facts.” United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 243 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 2001). A SACS fraud claim based on misrepresentations to SACS or the Government that Defendants were complying with accreditation standards, including the incentive compensation ban, is banned by the first-to-file rule. Defrauding SACS or the Government regarding Defendants' compliance with the incentive-compensation ban is related to the prior plaintiffs' claims that CEC and AIU online improperly used incentive-based compensation in United States ex rel. Hanson v. Career Educ. Corp., No. 05-CV-4444 (N.D. Ill, filed Aug. 3, 2005). The fact that the prior relators did not specifically allege that Defendants or related entities defrauded SACS or the Government specifically in connection with compliance with accreditation standards, is of no importance. Courts applying the first-to-file rule have not limited its application to cases in which the original and subsequent complaints rely on identical facts. United States ex rel. Branch Consultants v. Allstate Ins. Co., 560 F.3d 371, 378 (5th Cir. 2009); Grvnbers v. Koch Gateway Pipeline Co., 390 F.3d 1276, 1279 (10th Cir. 2004); see also Cooper v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 19 F.3d 562, 567 (11th Cir. 1994) (“And, once one suit has been filed by a relator or by the government, all other suits against the same defendant based on the same kind of conduct would be barred.”). Requiring identical facts would be contrary to the plain meaning of the statute, which speaks of related qui tam actions, and would run counter to the purpose, which is to put the Government on notice of potential fraud. Grynberg, 390 F.3d at 1279. Thus, a relator does not avoid the first-to-file bar by simply adding factual details or geographic locations to the essential or material elements of a fraud claim. Branch Consultants, 560 F.3d at 378. As the Fifth Circuit explained, any construction of Section 3730(b)(5) that focuses on the details of the later-filed action would allow an infinite number of copycat qui tam actions to proceed so long as the relator in each case alleged one additional instance of the previously exposed fraud. Id. “A relator who merely adds details to a previously exposed fraud does not help reduce fraud or return funds to the federal fisc, because once the Government knows the essential facts of a fraudulent scheme, it has enough information to discover related frauds.” Id. Therefore, under the first-to-file rule, “[s]o long as a subsequent complaint raises the same or a related claim based in significant measure on the core fact or general conduct relied upon in the first qui tam action, the Section 3730(b)(5)'s first-to-file bar applies.” Grynberg, 390 F.3d at 1279. Plaintiffs' claims that Defendants defrauded SACS with respect to their compliance with accreditation standards, specifically, the incentive compensation ban, would also fail for lack of jurisdiction. Prosecution of this additional fraud on SACS does not assist the Government in reducing fraud or returning money to the public fisc because it is simply exposing a different method by which Defendants allegedly perpetrated the same fraud on the Government exposed by previous filers. See, e.g., Grynberg, 390 F.3d at 1280 (holding that where relators' lawsuit, like former lawsuit, challenged the defendant's mismeasurement of the volume and wrongful analysis of the heating content of natural gas, causing underpayments of royalties to the United States, first-to-file bar was not avoided by alleging additional facts relating to how the gas was mismeasured). The first filers gave the Government enough notice that Defendants were allegedly lying about their compliance with the incentive-compensation ban so that the Government could uncover the additional details about the method by which the fraud was accomplished if it desired to do so. Notice that Defendants were pulling the wool over the Government's eyes with respect to the incentive compensation ban is notice enough to the Government that Defendants may also be doing so with their accrediting organization who is charged with examining the same things. See Defs.' Ex. C, SACS Principles of Accreditation § 4.8 (“The institution is in compliance with its program responsibilities under Title IV of the 1998 Higher Education Amendments (In reviewing the institution's compliance with these program responsibilities, the Commission relies on documentation forwarded to it by the U.S. Secretary of Education).”). Additionally, notice that Defendants were allegedly misrepresenting their compliance with the incentive compensation ban would be notice enough to the Government that Defendants were also lying when they advised the Government that they were in compliance with accreditation standards that require them to comply with the incentive-compensation ban. Thus, this Court concludes that Plaintiffs' claim that Defendants defrauded SACS and the Government regarding their compliance with accreditation standards which require them to comply with the incentive-compensation ban is jurisdictionally barred. Because fraud concerning compliance with the incentive-compensation ban is jurisdictionally barred from continuing as a part of Plaintiffs' SACS fraud claim, discovery should not be had on this topic. 