FPL Energy, LLC, Plaintiff, v. Hilliard Energy, Ltd., Defendant Civil Action Nos. 1:09-CV-137-C, Consolidated with 1:10-CV-057-C Signed July 22, 2010 Cummings, Sam R., United States District Judge ORDER *1 On this date the Court considered: (1) Plaintiff (FPL Energy L.L.C.'s) Motion to Compel Discovery, filed June 24, 2010; and (2) Defendant Hilliard Energy, Ltd.'s Response (Reply), filed July 15, 2010. Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure defines the general scope of discovery as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense .... For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a request for production of documents “must describe with reasonable particularity each item or category of items to be inspected.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(1)(A). “The particularity or preciseness of designation required by Rule 34 depends on the circumstances of each case.” United States v. Nat'l Steel Corp., 26 F.R.D. 607, 610 (S.D. Tex. 1960). “The goal is that the description be sufficient to apprise a man of ordinary intelligence which documents are required.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Whether discovery is relevant to the subject matter involved has been “construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 350 (1978). “The good-cause standard warranting broader discovery is meant to be flexible.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note. “A variety of types of information not directly pertinent to the incident in suit could be relevant to the claims or defenses raised in a given action. For example, other incidents of the same type, or involving the same product, could be properly discoverable under the revised standard.” Id. “The court may permit broader discovery in a particular case depending on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the claims and defenses, and the scope of the discovery requested.” Id. Specifically, FPL Energy, L.L.C. (“FPL”) moves that Hilliard Energy, Ltd. (“Hilliard”) be compelled to produce documents, including three categories of information: (a) pay stubs, payroll registers, and other documents responsive to Plaintiff's Requests for Production Nos. 40, 42, 43, and 53; (b) all electronically stored information (ESI), including e-mail communications, responsive to Plaintiff's First and Second Request for Production; and (c) all internal communications related to Hilliard's creation of the November 30 invoices responsive to Request for Production No. 48. As to the Requests for Production addressed in items (a) and (c) in the above paragraph, Hilliard represents to the Court that those Requests are moot because the documents were already turned over as responses to other Requests, have since been turned over, are available for counsel review, and/or do not exist. Thus, FPL's Motion to Compel as it relates to Requests for Production Nos. 40, 42, 43, 48, and 53 is DENIED AS MOOT. As to the Requests for Production addressed in item (b), Hilliard represents to the Court that “Hilliard has diligently been gathering all of its ESI, and will soon be able to produce all responsive and non-privileged ESI.” (Hilliard's Response to Mot. 5.) Therefore, FPL's Motion to Compel production of ESI as related to Requests for Production Nos. 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 22, 23, 24, 30, and 34 is GRANTED and Hilliard shall produce on or before 3:00 p.m. on August 16, 2010, the Responses to these specified Requests for Production, as well as any and all documents responsive to these specific Requests that are within Defendant's custody, possession, and/or control, in a manner that is in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34. Finally, as to Request for Production No. 38, FPL has not provided specific allegations as to how the response by Hilliard to this Request for Production is inadequate. Therefore, FPL's Motion to Compel as it relates to Request for Production No. 38 is DENIED without prejudice to being re-urged should FPL file, on or before 9:00 a.m. on July 29, 2010, a motion to compel that clarifies how Hilliard's Production is inadequate. *2 SO ORDERED this 22nd day of July, 2010.