2. While this Court Agrees With Defendants that Defendants' Alleged Failure to Maintain Proof of Graduation on File was not Part of Plaintiffs' SACS Fraud Claim, Discovery of Whether or not Students Have Graduated is Relevant to the SACS Fraud Claim *4 Plaintiffs also argue the scope of discovery in connection with the SACS fraud claim includes discovery concerning the proof of graduation requirement. In support, Plaintiffs point out that this Court has already held that the appropriate focus of discovery of AIU's fraud on SACS includes SACS' requirement that AIU admissions consider academic qualifications and the ability to benefit from a college education. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' reading of the Discovery Order to be inclusive of the proof of graduation requirement is untenable because the origin of the phrase “academic qualifications” and “ability to benefit from a collegiate education” within Paragraph 38 of Plaintiffs' Complaint does not relate to the proof of graduation requirement. (Docket Entry [189], pp. 4-5). In support, Defendants note that within Paragraph 38, Plaintiffs state: SACS provided Defendant AIU with an IDM (Interest, Desire, Motivation) checklist for the admissions department to utilize during student interviews to determine a student's academic qualifications and his or her ability to benefit from a collegiate education. Defendants contend that this paragraph does not support Plaintiffs' theory because proof of graduation is not obtained through student interviews and the IDM checklist does not evaluate whether a student has proof of graduation. Defendants argue instead, that the proof of graduation requirement is a separate, post-enrollment documentation requirement. This Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs' SACS fraud claim does not encompass fraud with respect to the proof of graduation requirement.[1] Plaintiffs do not specifically refer to the proof of graduation requirement in connection with their SACS fraud claim in their Complaint. Additionally, while this Court has previously concluded that the SACS fraud claim does include Defendants' alleged fraud in connection with the requirement that the AIU admissions department consider academic qualifications and ability to benefit from a college education, Defendants' failure to maintain proof of graduation records on file does not necessarily show that the students whose files were lacking proof of graduation were unable to benefit from a college education. In order to demonstrate eligibility of a student to receive federal funds, the institution must show that the student either has a high school diploma, general education diploma, or the ability to benefit from a college education. 20 U.S.C. § 1091(d); Jordan v. Sec. of Educ., 194 F.3d 169, 170 (D.C. Cir. 1999); 34 C.F.R. § 682.402(e)(13). The proof of graduation requirement, however, is found in 34 C.F.R. § 668.24 providing that an institution receiving Higher Education Act program funds must retain documentation showing each student's eligibility for Title IV of Higher Education Act funds. 34 C.F.R. § 668.24(c)(1)(iii). Whether Defendants maintained appropriate documentation for each student receiving federal funds is not necessarily probative of whether AIU considered academic qualifications and ability to benefit from a college education prior to admitting students and whether AIU misrepresented that it was doing so. Defendants' files could be lacking proof of graduation for any number of reasons, including poor record keeping. *5 Nevertheless, as Defendants have acknowledged during the oral argument, the question of whether students have, in fact, graduated prior to being admitted to AIU is discoverable. (Tr. 81). Whether the students have graduated from high school relates to whether AIU met SACS' requirement that the AIU admissions department consider academic qualifications and ability to benefit from a college education prior to admitting students and whether AIU misrepresented that it was meeting SACS' requirements when it was not. Moreover, whether or not AIU maintained proof of graduation on file may lead to the discovery of admissible information about whether or not the admitted students did actually graduate from high school or whether AIU was aware of whether its students graduated from high school. Certainly, the omission of proof of graduation records may lead to the proof that admitted students did not graduate. Thus, Plaintiffs may obtain discovery information regarding whether or not students did graduate from high school and whether Defendants were aware of that fact. To the extent that this overlaps with information about whether or not Defendants maintained proof of graduation on file, such information is still discoverable. B. Geography Defendants ask this Court to revisit its prior ruling with respect to the geographic scope of discovery in light of Judge Story's July 2012 Order. Defendants now contend that discovery on the SACS fraud claim concerning Defendants' failure to maintain the number of professors with a terminal degree should be limited to the AIU Los Angeles and Buckhead campuses because SACS' recommendations for improvement only discussed those campuses. Defendants further contend that discovery about AIU's admissions culture should be limited to documents coming from campuses in Houston, Buckhead, Los Angeles, and the online campus in Hoffman Estates, Illinois because SACS only visited those campuses when generating its recommendations. As noted in this Court's prior discovery order, the allegations of fraud on SACS in the Complaint are not limited to particular campuses. Additionally, Plaintiffs presented evidence that for purposes of granting or removing accreditation, AIU's campuses collectively are considered one university and that when responding to SACS' accreditation concerns, all of the campuses met together to determine how to respond. Defendants' successful Motion to Dismiss does not change this analysis or alter the geographic scope of discovery for the SACS' fraud claim. Therefore, for the same reasons outlined in this Court's previous discovery order (Docket Entry [140], at pp. 7-8), the geographic scope of discovery remains all of AIU's campuses.[2] C. Temporal Limits Defendants argue that because Judge Story's Order eliminated all but the SACS fraud claim, the temporal scope of discovery should be limited as well. Under Defendants' theory, discovery is limited to the 2005 through the 2007 time period. 1. Discovery of Information Concerning the SACS Fraud Claim Should be Limited to the Time Period Beginning January 1, 2005 Defendants argue that discovery on the SACS fraud claim should not be had for documents generated prior to January 2005 because according to the Complaint, Defendants' alleged fraud occurred after SACS made its eighteen recommendations for improvement in 2005 and Defendants allegedly falsely stated to SACS that it had made the required changes. (Compl. ¶¶ 34; Tr. 64). Plaintiffs argue that the temporal scope of discovery should extend back to 2002 because SACS had been investigating AIU since 2002 and that between 2002 and 2005, SACS placed AIU on warning status and made campus visits. This Court agrees with Defendants. Although SACS may have begun investigating AIU between 2002 and January 2005, Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendants defrauded SACS during this time period. Furthermore, although this Court has previously recognized that Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have defrauded the Government with respect to compliance with accreditation standards in obtaining federal funds from January 2001 to the present, Plaintiffs do not plead that fraud claim with particularity. (Compl. ¶ 1). Thus, Plaintiffs' theory as to how Defendants defrauded the Government in connection with compliance with accreditation standards during the 2001-2004 time period is not apparent to this Court. It is not clear what Defendants allegedly lied about during this period. It is also not clear whether the subject matter of Defendants' alleged deception during the 2001-2004 period extended beyond compliance with the incentive-compensation ban or the proof of graduation requirement, which are now both jurisdictionally-barred topics of discovery as a result of Judge Story's July 2012 Order. Plaintiffs are required to plead their fraud claim with particularity. United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 1301, 1310 (11th Cir. 2002). Plaintiffs do not plead with particularity fraud with respect to compliance with SACS accreditation standards prior to 2005. (Compl. ¶¶ 33-46, 58-61). Discovery should not be had prior to the 2005 time period because the Complaint only particularly describes fraud upon SACS as occurring as of 2005, when Defendants allegedly falsely represented to SACS that they were was making required corrective measures to meet SACS accreditation requirements. (Compl. ¶¶ 33-46). Accordingly, discovery information concerning the SACS fraud claim may be obtained for the time period beginning on January 1, 2005.[3] 2. Discovery on the SACS Fraud Claim Should not Extend Beyond November 2008 *6 Defendants argue that discovery should not be had after December 31, 2007, because SACS removed AIU from probationary status. (Docket Entry [189], pp. 12-14; Tr. 64). Defendants point out that there is no allegation that Defendants defrauded SACS post-2007, after SACS had taken AIU off probation. (Tr. 67). Defendants argue that, at a minimum, discovery documents must not extend past November 6, 2008, because SACS was no longer responsible for accrediting AIU after that date. (Tr. 100; Defs.' Ex. F). This Court agrees with Defendants that in light of Judge Story's July 2012 Order, the temporal scope of discovery must be curtailed. However, the conclusion of AIU's probation is not an appropriate ending date because Plaintiffs' theory of the case includes the notion that Defendants continued to defraud SACS after AIU regained its accreditation. (Compl. ¶ 46). Plaintiffs allege that in spite of SACS accreditation requirement that AIU improve the numbers of faculty holding terminal degrees, in January and February 2008, AIU fired a large number of professors, many holding terminal degrees. (Compl. ¶ 46). Plaintiffs also allege that after AIU hired a new director of admissions in January 2008, the new director instructed enrollment counselors to cease using the IDM checklist required by SACS and immediately placed AIU enrollment counselors on warning because their enrollment numbers were low. (Compl. ¶ 43). Subsequently, enrollment counselors ceased using the IDM checklist because it took time away from their primary goal of increasing the numbers of students enrolled at AIU. (Compl. ¶ 44). Thus, the Complaint references continuing deception of SACS after AIU regained its accreditation. That being said, discovery should not be permitted for documents created subsequent to November 6, 2008, because Defendants could no longer be misrepresenting compliance with SACS' corrective measures as outlined in the Complaint because SACS no longer was the accreditation organization for AIU. Accordingly, the temporal scope of discovery should be limited to the 2005 through 2008 time period. D. Directors of Admission Defendants further request that the Court limit the number of Directors of Admission custodians whose documents must be searched and produced. In light of the tighter temporal limits imposed above, this Court agrees with Defendants that some curtailment is in order. Defendants only must produce documents for Directors of Admission custodians who were employed between January 1, 2005, to November 6, 2008. E. Document Requests and Key Words Lastly, Defendants invite the Court to “hold a status conference to determine which of Relators' document requests and key words are no longer appropriate in light of the dismissal of Relators' POG [proof of graduation] and incentive compensation allegations.” At this time, the Court declines to review the parties' key words and document requests. Instead, the parties should review the Court's direction provided herein, meet and confer about how this Order changes Defendants' discovery obligations, and engage in the process described in this Court's May 24, 2012 Order, at pp. 10-13, prior to seeking the Court's assistance. (See Docket Entry [176] ). DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE THE DECLARATION OF ROBERT SHIREMAN On September 14, 2012, Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Filing the Declaration of Robert Shireman. Docket Entry [195]. Therein, Robert Shireman, who was the Deputy Undersecretary for the United States Department of Education, made statements regarding his interpretation of Judge Story's July 2012 Order, the effect of the Order on what he must review as an “accreditation expert,” his analysis as to relevant standards affecting accreditation, and his understanding of SACS' investigation of AIU based on his review of documents provided to him. (See generally, Declaration of Robert Shireman, Docket Entry [195-1] ). In Defendants' Motion to Strike the Declaration of Robert Shireman, they argue that Shireman's Declaration should be stricken because Shireman is not competent to offer “expert testimony” regarding the Court's jurisdiction, the scope of discovery, or the SACS' accreditation process. Docket Entry [197]. Plaintiffs do not respond in opposition to Defendants' motion. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1B, Plaintiffs' failure to file a response indicates that there is no opposition to Defendants' motion. See LR 7.1, NDGa. Furthermore, the Court's review of Shireman's Declaration does not change its analysis of the discovery issues. Accordingly, Defendants' motion is GRANTED as unopposed. Docket Entry [197]. CONCLUSION *7 Based on the foregoing reasons, the permissible scope of discovery is limited as described within the body of this Order. Additionally, Defendants' Motion to Strike the Declaration of Robert Shireman is GRANTED as unopposed. Docket Entry [197]. IT IS SO ORDERED this the 22nd day of February, 2013. Footnotes [1] This Court also agrees that if compliance with the proof of graduation requirement was part of Plaintiffs' SACS fraud claim, the claim would be jurisdictionally barred under the first-to-file rule. This Court is persuaded that defrauding SACS or the Government about compliance with the proof of graduation requirement would be related to the prior relators' claims that CEC and AIU online made false certifications regarding compliance with the proof of graduation requirement in United States ex rel. v. Career Educ. Corp., (C.D. Cal. filed Apr. 30, 2004) and Hanson v. Career Educ. Corp., No. 05-CV-4444 (N.D. Ill. filed Aug. 3, 2005). Thus, such claims would be barred under the first-to-file rule. [2] At this Court's September 18, 2012 hearing, Defendants concede that Plaintiffs may obtain discovery documents from all of the ground campuses. (Tr. 76). [3] Defendants agreed during the hearing before this Court that January 1, 2005, is an appropriate beginning date. (Tr. 64).